US to withdraw from NATO?

[Old Rocks]

I cannot think of anything that Putin would like more than to see the US withdraw from NATO. Having achieved nothing but chaos with his vastly unpopular war in Iran, one we started, Trump is once again doing the bidding of his KBG master in the Kremlin.

MSN

 

[rightwinger]

Why Putin wanted Trump

 

[theHawk]

I cannot think of anything that Putin would like more than to see the US withdraw from NATO. Having achieved nothing but chaos with his vastly unpopular war in Iran, one we started, Trump is once again doing the bidding of his KBG master in the Kremlin.

MSN

We’ve been at war with Iran for nearly 50 years.

They’ve killed over 1000 Americans since 1979.

 

[Invisibleflash]

I cannot think of anything that Putin would like more than to see the US withdraw from NATO. Having achieved nothing but chaos with his vastly unpopular war in Iran, one we started, Trump is once again doing the bidding of his KBG master in the Kremlin.

MSN

????

Some YT'ers speculate Trump may announce the USA is leaving NATO tonight on TV.

or...

Trump may announce the Iran war is over and just pull out and leave the mess to the Jews and Europeans.

or...

Trump may announce an escalation and draft.

or...

Trump may say the war is over and do a sneak attack a few days later.

No one knows.

 

[Dorian Mode]

Europe can take care of itself. It's time to withdraw from NATO and the Ukraine war. Ukraine is Europe's problem now.

 

[Dorian Mode]

????

Some speculate he may announce the USA is leaving NATO tonight on TV.

or...

Trump may announce the Iran war is over and just pull out and leave the mess to the Jews and Europeans.

or...

Trump may announce an escalation and draft.

No one knows.


View attachment 1238087

I think Trump has to get congress's approval to withdrawal officially, but he can stop spending and withdrawal from Europe as much as he wants.

 

[Zincwarrior]

Minor issue about a Federal law Congress passed just so Trump couldn't.

 

[rightwinger]

 

[kyzr]

I cannot think of anything that Putin would like more than to see the US withdraw from NATO. Having achieved nothing but chaos with his vastly unpopular war in Iran, one we started, Trump is once again doing the bidding of his KBG master in the Kremlin.

1. The president cannot withdraw from NATO without House and senate approval
2. If you dig into the EU "nuclear umbrella" it isn't there. The US has the only NATO nuclear umbrella.
3. If Putin nukes a NATO country would the US nuke Russia?

 

[Zincwarrior]

1. The president cannot withdraw from NATO without House and senate approval
2. If you dig into the EU "nuclear umbrella" it isn't there. The US has the only NATO nuclear umbrella.
3. If Putin nukes a NATO country would the US nuke Russia?

Thats been a real question for quite a while.

 

[IM2]

We’ve been at war with Iran for nearly 50 years.

They’ve killed over 1000 Americans since 1979.

It's sad how blind some Americans choose to be.

Few events in modern Middle Eastern history have left as deep a scar as the coup of August 1953 that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. In one decisive episode, a democratically elected leader was removed in a covert Anglo-American operation, foreign powers reasserted control over Iranian oil, and the Shah’s autocracy was restored. For many Iranians, the coup became the symbol of Western betrayal, setting the stage for decades of anti-imperialism and fueling the anger that erupted in the 1979 revolution.

This article examines the coup’s origins, course, and legacy — situating it in the context of Iranian nationalism, Anglo-American oil interests, Cold War strategy, and the long-term resentment it bred.

Mohammad Mosaddegh and the National Front​

Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882–1967) was an aristocratic landowner, educated in Europe, and a passionate constitutionalist. He entered politics during the constitutional movement and became known for his integrity and nationalism. By the late 1940s he had emerged as leader of the National Front, a coalition of nationalists, intellectuals, and bazaar merchants.

Mosaddegh’s central demand was simple: Iran must control its own oil. In 1951, amid mounting anger at Anglo-Iranian’s monopoly, the Majles (parliament) voted to nationalize the oil industry. Mosaddegh became prime minister and implemented the law. For many Iranians, this was a moment of pride and sovereignty restored. Crowds chanted his name, and he became a national hero.

Britain reacted furiously. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company lost its most valuable asset. London imposed a global boycott of Iranian oil, froze assets, and took the case to the International Court of Justice. The ICJ, however, ruled in 1952 that it had no jurisdiction. The United Nations Security Council also failed to condemn Iran, as Mosaddegh personally traveled to New York and made a passionate case for national sovereignty. His dignified speeches won international sympathy.

Yet the boycott devastated Iran’s economy. Oil revenues collapsed, government finances strained, and inflation rose. Mosaddegh responded by mobilizing nationalist fervor, expanding emergency powers, and marginalizing opponents. His popularity remained high, but political divisions deepened.

Britain and America: From Rivalry to Collaboration​

Initially, Britain sought to manage the crisis alone. British leaders hoped to topple Mosaddegh and reinstall a pliant government. They planned covert operations but lacked the ability to act without U.S. support.

James Barr highlights how Britain, desperate to preserve its declining Middle Eastern empire, persuaded Washington by framing the crisis as part of the global contest with Moscow. In Lords of the Desert, Barr shows that British fears of losing influence meshed with American fears of communist expansion.

The CIA, under Allen Dulles, and MI6 together devised a plan: Operation Ajax. Its aim was to depose Mosaddegh and strengthen the Shah. Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, was chosen to lead the covert operation in Tehran.

Operation Ajax: The Coup of 1953​

The plan involved propaganda, political manipulation, and street action. CIA and MI6 operatives funded opposition newspapers, spread disinformation, and bribed politicians, clerics, and military officers. They portrayed Mosaddegh as a communist sympathizer and a threat to Islam.

In August 1953 the Shah, under pressure, signed decrees dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. Initially, the coup faltered: Mosaddegh’s supporters resisted, and the Shah fled to Rome in panic.

But Roosevelt and his team regrouped. They mobilized paid demonstrators and allied military units. On August 19, violent clashes erupted in Tehran. Pro-coup forces, including elements of the army and street mobs, stormed Mosaddegh’s residence. After heavy fighting, Mosaddegh’s government collapsed. He was arrested, tried, and sentenced to house arrest until his death in 1967.

Zahedi assumed power, and the Shah returned triumphantly. The Anglo-American operation had succeeded.

Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men describes this as the CIA’s “first great success,” but also a Pandora’s box that would haunt U.S. policy. Kapuściński, writing with literary flair, cast the coup as a tragic betrayal of a nation’s hopes. Robert Fisk later observed that 1953 was “the original sin” of Western involvement in Iran, remembered bitterly for decades.

The coup’s consequences were profound.​

Domestic Authoritarianism: The Shah, restored to power, ruled with increasing autocracy for the next 25 years. His reliance on Western backing and his creation of SAVAK deepened repression.

National Humiliation: The coup became a collective memory of betrayal. When revolution erupted in 1979, chants of “Death to America” and “Death to England” drew directly on the memory of 1953.

Cold War Geopolitics: For Washington, Iran became a key ally, hosting U.S. military bases and serving as a pillar of containment. Yet the very alliance sowed the seeds of future estrangement.

Oil Nationalism: Although Mosaddegh was defeated, the principle of oil sovereignty remained powerful. Later OPEC revolts against Western oil companies drew inspiration from Iran’s example.

Enduring Distrust: The coup poisoned U.S.–Iran relations. Even today, Iranian leaders cite 1953 as proof of American duplicity. For many Iranians, the coup explains why foreign influence must be resisted at all costs.

Conclusion​

The coup of 1953 was a turning point in modern Iran. It crushed a democratic experiment, restored an autocratic Shah, and reasserted Western control over oil. For the United States and Britain, it was a Cold War victory; for Iranians, it was a national trauma. Its legacy shaped the revolutionary anger of 1979 and continues to color relations between Iran and the West.

The 1953 Coup: Oil, Mosaddegh, and the Roots of Iranian Resentment - Explaining History Podcast

In one decisive episode, a democratically elected leader was removed in a covert Anglo-American operation, foreign powers reasserted control over Iranian oil, and the Shah’s autocracy was restored.

explaininghistory.org

You would not appreciate another country coming in here, removing our president then installing someone they wanted to lead. Yet that is what we did to Iran, and idiots like you talk stupid.