This week 150 years ago

[oldfart]

I am loath to re-fight the Civil War with folks who think that if they wave a rebel flag long enough, the South will win this time around! But it is 150 years, the Sesquicentennial of the Civil War and I remember the Centennial clearly. Then the day by day news of the Civil War was published a hundred years later and it got pretty interesting. I would like to start that timeline again for anyone interested. So I will start with this initial post and update every week or so. Feel free to join in, but if you want to add a counter-history (“what would have happened if….) please label it as such.

We have already passed the Gettysburg campaign and the fall of Vicksburg. Lost in the news of Gettysburg, where Lee’s second invasion of the North was turned back and Vicksburg, where the Mississippi River was secured, few noticed a third pivotal event in a 24 hour period. Rosecrans Army of the Cumberland completed on July 3, 1863 a brilliant operation called the Tullahoma Campaign that began June 24 against the Confederate Army of Tennessee led by General Braxton Bragg, clearing the Confederates from Middle Tennessee and threatening Chattanooga. This would threaten the interruption of the South’s rail network that connected East and West and open the door to Atlanta. Bragg soon evacuated Chattanooga and is replaced by Joe Johnston.

Lee is returned to Virginia and Grant has set Sherman to lever Joe Johnston out of Jackson. This sets the stage for the next campaign.

From time to time Lee has utilized railroads to shift troops in large bodies between theaters of war. Now in early September 1863 he plans to do so again. His best corps and best corps commander, Longstreet, will be sent west to join the Army of the Tennessee commanded by Joe Johnston. Reinforced by Longstreet, who will plan and lead the attack, Johnson hopes to smash Rosecrans and retake Chattanooga.

The stage is set for a meeting on Chicamauga Creek.

 

[Luddly Neddite]

I live in a place where (backward and uneducated) people still refer to that time as the War of Nawthern Aggression and flies the damn Confederate flag.

Hell, people here probably still have old Confederate money!

 

[Moonglow]

I have old confederate money, handed down through generations. My mother's side of the family lived in Ohio and refused to pick a side and were run out of Ohio where they ended up in Texas, after Texas was out of the war.
My Dad's side of the family where from Kentucky, they had lived there since the revolution, they actually fought for the North.

 

[TheOldSchool]

There's a lot of Civil War history in Northern VA where I live. The Ox Hill, Manassas, and Bull Run battlefields are all nearby. And there's a smattering of others just a little further out than those are. I've been meaning to go see a reenactment for years.

 

[whitehall]

The Confederacy only existed for a couple of years. The flag that flew off the stern of slave ships for nearly 200 years was the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes.

 

[gipper]

By September of 1863 the South's fate was sealed. Losing access to the Mississippi at Vicksburg and the huge loss at Gettysburg...ironically on the same day...July 4th...ironically our nation's independence day, pretty much finished their chances of winning the war.

Lee's huge mistake at Gettysburg finished the South. Taking the offensive in the battle, resulting in terrible casualties, which the South could ill afford. Then compounding that mistake by sending his infantry on one of modern warfare's most idiotic charges (Pickets Charge), were terrible mistakes. Had he continued to prowl PA, taking supplies and fighting gorilla tactics and avoiding a major confrontation; the South might have had a chance of forcing the North to the peace table.

Had Lee fought the war much like George Washington fought the Brits, the South may have prevailed. Many in the North were against the war and anti-war riots were popping up. Remember...after Gettysburg, Lincoln sent an infantry division to NYC to quell the riots ruthlessly.

 

[rightwinger]

This is where the war stars to get nasty. The south abandons sweeping movement in favor of trench warfare. Sets the stage for WWI

 

[Rozman]

I thought it was about Woodstock...

 

[oldfart]

It's September 10, 1863 and today and the following day Union forces are edging forward unaware of the rebel buildup. A series of maneuvers and skirmishes, not quite an actual battle, with negligible casualties ensues at the Battle of Davis's Cross Roads, also known as the Battle of Dug Gap, in northwestern Georgia.

Encountering resistance, Negley's division took up defensive positions at Davis's Cross Roads on the night of the tenth and waited for the arrival of a supporting division under Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird, both of George H Thomas's XIV Corps.

Bragg had ordered Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman with his division to assault Negley in the flank at Davis's Cross Roads, while Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's division forced its way through Dug Gap to strike Negley in front. Hindman was to receive reinforcements for this movement, but most of them did not arrive. The Confederate officers, therefore, met and decided that they could not attack in their present condition. The next morning, however, fresh troops did arrive, and the Confederates began to move on the Union line. The supporting Union division had by now joined Negley, and, hearing of a Confederate attack, the Union forces determined that a strategic withdrawal to Stevens Gap was in order. Negley first moved his division to the ridge east of West Chickamauga Creek, where it established a defensive line. The other division then moved through them to Stevens Gap and established a defensive line there. Both divisions awaited the rest of Thomas's corps.

Upon viewing the situation, Bragg determined that the nearness of Thomas's reinforcements and the terrain did not favor a frontal assault and withdrew, looking north toward the XXI Corps under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, setting the stage for the bloody Battle of Chickamauga on September 19.

 

[oldfart]

By September of 1863 the South's fate was sealed. Losing access to the Mississippi at Vicksburg and the huge loss at Gettysburg...ironically on the same day...July 4th...ironically our nation's independence day, pretty much finished their chances of winning the war.

While this is a position voiced by many, given the triple decisive victories won on July 3--5, Many thought that the South had a viable strategy for victory. It hinged more on political factors than military victories. Lincoln must stand for re-election in November 1863 and a serious peace party was gaining strength based on war weariness in the North. Jefferson Davis and Bobby Lee felt that Atlanta could be held indefinitely, protecting the vital rail lines between the two theaters and the vast 'breadbasket" of the Confederacy. Lee in dispatching Longstreet had high hopes that Chattanooga could be retaken. The Union armies in the East showed no signs of campaigning until the Spring. All was not lost yet.

Lee's huge mistake at Gettysburg finished the South. Taking the offensive in the battle, resulting in terrible casualties, which the South could ill afford. Then compounding that mistake by sending his infantry on one of modern warfare's most idiotic charges (Pickets Charge), were terrible mistakes. Had he continued to prowl PA, taking supplies and fighting gorilla [guerrilla] tactics and avoiding a major confrontation; the South might have had a chance of forcing the North to the peace table.

Here you are exactly right. Lee was a gambler, staking much if not all on his own tactical skill and the fighting quality of his troops. But while the North could replace their battlefield losses, the South could not. Active campaigning depleted the South's manpower.

Pickett's charge revealed not only Lee's hubris but his overextended faith in his troops. The Southern general on the field who was most competent in this campaign and nearly always correct, was Longstreet. During the Civil War the South launched four great assaults that might have decisively destroyed a Union Army; Longstreet planned and executed three of them (Second Manassas, Gettysburg July 3, and Chicamauga; the fourth was Jackson at Chancellorsville). The only failure was at Gettysburg, where Longstreet did not believe in the plan and Lee insisted on the assault.

Had Lee fought the war much like George Washington fought the Brits, the South may have prevailed. Many in the North were against the war and anti-war riots were popping up. Remember...after Gettysburg, Lincoln sent an infantry division to NYC to quell the riots ruthlessly.

The NYC draft riot is a nearly forgotten episode of the Civil War. I thank you for bringing it up, as it reinforces the view that the South believed large casualties was sapping the North's will to continue the war and that a stalemate could lead to a negotiated peace after the 1864 election.

Thanks for bringing up some good points!

 

[oldfart]

This is where the war stars to get nasty. The south abandons sweeping movement in favor of trench warfare. Sets the stage for WWI

The trenches (as opposed to field fortifications used in the Peninsula in 1862 and thereafter) first appear in the Siege of Vicksburg and reappear in the Battle of Atlanta. In the East the trenches appear only after the Overland Campaign of 1864 deprives Lee of the ability to maneuver and he settles into the Richmond-Petersburg trenches.

You make a really good point about the evolving technology and tactics of the war!

 

[kwc57]

I live in a place where (backward and uneducated) people still refer to that time as the War of Nawthern Aggression and flies the damn Confederate flag.

Hell, people here probably still have old Confederate money!

Get a job and quit your welfare and maybe you can move to the land of enlightened elitists.

 

[gipper]

By September of 1863 the South's fate was sealed. Losing access to the Mississippi at Vicksburg and the huge loss at Gettysburg...ironically on the same day...July 4th...ironically our nation's independence day, pretty much finished their chances of winning the war.

While this is a position voiced by many, given the triple decisive victories won on July 3--5, Many thought that the South had a viable strategy for victory. It hinged more on political factors than military victories. Lincoln must stand for re-election in November 1863 and a serious peace party was gaining strength based on war weariness in the North. Jefferson Davis and Bobby Lee felt that Atlanta could be held indefinitely, protecting the vital rail lines between the two theaters and the vast 'breadbasket" of the Confederacy. Lee in dispatching Longstreet had high hopes that Chattanooga could be retaken. The Union armies in the East showed no signs of campaigning until the Spring. All was not lost yet.

Lee's huge mistake at Gettysburg finished the South. Taking the offensive in the battle, resulting in terrible casualties, which the South could ill afford. Then compounding that mistake by sending his infantry on one of modern warfare's most idiotic charges (Pickets Charge), were terrible mistakes. Had he continued to prowl PA, taking supplies and fighting gorilla [guerrilla] tactics and avoiding a major confrontation; the South might have had a chance of forcing the North to the peace table.

Here you are exactly right. Lee was a gambler, staking much if not all on his own tactical skill and the fighting quality of his troops. But while the North could replace their battlefield losses, the South could not. Active campaigning depleted the South's manpower.

Pickett's charge revealed not only Lee's hubris but his overextended faith in his troops. The Southern general on the field who was most competent in this campaign and nearly always correct, was Longstreet. During the Civil War the South launched four great assaults that might have decisively destroyed a Union Army; Longstreet planned and executed three of them (Second Manassas, Gettysburg July 3, and Chicamauga; the fourth was Jackson at Chancellorsville). The only failure was at Gettysburg, where Longstreet did not believe in the plan and Lee insisted on the assault.

Had Lee fought the war much like George Washington fought the Brits, the South may have prevailed. Many in the North were against the war and anti-war riots were popping up. Remember...after Gettysburg, Lincoln sent an infantry division to NYC to quell the riots ruthlessly.

The NYC draft riot is a nearly forgotten episode of the Civil War. I thank you for bringing it up, as it reinforces the view that the South believed large casualties was sapping the North's will to continue the war and that a stalemate could lead to a negotiated peace after the 1864 election.

Thanks for bringing up some good points!

Many think if Longstreet had attacked Little Round Top on the morning of July 2nd, as Lee directed, the South might have effectively flanked the Yanks.

I agree that Lee and Davis thought if they could achieve a major victory, it might lead the North to seek peace prior to the election of 1864. But, Lee made a big mistake by getting involved a huge engagement at Gettysburg. Then taking the offensive...and then losing.

Had he allowed his forces to loot and pillage the countryside, like Sherman did the South, the North might have sought peace. Imagine Confederate forces taking Harrisburg and then threatening Philadelphia and other Northern cities. Doing a hit and run campaign. But, he would have had to be ruthless like Sherman, and Lee was not a total war general.

I read a recent theory as to why Lee sent Pickett on that foolish charge. It claims that from Lee's observation post, he could not see all the Union forces in the center. Thus he concluded the center was weak. A terrible mistake for a great general to make.

I often wondered how any of Pickett's men survived the charge. Then I recently read that historians think many of Pickett's men laid down, rather than continue the charge leading to certain death. They then returned to their lines once it was all over.

 

[oldfart]

Many think if Longstreet had attacked Little Round Top on the morning of July 2nd, as Lee directed, the South might have effectively flanked the Yanks.

The second day at Gettysburg was a real mess. Troops were still arriving on both sides and Lee seems to not have been well. He committed troops piecemeal, which was a cardinal sin to Longstreet. I think this is why Longstreet hesitated. As it was, Sickles folly in advancing his line to gain slightly higher ground leaving his flank in the air was almost fatal to the Union cause, only the suicidal charge of the First Minnesota staved off disaster (not Chamberlain's later defense of Little Round Top portrayed in the movie), and was the pivotal action of the battle. But I think it stretches credulity to blame any Southern general for not anticipating the error Sickles made and having sufficient reserves to exploit the gap more aggressively.

I agree that Lee and Davis thought if they could achieve a major victory, it might lead the North to seek peace prior to the election of 1864. But, Lee made a big mistake by getting involved a huge engagement at Gettysburg. Then taking the offensive...and then losing.

In reality the Gettysburg campaign should have been a giant raid, as Lee first conceived it, rather than an attempt at a decisive battle.

Had he allowed his forces to loot and pillage the countryside, like Sherman did the South, the North might have sought peace. Imagine Confederate forces taking Harrisburg and then threatening Philadelphia and other Northern cities. Doing a hit and run campaign. But, he would have had to be ruthless like Sherman, and Lee was not a total war general.

I agree that it would not occur to Lee to wage a campaign similar to Sherman's. Southern efforts at sizeable raids at several points in the war, most notably the invasion of Kentucky in 1862, were disappointing.

I read a recent theory as to why Lee sent Pickett on that foolish charge. It claims that from Lee's observation post, he could not see all the Union forces in the center. Thus he concluded the center was weak. A terrible mistake for a great general to make.

Remember that Lee was blind as his cavalry was dashing around the Union army following Stuart, out of communication with Lee, instead of doing its job. Most of the Union infantry were either on the reverse slope or were lying down, so were less visible to Lee. This is less a knock on Lee than a acknowledgement of Meade and his generals' attention to detail. When Lee heard that Meade had been appointed to command, he noted that Meade would make no obvious mistakes as many of his opponents had before. The artillery barrage preceding the attack was also ranged about 200 yards too far and mainly fell on supply wagons and not on troops. The Union artillery held fire instead of engaging in a counter-battery duel, and thus was mostly unscathed when the Southern infantry came into range. Nothing about the plan worked for Lee that day.

I often wondered how any of Pickett's men survived the charge. Then I recently read that historians think many of Pickett's men laid down, rather than continue the charge leading to certain death. They then returned to their lines once it was all over.

By this point in the Civil War most veteran troops had a good idea of when an attack was bogged down. I believe that the Southern ranks had been so thinned by the time they crossed the fence running along the Emmittsburg road that lines broke down. many took cover, and the advance devolved into smaller groups working forward. This made them less vulnerable targets, but compromised the shock value of the assault. When these small groups got within 40 yards or so of the Union line behind a stone wall, they waited and gathered forces for a last effort. By this time probably two-thirds had already turned back, often assisting wounded.

BTW after their heroic charge the previous day, the First Minnesota consisted of 62 survivors of the charge and about 200 who had been on detached duty guarding supply wagons. The had been posted to what was thought to be a quiet section of the line, a small copse of woods at a bend in the stone wall. Today there is a monument there, noting "the high water mark of the Confederacy". After Gettysburg the First Minnesota was redesignated a battalion instead of a regiment.

 

[oldfart]

It's September 17, 1863, and Rosecrans has consolidated his three corps of 60,000 men near Steven's Gap, the only way over Lookout Mountain for over a twenty-mile stretch southwest of Chattanooga. Bragg senses that although he has missed the opportunity to defeat parts of Rosecrans army in detail, he still has an opportunity for a smashing victory. Johnson has sent him several thousand troops from Mississippi and Longstreet is on the trains with two divisions from his corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. It is the first Confederate use of railroads to achieve a local numerical superiority, but just barely, as Bragg will have about 65,000 troops when all of Longstreet's troops arrive.

At dawn of the 18th Bragg's army would be in motion, to either maneuver Rosecrans out of his strong position and back toward Chattanooga, or to force him into a battle where Bragg would have a numerical advantage.

 

[oldfart]

At dawn September 18, 1863, the division of Bushrod Johnson recently arrived from Mississippi, stepped out from Ringgold, GA, unfortunately on the wrong road. They ended up traveling west on the Reed's Bridge Road. At 7 a.m. his men encountered cavalry pickets from Col. Robert Minty's brigade, guarding the approach to Reed's Bridge. Being outnumbered five to one, Minty's men eventually withdrew across the bridge, but could not destroy the bridge and prevent Johnson's men from crossing.

By 4:30 p.m., when Johnson had reached Jay's Mill, Maj. Gen. John B. Hood of Longstreet's Corps arrived from the railroad station at Catoosa and took command of the column. He ordered Johnson to use the Jay's Mill Road instead of the Brotherton Road, as Johnson had planned. While Longstreet was on the field of battle, his troops were still in transit or disembarking. Only about 5000 of his men would participate in the battle over the next two days.

At Alexander's Bridge to the south, Union Col. John T. Wilder's mounted infantry brigade defended the crossing against the approach of Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walker's Reserve Corps. Armed with Spencer repeating rifles and four guns of the 18th Indiana Battery, Wilder was able to hold off a brigade of Brig. Gen. St. John Liddell's division, which suffered 105 casualties against Wilder's superior firepower. Walker moved his men downstream a mile to Lambert's Ford, an unguarded crossing, and was able to cross around 4:30 p.m., considerably behind schedule. Wilder, concerned about his left flank after Minty's loss of Reed's Bridge, withdrew and establish a new blocking position east of the Lafayette Road, near the Viniard farm.

By dark, Bushrod Johnson's division had halted in front of Wilder's Union position. Walker had crossed the creek, but his troops were well scattered along the road behind Johnson. Buckner, commanding the Confederate troops pulled in by Bragg from near Knoxville, had been able to push only one brigade across the creek at Thedford's Ford. Bishop Polk's Confederate troops were facing Crittenden's at Lee and Gordon's Mill and D.H. Hill's corps guarded crossing sites to the south.

Although Bragg had achieved some degree of surprise, he failed to exploit it strongly. Rosecrans, observing the dust raised by the marching Confederates in the morning, anticipated Bragg's plan. He ordered Thomas and McCook to Crittenden's support, and while the Confederates were crossing the creek, Thomas began to arrive in Crittenden's rear area.

The day ended with no decisive or pitched action, except for the brief actions at Alexander's Bridge and Reed's Bridge. But the Battle of Chickamauga was to begin in earnest the following morning.