excalibur
Diamond Member
- Mar 19, 2015
- 28,372
- 57,349
- 2,290
President Trump used the authority granted to a President by Congress.
The dissent was spot on.
From Justice Thomas:
The dissent was spot on.
From Justice Thomas:
Congress authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation.” 50 U. S. C.
§1702(a)(1)(B). Throughout American history, the author-
ity to “regulate importation” has been understood to include
the authority to impose duties on imports. Post, at 9–13,
22–29 (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting). The meaning of that
phrase was beyond doubt by the time that Congress enacted
this statute, shortly after President Nixon’s highly publi-
cized duties on imports were upheld based on identical lan-
guage. Post, at 14–22. The statute that the President relied
on therefore authorized him to impose the duties on imports at issue in these cases.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH makes clear
that the Court errs in concluding otherwise.
I write separately to explain why the statute at issue here
is consistent with the separation of powers as an original
matter. The Constitution’s separation of powers forbids
Congress from delegating core legislative power to the Pres-
ident. This principle, known as the nondelegation doctrine,
is rooted in the Constitution’s Legislative Vesting Clause
and Due Process Clause. Art. I, §1; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses
forbid Congress from delegating core legislative power,
which is the power to make substantive rules setting the
conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Nei-
ther Clause prohibits Congress from delegating other kinds
of power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many
powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the
President. Congress has done so repeatedly since the
founding, with this Court’s blessing.
The power to impose duties on imports can be delegated.
At the founding, that power was regarded as one of many powers over foreign commerce that could be delegated to the President. Power over foreign commerce was not within
the core legislative power, and engaging in foreign com-
merce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right.
Early Congresses often delegated to the President power to
regulate foreign commerce, including through duties on im-
ports. As I suggested over a decade ago, the nondelegation
doctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to make
rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign
trade,” including rules imposing duties on imports. Depart-
ment of Transportation v. Association of American Rail-
roads, 575 U. S. 43, 80–81, n. 5 (2015) (opinion concurring
in judgment). Therefore, to the extent that the Court relies
on “ ‘separation of powers principles’ ” to rule against the
President, ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS , C. J.), it is mis-
taken.
...
§1702(a)(1)(B). Throughout American history, the author-
ity to “regulate importation” has been understood to include
the authority to impose duties on imports. Post, at 9–13,
22–29 (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting). The meaning of that
phrase was beyond doubt by the time that Congress enacted
this statute, shortly after President Nixon’s highly publi-
cized duties on imports were upheld based on identical lan-
guage. Post, at 14–22. The statute that the President relied
on therefore authorized him to impose the duties on imports at issue in these cases.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH makes clear
that the Court errs in concluding otherwise.
I write separately to explain why the statute at issue here
is consistent with the separation of powers as an original
matter. The Constitution’s separation of powers forbids
Congress from delegating core legislative power to the Pres-
ident. This principle, known as the nondelegation doctrine,
is rooted in the Constitution’s Legislative Vesting Clause
and Due Process Clause. Art. I, §1; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses
forbid Congress from delegating core legislative power,
which is the power to make substantive rules setting the
conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Nei-
ther Clause prohibits Congress from delegating other kinds
of power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many
powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the
President. Congress has done so repeatedly since the
founding, with this Court’s blessing.
The power to impose duties on imports can be delegated.
At the founding, that power was regarded as one of many powers over foreign commerce that could be delegated to the President. Power over foreign commerce was not within
the core legislative power, and engaging in foreign com-
merce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right.
Early Congresses often delegated to the President power to
regulate foreign commerce, including through duties on im-
ports. As I suggested over a decade ago, the nondelegation
doctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to make
rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign
trade,” including rules imposing duties on imports. Depart-
ment of Transportation v. Association of American Rail-
roads, 575 U. S. 43, 80–81, n. 5 (2015) (opinion concurring
in judgment). Therefore, to the extent that the Court relies
on “ ‘separation of powers principles’ ” to rule against the
President, ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS , C. J.), it is mis-
taken.
...