[Like the man describes it in the article "The Kamikaze labor Union" destroys the company it works for.
Obama set the stage for this when he bailed out the UAW with GM and Chrysler. The UAW inevitably caused their companies' failure, but they got the reward. A lot of other unions are going to take their cue from this. What's going to happen when the bulk of the voters who have no skin in the game, feel no pain from their actions, but reap their rewards determine the direction the country is headed in?. A president for life Obama and a personal wealth tax when not enough personal income is available to support the Obama pander fest?]
"The news about the bankruptcy of Hostess, maker of the Twinkie and other legendary junk foods, touched off some memories of growing up in a mid-sized Midwestern town in the 1970s and '80s. No, not that kind of memory, though come to think of it, the 1980s was the last time I actually ate a Hostess snack. What I'm recalling has a lot less nostalgic charm: the whole phenomenon of a kamikaze labor union that keeps demanding more for workers--who end up getting nothing when their employer goes belly-up.
That's pretty much what the unions did, or tried to do, to three of the big employers in our area, and it taught me some early lessons about the real nature of labor unions and of government intervention.
I grew up in an area known as the Quad Cities, a cluster of four towns in Illinois and Iowa, on opposite banks of the Mississippi River. The big local employers at the time were the Rock Island Arsenal, which made howitzers and machine guns for the US Army, the celebrated Rock Island Line, and two big manufacturers of farm equipment, John Deere and International Harvester.
What might strike you about this list is that half of these companies no longer exist. I watched them go down, and that's why the Hostess story seems so familiar.
Take the Rock Island Line, the popular name for the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad. The line's Wikipedia entry tells the story pretty much as I remember it, only worse.
"By the summer of 1979, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the United Transportation Union had accepted new agreements. The Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks (BRAC) held firm to their demand that pay increases be back dated to the expiration date of the previous agreement.
"The Rock Island offered to open the books to show the precarious financial condition of the road in an effort to get the BRAC in line with the other unions that had already signed agreements. Fred J. Kroll, president of the BRAC, declined the offer to audit the books of the Rock Island. Kroll pulled his BRAC clerks off the job in August, 1979. Picket lines went up at every terminal on the Rock Island's system and the operating brotherhoods honored the picket lines. The Rock Island ground to a halt."
Here's where it gets worse. The railroad was bouncing back and showing signs that it might survive the strike--so the government intervened to shut it down and finish it off for good. Why? Because the survival of a railroad was considered less important than the survival of a union.
"The Ingram management team operated as much of the Rock Island as they could. Trains slowly began to move, with more traffic being hauled every week of the strike. President Jimmy Carter issued a back-to-work order that BRAC dismissed. Still more traffic flowed on the strikebound Rock Island. Seeing the trains rolling despite the strike and fearing a Florida East Coast strikebreaking situation, the unions appealed to the [Federal Railway Administration] and [the Interstate Commerce Commission] for relief. Despite that Rock Island management had been able to move 80% of pre-strike tonnage, at the behest of the Carter administration, the ICC declared a transportation emergency declaring that the RI would not be able to move the 1979 grain harvest to market. The ICC issued a Directed Service Order authorizing the Kansas City Terminal Railway to take over operations....
"On January 24, 1980, Judge McGarr elected not to review the Rock Island's final plan of reorganization. Instead, Judge McGarr initiated the shutdown and liquidation of the Rock Island Railroad."
Then there was International Harvester.
"In 1979, IH named a new CEO, who was determined to improve profit margins and drastically cut a ballooning cost structure. Unprofitable model lines were terminated and factory production curtailed. By the end of the year, IH profits were at their highest in 10 years, but cash reserves were still too low. Union members became increasingly irate over production cutbacks and other cost-cutting measures. In the spring and summer of 1979, IH began short-term planning for a strike that seemed inevitable. Then on November 1, IH announced figures showing that president and chairman Archie McCardell received a $1.8 million (in 1979 values) bonus. McCardell sought overtime, work rule, and other changes from the UAW, which led to a strike on November 2, 1979.
"Soon after, the economy turned unfavorable, and IH faced a financial crisis. The strike lasted approximately six months. When it ended, IH had lost almost $600 million (in 1979 value; over $2 billion today).
"By 1981 the company's finances were at their lowest point ever. The strike, accompanied by the economy and internal corporate problems, had placed IH in a hole that had only a slim way out. Things only got worse until 1984, when the bitter end came.
"International Harvester, following long negotiations, agreed to sell its agricultural products division to Tenneco, Inc. on November 26, 1984.... Following the merger, tractor production at Harvester's Rock Island, Illinois, Farmall Works ceased in May 1985."...."
RealClearMarkets - The Parasite That Kills Its Hostess