Annie
Diamond Member
- Nov 22, 2003
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I doubt that we'll get closer, unless the terrorists decide to target our other foes. Come to think of it they have, the Euros just refuse to leave denial. Somehow I think that rug will eventually be pulled from under them. Links at site:
http://medienkritik.typepad.com/blog/2005/08/schroeder_won_t.html
http://medienkritik.typepad.com/blog/2005/08/schroeder_won_t.html
Schroeder Won the Right to Lose His Job
Germany's Bundesverfassungsgericht (constitutional court) cleared the way for a general election on September 18, 2005. So Schroeder got his will - and will with certainty lose his chancellor job as a result of this election. Its safe to predict the same fate for foreign minister Fischer.
I'm just not sure what a new government will mean for German-American relations. A change in style: definitely. Chancellor Angela Merkel would not publicly criticize or "warn" the U.S. government in the arrogant manner Schroeder or Fischer did against "going alone" or using military means in Iraq or Iran.
But don't expect a change in substance. The next German government will not contribute a soldier or even a penny to military actions aimed at solving problems in Iraq or Iran. A Merkel government will most likely actively try to convince the U.S. government to turn to peaceful, "soft", diplomatic approaches in dealing with the Mullahs in Iran or the terrorist insurgents in Iraq. No chance for German support for the current U.S. administration in the UN Security Council, if German should become a permanent member.
This SPIEGEL interview with Wolfgang Gerhardt foreshadows the foreign policy of the next German government, at least if the Free Democrats (FDP) will be coalition partner of Merkel's CDU/CSU. Gerhardt, currently chairman of the FDP faction in the Bundestag, the German parliament, about the Iran crisis:
SPIEGEL: ... President George W. Bush says: "all options are on the table."
Gerhardt: There isn't any realistic chance of military action because the US cannot afford to overstrain itself. (...)
SPIEGEL: Wolfgang Schäuble, the conservatives' (CDU) foreign policy expert, is demanding a demonstration of unity with the US. On the Iran question he is therefore much closer to Bush than you are.
Gerhardt: We (the liberals) differed with Mr. Schäuble over the war in Iraq, and the same is true here. The US has found peace with India and Pakistan, both of whom acquired nuclear power status through their contempt for the non-proliferation treaty. If it's acceptable there, one can hardly threaten another country -- with which, incidentally, negotiations are ongoing -- with the military option.
SPIEGEL: So you don't want to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb at any price?
Gerhardt: "At any price" always means: it's my way or the highway! That's not a policy which sits comfortably in the tradition of German foreign diplomacy.
The "tradition of German foreign diplomacy" of course refers to FDP's Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany's foreign minister for 18 years under chancellors Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl. A leading German journalist, Josef Joffe, wrote:
Genscher was the master tactician-so much so that Richard Burt, the U.S. ambassador in the early 1980s, would end up calling him a "slippery man." The compliment was hardly misplaced, for Genscher was indeed hard to pin down. What did he want, and where did he want to take his country? From his rhetoric, it was usually impossible to tell.
He loved to wrap himself in the fog of bienpensant oratory. Genscher, the diplomat's diplomat, was an exemplar of political correctness before PC was even a gleam in a
e deconstructionist's eye. His favorite shibboleths were "bloc-transcendence," "peace order," "responsibility," "cooperation." He would drive his Western allies to distraction by drenching them with verbiage, and before the stuff was translated into halfway comprehensible English, he was off on yet another trip to yet another capital where the nuances of his demarches were ever so slightly different. He probably spent more time in the air than in his office on Bonn's Adenauerallee.
Did he say one thing and do another, as the Americans and the British always suspected? Such an indictment would hardly hold up in a court of law because Genscher's discourse was so voluble and so cloudy as to flummox even the most hardened prosecutor. To do an interview with him meant transcribing 6,000 words and then whittling them down to about 1,200-and usually without the benefit of a single memorable quote. (...)
He, Genscher, had always understood that Saddam wanted "hegemony in the region" while "some of our important allies had supported [his] regime for years with arms shipments . . ." Having scored his point, he explains why Bonn could not commit armed forces to the allied cause (in 1990). The army "was not prepared"; there was a constitutional ban on out-of-area operations (which the Constitutional Court has since declared nonexistent); there was the "fragile Two-plus-Four [reunification] process" with the Russians, who had, after all, been "close" Iraqi allies.
Seeking to avoid damage and to maximize their influence, brokers never commit completely to either side-that is the essence of their game, and Genscher was a virtuoso at it. (emphasis added)
Its a safe bet to expect a continuation of the "tradition of German foreign diplomacy" past Schroeder, whoever holds the helm of foreign policy. CDU's Schäuble would possibly steer a different, more realistic course, but he will only get a chance to become foreign minister in case of an absolute majority for the CDU/CSU and that is unlikely to happen.
August 25, 2005 at 02:43 PM