Thank you fo demonstrating that you have no rational or factual basis for your opinion,; no amount of prepubescent posturing will change this.
Again, you have no rational or factual basis for your opinion.
Scalia:
Justice Stevens places overwhelming reliance upon this Court’s decision in
United States v.
Miller,
307 U. S. 174 (1939) . ...
Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of Justice Stevens’ case.
Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a
Second Amendment challenge two men’s federal convictions for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat.
1236. It is entirely clear that the Court’s basis for saying that the
Second Amendment did not apply was
not that the defendants were “bear[ing] arms” not “for … military purposes” but for “nonmilitary use,”
post, at 2
. Rather, it was that the
type of weapon at issue was not eligible for
Second Amendment protection: “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
such an instrument.” 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). “Certainly,” the Court continued, “it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.”
Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right.
This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the
Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that “have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”). Had the Court believed that the
Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. Justice Stevens can say again and again that
Miller did “not turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns, it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns,”
post, at 42–43, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most Justice Stevens can plausibly claim for
Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the
Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General’s argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, pp. 4–5.
Miller stands only for the proposition that the
Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.
It is particularly wrongheaded to read
Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the
Second Amendment .