Air Power for Patton's Army: The 19th Tactical Air Command in the Second World War

[Picaro]

For the history buffs here.

Air Power for Patton's Army: The 19th Tactical Air Command in the Second World War : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive

Excerpt from Ch.7 "An After-Action Assessment", pgs.315-316.

....Yet would a revised manual and sound doctrine be sufficient to preserve the lessons of air-ground cooperation of World War II in the absence of goodwill?
To be sure, in the postwar period of rapid and massive demobilization goodwill did not prevail in the competition for declining budgets, lobbying for an independent Air Force, and a growing emphasis on the strategic nuclear mission to confront the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In later years interservice rivalry among military leaders would lead to precisely the kind of aerial duplication that other leaders in the euphoria of victory after the Second World War argued against. The future would see separate tactical aviation organizations grow and evolve in the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, in addition to the Air Force.53 General Bradley called the victory in Europe a victory for combined arms and joint operations. Though correct, command of the air proved the key to the campaign. In a sense, everything else flowed from the fundamental fact that the Allies achieved and maintained air superiority and their enemy had not. General Weyland realized this as much as any airman. A few years later,when he assumed command of Far Eastern Air Forces and directed air operations in Korea, few could match his level of tactical air experience and competence.

Yet even Allied air superiority and his impressive background in tactical aviation did not guarantee effective air-ground operations. In fact, Weyland faced enormous problems in coordinating air-ground operations and centralizing control of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine air. At the same time, he struggled to convince the U.S. Army to abandon a traditional view that it should control its own air forces. As Weyland’s official report on the war observed, “an astounding facet of the Korean War was the number of old lessons that had to be relearned.”54 That same refrain would be repeated during the Vietnam War.

The lesson, of course, is that air superiority by itself does not ensure either centralized control of air assets by airmen or a proper balance between interdiction and close air support efforts. Although doctrine may serve well in principle, no air-ground program can succeed without the cooperation and goodwill of air and ground commanders and their staffs. Given sufficient resources, people who will work together toward a commonly shared goal can turn theory into effective practice. Assessing a later war, General Quesada put it succinctly: “You can have all the doctrine you want, but unless you have people, commanders, to implement those doctrines, you might as well throw your doctrines away.”55 Generals Weyland and Patton knew this. Theirs was a partnership founded on mutual trust, respect, and a common mission-directed interest. That is the basic lesson from the Second World War for tactical air power. It is a lesson worth remembering.

Given the current interest in such military projects as the F-35 and the future of close air support doctrines that it represents, I thought this book would be of timely interest for the Gallery. It also gives some insight into the kind of war Patton invisioned re going against the Soviets, as an aside, before the standing down that came soon afterwards, and U.S. doctrines changed to ones of essentially abandoning Germany and northern Europe in the face of the Soviet buildup of 1946 and afterward.

 

[DudleySmith]

"The lesson, of course, is that air superiority by itself does not ensure either centralized control of air assets by airmen or a proper balance between interdiction and close air support efforts. Although doctrine may serve well in principle, no air-ground program can succeed without the cooperation and goodwill of air and ground commanders and their staffs."

Nowadays the the two are merging with the advent of drones. Good link, though; most people these days probably think Patton did it all with just tanks and infantry.

 

[whitehall]

Ike is an Army and a political icon and above criticism by military historians. He should have been relieved of duty after the tragedy of the Battle of the Bulge which was the most notorious example of negligence in military history when Ike spent time attending pre-Christmas parties in late December 1944 while the Germans could be heard revving up tanks in preparation for a counter-offensive. As the European war ground on Ike seemed clueless that Patton's army was still aggressive in 1945 and Patton crossed the Rhine on pontoon boats. Ike and Bradley were examples of the political Soldier while Patton was the real hero. In later years Hollywood chose to portray MacArthur by steadfast serious Gregory Peck but they picked quirky George C. Scott almost like a cartoon character to portray the Patton legacy.

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Patton left to his own devices would have been in Berlin at least 6 months ahead of the Soviets. In addition, with a reconstituted Germany Army, he would have rolled Zhukov back east of Poland

 

[whitehall]

Ike was a political Soldier forced to deal with FDR who was a dying man and soon to be replaced by a clueless Missouri senator. The highest ranking member of the military, Chief of Staff Marshall, was a bureaucrat who never had a combat command. Put it all together and you end up with Churchill's prediction of the "Iron Curtain".