Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature currently requires accessing the site using the built-in Safari browser.
The National Security Agency is using complex analysis of electronic surveillance, rather than human intelligence, as the primary method to locate targets for lethal drone strikes an unreliable tactic that results in the deaths of innocent or unidentified people.
According to a former drone operator for the militarys Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who also worked with the NSA, the agency often identifies targets based on controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking technologies. Rather than confirming a targets identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the U.S. military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using.
The drone operator, who agreed to discuss the top-secret programs on the condition of anonymity, was a member of JSOCs High Value Targeting task force, which is charged with identifying, capturing or killing terrorist suspects in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Relying on this method, says the former JSOC drone operator, means that the wrong people could be killed due to metadata errors, particularly in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. We dont have people on the ground we dont have the same forces, informants, or information coming in from those areas as we do where we have a strong foothold, like we do in Afghanistan. I would say that its even more likely that mistakes are made in places such as Yemen or Somalia, and especially Pakistan.
As of May 2013, according to the former drone operator, President Obama had cleared 16 people in Yemen and five in Somalia for targeting in strikes. Before a strike is green-lit, he says, there must be at least two sources of intelligence. The problem is that both of those sources often involve NSA-supplied data, rather than human intelligence (HUMINT).
President Obama signs authorizations for hits that remain valid for 60 days. If a target cannot be located within that period, it must be reviewed and renewed. According to the former drone operator, it can take 18 months or longer to move from intelligence gathering to getting approval to actually carrying out a strike in Yemen. What that tells me, he says, is that commanders, once given the authorization needed to strike, are more likely to strike when they see an opportunity even if theres a high chance of civilians being killed, too because in their mind they might never get the chance to strike that target again.
The former JSOC drone operator, however, remains highly disturbed by the unreliability of such methods. Like other whistleblowers, including Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, he says that his efforts to alert his superiors to the problems were brushed off. The system continues to work because, like most things in the military, the people who use it trust it unconditionally, he says.
When he would raise objections about intelligence that was rushed or inaccurate or outright wrong, he adds, the most common response I would get was JSOC wouldnt spend millions and millions of dollars, and man hours, to go after someone if they werent certain that they were the right person. There is a saying at the NSA: SIGINT never lies. It may be true that SIGINT never lies, but its subject to human error.
