An October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate warned that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction, had reconstituted its nuclear weapon program and had biological and chemical weapons.
The Bush administration used those conclusions as part of its argument for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.
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Congressional Record: July 21, 2003 (Extensions)
Page E1545-E1546
KEY JUDGMENTS
______
HON. PETER T. KING
of new york
in the house of representatives
Monday, July 21, 2003
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, in light of the incessant barrage
of attacks of inaccurate and baseless charges being made against
President Bush by his political opponents and their allies in the
media, I thought it important to include in the Record the declassified
portions of the National Intelligence Estimate released by the White
House this past Friday. This NIE clearly states the consensus view of
our intelligence agencies that Saddam Hussein was attempting to
reconstitute his nuclear capacity. The first half of these documents
are being submitted today and the second half tomorrow. I commend these
documents to all willing to approach this vital issue with an open
mind.
[From October 2002 NIE]
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and
restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as
well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if
left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during
this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these
Key Judgments.)
We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD
efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception
efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate
the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information.
We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's
WJMD programs.
Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its
chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and
invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of
most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons
program.
Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases
Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual
earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled, from
$580 million in 1998 to about $3 billion this year.
Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons
facilities damaged during
[[Page E1546]]
Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and
biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian
production.
Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its
ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to
deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear
weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent
on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started
reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM
inspectors departed--December 1998.
How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon
depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile
material.
If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad
it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a
year.
Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not
be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to
inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities
to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in
procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.
Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in
and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength
aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors--as well as Iraq's
attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines,
and machine tools--provide compelling evidence that Saddam is
reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's
nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of
the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes
probably are not part of the program.)
Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of
weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect
nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is
underway.
All agencies agree that about 25,000 centrifuges based on
tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire would be capable
of producing approximately two weapons' worth of highly
enriched uranium per year.
In a much less likely scenario, Bagbdad could make enough
fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it
obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the
other materials and technological expertise necessary to
build production-scale uranium enrichment facilities.
We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of
mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosari), and VX; its capability
probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the
Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life
probably have been improved.
An array of clandestine reporting reveals that Baghdad has
procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and
equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production
hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.
Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW
stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric
tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents--much
of it added in the last year.
The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs,
artillery rockets, and projectiles. We assess that they
possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a
limited number of covertly stored Scuds, possibly a few with
extended ranges.
We judge that all key aspects--R&D, production, and
weaponization--of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and
that most elements are larger and more advanced than they
were before the Gulf war.
We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents
and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety
of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs,
missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.
Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive
BW program.
Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW
agents.
Bagbdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and
concealed BW agent production capability.
Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and
toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are
highly survivable. Within three to six months* these units
probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total
that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several
development programs, including for a UAV probably intended
to deliver biological warfare agent.
Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam
retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant
SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
lraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababi-100 SRBMs,
which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km
range limit; Iraq has tested an al-Samoud variant beyond 150
km--perhaps as far as 300 km,
Baghdad's UAVs could threaten Iraq's neighbors, U.S. forces
in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the
United States, the U.S. Homeland.
An Iraqi UAV procurement network attempted to procure
commercially available route planning software and an
associated topographic database that would be able to support
targeting of the United States, according to analysis of
special intelligence.
The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is
developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms
for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small
size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of
reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent
capability.
Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile
capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building
specialized facilities, including a test stand for engines
more powerful than those in its current missile force.
We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam
would use WMD.
Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare
(CBW) preemptively against U.S. forces, friends, and allies
in the region in an attempt to disrupt U.S. war preparations
and undermine the political will of the Coalition.
[Corrected per Errata sheet issued in October 2002]
Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi
territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose diplomatic
options for stalling the US advance.
He probably would use CBW when be perceived he
irretrievably had lost control of the military and security
situation, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches
that point.
We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical
weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.
Saddam historically has maintained tight control over the
use of WMD; however, he probably has provided contingency
instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific
circumstances.
Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against
the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement
would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.
Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the
U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the
survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or
possibly for revenge. Such attacks--more likely with
biological than chemical agents--probably would be carried
out by special forces or intelligence operatives.
The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has been
directed to conduct clandestine attacks against US and Allied
interests in the Middle East in the event the United States
takes action against Iraq. The US probably would be the
primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW
attacks on the US Homeland, although we have no specific
intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed
attacks against US territory.
Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only
an organization such as al-Qaida--with worldwide reach and
extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a
life-or-death struggle against the United States--could
perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that be would hope to
conduct.
In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme
step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a CBW
attack against the United States would be his last chance to
exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.
____________________
Congressional Record: July 23, 2003 (Extensions)
Page E1567
DECLASSIFIED PORTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
______
HON. PETER T. KING
of new york
in the house of representatives
Tuesday, July 22, 2003
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, as I stated yesterday, President
Bush's adversaries--both in the political arena and the media--have
chosen to ignore or distort the facts regarding Iraq's pursuit of a
nuclear weapons program. To counter the numerous inaccuracies created
by too many people who should know better, I am including in the Record
the second half of the declassified portions of the National
Intelligence Estimate released by the White House this past Friday.
State/INR Alternative View
. . . acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but
INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support
such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has
launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear
weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an
effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to
project a timeline for the completion of activities it does
not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict
when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.
In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is
central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the
tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors.
INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes
lraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas
centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds
unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the
case that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers
it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another
purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets. The
very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were
tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to
operational security in the procurement efforts are among the
factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to
conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's
nuclear weapon program.
Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This Estimate
High Confidence
Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding its
chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary
to UN resolutions.
We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.
Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons
and missiles.
Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once
it acquires sufficient weapons grade fissile material.
moderate confidence
Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient
material to make one but is likely to have a weapon by 2007
to 2009.
Low Confidence
When Saddam would use weapons of mass-destruction.
Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against
the U.S. Homeland.
Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or
biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.
______
Uranium Acquisition. Iraq retains approximately two-and-a-
half tons of 2.5 percent enriched uranium oxide, which the
IAEA permits. This low-enriched material could be used as
feed material to produce enough HEU for about two nuclear
weapons. The use of enriched feed material also would reduce
the initial number of centrifuges that Baghdad would need by
about half, Iraq could divert this material--the IAEA
inspects it only once a year--and enrich it to weapons grade
before a subsequent inspection discovered it was missing. The
IAEA last inspected this material in late January 2002.
Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-
enriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by
the IAEA, Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure
uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten
the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons.
A foreign government service reported that as of early
2001, Niger planned to send several tons of ``pure uranium''
(probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and
Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this
deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do
not know the status of this arrangement.
Reports indicate Iraq also has sought uranium ore from
Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring
uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources. Reports
suggest Iraq is shifting from domestic mining and milling of
uranium to foreign acquisition. Iraq possesses significant
phosphate deposits, from which uranium had been chemically
extracted before Operation Desert Storm. Intelligence
information on whether nuclear-related phosphate mining and/
or processing has been reestablished is inconclusive,
however.
Annex A--Iraq's Attempts To Acquire Aluminum Tubes
Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought
are, by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile program.
Other cases are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-
production line whose suitability for centrifuge operations
remains unknown. Some efforts involve noncontrolled
industrial material and equipment--including a variety of
machine tools--and are troubling because they would help
establish the infrastructure for a renewed nuclear program.
But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors
departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use.
Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in
Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.-
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