Not true.
It is true that the Maastricht Treaty has been shredded by the likes of France and Germany, but that's not the fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is that there is no mechanism to counter-balance economic pressures within the eurozone.
For a currency union to work, when one region is economically depressed and another reason is booming, there must be some transfer between regions. In a well-functioning currency union, labour would flow freely from the depressed region to the booming region, and/or money flowing from the booming region to the depressed region.
The EU has a free market in labour but in practice, there are significant cultural barriers to the mass movement of labour from one region to another. A third of Greece is not going to move to Germany for example. And apart from the CAP and some infrastructure spending, there isn't much in the way of transfers from the rich to the poor areas, at least not in the scale required. Social programs that could alleviate the depressed region are funded mainly by national governments, not from Brussels, when what is needed is for the Germans to fund the Spanish unemployed.
This is why the eurozone was destined to fail. Economically weak regions need to be subsidized by the strong areas. Or the economically weak areas have to become more productive and efficient. The problem is thus a political one, not an economic one. But you have to either convince the northern countries to subsidize the southern countries forever, or the southern countries have to become more like the north, which is highly unlikely.
The capital transfer is happening independent from and EU has mechanisms (funds) to support poorer regions within the EU. Long before was introduced.
It equals 347 billion for current budget period of the EU.
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
German economy has been 2nd biggest capital exporter in world since 1990's after China. Only 24% of what has been generated in Germany has been reinvested in Germany. The rest went to foreign countries, also to the southern EU countries. Germany had the 2nd lowest growth within the EU since 90's and between 1998-2005 wages in Germany decreased in relation to the EU by 18%. The wages didn't really decrease but the wages elsewhere in EU skyrocketed.
Source is from IFO, which makes tax estimates for German Finance Ministry for next fiscal years.
In the meantime, Germany introduced some very painfully reforms and catapulted a 2-3rd world country (East-Germany) into a situation where infrastructure is even better than in West-Germany.
Countries like Greece meanwhile were on a big siesta could refinance with much lower costs on the markets () and overplayed (debt) by continuously violating the stability pact (Maastricht).
Now they're bankrupt, money is re-entering Germany with very positive effects (lowest unemployment since re-union with East-G.) and now those unproductive countries call for bailouts, Eurobonds.
I live in Germany and there is strong opposition to such kind of adventures and people think, that the other countries should go into austerity and make reforms, just like Germany did.
It is clear, that the German economic-system is one of most successful if not most successful in whole Western world. Like in evolution the fittest survive and there's no reason to continue uncompetitive habits and systems - and clearly not bailing them out for them to continue the same way.
60 billion a year isn't enough to mitigate the pressure in the south.
Germany an exporter of capital is what one would expect from a country that runs a trade surplus with its partners. Half of Germany's exports go to the rest of Europe, which is no surprise because Germany is more productive than the south. When countries use the same currency, the relative price of the more productive country falls and the relative price of the less productive country rises. This is the fundamental problem with the eurozone. The more productive economy is more competitive and the less productive economy is less competitive. Thus, the productive north sells more than the unproductive south. To alleviate the pressures in the south, either capital has to come in or labour has to go out.
Equity capital flows are not a problem - the investor takes the loss if it goes sour. Debt isn't a problem either if the lender is willing to take a haircut on their debt. But the Germans and French banks don't want to take the requisite haircuts because they risk insolvency. They want their money back. Well, that's not going to happen. Banks have already started to take haircuts on Greek bonds and eventually will on lending to Italy and Spain.
Capital came into the south primarily through lending. German banks had excess capital deposited by German companies making lots of money selling to their European neighbors. German banks then lent it outside of Germany because their home market is stagnant - the population isn't growing and consumption is relatively weak. Much of that money went into funding a speculative boom in Spanish real estate. For a time, more homes were built in Spain than were built in France and Germany combined, which is nuts given that Spain has a population a third that of the two. But, like housing bubbles around the world, it went bust, and the banks are holding a lot of bad loans they don't want to recognize.
This situation is untenable. For a currency union to work, there must be sufficient funds transferred into the depressed region, or a sufficient amount of labour must leave. Even if all the debt is wiped out, the fundamental problem is not solved because it will happen again (unless German and French banks want to continuously underwrite bad loans to the south).
The euro will not survive as is. I believe it will survive in some form but either members will leave or there will be a tighter political union. The problem goes away if there is a tighter political union that facilitates the flow of capital from the north to the south. But it is hard to see that happening.