Are you quoting the bill itself with that "NO BAILOUTS" information or something else?
Yes, that's from the bill passed by the House last November, H.R. 3962 (the final, post-mark-up, iteration of the original, H.R. 3200).
The "administrative expenses" that you mention are not something that the government has to worry about, they simply pass those expenses off on the tax payer or should I say our great grandchildren at the moment. And if the tax dollars collected in a given year for this legislation are insufficient to cover the expenses, the government simply passes the short fall off on to future generations just as they are doing with Social Security, not to mention every other social endeavor the government attempts. It is called the deficit and right now, this country is drowning in red ink.
Again, the public option wouldn't be funded like Medicare or Social Security. Medicare is partially funded by premiums. A public option would be
entirely funded by premiums; that's a requirement of the law. Tax revenues play no part in its operation, beyond the refundable tax credit offered to anyone with income below 400% FPL buying coverage in an exchange. Or as the legislation itself read:
(a) Establishment of Premiums-
(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary shall establish geographically adjusted premium rates for the public health insurance option--
(A) in a manner that complies with the premium rules established by the Commissioner under section 213 for Exchange-participating health benefits plans; and
(B) at a level sufficient to fully finance the costs of--
(i) health benefits provided by the public health insurance option; and
(ii) administrative costs related to operating the public health insurance option.
(2) CONTINGENCY MARGIN- In establishing premium rates under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall include an appropriate amount for a contingency margin (which shall be not less than 90 days of estimated claims). Before setting such appropriate amount for years starting with Y3, the Secretary shall solicit a recommendation on such amount from the American Academy of Actuaries.
Eliminating price competition is only one part of the problem. Another problem is that when the government has driven the other insurers out of the market, then the government will dictate to the providers (as they already do with Medicare) what the providers will receive for their services. There will be no "negotiating" as there is in today's market between the health care provider and the insurers. The government will inform the providers what the government will pay and that will be all that there is to it. That will in effect drive the quality of health care down the toilet and force good doctors into other professions or retirement.
That's the key feature of the robust public option (i.e. the original version found in H.R. 3200): it starts with the Medicare provider network, though providers may opt-out, and it pegs reimbursements to Medicare rates + 5% for the first few years. The negotiated rates public option, which would be much less effective, was what eventually passed the House. And of course ultimately no public option became law.
As I've argued before, the idea behind the public option was never that the public option would became the only insurer or that all insurance would eventually reimburse at rates set like Medicare rates (not least because the proposed public option was limited to the exchanges, which is
not where the large majority of people will be buying their coverage). Instead, it would've put pressure on private insurers and providers alike to start controlling costs. The reason, of course, is that since the robust public option would have reimbursed at lower rates than private insurers, its premiums would be lower.
Insurers would face pressure to negotiate lower reimbursement rates to keep their own premiums down and providers would have an incentive to grant lower rates, lest more customers flock toward the public option (an outcome that would lower reimbursements to those providers more than would granting private insurers lower--but still higher than public option--rates). As I said above, the intent wasn't for it to take over the market but rather to reshape the landscape in which the insurer-provider negotiation takes place. In one sense, it would have given private insurers cover (and leverage--something payers
lack in many areas) to start bringing down rates. The public option would be most effective if it actually had relatively few customers but succeeded in narrowing the gap between its administratively set rates and the average negotiated private payer rate. That's the most important point that was never stressed enough:
the point of the public option was to change the way private payers and providers interact with each other, not scoop up everyone's customers.
Now, as I mentioned, all-payer rate setting can close the gap between the private (negotiated) and public (administratively set) payments and overcome the cost-driving influences of provider consolidation in numerous markets in a much less cutesy way. But that would require lots of effort on the part of states (only Maryland currently has an all-payer rate setting system in place), whereas a public option would be a problem for the feds alone. But at very least, using all-payer rate setting instead of a public option would presumably assuage your fears that there's some plot afoot to destroy private insurance, even though it's arguably more heavy-handed.