Fed appeals court just said funding the healthcare law is uncontitutional

Appeals Court Rules That Individual Mandate in Obama's Health Care Law Is Unconstitutional


The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

In a split decision, a three-judge panel on the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the health care law's individual mandate exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause powers and is therefore unconstitutional. However, unlike the district court ruling preceding this case, the judges found the mandate to be "severable" and thus holds that the rest of the law can stand.

..."concluded that the individual mandate exceeded congressional authority under Article I of the Constitution because it was not enacted pursuant to Congress's tax power and it exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause."
11th Circuit: Health Care Law's Individual Mandate Is Unconstitutional | TPMDC


This is the first Democrat-appointee found against ObamaCare.
 
Appeals Court Rules That Individual Mandate in Obama's Health Care Law Is Unconstitutional


The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

So what? You'll just end up paying for the uninsureds emergency room care as always.
 
Appeals Court Rules That Individual Mandate in Obama's Health Care Law Is Unconstitutional


The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

So what? You'll just end up paying for the uninsureds emergency room care as always.

Wrong again, Karnak.

Massachusetts has the ObamaCare model...and guess what:

ER visits, costs in Mass. climb

Questions raised about healthcare law's impact on overuse

By Liz Kowalczyk
Globe Staff / April 24, 2009


More people are seeking care in hospital emergency rooms, and the cost of caring for ER patients has soared 17 percent over two years, despite efforts to direct patients with nonurgent problems to primary care doctors instead, according to new state data. ER visits, costs in Mass. climb - The Boston Globe
 
The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

No, it isn't the funding part (the funding part is "Title IX--Revenue Provisions"). That part, like virtually all of the ACA, isn't touched by this ruling.
 
Sounds like they made an error, and should have ruled the whole thing unconstitutional, as the obamacare law had no severability clause.
 
They laid out their logic pretty clearly. I was unaware of the blue text and found that fascinating. If I recall correctly, the earlier ruling that struck down the entire law relied heavily on the provision in the earlier House bill in its argument; the blue facts noted in the decision today pretty neatly eliminate that line of reasoning.

VII. SEVERABILITY

We now turn to whether the individual mandate, found in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, can be severed from the remainder of the 975-page Act.

A. Governing Principles

In analyzing this question, we start with the settled premise that severability is fundamentally rooted in a respect for separation of powers and notions of judicial restraint. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329–30, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967–68 (2006). Courts must “strive to salvage” acts of Congress by severing any constitutionally infirm provisions “while leaving the remainder intact.” Id. at 329, 126 S. Ct. at 967–68. “[T]he presumption is in favor of severability.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653, 104 S. Ct. 3262, 3269 (1984).

In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Supreme Court has opted to sever the constitutionally defective provision from the remainder of the statute. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010) (holding tenure provision severable from Sarbanes-Oxley Act); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186–187, 112 S. Ct. at 2434 (holding take-title provision severable from Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684–97, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 1479–86 (1987) (holding legislative veto provision severable from Airline Deregulation Act of 1978); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931–35, 103 S. Ct. at 2774–76 (holding legislative veto provision severable from Immigration and Nationality Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108–09, 96 S. Ct. 612, 677 (1976) (holding campaign expenditure limits severable from public financing provisions in Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).136

Indeed, in the Commerce Clause context, the Supreme Court struck down an important provision of a statute and left the remainder of the statute intact. In Morrison, the Court invalidated only one provision—the civil remedies provision for victims of gender-based violence. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605, 627, 120 S. Ct. at 1747, 1759. The Supreme Court did not invalidate the entire VAWA—or the omnibus Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, of which it was part—even though the text of the two bills did not contain a severability clause.

As these cases amply demonstrate, the Supreme Court has declined to invalidate more of a statute than is absolutely necessary. Rather, “when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328, 126 S. Ct. at 967. Because “[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people,” courts should “act cautiously” and “refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.” Regan, 468 U.S. at 652, 104 S. Ct. at 3269.

The Supreme Court’s test for severability is “well-established”: “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684, 107 S. Ct. at 1480 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court remarked in Chadha, divining legislative intent in the absence of a severability or non-severability clause can be an “elusive” enterprise. 462 U.S. at 932, 103 S. Ct. at 2774.

B. Wholesale Invalidation

Applying these principles, we conclude that the district court erred in its decision to invalidate the entire Act. Excising the individual mandate from the Act does not prevent the remaining provisions from being “fully operative as a law.” As our exhaustive review of the Act’s myriad provisions in Appendix A demonstrates, the lion’s share of the Act has nothing to do with private insurance, much less the mandate that individuals buy insurance. While such wholly unrelated provisions are too numerous to bear repeating, representative examples include provisions establishing reasonable break time for nursing mothers, 29 U.S.C. § 207(r); epidemiology-laboratory capacity grants, 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-31; an HHS study on urban Medicare-dependent hospitals, id. § 1395ww note; restoration of funding for abstinence education, id. § 710; and an excise tax on indoor tanning salons, 26 U.S.C. § 5000B.

In invalidating the entire Act, the district court placed undue emphasis on the Act’s lack of a severability clause. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. HHS, No. 3:10-CV- 91-RV/EMT, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683, at *35–36 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). Supreme Court precedent confirms that the “ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause.” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1218 n.27 (1968). Rather, “Congress’ silence is just that—silence—and does not raise a presumption against severability.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686, 107 S. Ct. at 1481.

Nevertheless, the district court emphasized that an early version of Congress’s health reform bill did contain a severability clause. Congress’s failure to include such a clause in the final bill, the district court reasoned, “can be viewed as strong evidence that Congress recognized the Act could not operate as intended without the individual mandate.” Florida v. HHS, 2011 WL 285683, at *36. The district court pushes this inference too far.

First, both the Senate and House legislative drafting manuals state that, in light of Supreme Court precedent in favor of severability, severability clauses are unnecessary unless they specifically state that all or some portions of a statute should not be severed. See Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, Legislative Drafting Manual, § 131 (Feb. 1997) (providing that “a severability clause is unnecessary” but distinguishing a “nonseverability clause,” which “provides that if a specific portion of an Act is declared invalid, the whole Act or some portion of the Act shall be invalid”); Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, § 328 (Nov. 1995) (stating that “a severability clause is unnecessary unless it provides in detail which related provisions are to fall, and which are not to fall, if a specified key provision is held invalid”).

Second, the clause present in one early version of the Act was a general severability clause, not a non-severability clause. See H.R. Rep. No 111-299, pt. 3, at 17 § 155 (2009), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 474, 537 (“If any provision of this Act . . . is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the provisions of this Act . . . shall not be affected.”). Thus, according to Congress’s own drafting manuals, the severability clause was unnecessary, and its removal should not be read as any indicator of legislative intent against severability. Rather, the removal of the severability clause, in short, has no probative impact on the severability question before us.


In light of the stand-alone nature of hundreds of the Act’s provisions and their manifest lack of connection to the individual mandate, the plaintiffs have not met the heavy burden needed to rebut the presumption of severability. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in its wholesale invalidation of the Act.
 
Look what is going on in England. They have all these entitlements and they abuse the system. If we get Obamacare we are socialist period. This country was founded on a REPUBLIC not a democracy or socialist
 
The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

No, it isn't the funding part (the funding part is "Title IX--Revenue Provisions"). That part, like virtually all of the ACA, isn't touched by this ruling.

The mandate is what the insurance companies said was required in order to make the "reforms" economically viable, which is why it was not written into law as a tax, but as a penalty if a person did not participate.
 
They laid out their logic pretty clearly. I was unaware of the blue text and found that fascinating. If I recall correctly, the earlier ruling that struck down the entire law relied heavily on the provision in the earlier House bill in its argument; the blue facts noted in the decision today pretty neatly eliminate that line of reasoning.

VII. SEVERABILITY

We now turn to whether the individual mandate, found in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, can be severed from the remainder of the 975-page Act.

A. Governing Principles

In analyzing this question, we start with the settled premise that severability is fundamentally rooted in a respect for separation of powers and notions of judicial restraint. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329–30, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967–68 (2006). Courts must “strive to salvage” acts of Congress by severing any constitutionally infirm provisions “while leaving the remainder intact.” Id. at 329, 126 S. Ct. at 967–68. “[T]he presumption is in favor of severability.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653, 104 S. Ct. 3262, 3269 (1984).

In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Supreme Court has opted to sever the constitutionally defective provision from the remainder of the statute. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010) (holding tenure provision severable from Sarbanes-Oxley Act); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186–187, 112 S. Ct. at 2434 (holding take-title provision severable from Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684–97, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 1479–86 (1987) (holding legislative veto provision severable from Airline Deregulation Act of 1978); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931–35, 103 S. Ct. at 2774–76 (holding legislative veto provision severable from Immigration and Nationality Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108–09, 96 S. Ct. 612, 677 (1976) (holding campaign expenditure limits severable from public financing provisions in Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).136

Indeed, in the Commerce Clause context, the Supreme Court struck down an important provision of a statute and left the remainder of the statute intact. In Morrison, the Court invalidated only one provision—the civil remedies provision for victims of gender-based violence. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605, 627, 120 S. Ct. at 1747, 1759. The Supreme Court did not invalidate the entire VAWA—or the omnibus Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, of which it was part—even though the text of the two bills did not contain a severability clause.

As these cases amply demonstrate, the Supreme Court has declined to invalidate more of a statute than is absolutely necessary. Rather, “when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem.” Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328, 126 S. Ct. at 967. Because “[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people,” courts should “act cautiously” and “refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.” Regan, 468 U.S. at 652, 104 S. Ct. at 3269.

The Supreme Court’s test for severability is “well-established”: “Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684, 107 S. Ct. at 1480 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court remarked in Chadha, divining legislative intent in the absence of a severability or non-severability clause can be an “elusive” enterprise. 462 U.S. at 932, 103 S. Ct. at 2774.

B. Wholesale Invalidation

Applying these principles, we conclude that the district court erred in its decision to invalidate the entire Act. Excising the individual mandate from the Act does not prevent the remaining provisions from being “fully operative as a law.” As our exhaustive review of the Act’s myriad provisions in Appendix A demonstrates, the lion’s share of the Act has nothing to do with private insurance, much less the mandate that individuals buy insurance. While such wholly unrelated provisions are too numerous to bear repeating, representative examples include provisions establishing reasonable break time for nursing mothers, 29 U.S.C. § 207(r); epidemiology-laboratory capacity grants, 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-31; an HHS study on urban Medicare-dependent hospitals, id. § 1395ww note; restoration of funding for abstinence education, id. § 710; and an excise tax on indoor tanning salons, 26 U.S.C. § 5000B.

In invalidating the entire Act, the district court placed undue emphasis on the Act’s lack of a severability clause. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. HHS, No. 3:10-CV- 91-RV/EMT, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683, at *35–36 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). Supreme Court precedent confirms that the “ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause.” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 1218 n.27 (1968). Rather, “Congress’ silence is just that—silence—and does not raise a presumption against severability.” Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686, 107 S. Ct. at 1481.

Nevertheless, the district court emphasized that an early version of Congress’s health reform bill did contain a severability clause. Congress’s failure to include such a clause in the final bill, the district court reasoned, “can be viewed as strong evidence that Congress recognized the Act could not operate as intended without the individual mandate.” Florida v. HHS, 2011 WL 285683, at *36. The district court pushes this inference too far.

First, both the Senate and House legislative drafting manuals state that, in light of Supreme Court precedent in favor of severability, severability clauses are unnecessary unless they specifically state that all or some portions of a statute should not be severed. See Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, Legislative Drafting Manual, § 131 (Feb. 1997) (providing that “a severability clause is unnecessary” but distinguishing a “nonseverability clause,” which “provides that if a specific portion of an Act is declared invalid, the whole Act or some portion of the Act shall be invalid”); Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, § 328 (Nov. 1995) (stating that “a severability clause is unnecessary unless it provides in detail which related provisions are to fall, and which are not to fall, if a specified key provision is held invalid”).

Second, the clause present in one early version of the Act was a general severability clause, not a non-severability clause. See H.R. Rep. No 111-299, pt. 3, at 17 § 155 (2009), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 474, 537 (“If any provision of this Act . . . is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the provisions of this Act . . . shall not be affected.”). Thus, according to Congress’s own drafting manuals, the severability clause was unnecessary, and its removal should not be read as any indicator of legislative intent against severability. Rather, the removal of the severability clause, in short, has no probative impact on the severability question before us.


In light of the stand-alone nature of hundreds of the Act’s provisions and their manifest lack of connection to the individual mandate, the plaintiffs have not met the heavy burden needed to rebut the presumption of severability. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in its wholesale invalidation of the Act.

How is it that you always have access to things even when the court servers are so heavily trafficked that they collapse under the weight?
 
How is it that you always have access to things even when the court servers are so heavily trafficked that they collapse under the weight?

My prowess in accessing publicly available documents is legendary.

Csm1.jpg
 
Appeals Court Rules That Individual Mandate in Obama's Health Care Law Is Unconstitutional


The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

In a split decision, a three-judge panel on the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the health care law's individual mandate exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause powers and is therefore unconstitutional. However, unlike the district court ruling preceding this case, the judges found the mandate to be "severable" and thus holds that the rest of the law can stand.

..."concluded that the individual mandate exceeded congressional authority under Article I of the Constitution because it was not enacted pursuant to Congress's tax power and it exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause."
11th Circuit: Health Care Law's Individual Mandate Is Unconstitutional | TPMDC


This is the first Democrat-appointee found against ObamaCare.
That dem balances out Federalist Society poster boy (well maybe no longer) Jeffrey Sutton of the 6th Circuit who pretty much destroyed his chance of every being on the USSC when he sided with Dem B Martin in a 2-1 Decision (district Court Judge Graham sitting by designation dissented) upholding Obumble care
 
Robert Alt, senior legal fellow and deputy director of the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation, estimates an 85 percent chance the Supreme Court will rule on the various appeals in June 2012.
“It was sharply worded,” Alt said of the 11th Circuit ruling. “But I think it was sharply worded in part because of the very serious constitutional problems that are inherent in the statute.”

Alt predicted that if the Supreme Court invalidates the individual mandate but leaves intact other provisions of the bill such as the stipulation that consumers must be covered for pre-existing conditions, Congress would have no choice but to act to keep insurance firms in business.

“The Obama administration has argued that if you strike down the mandate and require everything else, it will lead to what they call ‘the ineluctable failure’ of the healthcare market in the United States,” he said.

“Essentially, the health insurers couldn’t continue to operate like that. That’s an example of why Judge Vinson got it right in the lower court. … The statute just doesn’t operate without the mandate. You can’t really carve that out and make it work.”

Alt predicted a mixed Supreme Court verdict along the lines of the 11th Circuit ruling would lead to “pretty heavy lifting right away by Congress. Otherwise the insurance industry would get gutted by this.”


http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/...s/2011/08/12/id/407163?s=al&promo_code=CD47-1
 
Appeals Court Rules That Individual Mandate in Obama's Health Care Law Is Unconstitutional


The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

So what? You'll just end up paying for the uninsureds emergency room care as always.

Wrong again, Karnak.

Massachusetts has the ObamaCare model...and guess what:

ER visits, costs in Mass. climb

Questions raised about healthcare law's impact on overuse

By Liz Kowalczyk
Globe Staff / April 24, 2009


More people are seeking care in hospital emergency rooms, and the cost of caring for ER patients has soared 17 percent over two years, despite efforts to direct patients with nonurgent problems to primary care doctors instead, according to new state data. ER visits, costs in Mass. climb - The Boston Globe

Good job linking to an article I have to pay to read.

jeezus
 
So what? You'll just end up paying for the uninsureds emergency room care as always.

Wrong again, Karnak.

Massachusetts has the ObamaCare model...and guess what:

ER visits, costs in Mass. climb

Questions raised about healthcare law's impact on overuse

By Liz Kowalczyk
Globe Staff / April 24, 2009


More people are seeking care in hospital emergency rooms, and the cost of caring for ER patients has soared 17 percent over two years, despite efforts to direct patients with nonurgent problems to primary care doctors instead, according to new state data. ER visits, costs in Mass. climb - The Boston Globe

Good job linking to an article I have to pay to read.

jeezus

It's common knowledge that Massachusetts socialized health care is a money pit......

failure of Massachusetts health care - Google Search

There are only 19,400,000 web pages that discuss this fact.
 
Appeals Court Rules That Individual Mandate in Obama's Health Care Law Is Unconstitutional


The individual is the funding part... but they say the rest of law might stand how is it going to stand with no money:clap2:

So what? You'll just end up paying for the uninsureds emergency room care as always.
A part of the solution for that is to kick the illegal aliens out of this country. That would save a big chunk.
 

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