You bought in on that liberal lie huh?
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8690/10-24-CostOfWar_Testimony.pdf
At the request of Chairman Spratt, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has
totaled the funding provided through fiscal year 2007 for military and diplomatic
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other activities associated with the war on
terrorism, as well as for related costs incurred by the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) for medical care, disability compensation, and survivorsÂ’ benefits.
In
addition to totaling the funding provided to date, CBO has projected the total cost
over the next 10 years of funding operations in support of the war on terrorism
under two scenarios specified by the Chairman. Those scenarios are meant to serve
as an illustration of the budgetary impact of two different courses in the war on terrorism
but are not intended to be a prediction of what will occur.
Including both funding provided through 2007 and projected funding under the
two illustrative scenarios, total spending for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
and other activities related to the war on terrorism would amount to between
$1.2 trillion and $1.7 trillion for fiscal years 2001 through 2017 (see Table 1).1 A
final section of this testimony briefly compares parts of CBOÂ’s estimate to a frequently
cited estimate prepared by two academic researchers, Linda Bilmes and
Joseph Stiglitz.2
A number of estimates of the costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
been performed by analysts working outside the government; those estimates are
often higher than CBO’s. For example, in 2006, two academic researchers—Linda
Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz—estimated that the war in Iraq could cost several trillion
dollars in present-value terms, including costs to the federal government as
well as other economic costs outside the federal budget.9 CBO restricts its estimates
of war costs to federal budgetary effects and has not attempted to estimate
the macroeconomic effects of the war. However, even within the confines of federal
budgetary costs, CBOÂ’s estimates differ from those of Bilmes and Stiglitz.
Several important differences between CBOÂ’s estimates and the Bilmes-Stiglitz
estimates are explored below.
Increases in the Regular Defense Budget
Bilmes and Stiglitz estimated that, because of the war, the regular defense budget—
the portion not funded through emergency appropriations—increased by a
total of $104 billion to $139 billion between 2002 and 2006. However, CBOÂ’s
analysis suggests that most of the budget increases that occurred during that period
reflect factors not related to the war, such as inflation, real (inflation-adjusted) pay
increases for military and civilian personnel, enhanced personnel benefits that
were either enacted before the war or not requested by the Administration as part
of its war-funding request, and DoDÂ’s efforts to modernize and reconfigure military
forces (efforts that were initiated before the onset of the war in Iraq).
Costs to Replace Equipment
Bilmes and Stiglitz estimated that repairing or replacing equipment that had been
worn out, damaged, or destroyed in Iraq would total between $89 billion and $149
billion in present-value terms over the 2006–2010 period. Those figures, though,
do not reflect the cost of replacing and repairing equipment used in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Instead, they are based on estimates of the difference between DoDÂ’s
peacetime procurement budget and the long-term funding required to maintain
DoDÂ’s inventories of major weapon systems at acceptable levels. Any such funding
gap would have nothing to do with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which
use existing weapon systems and are funded by supplemental appropriations.10
Costs for Recruiting and Retention Incentives
Bilmes and Stiglitz argued that some of the wartime incentive payments will
become permanent, adding between $1 billion and $2 billion a year to all future
defense budgets, or between $5 billion and $17 billion in present-value terms. By
contrast, CBO estimates that incentive payments will not permanently increase the
defense budget. Furthermore, the cash incentives that Bilmes and Stiglitz quote
represent the legislated maximum amounts for active-duty personnel, but those
amounts are not paid to every service member. Only personnel who are recruited
into a limited number of critical military occupational specialties and who commit Costs to Treat Brain Injuries
Bilmes and Stiglitz estimated that the treatment and care of personnel who suffered
serious brain damage in Iraq would cost $14 billion if the war continued until
2010 and costs accrued over a 20-year life expectancy, or $35 billion if the war
continued through 2015 and costs accrued over a 40-year life expectancy. CBOÂ’s
analysis suggests that those figures overstate both the number of injured service
members who will likely need expensive care for brain injuries and the cost of
treating those who do.
Bilmes and Stiglitz estimate that of the 16,000 service members who had suffered
nonfatal injuries as of the publication date of their study, 20 percent had incurred
serious brain damage. Bilmes and Stiglitz derived this estimate of the incidence
rate of brain injuries from a study conducted by Scott Wallsten and Katrina
Kosec.11 That estimate, in turn, was based on a research paper by Lt. Colonel
Xydakis, an Air Force otolaryngologist (ear-nose-and-throat specialist) and headand-
neck surgeon stationed at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany.12
He and his colleagues found that among 2,483 battle-injured patients evacuated
from Iraq or Afghanistan and treated at Landstuhl through March 19, 2004, some
21 percent had head or neck trauma. Head or neck trauma, though, differs greatly
from traumatic brain injury: neck injuries affect the area below the helmet line and
are distinct from brain injuries; and traumatic brain injuries would be treated by
neurologists rather than by otolaryngologists. Moreover, the 21 percent incidence
rate would at most apply only to those patients evacuated to Landstuhl and classified
as “battle-injured,” not to the much larger pool of all wounded troops, over
half of whom are treated in-country and return to duty within 72 hours. On the
basis of a DoD medical census, 1,950 traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) had been diagnosed through December 2006 and 2,669 through July 2007 but still not the
3,213 that Bilmes and Stiglitz assert had occurred as early as January 2006.
Perhaps more important, Bilmes and Stiglitz appear to overstate the cost of treating
brain injuries among military personnel. Again, they adopted their cost estimates
from Wallsten and Kosec, who assumed that all brain injuries, regardless of
the degree of severity, would cost as much as “severe head injuries” sustained in
automobile crashes, as defined by the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration. On that basis, Wallsten and Kosec estimated costs of between
$600,000 and $4 million for the lifetime care of a brain-injured victim. Applying
those estimates to military personnel with brain injuries, though, is problematic
because the two types of brain injuries are quite different: U.S. soldiers wear
Kevlar helmets that are capable of deflecting some bullets and shrapnel, or at least
of significantly reducing their velocity upon penetration, whereas motorists generally
do not wear helmets. Through 2006, about two-thirds of the diagnoses among
military personnel were for mild (as opposed to moderate or severe) traumatic
brain injuries; more recent tabulations indicate that mild TBIs may represent as
much as 80 percent of the total. Most patients should recover naturally from mild
TBIs, especially if given prompt treatment. CBO estimates that a few hundred
service members—rather than several thousand—have sustained brain injuries
serious enough to require a lifetime of around-the-clock care.