The Constitution Requires Judge Emmet Sullivan’s Lawless Amicus Order Against Michael Flynn Be Overturned

easyt65

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Do you know WHY legal experts are calling Sullivan's actions 'Unheard Of', 'un-precedented', 'un-believable', etc...?


BECAUSE SULLIVAN IS VIOLAITNG THE LAW, GOING AGAINST LEGAL MANDATE / ESTABLISHED PRECEDNECE


"The U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. That’s what Michael Flynn judge Emmet Sullivan decided to do.

Judge Sullivan announced he would accept amicus briefs, a group of lawyers operating under the moniker Watergate Prosecutors filed a notice of its intent to file an amicus brief. That a group of left-leaning lawyers intended to relitigate Obamagate via the Flynn case wasn’t surprising. What was surprising—no, unbelievable—is what Judge Sullivan did on Wednesday: He entered an order “appoint[ing] The Honorable John Gleeson (Ret.) as amicus curiae to present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss.”
This order was jaw-dropping for two reasons.

First, the U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. In fact, the very case Judge Sullivan cited for the proposition that he had the inherent authority to appoint an amicus curiae—United States v. Fokker—made clear Sullivan’s order was lawless.

“decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion.”

’to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment . . . when the [g]overnment moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection.’” Such review in that case is to guard against “a scheme of ‘prosecutorial harassment’ of the defendant through repeated efforts to bring—and then dismiss—charges.”


Fokker then concluded: “So understood, the ‘leave of court’ authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority. For instance, a court cannot deny leave of court because of a view that the defendant should stand trial notwithstanding the prosecution’s desire to dismiss the charges, or a view that any remaining charges fail adequately to redress the gravity of the defendant’s alleged conduct. The authority to make such determinations remains with the Executive.”

The Fokker decision was a 2016 decision from the D.C. Circuit Court and, as such, establishes “mandatory precedent,” i.e., precedent that must be followed, by all D.C. district court judges—including Judge Sullivan. Thus, Judge Sullivan’s directive that Judge Gleeson, as amicus curiae, should “present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss,” cannot stand: It conflicts with controlling circuit court precedent, and more significantly with the U.S. Constitution."




So what NOW?


'While Judge Sullivan has not yet ruled on the government’s Motion to Dismiss, his mere attempt to usurp the executive branch’s authority must be addressed, and now. The government should, as it did in Fokker, seek a writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit, directing the charge against Flynn be dismissed.

The government should also seek reassignment of the case on remand, meaning that when the case returns to the lower court for dismissal of the charge, it goes to a different judge.'




SULLIVAN'S OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO THWART THE DISMISAL OF THE CASE

The same day Judge Sullivan named Judge Gleeson to serve in the amicus curiae role, the Washington Post ran an op-ed co-authored by Gleeson, entitled, “The Flynn case isn’t over until the judge says it’s over.” “The Justice Department’s move to dismiss the prosecution of former national security adviser Michael Flynn does not need to be the end of the case—and it shouldn’t be,” he opened. Then, after misrepresenting the Rule 48(b)’s “leave of court” requirement, Gleeson suggests dismissal of the Flynn case would be inappropriate because “the record reeks of improper political influence.”

No, what reeks is Judge Sullivan’s selection of a clearly biased “friend of the court” who appears to have already pre-judged the prosecutor’s motive and found it improper. Judge Sullivan surely knew of Gleeson’s bent and just as surely shares it.

There were several earlier glimpses of Judge Sullivan’s bias.




 
This is why Sullivan has asked another democrat controlled judge for help. Sullivan knows what he has to do.

He's also calling upon Flynn's FORMER lawyers hoping to berate them into violating attorney client confidentiality.

This is what the country looks like without a Constitution.
 
his russian pals turned the entire smear book over to easy this morning -
 
Do you know WHY legal experts are calling Sullivan's actions 'Unheard Of', 'un-precedented', 'un-believable', etc...?


BECAUSE SULLIVAN IS VIOLAITNG THE LAW, GOING AGAINST LEGAL MANDATE / ESTABLISHED PRECEDNECE


"The U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. That’s what Michael Flynn judge Emmet Sullivan decided to do.

Judge Sullivan announced he would accept amicus briefs, a group of lawyers operating under the moniker Watergate Prosecutors filed a notice of its intent to file an amicus brief. That a group of left-leaning lawyers intended to relitigate Obamagate via the Flynn case wasn’t surprising. What was surprising—no, unbelievable—is what Judge Sullivan did on Wednesday: He entered an order “appoint[ing] The Honorable John Gleeson (Ret.) as amicus curiae to present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss.”
This order was jaw-dropping for two reasons.

First, the U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. In fact, the very case Judge Sullivan cited for the proposition that he had the inherent authority to appoint an amicus curiae—United States v. Fokker—made clear Sullivan’s order was lawless.

“decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion.”

’to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment . . . when the [g]overnment moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection.’” Such review in that case is to guard against “a scheme of ‘prosecutorial harassment’ of the defendant through repeated efforts to bring—and then dismiss—charges.”


Fokker then concluded: “So understood, the ‘leave of court’ authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority. For instance, a court cannot deny leave of court because of a view that the defendant should stand trial notwithstanding the prosecution’s desire to dismiss the charges, or a view that any remaining charges fail adequately to redress the gravity of the defendant’s alleged conduct. The authority to make such determinations remains with the Executive.”

The Fokker decision was a 2016 decision from the D.C. Circuit Court and, as such, establishes “mandatory precedent,” i.e., precedent that must be followed, by all D.C. district court judges—including Judge Sullivan. Thus, Judge Sullivan’s directive that Judge Gleeson, as amicus curiae, should “present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss,” cannot stand: It conflicts with controlling circuit court precedent, and more significantly with the U.S. Constitution."




So what NOW?


'While Judge Sullivan has not yet ruled on the government’s Motion to Dismiss, his mere attempt to usurp the executive branch’s authority must be addressed, and now. The government should, as it did in Fokker, seek a writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit, directing the charge against Flynn be dismissed.

The government should also seek reassignment of the case on remand, meaning that when the case returns to the lower court for dismissal of the charge, it goes to a different judge.'




SULLIVAN'S OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO THWART THE DISMISAL OF THE CASE

The same day Judge Sullivan named Judge Gleeson to serve in the amicus curiae role, the Washington Post ran an op-ed co-authored by Gleeson, entitled, “The Flynn case isn’t over until the judge says it’s over.” “The Justice Department’s move to dismiss the prosecution of former national security adviser Michael Flynn does not need to be the end of the case—and it shouldn’t be,” he opened. Then, after misrepresenting the Rule 48(b)’s “leave of court” requirement, Gleeson suggests dismissal of the Flynn case would be inappropriate because “the record reeks of improper political influence.”

No, what reeks is Judge Sullivan’s selection of a clearly biased “friend of the court” who appears to have already pre-judged the prosecutor’s motive and found it improper. Judge Sullivan surely knew of Gleeson’s bent and just as surely shares it.

There were several earlier glimpses of Judge Sullivan’s bias.




Political hacks don't care about the law..this is why he needs to be removed from the bench
 
his russian pals turned the entire smear book over to easy this morning -
Really? You are pissed that you and your fellow snowflakes just got SCHOOLED / EDUCAED AGAINST YOUR WILL on DC law, that Sullivan is trampling, so you bring up the debunked, BS Russian Collusion coup narrative as a personal attack?!

Bwuhahahahahaha.....
 

By Refusing DOJ Decision to Drop Flynn Case Judge Sullivan Ignored UNANIMOUS Supreme Court Decision from LAST WEEK!

The criminal case against General Flynn is over. Judge Sullivan just does not want to admit it.

And Sullivan really looks foolish for his outlandish antics considering the US Supreme Court just one week ago ruled that rogue judges CANNOT do what Judge Sullivan is wanting to do.
The Supreme Court ruled 9-0 to prevent judges like Emmet Sullivan from becoming tyrants on the bench.

U.S. District Court Judge Emmet Sullivan disregarded two controlling precedents from higher courts with his decision to appoint John Gleeson as amicus curiae in the U.S. v. Michael Flynn case this week. Judicial conduct similar to J. Sullivan’s in these prior, far less politically charged cases was roundly and unanimously condemned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, D.C. Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, and their colleagues across the ideological spectrum. So, whether or not one agrees with the Department of Justice’s call to drop its charges against President Trump’s former National Security Advisor, Gen. Michael Flynn, there should be widespread agreement that J. Sullivan has veered way out of line.

One week ago, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 9-0 decision, authored by Justice Ginsburg, that took judges to task for similar amicus antics. Her opinion for the Court in U.S. v. Sineneng-Smith upbraided the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for violating a basic aspect of legal proceedings called the “party presentation principle.”

In a nutshell, this concept dictates that judges must decide the case as presented by the parties before them. They are not to go out questing for dragons to slay (or issues to tackle) that the parties have not brought before them. As J. Ginsburg put it: “[C]ourts are essentially passive instruments of government … They ‘do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. [They] wait for cases to come to [them], and when [cases arise, courts] normally decide only questions presented by the parties.”




Sullivan should be proverbially, judicially kicked in the nuts for this.....



 
Fokker does not involve a situation in which the dismissal is sought during the sentencing phase of a case after a criminal defendant has already pleaded guilty. It dealt only with an agreement to defer prosecution to assess the defendant's cooperation. The government already has exercised its discretion to prosecute Flynn, which is what led to his guilty plea. The charges against him have not been "pending" for quite a while.

It would be interesting to find out whether or not the government has ever sought to dismiss a case that already has been prosecuted and completed.

This matter has a strange posture, since it is my understanding, based on a very brief search, that Rule 48(a) is aimed at preventing harassment of a defendant by prosecutors and I don't know if it has ever been invoked by the government against itself until now. I can understand the judge wanting amicus briefs discussing the matter.

BTW: I really wouldn't trust The Federalist. FDRLST Media was founded by republican activists/financiers of "conservative" causes Van Andel and Devoss, both now deceased.
 
Do you know WHY legal experts are calling Sullivan's actions 'Unheard Of', 'un-precedented', 'un-believable', etc...?


BECAUSE SULLIVAN IS VIOLAITNG THE LAW, GOING AGAINST LEGAL MANDATE / ESTABLISHED PRECEDNECE


"The U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. That’s what Michael Flynn judge Emmet Sullivan decided to do.

Judge Sullivan announced he would accept amicus briefs, a group of lawyers operating under the moniker Watergate Prosecutors filed a notice of its intent to file an amicus brief. That a group of left-leaning lawyers intended to relitigate Obamagate via the Flynn case wasn’t surprising. What was surprising—no, unbelievable—is what Judge Sullivan did on Wednesday: He entered an order “appoint[ing] The Honorable John Gleeson (Ret.) as amicus curiae to present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss.”
This order was jaw-dropping for two reasons.

First, the U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. In fact, the very case Judge Sullivan cited for the proposition that he had the inherent authority to appoint an amicus curiae—United States v. Fokker—made clear Sullivan’s order was lawless.

“decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion.”

’to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment . . . when the [g]overnment moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection.’” Such review in that case is to guard against “a scheme of ‘prosecutorial harassment’ of the defendant through repeated efforts to bring—and then dismiss—charges.”


Fokker then concluded: “So understood, the ‘leave of court’ authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority. For instance, a court cannot deny leave of court because of a view that the defendant should stand trial notwithstanding the prosecution’s desire to dismiss the charges, or a view that any remaining charges fail adequately to redress the gravity of the defendant’s alleged conduct. The authority to make such determinations remains with the Executive.”

The Fokker decision was a 2016 decision from the D.C. Circuit Court and, as such, establishes “mandatory precedent,” i.e., precedent that must be followed, by all D.C. district court judges—including Judge Sullivan. Thus, Judge Sullivan’s directive that Judge Gleeson, as amicus curiae, should “present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss,” cannot stand: It conflicts with controlling circuit court precedent, and more significantly with the U.S. Constitution."




So what NOW?


'While Judge Sullivan has not yet ruled on the government’s Motion to Dismiss, his mere attempt to usurp the executive branch’s authority must be addressed, and now. The government should, as it did in Fokker, seek a writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit, directing the charge against Flynn be dismissed.

The government should also seek reassignment of the case on remand, meaning that when the case returns to the lower court for dismissal of the charge, it goes to a different judge.'




SULLIVAN'S OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO THWART THE DISMISAL OF THE CASE

The same day Judge Sullivan named Judge Gleeson to serve in the amicus curiae role, the Washington Post ran an op-ed co-authored by Gleeson, entitled, “The Flynn case isn’t over until the judge says it’s over.” “The Justice Department’s move to dismiss the prosecution of former national security adviser Michael Flynn does not need to be the end of the case—and it shouldn’t be,” he opened. Then, after misrepresenting the Rule 48(b)’s “leave of court” requirement, Gleeson suggests dismissal of the Flynn case would be inappropriate because “the record reeks of improper political influence.”

No, what reeks is Judge Sullivan’s selection of a clearly biased “friend of the court” who appears to have already pre-judged the prosecutor’s motive and found it improper. Judge Sullivan surely knew of Gleeson’s bent and just as surely shares it.

There were several earlier glimpses of Judge Sullivan’s bias.




If memory serves and I maybe recalling this wrong way, but I believe a Writ I cannot recall the legal name can be filed with the court of appeals to have the case dismissed. The DOJ lawyers would have to do this writ which can force the district court judge to dismiss charges or something to that effect.
 
Trump needs to pardon Flynn anyway, so that the next time the democrats get power they can't reopen the bullshit case against Flynn.
 
Do you know WHY legal experts are calling Sullivan's actions 'Unheard Of', 'un-precedented', 'un-believable', etc...?


BECAUSE SULLIVAN IS VIOLAITNG THE LAW, GOING AGAINST LEGAL MANDATE / ESTABLISHED PRECEDNECE


"The U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. That’s what Michael Flynn judge Emmet Sullivan decided to do.

Judge Sullivan announced he would accept amicus briefs, a group of lawyers operating under the moniker Watergate Prosecutors filed a notice of its intent to file an amicus brief. That a group of left-leaning lawyers intended to relitigate Obamagate via the Flynn case wasn’t surprising. What was surprising—no, unbelievable—is what Judge Sullivan did on Wednesday: He entered an order “appoint[ing] The Honorable John Gleeson (Ret.) as amicus curiae to present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss.”
This order was jaw-dropping for two reasons.

First, the U.S. Constitution makes clear that the judiciary has no business second-guessing prosecutorial decisions. In fact, the very case Judge Sullivan cited for the proposition that he had the inherent authority to appoint an amicus curiae—United States v. Fokker—made clear Sullivan’s order was lawless.

“decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion.”

’to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment . . . when the [g]overnment moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection.’” Such review in that case is to guard against “a scheme of ‘prosecutorial harassment’ of the defendant through repeated efforts to bring—and then dismiss—charges.”


Fokker then concluded: “So understood, the ‘leave of court’ authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor’s Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority. For instance, a court cannot deny leave of court because of a view that the defendant should stand trial notwithstanding the prosecution’s desire to dismiss the charges, or a view that any remaining charges fail adequately to redress the gravity of the defendant’s alleged conduct. The authority to make such determinations remains with the Executive.”

The Fokker decision was a 2016 decision from the D.C. Circuit Court and, as such, establishes “mandatory precedent,” i.e., precedent that must be followed, by all D.C. district court judges—including Judge Sullivan. Thus, Judge Sullivan’s directive that Judge Gleeson, as amicus curiae, should “present arguments in opposition to the government’s Motion to Dismiss,” cannot stand: It conflicts with controlling circuit court precedent, and more significantly with the U.S. Constitution."




So what NOW?


'While Judge Sullivan has not yet ruled on the government’s Motion to Dismiss, his mere attempt to usurp the executive branch’s authority must be addressed, and now. The government should, as it did in Fokker, seek a writ of mandamus from the D.C. Circuit, directing the charge against Flynn be dismissed.

The government should also seek reassignment of the case on remand, meaning that when the case returns to the lower court for dismissal of the charge, it goes to a different judge.'




SULLIVAN'S OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO THWART THE DISMISAL OF THE CASE

The same day Judge Sullivan named Judge Gleeson to serve in the amicus curiae role, the Washington Post ran an op-ed co-authored by Gleeson, entitled, “The Flynn case isn’t over until the judge says it’s over.” “The Justice Department’s move to dismiss the prosecution of former national security adviser Michael Flynn does not need to be the end of the case—and it shouldn’t be,” he opened. Then, after misrepresenting the Rule 48(b)’s “leave of court” requirement, Gleeson suggests dismissal of the Flynn case would be inappropriate because “the record reeks of improper political influence.”

No, what reeks is Judge Sullivan’s selection of a clearly biased “friend of the court” who appears to have already pre-judged the prosecutor’s motive and found it improper. Judge Sullivan surely knew of Gleeson’s bent and just as surely shares it.

There were several earlier glimpses of Judge Sullivan’s bias.





The above link is what needs to be done.
 
Sullivan cited case precedent to affirm that the amicus brief is generally permissible “when a party is not represented competently or is not represented at all, when the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected by the decision in the present case (though not enough affected to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in the present case), or when the amicus has unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.” Because there has been little to no precedent for how to handle this situation of the DOJ suddenly dropping the case after years of litigation and postponing, Sullivan held it to be appropriate to allow the submission of any amicus briefs.
 
The Justice Department’s motion to dismiss the case against former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn is flawed in many ways, but one of its weakest arguments is that the investigation of Flynn was not properly “predicated.” This argument not only lacks merit—it also opens the door to the same frivolous argument from future defendants in other criminal cases. And it creates a dangerous incentive that could dissuade the FBI from fulfilling its duty to fully investigate criminal and national security threats.


Barr's entire canard is founded on a pile of ridiculous horseshit.
 

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