Palestinian identity ?

[montelatici]

Man that got off track fast.

In the end I'd agree with the OP that while the revisionists would have us believe the people living in the British mandate area prior to the creation of either Jordan or Israel were somehow distinct and possessing of their own culture separate from that of any number of surrounding Arab states. I believe its more than obvious these people were colonists from the Muslim Arab invasion and were in fact a conglomeration of peoples from a variety of North African states.

The best most recent genetic studies bear this out.

Genetic Evidence for the Expansion of Arabian Tribes into ...

Posting Zionist propaganda does not help your cause. Especially when the official data is easily available for posting:

Migration statistics Palestine show that of 414,456 migrants to Palestine from 1920 to 1946, 376,415 were Jews. More than 90%.

A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 Berman Jewish Policy Archive NYU Wagner Page 17.

Then comes the claim of illegal immigration. The Survey also debunks that idea by citing the following:

"59. The conclusion is that Arab illegal immigration for the purposes of permanent settlement is insignificant."

A Survey of Palestine Vol 1, page 212, para. 59

A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 Berman Jewish Policy Archive NYU Wagner

Concluding that the illegal immigrants included tens of thousands of Jews in 1946.

"It follows that the Jewish population may now include between 50,000 and 60,000 illegal immigrants who have
settled in Palestine at any time since 1920 when the first Immigration Ordinance was enacted. The number of Jewish illegal
immigrants recorded during 1945 is 370."

A Survey of Palestine Vol 1, page 212, para. 59

A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 Berman Jewish Policy Archive NYU Wagner

A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 | Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner

 

[American_Jihad]

Coordinated assault
Are Palestinian cold-blooded killers like Murad Adais really "lone wolves"?
January 25, 2016
Caroline Glick

Originally published by the Jerusalem Post.

‘I’m proud of him.”

That’s what the father of Dafna Meir’s murderer said when the Palestinian media asked him what he thinks of his cold-blooded son Murad Adais.

On Sunday afternoon, Adais butchered Meir in her home, in front of her children.

Whether Adais Sr. is really happy that his son will rot in prison is less important than the fact that he said what he said to his home crowd.

He knows that his audience thinks his son is a hero. And so he played to his audience.

Since last September when the Palestinians began their current terrorist onslaught, killers like Adais have been characterized as lone wolves. But a study published last November in Mosaic online journal by Shalem College’s Daniel Polisar shows that this characterization is both wrong and unhelpful.

Polisar studied Palestinian public opinion data from surveys conducted by four independent research groups over the past 25 years. His data exposed three key aspects to Palestinian positions about Israel that all bear directly on the current Palestinian terrorist offensive.

His first finding is that throughout most of the past quarter-century a solid majority of Palestinians have supported terrorism against Israelis.

Moreover, the more murderous an attack, the more it is supported.

Polisar’s second finding was that the vast majority of Palestinians hate Israelis and believe that Jews have no right to the Land of Israel, and therefore our state has no right to exist.

Taken together, these first two insights lead to one clear conclusion about the nature of the current Palestinian terrorism campaign against Israelis. As Polisar explained, they show that this campaign is not being carried out by “lone wolves,” who have been incited by Palestinian Authority propaganda. Rather, that propaganda reflects the murderous hatred that the vast majority of Palestinians feel toward Israelis and Israel.

Adais and his comrades may or may not be members of terrorist groups. But they are the loyal representatives of their terrorism-supporting society.

Obviously, any talk of a peace process in this climate is utter folly. The most Israel can aspire to is to deter the hate-soaked Palestinians from attacking us.

This brings us to the third insight of Polisar’s study. Twenty-five years of survey data make clear that most Palestinians believe that terrorism pays.

And the plain fact is that they are right. For the past generation, the Palestinians have only benefited from killing Israelis through terrorism.

The fact that Israeli concessions to the Palestinians have strengthened their conviction that terrorism pays rather than convinced them to make peace shows that all concessions in the face of terrorism are dangerous.

While the majority of Israelis have learned this lesson and so elected governments that oppose appeasement, the Palestinians have learned that the Israeli public does not have the final word on whether or not they will be rewarded for their crimes against humanity.

The Palestinians believe that Israel is dependent on Western goodwill. So to the extent that the West pressures Israel surrender to Palestinian demands, the US and the EU work hand in glove with Palestinian terrorists and prove that they are right to murder mothers in their homes in front of their children.

This week US Ambassador Dan Shapiro proved the Palestinians right, yet again.

At the outset of his speech before the Institute of National Security Studies on Monday, Shapiro issued a pro forma condemnation of “barbaric acts of terrorism” against Israelis at the outset of his remarks.

But that was just clearing his throat. In his substantive remarks, Shapiro accused Israel of institutional racism in Judea and Samaria.

...

Our options for dealing with this assault are not optimal. But they are formidable. If we make judicious use of them, we can flummox the White House and the EU, and at a minimum, we can begin to prove to the Palestinians that their faith in terrorism is no longer justified.

Coordinated assault

 

[American_Jihad]

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Simple Answers to False Claims
Defeating the radicals begins with the facts.
January 25, 2016
Dr. Shmuel Katz

Reprinted from Aish.com.

It took the Arab propaganda machine decades of persistent, aggressive effort to convince many oblivious individuals – including some world leaders – of the canard that Jews illegally occupy Arab land, having "stolen it from Palestinians."

The Mideast conflict may be complicated to solve, but is quite easily explained:

1. The Jewish people have an unbroken 4,000-year national history in the land of Israel.
2. Never in history has there been an Arab Palestinian State.
3. The Palestinian movement was founded to annihilate Israel.

Let's look at some facts:

The Palestinian movement (PLO) was founded with the express purpose of destroying Israel. The PLO Covenant – adopted in 1964, long before Israel held any disputed territories – calls "to move forward on the path of jihad until complete and final victory is achieved," i.e. the annihilation of Israel.

Fatah refers to Mohammed signing an insincere "peace treaty."
This view permeates the Palestinian movement: Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah's "Party of God," and Hamas (acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement) all share the goal of destroying Israel. Mahmoud Abbas' political party – "Fatah" – is the name of chapter 48 of the Koran which describes Mohammed signing a "peace treaty" as a way to gain leverage and launch an attack.

At the root of Palestinian ideology is this "phased plan" to destroy Israel. Palestinian statesman Faisal Husseini described peace agreements with Israel as a Trojan Horse:

"If we agree to declare our state over what is now only 22 percent of Palestine, meaning the West Bank and Gaza – our ultimate goal is [still] the liberation of all historical Palestine from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] sea, even if this means that the conflict will last for another thousand years or for many generations."

It is cheap to talk about peace, and dangerously emboldens those who lack true commitment to peace. Genuine Arab-Israeli conciliation will require genuine peace partners – not conniving perpetrators planning to liquidate Israel in stages.

The war against Israel is bolstered by anti-Semites in the West.
The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS) – a global campaign to put economic and political pressure on Israel – gives anti-Semites the veneer of "humanitarian cause" to spew venom against Israel.

In its efforts to isolate and stigmatize Israel – the only true democracy in the Middle East – BDS makes a false analogy between Israel and Apartheid South Africa. Israel was the first Middle East country to grant Arab women the right to vote. One-third of the staff at Jerusalem's Hadassah Hospital are Arabs. Israeli-Arab Salim Joubran sits on Israel's Supreme Court, and Israeli-Arab Majalli Wahabi has served as acting President of Israel.

Ironically, anti-Israel boycotts actually harm the Palestinians.
With great irony, BDS actually harms Palestinians. SodaStream's West Bank factory gainfully employed 900 Palestinians working side-by-side with Israelis – building bridges of peace, and earning wages far greater than Palestinian employers would pay. Yet BDS forced the factory to close, causing 900 Palestinian families to lose their primary source of income.

For BDS activists, harming Palestinians is apparently a fair price to pay for harming Israel.

This smear campaign includes pressuring artists and musicians to cancel appearances in Israel. For example, when Paul McCartney announced a performance in Israel, Islamist leader Omar Bakri Muhammad threatened:

“Paul McCartney is the enemy of every Muslim... If he values his life, Mr. McCartney must not come to Israel. He will not be safe there. The sacrifice operatives [i.e. suicide squads] will be waiting for him.”

Rather than forging peace, supporting BDS encourages the work of anti-Semites.

The Solution: Free Speech

...

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Simple Answers to False Claims

 

[montelatici]

Israel is as democratic as Apartheid South Africa.

 

[abu afak]

The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
by Fred M. Gottheil
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2003, pp. 53-64

['........]
Evidence for Arab Migration
There are several problems associated with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s, the principal one being that Arab migration flows were, in the main, illegal, and therefore unreported and unrecorded.[17] But they were not entirely unnoticed.

Demographer U.O. Schmelz's analysis of the Ottoman registration data for 1905 populations of Jerusalem and Hebron kazas (Ottoman districts), by place of birth, showed that of those Arab Palestinians born outside their localities of residence, approximately HALF represented intra-Palestine movement—from areas of low-level economic activity to areas of higher-level activity—while the other half represented Arab immigration into Palestine itself, 43% originating in Asia, 39% in Africa, and 20% in Turkey.[18] Schmelz conjectured:

The above-average population growth of the Arab villages around the city of Jerusalem, with its Jewish majority, continued until the end of the mandatory period. This must have been due—as elsewhere in Palestine under similar conditions—to in-migrants attracted by economic opportunities, and to the beneficial effects of improved health services in reducing mortality—just as happened in other parts of Palestine around cities with a large Jewish population sector.[19]

While Schmelz restricted his research of the 1905 Palestinian census to the official Ottoman registrations and used these registrations with only minor critical comment, he did acknowledge that "stable population models assume the absence of external migrations, a condition which was obviously not met by all the subpopulations" that Schmelz enumerated.[20]

Like U.O. Schmelz, Roberto Bachi expressed some reservation about the virtual non-existence of data and discussion concerning migration into and within Palestine. He writes:

Between 1800 and 1914, the Muslim population had a yearly average increase in the order of magnitude of roughly 6-7 per thousand. This can be compared to the very crude estimate of about 4 per thousand for the "less developed countries" of the world (in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) between 1800 and 1910. It is possible that part of the growth of the Muslim population was due to Immigration.[21]

Although Bachi did not pursue the linkage between undocumented immigration into Palestine and the 6 (or 7) to 4 per thousand differential in growth rates between Palestine and the other less developed countries (LDCs), the idea that at least one-third of Palestine's population growth may be attributed to immigration is—using Bachi's own growth rate differentials—not an entirely unreasonable one.

Lacking verifiable evidence did not prevent Bachi from stating the obvious concerning internal migration within Palestine:

The great economic development of the coastal plains—largely due to Jewish immigration—was accompanied both in 1922-1931 and in 1931-1944 by a much stronger increase of the Muslim and Christian populations in this region than that registered in other regions. This was probably due to two reasons: stronger decrease in mortality of the non-Jewish population in the neighborhood of Jewish areas and Internal migration toward the more developed zones.[22][/B]


In the footnote accompanying this quote, Bachi writes: "As no statistics are available for internal migration, this conclusion has been obtained from indirect evidence."[23] Bachi's footnote is instructive. The "indirect evidence" he referred to no doubt included his understanding of the important role economics plays in explaining demographic movements. While appreciating the value of Ottoman registrations and British mandatory government censuses in providing estimates of Palestinian demography, they were, in his judgment, still crude and incomplete.

Reference to Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s is made as well in the British mandatory government's annual compilation of statistical data on population. The Palestine Blue Book, 1937, for example, provides time series demographic statistics whose annual estimates are based on extrapolations from its 1922 census.[24] The footnote accompanying the table on population of Palestine reads:[/B]

There has been unrecorded illegal immigration of both Jews and Arabs in the period since the census of 1931, but it is clear that, since it cannot be recorded, no estimate of its volume is possible.[25]
The 1935 British report to the League of Nations noted that:

One thousand five hundred and fifty-seven persons (including 565 Jews) who, having made their way into the country surreptitiously, were later detected, were sentenced to imprisonment for their offence and recommended for deportation.[26]
The number who "made their way into the country surreptitiously" and undetected was neither estimated nor mentioned.

Historian Gad Gilbar's observation on Ruth Kark's contribution to his edited volume Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914, touches on the issue of Arab immigration into and within Palestine. He relates her ideas in "The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine" to Charles Issawi's thesis concerning the role of minority groups and foreigners in the development of Middle Eastern towns. Explaining why NO other Palestinian cities grew as rapidly as Jaffa and Haifa did during the final three decades of the Ottoman rule, Gilbar writes: "Both attracted population from the rural and urban surroundings and immigrants from outside Palestine."[27]

Each piece of the demographic puzzle by itself may reveal no identifiable picture. But given a multiplicity of such pieces, an image does begin to appear. The Royal Institute for International Affairs adds another piece. Commenting on the growth of the Palestinian population during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s it reports: "The number of Arabs who have entered Palestine illegally from Syria and Transjordan is unknown. But probably considerable."[28] And C.S. Jarvis, governor of the Sinai from 1923-36, adds yet another:

This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Trans-Jordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.[29]
Estimating Real Numbers
The derivation of Palestine migration estimates in this section is based on an uncomplicated imputation theory. Migration becomes a residual claimant for numbers not explained by a population-estimating model based on known initial population stocks and known sets of birth and death rates for that population. In this way, expected population stocks can be derived for any set of subsequent years.

The value of the model depends, of course, on the reliability of the estimates given for initial population stocks and for the rates associated with natural increase. Therein lies the problem with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine. The model itself may be simple and applicable, but its usefulness—as with all estimating models—is contingent upon the quality of the data inputs. That quality in the case of Palestinian migration is compromised by the explicit neglect of illegal entrants. If illegal migrants and subsequently illegal residents escaped the census taker, how could the census account for them? It couldn't and didn't.

It is not surprising then that the British census data produce an Arab Palestinian population growth for 1922-31 that turns out to be generated by natural increase and legal migrations alone. Applying a 2.5 per annum growth rate[30] to a population stock of 589,177 for 1922 generates a 1931 population estimate of 735,799 or 97.6% of the 753,822 recorded in the 1931 census. Does the imputation model then "prove" that illegal immigration into Palestine was inconsequential during 1922-31? Not at all. A footnote accompanying the census's population time series acknowledges the presence in Palestine of illegal Arab immigration. But because it could not be recorded, no estimate of its numbers was included in the census count.[31] Ignoring illegal migrants does not mean they don't exist.

Setting illegal immigration into Palestine aside, the imputation model does generate substantial migrations of Arab Palestinians within Palestine itself and confirms what many demographers, historians, government administrators, and economists have alluded to: the migration of Arab Palestinians from villages, towns, and cities of low economic opportunity to villages, towns, and cities of higher economic opportunity.

Which towns, villages, and cities offered the higher economic opportunity? Analyzing the 1922 and 1931 demographic data by sub-district and separating those sub-districts of Palestine that eventually became 1948 Israel—that is, sub-districts that had relatively large Jewish populations (with accompanying Jewish capital and modern technology)—from those that were not designated as part of 1948 Israel, identified not only the direction of Arab Palestinian migration within Palestine but its magnitude as well.[32]

The Arab Palestinian populations within those sub-districts that eventually became Israel increased from 321,866 in 1922 to 463,288 in 1931 or by 141,422. Applying the 2.5 per annum natural rate of population growth to the 1922 Arab Palestinian population generates an expected population size for 1931 of 398,498 or 64,790 less than the actual population recorded in the British census. By imputation, this unaccounted population increase must have been either illegal immigration not accounted for in the British census and/or registered Arab Palestinians moving from outside the Jewish-identified sub-districts to those sub-districts so identified.This 1922-31 Arab migration into the Jewish sub-districts represented 11.8% of the total 1931 Arab population residing in those sub-districts and as much as 36.8% of its 1922-31 growth.

That over 10% of the 1931 Arab Palestinian population in those sub-districts that eventually became Israel had immigrated to those sub-districts within the 1922-31years is a datum of considerable significance. It is consistent with the fragmentary evidence of illegal migration to and within Palestine; it supports the idea of linkage between economic disparities and migratory impulses—a linkage universally accepted; it undercuts the thesis of "spatial stickiness" attributed by some scholars to the Arab Palestinian population of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and it provides strong circumstantial evidence that the illegal Arab immigration into Palestine, like that within Palestine, was of consequence as well.

Denying the Evidence
As compelling as the arguments and evidence supporting consequential illegal immigration may be to some scholars, they are clearly unconvincing to others. The single most cited contemporary publication on Palestinian demography is Justin McCarthy's 1990 The Population of Palestine. Of McCarthy's 43 pages of descriptive analysis—supplemented by 188 pages of demographic tables copied directly from Ottoman, European, and Jewish source materials—slightly more than one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration into and within Palestine during the Ottoman period, and a similar one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration during the succeeding mandate period.[33] According to McCarthy, these few pages offer enough critical analysis to close the lid on the "infamous" immigration thesis.

Consider first McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration during the Ottoman period. That he finds no illegal immigration of consequence is not surprising because McCarthy uses official Ottoman registration lists that, by the nature of its classifications, take no account of the unreported, illegal immigration. That is to say, if you look in a haystack for a needle that wasn't put there, the probability is high you won't find it. It is strange that that idea had not occurred to McCarthy. Choosing to focus on the official registration lists allows him to write:

From the analysis of rates of increase of the Muslim population of the three Palestiniansanjaks [Ottoman sub-provinces], one can say with certainty that Muslim immigration after 1870 was small.[34]
Reflecting elsewhere on the possibility that the immigration may have occurred over an extended period of time, McCarthy writes: "To postulate such an immigration … stretches the limits of credulity."[35]

McCarthy's treatment of the linkage between economic disparities and migration impulses appears to be even more disingenuous. He writes: "The question of the relative economic development of Palestine in Ottoman times is not a matter to be discussed here."[36] Nor is it considered anywhere else in his book. That is to say, McCarthy does not contest the linkage so much as ignore its relevance to the Palestinian situation.[37]

His dismissal of Arab immigration into Palestine during the mandate period is based on a set of assumptions concerning illegal immigration that is both restrictive and unsubstantiated. He contends that even if the illegal immigrants were unreported on entry, their deaths in Palestine would have been registered. So too, he argues, would their children born in Palestine. Deriving estimates based on such registrations, he arrives at this conclusion: immigration was minimal.[38] But he provides no evidence to show that these supposed registrations of births and deaths were actually made. Had McCarthy considered the fact that detection of illegal immigration during the mandate period resulted in imprisonment and deportation and that immigrants, aware of this, may have avoided any formal registration of deaths and births, he would have had to revise his assessment of illegal immigration.

Perhaps the more serious charge against McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration is his use of Roberto Bachi's estimates. McCarthy's numbers are based, in part, on Bachi's reporting of 900 illegal Arab immigrants per year over the period 1931-45.[39] But McCarthy misrepresents what Bachi's estimate is meant to show. Bachi is careful to identify his 900-per-year illegal Arab immigration estimate as only those discovered by the mandatory authorities. Illegal Arab immigration that went undetected and unreported is not included. He writes:

A detailed analysis presented in Appendix 6.5B on the basis of the registration of part of the illegal migratory traffic, discovered by the Palestine police, shows that legal movements (as reflected in Tables 9.4-9.7) constituted only a small fraction of total Muslim immigration.[40]
To emphasize this point, Bachi writes: "It is hardly credible that illegal movements which were actually discovered included all the illegal entrances which actually occurred, or even the majority of them."[41] As a result, Bachi can only conclude that "in the present state of knowledge, we have beenunable to even guess the size of total immigration."[42]

Such a cautionary comment finds no place in McCarthy's analysis or conclusions. Using Bachi's estimates inappropriately, deriving estimates based solely on registration lists, and ignoring completely the linkages between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses, McCarthy confidently concludes,

the vast majority of the Palestinians resident in 1947 were the sons and daughters who were living in Palestine before modern Jewish immigration began. There is no reason to believe that they were not the sons and daughters of Arabs who had been in Palestine for many centuries.[43]
Every Reason to Believe
Therein lies the ideological warfare concerning claims to territorial inheritance and national sovereignty. Contrary to McCarthy's findings or wishes, there is every reason to believe that consequential immigration of Arabs into and within Palestine occurred during the Ottoman and British mandatory periods. Among the most compelling arguments in support of such immigration is the universally acknowledged and practiced linkage between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses.

The precise magnitude of Arab immigration into and within Palestine is, as Bachi noted, unknown. Lack of completeness in Ottoman registration lists and British Mandatory censuses, and the immeasurable illegal, unreported, and undetected immigration during both periods make any estimate a bold venture into creative analysis. In most cases, those venturing into the realm of Palestinian demography—or other demographic analyses based on very crude data—acknowledge its limitations and the tentativeness of the conclusions that may be drawn.

Fred M. Gottheil is a professor in the department of economics, University of Illinois.

 

[abu afak]

Forgot Link:
It's easy to look up but highly useful for 'us' and for first part of article.
The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
All most cite are the Turkish-paid and Bogus Justin McCarthy assumptions.

and sorry about the bolding of the whole post.
Unfortunately once bolded, it cannot be edited back to standard fonts. A quirk on this board.
`

 

[American_Jihad]

"I Am Your Protector": The Anti-Israel Group Hijacking the Holocaust for Islam
February 3, 2016
Daniel Greenfield

There has been a troubling pattern of Muslims and their political allies hijacking the Holocaust to promote their own agenda. This extends to wearing yellow stars (it was Muslims who forced Jews to wear yellow to begin with) to hijacking Jewish holidays and commemorations, such as the commemoration of the Holocaust with claims of Muslim victimhood.

One of the latest such efforts is I Am Your Protector or in hashtag form #IAmYourProtector. The group promotes the claim that Muslims saved Jews during the Holocaust and Jews are obligated to endanger themselves by taking in large numbers of anti-Semitic Muslim migrants, with deadly results.

The website of I Am Your Protector lists no actual leadership. However its creator is identified in some stories as Dani Laurence. Laurence, who used to be known as Andrea Varadi, claimed to have founded the Global Forum for Counter Radicalization. The GFCR's website however seems to contain nothing except a donation page with bank accounts in New York and Geneva. She's on the board of the Sisterhood of Shalom Salaam. Her bio claims that she is the head of the Project Department and incubator of the Muslim Jewish Conference, "a Fellow of the Arianne de Rotchild Fellowship, Cambridge, Muslim Jewish Social entrepreneurs and created a social media Platform spreading constructive messages about Muslims and Jews that has around 100’000 followers."

Who is Andrea Varadi/Dani Laurence? She claims to be a political refugee from Hungary who was born in Switzerland, and lived in a whole bunch of other places. A story about her claims that...

Varadi, a young woman from central Europe (Switzerland, if I remember correctly), talked about her experience when first coming to Israel. Having been raised by religiously orthodox parents, she came expecting every Arab to be potential terrorists, murderers, et al. For the longest time, she lived in a multi-cultural city with this opinion of those who surrounded her. And yet, instead of continuing to live as she was, she decided to do something that I admire. To get over this fear of hers, she began learning Arabic, began reading more about the conflict, and speaking to more Arabs.

She has now created a group called Global Forum for Counter Radicalization. This is honestly the part of the night that interested the most people. The group works with many ex-radicalized personas that have worked with the likes of al Qaeda, neo-Nazi groups, Hamas, and other extremist, often times considered “terrorist” groups. By meeting and working with former members of such groups, Varadi hopes cease any misconceptions that the general population has of certain groups or religions, such as Islam, and to instigate dialogue that would change the preconception with which people view certain conflicts.

So Varadi works with ex-terrorists to improve people's misconceptions about Islam. The best part of this is how Al Qaeda and Hamas are described as being "considered" terrorist groups. With the terrorist part in quotation marks. And of course there's the "preconception with which people view certain conflicts". Like the Islamic terror war against the Jews.

The Global Forum for Counter Radicalization appears to be a website with a donation request, but the Muslim Jewish Conference, a European organization which operates out of Austria, is all too real, but it's yet another shadow on a mirror in the hall of mirrors that is the NGO Deep State.

NGOs often operate like shell corporations. You have to spend a lot of time figuring out who is behind the whole thing. It's telling that I Am Your Protector does not explicitly identify its links to the Muslim Jewish Conference. It doesn't even list its leadership. And it takes a lot of extra steps to connect Dani Laurence of I Am Your Protector to Andrea Varadi of the Muslim Jewish Conference.

The origins of I Am Your Protector appear to have been with an Andrea Varadi short film for the Muslim Jewish Conference titled, "Muslim & Jews: Saviors in the Darkest Moments of History". And what is the Muslim Jewish Conference?

Under its facade, the Muslim Jewish Conference is funded by the Karl Kahane Foundation, a close friend of Bruno Kreisky. Anyone familiar with Austrian politics will be getting nauseous around this point.

Bruno Kreisky was a horrifying monster. A George Soros on steroids, he violently hated Jews, despite being of Jewish origin. As the Socialist Chancellor of Austria, he filled his cabinet with former Nazis and collaborated with the PLO.

Kreisky declared that, "If the Jews are a people, they are a wretched people". He waged an unrelenting campaign against Jewish Nazi hunter Simon Wisenthal. And he helped Muslim terrorists kill Jews.


...

Turkey's Erdogan, a key Alliance figure and backer of Hamas, believes Islamophobia should be a crime. His regime has also been linked to assorted other Islamic terror groups. It's also been at best complicit in genocide.

When we peel back the elaborate network, behind the latest bid to hijack the Holocaust stands a memorial to a Nazi collaborator and a state sponsor of terror. This is what the various Islamic attempts to hijack the Holocaust for propaganda ultimately come down to... Muslim victimhood is always yet another argument for the murder of Jews.

"I Am Your Protector": The Anti-Israel Group Hijacking the Holocaust for Islam

 

[montelatici]

The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
by Fred M. Gottheil
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2003, pp. 53-64

['........]
Evidence for Arab Migration
There are several problems associated with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s, the principal one being that Arab migration flows were, in the main, illegal, and therefore unreported and unrecorded.[17] But they were not entirely unnoticed.

Demographer U.O. Schmelz's analysis of the Ottoman registration data for 1905 populations of Jerusalem and Hebron kazas (Ottoman districts), by place of birth, showed that of those Arab Palestinians born outside their localities of residence, approximately HALF represented intra-Palestine movement—from areas of low-level economic activity to areas of higher-level activity—while the other half represented Arab immigration into Palestine itself, 43% originating in Asia, 39% in Africa, and 20% in Turkey.[18] Schmelz conjectured:

The above-average population growth of the Arab villages around the city of Jerusalem, with its Jewish majority, continued until the end of the mandatory period. This must have been due—as elsewhere in Palestine under similar conditions—to in-migrants attracted by economic opportunities, and to the beneficial effects of improved health services in reducing mortality—just as happened in other parts of Palestine around cities with a large Jewish population sector.[19]

While Schmelz restricted his research of the 1905 Palestinian census to the official Ottoman registrations and used these registrations with only minor critical comment, he did acknowledge that "stable population models assume the absence of external migrations, a condition which was obviously not met by all the subpopulations" that Schmelz enumerated.[20]

Like U.O. Schmelz, Roberto Bachi expressed some reservation about the virtual non-existence of data and discussion concerning migration into and within Palestine. He writes:

Between 1800 and 1914, the Muslim population had a yearly average increase in the order of magnitude of roughly 6-7 per thousand. This can be compared to the very crude estimate of about 4 per thousand for the "less developed countries" of the world (in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) between 1800 and 1910. It is possible that part of the growth of the Muslim population was due to Immigration.[21]

Although Bachi did not pursue the linkage between undocumented immigration into Palestine and the 6 (or 7) to 4 per thousand differential in growth rates between Palestine and the other less developed countries (LDCs), the idea that at least one-third of Palestine's population growth may be attributed to immigration is—using Bachi's own growth rate differentials—not an entirely unreasonable one.

Lacking verifiable evidence did not prevent Bachi from stating the obvious concerning internal migration within Palestine:

The great economic development of the coastal plains—largely due to Jewish immigration—was accompanied both in 1922-1931 and in 1931-1944 by a much stronger increase of the Muslim and Christian populations in this region than that registered in other regions. This was probably due to two reasons: stronger decrease in mortality of the non-Jewish population in the neighborhood of Jewish areas and Internal migration toward the more developed zones.[22][/B]


In the footnote accompanying this quote, Bachi writes: "As no statistics are available for internal migration, this conclusion has been obtained from indirect evidence."[23] Bachi's footnote is instructive. The "indirect evidence" he referred to no doubt included his understanding of the important role economics plays in explaining demographic movements. While appreciating the value of Ottoman registrations and British mandatory government censuses in providing estimates of Palestinian demography, they were, in his judgment, still crude and incomplete.

Reference to Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s is made as well in the British mandatory government's annual compilation of statistical data on population. The Palestine Blue Book, 1937, for example, provides time series demographic statistics whose annual estimates are based on extrapolations from its 1922 census.[24] The footnote accompanying the table on population of Palestine reads:[/B]

There has been unrecorded illegal immigration of both Jews and Arabs in the period since the census of 1931, but it is clear that, since it cannot be recorded, no estimate of its volume is possible.[25]
The 1935 British report to the League of Nations noted that:

One thousand five hundred and fifty-seven persons (including 565 Jews) who, having made their way into the country surreptitiously, were later detected, were sentenced to imprisonment for their offence and recommended for deportation.[26]
The number who "made their way into the country surreptitiously" and undetected was neither estimated nor mentioned.

Historian Gad Gilbar's observation on Ruth Kark's contribution to his edited volume Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914, touches on the issue of Arab immigration into and within Palestine. He relates her ideas in "The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine" to Charles Issawi's thesis concerning the role of minority groups and foreigners in the development of Middle Eastern towns. Explaining why NO other Palestinian cities grew as rapidly as Jaffa and Haifa did during the final three decades of the Ottoman rule, Gilbar writes: "Both attracted population from the rural and urban surroundings and immigrants from outside Palestine."[27]

Each piece of the demographic puzzle by itself may reveal no identifiable picture. But given a multiplicity of such pieces, an image does begin to appear. The Royal Institute for International Affairs adds another piece. Commenting on the growth of the Palestinian population during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s it reports: "The number of Arabs who have entered Palestine illegally from Syria and Transjordan is unknown. But probably considerable."[28] And C.S. Jarvis, governor of the Sinai from 1923-36, adds yet another:

This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Trans-Jordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.[29]
Estimating Real Numbers
The derivation of Palestine migration estimates in this section is based on an uncomplicated imputation theory. Migration becomes a residual claimant for numbers not explained by a population-estimating model based on known initial population stocks and known sets of birth and death rates for that population. In this way, expected population stocks can be derived for any set of subsequent years.

The value of the model depends, of course, on the reliability of the estimates given for initial population stocks and for the rates associated with natural increase. Therein lies the problem with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine. The model itself may be simple and applicable, but its usefulness—as with all estimating models—is contingent upon the quality of the data inputs. That quality in the case of Palestinian migration is compromised by the explicit neglect of illegal entrants. If illegal migrants and subsequently illegal residents escaped the census taker, how could the census account for them? It couldn't and didn't.

It is not surprising then that the British census data produce an Arab Palestinian population growth for 1922-31 that turns out to be generated by natural increase and legal migrations alone. Applying a 2.5 per annum growth rate[30] to a population stock of 589,177 for 1922 generates a 1931 population estimate of 735,799 or 97.6% of the 753,822 recorded in the 1931 census. Does the imputation model then "prove" that illegal immigration into Palestine was inconsequential during 1922-31? Not at all. A footnote accompanying the census's population time series acknowledges the presence in Palestine of illegal Arab immigration. But because it could not be recorded, no estimate of its numbers was included in the census count.[31] Ignoring illegal migrants does not mean they don't exist.

Setting illegal immigration into Palestine aside, the imputation model does generate substantial migrations of Arab Palestinians within Palestine itself and confirms what many demographers, historians, government administrators, and economists have alluded to: the migration of Arab Palestinians from villages, towns, and cities of low economic opportunity to villages, towns, and cities of higher economic opportunity.

Which towns, villages, and cities offered the higher economic opportunity? Analyzing the 1922 and 1931 demographic data by sub-district and separating those sub-districts of Palestine that eventually became 1948 Israel—that is, sub-districts that had relatively large Jewish populations (with accompanying Jewish capital and modern technology)—from those that were not designated as part of 1948 Israel, identified not only the direction of Arab Palestinian migration within Palestine but its magnitude as well.[32]

The Arab Palestinian populations within those sub-districts that eventually became Israel increased from 321,866 in 1922 to 463,288 in 1931 or by 141,422. Applying the 2.5 per annum natural rate of population growth to the 1922 Arab Palestinian population generates an expected population size for 1931 of 398,498 or 64,790 less than the actual population recorded in the British census. By imputation, this unaccounted population increase must have been either illegal immigration not accounted for in the British census and/or registered Arab Palestinians moving from outside the Jewish-identified sub-districts to those sub-districts so identified.This 1922-31 Arab migration into the Jewish sub-districts represented 11.8% of the total 1931 Arab population residing in those sub-districts and as much as 36.8% of its 1922-31 growth.

That over 10% of the 1931 Arab Palestinian population in those sub-districts that eventually became Israel had immigrated to those sub-districts within the 1922-31years is a datum of considerable significance. It is consistent with the fragmentary evidence of illegal migration to and within Palestine; it supports the idea of linkage between economic disparities and migratory impulses—a linkage universally accepted; it undercuts the thesis of "spatial stickiness" attributed by some scholars to the Arab Palestinian population of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and it provides strong circumstantial evidence that the illegal Arab immigration into Palestine, like that within Palestine, was of consequence as well.

Denying the Evidence
As compelling as the arguments and evidence supporting consequential illegal immigration may be to some scholars, they are clearly unconvincing to others. The single most cited contemporary publication on Palestinian demography is Justin McCarthy's 1990 The Population of Palestine. Of McCarthy's 43 pages of descriptive analysis—supplemented by 188 pages of demographic tables copied directly from Ottoman, European, and Jewish source materials—slightly more than one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration into and within Palestine during the Ottoman period, and a similar one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration during the succeeding mandate period.[33] According to McCarthy, these few pages offer enough critical analysis to close the lid on the "infamous" immigration thesis.

Consider first McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration during the Ottoman period. That he finds no illegal immigration of consequence is not surprising because McCarthy uses official Ottoman registration lists that, by the nature of its classifications, take no account of the unreported, illegal immigration. That is to say, if you look in a haystack for a needle that wasn't put there, the probability is high you won't find it. It is strange that that idea had not occurred to McCarthy. Choosing to focus on the official registration lists allows him to write:

From the analysis of rates of increase of the Muslim population of the three Palestiniansanjaks [Ottoman sub-provinces], one can say with certainty that Muslim immigration after 1870 was small.[34]
Reflecting elsewhere on the possibility that the immigration may have occurred over an extended period of time, McCarthy writes: "To postulate such an immigration … stretches the limits of credulity."[35]

McCarthy's treatment of the linkage between economic disparities and migration impulses appears to be even more disingenuous. He writes: "The question of the relative economic development of Palestine in Ottoman times is not a matter to be discussed here."[36] Nor is it considered anywhere else in his book. That is to say, McCarthy does not contest the linkage so much as ignore its relevance to the Palestinian situation.[37]

His dismissal of Arab immigration into Palestine during the mandate period is based on a set of assumptions concerning illegal immigration that is both restrictive and unsubstantiated. He contends that even if the illegal immigrants were unreported on entry, their deaths in Palestine would have been registered. So too, he argues, would their children born in Palestine. Deriving estimates based on such registrations, he arrives at this conclusion: immigration was minimal.[38] But he provides no evidence to show that these supposed registrations of births and deaths were actually made. Had McCarthy considered the fact that detection of illegal immigration during the mandate period resulted in imprisonment and deportation and that immigrants, aware of this, may have avoided any formal registration of deaths and births, he would have had to revise his assessment of illegal immigration.

Perhaps the more serious charge against McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration is his use of Roberto Bachi's estimates. McCarthy's numbers are based, in part, on Bachi's reporting of 900 illegal Arab immigrants per year over the period 1931-45.[39] But McCarthy misrepresents what Bachi's estimate is meant to show. Bachi is careful to identify his 900-per-year illegal Arab immigration estimate as only those discovered by the mandatory authorities. Illegal Arab immigration that went undetected and unreported is not included. He writes:

A detailed analysis presented in Appendix 6.5B on the basis of the registration of part of the illegal migratory traffic, discovered by the Palestine police, shows that legal movements (as reflected in Tables 9.4-9.7) constituted only a small fraction of total Muslim immigration.[40]
To emphasize this point, Bachi writes: "It is hardly credible that illegal movements which were actually discovered included all the illegal entrances which actually occurred, or even the majority of them."[41] As a result, Bachi can only conclude that "in the present state of knowledge, we have beenunable to even guess the size of total immigration."[42]

Such a cautionary comment finds no place in McCarthy's analysis or conclusions. Using Bachi's estimates inappropriately, deriving estimates based solely on registration lists, and ignoring completely the linkages between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses, McCarthy confidently concludes,

the vast majority of the Palestinians resident in 1947 were the sons and daughters who were living in Palestine before modern Jewish immigration began. There is no reason to believe that they were not the sons and daughters of Arabs who had been in Palestine for many centuries.[43]
Every Reason to Believe
Therein lies the ideological warfare concerning claims to territorial inheritance and national sovereignty. Contrary to McCarthy's findings or wishes, there is every reason to believe that consequential immigration of Arabs into and within Palestine occurred during the Ottoman and British mandatory periods. Among the most compelling arguments in support of such immigration is the universally acknowledged and practiced linkage between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses.

The precise magnitude of Arab immigration into and within Palestine is, as Bachi noted, unknown. Lack of completeness in Ottoman registration lists and British Mandatory censuses, and the immeasurable illegal, unreported, and undetected immigration during both periods make any estimate a bold venture into creative analysis. In most cases, those venturing into the realm of Palestinian demography—or other demographic analyses based on very crude data—acknowledge its limitations and the tentativeness of the conclusions that may be drawn.

Fred M. Gottheil is a professor in the department of economics, University of Illinois.

Posting Zionist propaganda does not change the facts. Let's look at the facts as set forth in the Survey of Palestine Vol. 1, page 212.

Now this is from a professional Anglo-American survey group that took all data into consideration. Not some Zionist propagandist. Interestingly, the survey indicates that there was, on the other hand, substantial illegal Jewish immigration from Europe. The 3 volumes of the survey are available on-line at the Berman Jewish Policy Archive at NYU/Wagner.

The old Zionist propaganda has ceased to be effective since official archives have been made available online. At least for people with half a brain that can do research and is willing to discover the truth using independent source documentation.


Here is the link to volume 1.


A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 | Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner

 

[abu afak]

The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
by Fred M. Gottheil
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2003, pp. 53-64

['........]
Evidence for Arab Migration
There are several problems associated with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s, the principal one being that Arab migration flows were, in the main, illegal, and therefore unreported and unrecorded.[17] But they were not entirely unnoticed.

Demographer U.O. Schmelz's analysis of the Ottoman registration data for 1905 populations of Jerusalem and Hebron kazas (Ottoman districts), by place of birth, showed that of those Arab Palestinians born outside their localities of residence, approximately HALF represented intra-Palestine movement—from areas of low-level economic activity to areas of higher-level activity—while the other half represented Arab immigration into Palestine itself, 43% originating in Asia, 39% in Africa, and 20% in Turkey.[18] Schmelz conjectured:

The above-average population growth of the Arab villages around the city of Jerusalem, with its Jewish majority, continued until the end of the mandatory period. This must have been due—as elsewhere in Palestine under similar conditions—to in-migrants attracted by economic opportunities, and to the beneficial effects of improved health services in reducing mortality—just as happened in other parts of Palestine around cities with a large Jewish population sector.[19]

While Schmelz restricted his research of the 1905 Palestinian census to the official Ottoman registrations and used these registrations with only minor critical comment, he did acknowledge that "stable population models assume the absence of external migrations, a condition which was obviously not met by all the subpopulations" that Schmelz enumerated.[20]

Like U.O. Schmelz, Roberto Bachi expressed some reservation about the virtual non-existence of data and discussion concerning migration into and within Palestine. He writes:

Between 1800 and 1914, the Muslim population had a yearly average increase in the order of magnitude of roughly 6-7 per thousand. This can be compared to the very crude estimate of about 4 per thousand for the "less developed countries" of the world (in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) between 1800 and 1910. It is possible that part of the growth of the Muslim population was due to Immigration.[21]

Although Bachi did not pursue the linkage between undocumented immigration into Palestine and the 6 (or 7) to 4 per thousand differential in growth rates between Palestine and the other less developed countries (LDCs), the idea that at least one-third of Palestine's population growth may be attributed to immigration is—using Bachi's own growth rate differentials—not an entirely unreasonable one.

Lacking verifiable evidence did not prevent Bachi from stating the obvious concerning internal migration within Palestine:

The great economic development of the coastal plains—largely due to Jewish immigration—was accompanied both in 1922-1931 and in 1931-1944 by a much stronger increase of the Muslim and Christian populations in this region than that registered in other regions. This was probably due to two reasons: stronger decrease in mortality of the non-Jewish population in the neighborhood of Jewish areas and Internal migration toward the more developed zones.[22][/B]


In the footnote accompanying this quote, Bachi writes: "As no statistics are available for internal migration, this conclusion has been obtained from indirect evidence."[23] Bachi's footnote is instructive. The "indirect evidence" he referred to no doubt included his understanding of the important role economics plays in explaining demographic movements. While appreciating the value of Ottoman registrations and British mandatory government censuses in providing estimates of Palestinian demography, they were, in his judgment, still crude and incomplete.

Reference to Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s is made as well in the British mandatory government's annual compilation of statistical data on population. The Palestine Blue Book, 1937, for example, provides time series demographic statistics whose annual estimates are based on extrapolations from its 1922 census.[24] The footnote accompanying the table on population of Palestine reads:[/B]

There has been unrecorded illegal immigration of both Jews and Arabs in the period since the census of 1931, but it is clear that, since it cannot be recorded, no estimate of its volume is possible.[25]
The 1935 British report to the League of Nations noted that:

One thousand five hundred and fifty-seven persons (including 565 Jews) who, having made their way into the country surreptitiously, were later detected, were sentenced to imprisonment for their offence and recommended for deportation.[26]
The number who "made their way into the country surreptitiously" and undetected was neither estimated nor mentioned.

Historian Gad Gilbar's observation on Ruth Kark's contribution to his edited volume Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914, touches on the issue of Arab immigration into and within Palestine. He relates her ideas in "The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine" to Charles Issawi's thesis concerning the role of minority groups and foreigners in the development of Middle Eastern towns. Explaining why NO other Palestinian cities grew as rapidly as Jaffa and Haifa did during the final three decades of the Ottoman rule, Gilbar writes: "Both attracted population from the rural and urban surroundings and immigrants from outside Palestine."[27]

Each piece of the demographic puzzle by itself may reveal no identifiable picture. But given a multiplicity of such pieces, an image does begin to appear. The Royal Institute for International Affairs adds another piece. Commenting on the growth of the Palestinian population during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s it reports: "The number of Arabs who have entered Palestine illegally from Syria and Transjordan is unknown. But probably considerable."[28] And C.S. Jarvis, governor of the Sinai from 1923-36, adds yet another:

This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Trans-Jordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.[29]
Estimating Real Numbers
The derivation of Palestine migration estimates in this section is based on an uncomplicated imputation theory. Migration becomes a residual claimant for numbers not explained by a population-estimating model based on known initial population stocks and known sets of birth and death rates for that population. In this way, expected population stocks can be derived for any set of subsequent years.

The value of the model depends, of course, on the reliability of the estimates given for initial population stocks and for the rates associated with natural increase. Therein lies the problem with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine. The model itself may be simple and applicable, but its usefulness—as with all estimating models—is contingent upon the quality of the data inputs. That quality in the case of Palestinian migration is compromised by the explicit neglect of illegal entrants. If illegal migrants and subsequently illegal residents escaped the census taker, how could the census account for them? It couldn't and didn't.

It is not surprising then that the British census data produce an Arab Palestinian population growth for 1922-31 that turns out to be generated by natural increase and legal migrations alone. Applying a 2.5 per annum growth rate[30] to a population stock of 589,177 for 1922 generates a 1931 population estimate of 735,799 or 97.6% of the 753,822 recorded in the 1931 census. Does the imputation model then "prove" that illegal immigration into Palestine was inconsequential during 1922-31? Not at all. A footnote accompanying the census's population time series acknowledges the presence in Palestine of illegal Arab immigration. But because it could not be recorded, no estimate of its numbers was included in the census count.[31] Ignoring illegal migrants does not mean they don't exist.

Setting illegal immigration into Palestine aside, the imputation model does generate substantial migrations of Arab Palestinians within Palestine itself and confirms what many demographers, historians, government administrators, and economists have alluded to: the migration of Arab Palestinians from villages, towns, and cities of low economic opportunity to villages, towns, and cities of higher economic opportunity.

Which towns, villages, and cities offered the higher economic opportunity? Analyzing the 1922 and 1931 demographic data by sub-district and separating those sub-districts of Palestine that eventually became 1948 Israel—that is, sub-districts that had relatively large Jewish populations (with accompanying Jewish capital and modern technology)—from those that were not designated as part of 1948 Israel, identified not only the direction of Arab Palestinian migration within Palestine but its magnitude as well.[32]

The Arab Palestinian populations within those sub-districts that eventually became Israel increased from 321,866 in 1922 to 463,288 in 1931 or by 141,422. Applying the 2.5 per annum natural rate of population growth to the 1922 Arab Palestinian population generates an expected population size for 1931 of 398,498 or 64,790 less than the actual population recorded in the British census. By imputation, this unaccounted population increase must have been either illegal immigration not accounted for in the British census and/or registered Arab Palestinians moving from outside the Jewish-identified sub-districts to those sub-districts so identified.This 1922-31 Arab migration into the Jewish sub-districts represented 11.8% of the total 1931 Arab population residing in those sub-districts and as much as 36.8% of its 1922-31 growth.

That over 10% of the 1931 Arab Palestinian population in those sub-districts that eventually became Israel had immigrated to those sub-districts within the 1922-31years is a datum of considerable significance. It is consistent with the fragmentary evidence of illegal migration to and within Palestine; it supports the idea of linkage between economic disparities and migratory impulses—a linkage universally accepted; it undercuts the thesis of "spatial stickiness" attributed by some scholars to the Arab Palestinian population of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and it provides strong circumstantial evidence that the illegal Arab immigration into Palestine, like that within Palestine, was of consequence as well.

Denying the Evidence
As compelling as the arguments and evidence supporting consequential illegal immigration may be to some scholars, they are clearly unconvincing to others. The single most cited contemporary publication on Palestinian demography is Justin McCarthy's 1990 The Population of Palestine. Of McCarthy's 43 pages of descriptive analysis—supplemented by 188 pages of demographic tables copied directly from Ottoman, European, and Jewish source materials—slightly more than one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration into and within Palestine during the Ottoman period, and a similar one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration during the succeeding mandate period.[33] According to McCarthy, these few pages offer enough critical analysis to close the lid on the "infamous" immigration thesis.

Consider first McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration during the Ottoman period. That he finds no illegal immigration of consequence is not surprising because McCarthy uses official Ottoman registration lists that, by the nature of its classifications, take no account of the unreported, illegal immigration. That is to say, if you look in a haystack for a needle that wasn't put there, the probability is high you won't find it. It is strange that that idea had not occurred to McCarthy. Choosing to focus on the official registration lists allows him to write:

From the analysis of rates of increase of the Muslim population of the three Palestiniansanjaks [Ottoman sub-provinces], one can say with certainty that Muslim immigration after 1870 was small.[34]
Reflecting elsewhere on the possibility that the immigration may have occurred over an extended period of time, McCarthy writes: "To postulate such an immigration … stretches the limits of credulity."[35]

McCarthy's treatment of the linkage between economic disparities and migration impulses appears to be even more disingenuous. He writes: "The question of the relative economic development of Palestine in Ottoman times is not a matter to be discussed here."[36] Nor is it considered anywhere else in his book. That is to say, McCarthy does not contest the linkage so much as ignore its relevance to the Palestinian situation.[37]

His dismissal of Arab immigration into Palestine during the mandate period is based on a set of assumptions concerning illegal immigration that is both restrictive and unsubstantiated. He contends that even if the illegal immigrants were unreported on entry, their deaths in Palestine would have been registered. So too, he argues, would their children born in Palestine. Deriving estimates based on such registrations, he arrives at this conclusion: immigration was minimal.[38] But he provides no evidence to show that these supposed registrations of births and deaths were actually made. Had McCarthy considered the fact that detection of illegal immigration during the mandate period resulted in imprisonment and deportation and that immigrants, aware of this, may have avoided any formal registration of deaths and births, he would have had to revise his assessment of illegal immigration.

Perhaps the more serious charge against McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration is his use of Roberto Bachi's estimates. McCarthy's numbers are based, in part, on Bachi's reporting of 900 illegal Arab immigrants per year over the period 1931-45.[39] But McCarthy misrepresents what Bachi's estimate is meant to show. Bachi is careful to identify his 900-per-year illegal Arab immigration estimate as only those discovered by the mandatory authorities. Illegal Arab immigration that went undetected and unreported is not included. He writes:

A detailed analysis presented in Appendix 6.5B on the basis of the registration of part of the illegal migratory traffic, discovered by the Palestine police, shows that legal movements (as reflected in Tables 9.4-9.7) constituted only a small fraction of total Muslim immigration.[40]
To emphasize this point, Bachi writes: "It is hardly credible that illegal movements which were actually discovered included all the illegal entrances which actually occurred, or even the majority of them."[41] As a result, Bachi can only conclude that "in the present state of knowledge, we have beenunable to even guess the size of total immigration."[42]

Such a cautionary comment finds no place in McCarthy's analysis or conclusions. Using Bachi's estimates inappropriately, deriving estimates based solely on registration lists, and ignoring completely the linkages between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses, McCarthy confidently concludes,

the vast majority of the Palestinians resident in 1947 were the sons and daughters who were living in Palestine before modern Jewish immigration began. There is no reason to believe that they were not the sons and daughters of Arabs who had been in Palestine for many centuries.[43]
Every Reason to Believe
Therein lies the ideological warfare concerning claims to territorial inheritance and national sovereignty. Contrary to McCarthy's findings or wishes, there is every reason to believe that consequential immigration of Arabs into and within Palestine occurred during the Ottoman and British mandatory periods. Among the most compelling arguments in support of such immigration is the universally acknowledged and practiced linkage between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses.

The precise magnitude of Arab immigration into and within Palestine is, as Bachi noted, unknown. Lack of completeness in Ottoman registration lists and British Mandatory censuses, and the immeasurable illegal, unreported, and undetected immigration during both periods make any estimate a bold venture into creative analysis. In most cases, those venturing into the realm of Palestinian demography—or other demographic analyses based on very crude data—acknowledge its limitations and the tentativeness of the conclusions that may be drawn.

Fred M. Gottheil is a professor in the department of economics, University of Illinois.

Posting Zionist propaganda does not change the facts. Let's look at the facts as set forth in the Survey of Palestine Vol. 1, page 212.

View attachment 62285View attachment 62285

Now this is from a professional Anglo-American survey group that took all data into consideration. Not some Zionist propagandist. Interestingly, the survey indicates that there was, on the other hand, substantial illegal Jewish immigration from Europe. The 3 volumes of the survey are available on-line at the Berman Jewish Policy Archive at NYU/Wagner.

The old Zionist propaganda has ceased to be effective since official archives have been made available online. At least for people with half a brain that can do research and is willing to discover the truth using independent source documentation.Here is the link to volume 1.
A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 | Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner

Your post is an official finding with NO Analysis.
My link gives the analysis and WHY it is wrong.

Further, your link talks about Arabs who came for the purpose of permanent settlement.. ONLY.
IOW, Tens of thousands of Arabs who came for work (as they always had and will) and just happpened to be there when they rang the bell are now "refugees."

It's funny how you try Apples and Oranges, while I am a native English speaker .. and I'm straightforward/honest.
+

 

[montelatici]

Forgot Link:
It's easy to look up but highly useful for 'us' and for first part of article.
The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
All most cite are the Turkish-paid and Bogus Justin McCarthy assumptions.

and sorry about the bolding of the whole post.
Unfortunately once bolded, it cannot be edited back to standard fonts. A quirk on this board.
`

You keep posting nonsense from a propaganda site that the historical record debunks completely.

The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
by Fred M. Gottheil
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2003, pp. 53-64

['........]
Evidence for Arab Migration
There are several problems associated with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s, the principal one being that Arab migration flows were, in the main, illegal, and therefore unreported and unrecorded.[17] But they were not entirely unnoticed.

Demographer U.O. Schmelz's analysis of the Ottoman registration data for 1905 populations of Jerusalem and Hebron kazas (Ottoman districts), by place of birth, showed that of those Arab Palestinians born outside their localities of residence, approximately HALF represented intra-Palestine movement—from areas of low-level economic activity to areas of higher-level activity—while the other half represented Arab immigration into Palestine itself, 43% originating in Asia, 39% in Africa, and 20% in Turkey.[18] Schmelz conjectured:

The above-average population growth of the Arab villages around the city of Jerusalem, with its Jewish majority, continued until the end of the mandatory period. This must have been due—as elsewhere in Palestine under similar conditions—to in-migrants attracted by economic opportunities, and to the beneficial effects of improved health services in reducing mortality—just as happened in other parts of Palestine around cities with a large Jewish population sector.[19]

While Schmelz restricted his research of the 1905 Palestinian census to the official Ottoman registrations and used these registrations with only minor critical comment, he did acknowledge that "stable population models assume the absence of external migrations, a condition which was obviously not met by all the subpopulations" that Schmelz enumerated.[20]

Like U.O. Schmelz, Roberto Bachi expressed some reservation about the virtual non-existence of data and discussion concerning migration into and within Palestine. He writes:

Between 1800 and 1914, the Muslim population had a yearly average increase in the order of magnitude of roughly 6-7 per thousand. This can be compared to the very crude estimate of about 4 per thousand for the "less developed countries" of the world (in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) between 1800 and 1910. It is possible that part of the growth of the Muslim population was due to Immigration.[21]

Although Bachi did not pursue the linkage between undocumented immigration into Palestine and the 6 (or 7) to 4 per thousand differential in growth rates between Palestine and the other less developed countries (LDCs), the idea that at least one-third of Palestine's population growth may be attributed to immigration is—using Bachi's own growth rate differentials—not an entirely unreasonable one.

Lacking verifiable evidence did not prevent Bachi from stating the obvious concerning internal migration within Palestine:

The great economic development of the coastal plains—largely due to Jewish immigration—was accompanied both in 1922-1931 and in 1931-1944 by a much stronger increase of the Muslim and Christian populations in this region than that registered in other regions. This was probably due to two reasons: stronger decrease in mortality of the non-Jewish population in the neighborhood of Jewish areas and Internal migration toward the more developed zones.[22][/B]


In the footnote accompanying this quote, Bachi writes: "As no statistics are available for internal migration, this conclusion has been obtained from indirect evidence."[23] Bachi's footnote is instructive. The "indirect evidence" he referred to no doubt included his understanding of the important role economics plays in explaining demographic movements. While appreciating the value of Ottoman registrations and British mandatory government censuses in providing estimates of Palestinian demography, they were, in his judgment, still crude and incomplete.

Reference to Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s is made as well in the British mandatory government's annual compilation of statistical data on population. The Palestine Blue Book, 1937, for example, provides time series demographic statistics whose annual estimates are based on extrapolations from its 1922 census.[24] The footnote accompanying the table on population of Palestine reads:[/B]

There has been unrecorded illegal immigration of both Jews and Arabs in the period since the census of 1931, but it is clear that, since it cannot be recorded, no estimate of its volume is possible.[25]
The 1935 British report to the League of Nations noted that:

One thousand five hundred and fifty-seven persons (including 565 Jews) who, having made their way into the country surreptitiously, were later detected, were sentenced to imprisonment for their offence and recommended for deportation.[26]
The number who "made their way into the country surreptitiously" and undetected was neither estimated nor mentioned.

Historian Gad Gilbar's observation on Ruth Kark's contribution to his edited volume Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914, touches on the issue of Arab immigration into and within Palestine. He relates her ideas in "The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine" to Charles Issawi's thesis concerning the role of minority groups and foreigners in the development of Middle Eastern towns. Explaining why NO other Palestinian cities grew as rapidly as Jaffa and Haifa did during the final three decades of the Ottoman rule, Gilbar writes: "Both attracted population from the rural and urban surroundings and immigrants from outside Palestine."[27]

Each piece of the demographic puzzle by itself may reveal no identifiable picture. But given a multiplicity of such pieces, an image does begin to appear. The Royal Institute for International Affairs adds another piece. Commenting on the growth of the Palestinian population during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s it reports: "The number of Arabs who have entered Palestine illegally from Syria and Transjordan is unknown. But probably considerable."[28] And C.S. Jarvis, governor of the Sinai from 1923-36, adds yet another:

This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Trans-Jordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.[29]
Estimating Real Numbers
The derivation of Palestine migration estimates in this section is based on an uncomplicated imputation theory. Migration becomes a residual claimant for numbers not explained by a population-estimating model based on known initial population stocks and known sets of birth and death rates for that population. In this way, expected population stocks can be derived for any set of subsequent years.

The value of the model depends, of course, on the reliability of the estimates given for initial population stocks and for the rates associated with natural increase. Therein lies the problem with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine. The model itself may be simple and applicable, but its usefulness—as with all estimating models—is contingent upon the quality of the data inputs. That quality in the case of Palestinian migration is compromised by the explicit neglect of illegal entrants. If illegal migrants and subsequently illegal residents escaped the census taker, how could the census account for them? It couldn't and didn't.

It is not surprising then that the British census data produce an Arab Palestinian population growth for 1922-31 that turns out to be generated by natural increase and legal migrations alone. Applying a 2.5 per annum growth rate[30] to a population stock of 589,177 for 1922 generates a 1931 population estimate of 735,799 or 97.6% of the 753,822 recorded in the 1931 census. Does the imputation model then "prove" that illegal immigration into Palestine was inconsequential during 1922-31? Not at all. A footnote accompanying the census's population time series acknowledges the presence in Palestine of illegal Arab immigration. But because it could not be recorded, no estimate of its numbers was included in the census count.[31] Ignoring illegal migrants does not mean they don't exist.

Setting illegal immigration into Palestine aside, the imputation model does generate substantial migrations of Arab Palestinians within Palestine itself and confirms what many demographers, historians, government administrators, and economists have alluded to: the migration of Arab Palestinians from villages, towns, and cities of low economic opportunity to villages, towns, and cities of higher economic opportunity.

Which towns, villages, and cities offered the higher economic opportunity? Analyzing the 1922 and 1931 demographic data by sub-district and separating those sub-districts of Palestine that eventually became 1948 Israel—that is, sub-districts that had relatively large Jewish populations (with accompanying Jewish capital and modern technology)—from those that were not designated as part of 1948 Israel, identified not only the direction of Arab Palestinian migration within Palestine but its magnitude as well.[32]

The Arab Palestinian populations within those sub-districts that eventually became Israel increased from 321,866 in 1922 to 463,288 in 1931 or by 141,422. Applying the 2.5 per annum natural rate of population growth to the 1922 Arab Palestinian population generates an expected population size for 1931 of 398,498 or 64,790 less than the actual population recorded in the British census. By imputation, this unaccounted population increase must have been either illegal immigration not accounted for in the British census and/or registered Arab Palestinians moving from outside the Jewish-identified sub-districts to those sub-districts so identified.This 1922-31 Arab migration into the Jewish sub-districts represented 11.8% of the total 1931 Arab population residing in those sub-districts and as much as 36.8% of its 1922-31 growth.

That over 10% of the 1931 Arab Palestinian population in those sub-districts that eventually became Israel had immigrated to those sub-districts within the 1922-31years is a datum of considerable significance. It is consistent with the fragmentary evidence of illegal migration to and within Palestine; it supports the idea of linkage between economic disparities and migratory impulses—a linkage universally accepted; it undercuts the thesis of "spatial stickiness" attributed by some scholars to the Arab Palestinian population of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and it provides strong circumstantial evidence that the illegal Arab immigration into Palestine, like that within Palestine, was of consequence as well.

Denying the Evidence
As compelling as the arguments and evidence supporting consequential illegal immigration may be to some scholars, they are clearly unconvincing to others. The single most cited contemporary publication on Palestinian demography is Justin McCarthy's 1990 The Population of Palestine. Of McCarthy's 43 pages of descriptive analysis—supplemented by 188 pages of demographic tables copied directly from Ottoman, European, and Jewish source materials—slightly more than one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration into and within Palestine during the Ottoman period, and a similar one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration during the succeeding mandate period.[33] According to McCarthy, these few pages offer enough critical analysis to close the lid on the "infamous" immigration thesis.

Consider first McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration during the Ottoman period. That he finds no illegal immigration of consequence is not surprising because McCarthy uses official Ottoman registration lists that, by the nature of its classifications, take no account of the unreported, illegal immigration. That is to say, if you look in a haystack for a needle that wasn't put there, the probability is high you won't find it. It is strange that that idea had not occurred to McCarthy. Choosing to focus on the official registration lists allows him to write:

From the analysis of rates of increase of the Muslim population of the three Palestiniansanjaks [Ottoman sub-provinces], one can say with certainty that Muslim immigration after 1870 was small.[34]
Reflecting elsewhere on the possibility that the immigration may have occurred over an extended period of time, McCarthy writes: "To postulate such an immigration … stretches the limits of credulity."[35]

McCarthy's treatment of the linkage between economic disparities and migration impulses appears to be even more disingenuous. He writes: "The question of the relative economic development of Palestine in Ottoman times is not a matter to be discussed here."[36] Nor is it considered anywhere else in his book. That is to say, McCarthy does not contest the linkage so much as ignore its relevance to the Palestinian situation.[37]

His dismissal of Arab immigration into Palestine during the mandate period is based on a set of assumptions concerning illegal immigration that is both restrictive and unsubstantiated. He contends that even if the illegal immigrants were unreported on entry, their deaths in Palestine would have been registered. So too, he argues, would their children born in Palestine. Deriving estimates based on such registrations, he arrives at this conclusion: immigration was minimal.[38] But he provides no evidence to show that these supposed registrations of births and deaths were actually made. Had McCarthy considered the fact that detection of illegal immigration during the mandate period resulted in imprisonment and deportation and that immigrants, aware of this, may have avoided any formal registration of deaths and births, he would have had to revise his assessment of illegal immigration.

Perhaps the more serious charge against McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration is his use of Roberto Bachi's estimates. McCarthy's numbers are based, in part, on Bachi's reporting of 900 illegal Arab immigrants per year over the period 1931-45.[39] But McCarthy misrepresents what Bachi's estimate is meant to show. Bachi is careful to identify his 900-per-year illegal Arab immigration estimate as only those discovered by the mandatory authorities. Illegal Arab immigration that went undetected and unreported is not included. He writes:

A detailed analysis presented in Appendix 6.5B on the basis of the registration of part of the illegal migratory traffic, discovered by the Palestine police, shows that legal movements (as reflected in Tables 9.4-9.7) constituted only a small fraction of total Muslim immigration.[40]
To emphasize this point, Bachi writes: "It is hardly credible that illegal movements which were actually discovered included all the illegal entrances which actually occurred, or even the majority of them."[41] As a result, Bachi can only conclude that "in the present state of knowledge, we have beenunable to even guess the size of total immigration."[42]

Such a cautionary comment finds no place in McCarthy's analysis or conclusions. Using Bachi's estimates inappropriately, deriving estimates based solely on registration lists, and ignoring completely the linkages between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses, McCarthy confidently concludes,

the vast majority of the Palestinians resident in 1947 were the sons and daughters who were living in Palestine before modern Jewish immigration began. There is no reason to believe that they were not the sons and daughters of Arabs who had been in Palestine for many centuries.[43]
Every Reason to Believe
Therein lies the ideological warfare concerning claims to territorial inheritance and national sovereignty. Contrary to McCarthy's findings or wishes, there is every reason to believe that consequential immigration of Arabs into and within Palestine occurred during the Ottoman and British mandatory periods. Among the most compelling arguments in support of such immigration is the universally acknowledged and practiced linkage between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses.

The precise magnitude of Arab immigration into and within Palestine is, as Bachi noted, unknown. Lack of completeness in Ottoman registration lists and British Mandatory censuses, and the immeasurable illegal, unreported, and undetected immigration during both periods make any estimate a bold venture into creative analysis. In most cases, those venturing into the realm of Palestinian demography—or other demographic analyses based on very crude data—acknowledge its limitations and the tentativeness of the conclusions that may be drawn.

Fred M. Gottheil is a professor in the department of economics, University of Illinois.

Posting Zionist propaganda does not change the facts. Let's look at the facts as set forth in the Survey of Palestine Vol. 1, page 212.

View attachment 62285View attachment 62285

Now this is from a professional Anglo-American survey group that took all data into consideration. Not some Zionist propagandist. Interestingly, the survey indicates that there was, on the other hand, substantial illegal Jewish immigration from Europe. The 3 volumes of the survey are available on-line at the Berman Jewish Policy Archive at NYU/Wagner.

The old Zionist propaganda has ceased to be effective since official archives have been made available online. At least for people with half a brain that can do research and is willing to discover the truth using independent source documentation.Here is the link to volume 1.
A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 | Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner

Your post is an official finding with NO Analysis.
My link gives the analysis and WHY it is wrong.

Further, your link talks about Arabs who came for the purpose of permanent settlement.. ONLY.
IOW, Tens of thousands of Arabs who came for work (as they always had and will) and just happpened to be there when they rang the bell are now "refugees."

It's funny how you try Apples and Oranges, while I am a native English speaker .. and I'm straightforward/honest.
+

Your link is to a propaganda site. My link is to an historical university archive that hosts source documentation that contains fact. Big difference.

By the way the Survey contains 100s of pages of analysis regarding immigration, legal and illegal.

 

[abu afak]

Forgot Link:
It's easy to look up but highly useful for 'us' and for first part of article.
The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
All most cite are the Turkish-paid and Bogus Justin McCarthy assumptions.

and sorry about the bolding of the whole post.
Unfortunately once bolded, it cannot be edited back to standard fonts. A quirk on this board.
`

You keep posting nonsense from a propaganda site that the historical record debunks completely.

The Smoking Gun: Arab Immigration into Palestine, 1922-1931
by Fred M. Gottheil
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2003, pp. 53-64

['........]
Evidence for Arab Migration
There are several problems associated with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s, the principal one being that Arab migration flows were, in the main, illegal, and therefore unreported and unrecorded.[17] But they were not entirely unnoticed.

Demographer U.O. Schmelz's analysis of the Ottoman registration data for 1905 populations of Jerusalem and Hebron kazas (Ottoman districts), by place of birth, showed that of those Arab Palestinians born outside their localities of residence, approximately HALF represented intra-Palestine movement—from areas of low-level economic activity to areas of higher-level activity—while the other half represented Arab immigration into Palestine itself, 43% originating in Asia, 39% in Africa, and 20% in Turkey.[18] Schmelz conjectured:

The above-average population growth of the Arab villages around the city of Jerusalem, with its Jewish majority, continued until the end of the mandatory period. This must have been due—as elsewhere in Palestine under similar conditions—to in-migrants attracted by economic opportunities, and to the beneficial effects of improved health services in reducing mortality—just as happened in other parts of Palestine around cities with a large Jewish population sector.[19]

While Schmelz restricted his research of the 1905 Palestinian census to the official Ottoman registrations and used these registrations with only minor critical comment, he did acknowledge that "stable population models assume the absence of external migrations, a condition which was obviously not met by all the subpopulations" that Schmelz enumerated.[20]

Like U.O. Schmelz, Roberto Bachi expressed some reservation about the virtual non-existence of data and discussion concerning migration into and within Palestine. He writes:

Between 1800 and 1914, the Muslim population had a yearly average increase in the order of magnitude of roughly 6-7 per thousand. This can be compared to the very crude estimate of about 4 per thousand for the "less developed countries" of the world (in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) between 1800 and 1910. It is possible that part of the growth of the Muslim population was due to Immigration.[21]

Although Bachi did not pursue the linkage between undocumented immigration into Palestine and the 6 (or 7) to 4 per thousand differential in growth rates between Palestine and the other less developed countries (LDCs), the idea that at least one-third of Palestine's population growth may be attributed to immigration is—using Bachi's own growth rate differentials—not an entirely unreasonable one.

Lacking verifiable evidence did not prevent Bachi from stating the obvious concerning internal migration within Palestine:

The great economic development of the coastal plains—largely due to Jewish immigration—was accompanied both in 1922-1931 and in 1931-1944 by a much stronger increase of the Muslim and Christian populations in this region than that registered in other regions. This was probably due to two reasons: stronger decrease in mortality of the non-Jewish population in the neighborhood of Jewish areas and Internal migration toward the more developed zones.[22][/B]


In the footnote accompanying this quote, Bachi writes: "As no statistics are available for internal migration, this conclusion has been obtained from indirect evidence."[23] Bachi's footnote is instructive. The "indirect evidence" he referred to no doubt included his understanding of the important role economics plays in explaining demographic movements. While appreciating the value of Ottoman registrations and British mandatory government censuses in providing estimates of Palestinian demography, they were, in his judgment, still crude and incomplete.

Reference to Arab immigration into Palestine during the 1920s is made as well in the British mandatory government's annual compilation of statistical data on population. The Palestine Blue Book, 1937, for example, provides time series demographic statistics whose annual estimates are based on extrapolations from its 1922 census.[24] The footnote accompanying the table on population of Palestine reads:[/B]

There has been unrecorded illegal immigration of both Jews and Arabs in the period since the census of 1931, but it is clear that, since it cannot be recorded, no estimate of its volume is possible.[25]
The 1935 British report to the League of Nations noted that:

One thousand five hundred and fifty-seven persons (including 565 Jews) who, having made their way into the country surreptitiously, were later detected, were sentenced to imprisonment for their offence and recommended for deportation.[26]
The number who "made their way into the country surreptitiously" and undetected was neither estimated nor mentioned.

Historian Gad Gilbar's observation on Ruth Kark's contribution to his edited volume Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914, touches on the issue of Arab immigration into and within Palestine. He relates her ideas in "The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine" to Charles Issawi's thesis concerning the role of minority groups and foreigners in the development of Middle Eastern towns. Explaining why NO other Palestinian cities grew as rapidly as Jaffa and Haifa did during the final three decades of the Ottoman rule, Gilbar writes: "Both attracted population from the rural and urban surroundings and immigrants from outside Palestine."[27]

Each piece of the demographic puzzle by itself may reveal no identifiable picture. But given a multiplicity of such pieces, an image does begin to appear. The Royal Institute for International Affairs adds another piece. Commenting on the growth of the Palestinian population during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s it reports: "The number of Arabs who have entered Palestine illegally from Syria and Transjordan is unknown. But probably considerable."[28] And C.S. Jarvis, governor of the Sinai from 1923-36, adds yet another:

This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Trans-Jordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.[29]
Estimating Real Numbers
The derivation of Palestine migration estimates in this section is based on an uncomplicated imputation theory. Migration becomes a residual claimant for numbers not explained by a population-estimating model based on known initial population stocks and known sets of birth and death rates for that population. In this way, expected population stocks can be derived for any set of subsequent years.

The value of the model depends, of course, on the reliability of the estimates given for initial population stocks and for the rates associated with natural increase. Therein lies the problem with estimating Arab immigration into Palestine. The model itself may be simple and applicable, but its usefulness—as with all estimating models—is contingent upon the quality of the data inputs. That quality in the case of Palestinian migration is compromised by the explicit neglect of illegal entrants. If illegal migrants and subsequently illegal residents escaped the census taker, how could the census account for them? It couldn't and didn't.

It is not surprising then that the British census data produce an Arab Palestinian population growth for 1922-31 that turns out to be generated by natural increase and legal migrations alone. Applying a 2.5 per annum growth rate[30] to a population stock of 589,177 for 1922 generates a 1931 population estimate of 735,799 or 97.6% of the 753,822 recorded in the 1931 census. Does the imputation model then "prove" that illegal immigration into Palestine was inconsequential during 1922-31? Not at all. A footnote accompanying the census's population time series acknowledges the presence in Palestine of illegal Arab immigration. But because it could not be recorded, no estimate of its numbers was included in the census count.[31] Ignoring illegal migrants does not mean they don't exist.

Setting illegal immigration into Palestine aside, the imputation model does generate substantial migrations of Arab Palestinians within Palestine itself and confirms what many demographers, historians, government administrators, and economists have alluded to: the migration of Arab Palestinians from villages, towns, and cities of low economic opportunity to villages, towns, and cities of higher economic opportunity.

Which towns, villages, and cities offered the higher economic opportunity? Analyzing the 1922 and 1931 demographic data by sub-district and separating those sub-districts of Palestine that eventually became 1948 Israel—that is, sub-districts that had relatively large Jewish populations (with accompanying Jewish capital and modern technology)—from those that were not designated as part of 1948 Israel, identified not only the direction of Arab Palestinian migration within Palestine but its magnitude as well.[32]

The Arab Palestinian populations within those sub-districts that eventually became Israel increased from 321,866 in 1922 to 463,288 in 1931 or by 141,422. Applying the 2.5 per annum natural rate of population growth to the 1922 Arab Palestinian population generates an expected population size for 1931 of 398,498 or 64,790 less than the actual population recorded in the British census. By imputation, this unaccounted population increase must have been either illegal immigration not accounted for in the British census and/or registered Arab Palestinians moving from outside the Jewish-identified sub-districts to those sub-districts so identified.This 1922-31 Arab migration into the Jewish sub-districts represented 11.8% of the total 1931 Arab population residing in those sub-districts and as much as 36.8% of its 1922-31 growth.

That over 10% of the 1931 Arab Palestinian population in those sub-districts that eventually became Israel had immigrated to those sub-districts within the 1922-31years is a datum of considerable significance. It is consistent with the fragmentary evidence of illegal migration to and within Palestine; it supports the idea of linkage between economic disparities and migratory impulses—a linkage universally accepted; it undercuts the thesis of "spatial stickiness" attributed by some scholars to the Arab Palestinian population of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and it provides strong circumstantial evidence that the illegal Arab immigration into Palestine, like that within Palestine, was of consequence as well.

Denying the Evidence
As compelling as the arguments and evidence supporting consequential illegal immigration may be to some scholars, they are clearly unconvincing to others. The single most cited contemporary publication on Palestinian demography is Justin McCarthy's 1990 The Population of Palestine. Of McCarthy's 43 pages of descriptive analysis—supplemented by 188 pages of demographic tables copied directly from Ottoman, European, and Jewish source materials—slightly more than one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration into and within Palestine during the Ottoman period, and a similar one and a half pages are devoted to Arab immigration during the succeeding mandate period.[33] According to McCarthy, these few pages offer enough critical analysis to close the lid on the "infamous" immigration thesis.

Consider first McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration during the Ottoman period. That he finds no illegal immigration of consequence is not surprising because McCarthy uses official Ottoman registration lists that, by the nature of its classifications, take no account of the unreported, illegal immigration. That is to say, if you look in a haystack for a needle that wasn't put there, the probability is high you won't find it. It is strange that that idea had not occurred to McCarthy. Choosing to focus on the official registration lists allows him to write:

From the analysis of rates of increase of the Muslim population of the three Palestiniansanjaks [Ottoman sub-provinces], one can say with certainty that Muslim immigration after 1870 was small.[34]
Reflecting elsewhere on the possibility that the immigration may have occurred over an extended period of time, McCarthy writes: "To postulate such an immigration … stretches the limits of credulity."[35]

McCarthy's treatment of the linkage between economic disparities and migration impulses appears to be even more disingenuous. He writes: "The question of the relative economic development of Palestine in Ottoman times is not a matter to be discussed here."[36] Nor is it considered anywhere else in his book. That is to say, McCarthy does not contest the linkage so much as ignore its relevance to the Palestinian situation.[37]

His dismissal of Arab immigration into Palestine during the mandate period is based on a set of assumptions concerning illegal immigration that is both restrictive and unsubstantiated. He contends that even if the illegal immigrants were unreported on entry, their deaths in Palestine would have been registered. So too, he argues, would their children born in Palestine. Deriving estimates based on such registrations, he arrives at this conclusion: immigration was minimal.[38] But he provides no evidence to show that these supposed registrations of births and deaths were actually made. Had McCarthy considered the fact that detection of illegal immigration during the mandate period resulted in imprisonment and deportation and that immigrants, aware of this, may have avoided any formal registration of deaths and births, he would have had to revise his assessment of illegal immigration.

Perhaps the more serious charge against McCarthy's analysis of Arab immigration is his use of Roberto Bachi's estimates. McCarthy's numbers are based, in part, on Bachi's reporting of 900 illegal Arab immigrants per year over the period 1931-45.[39] But McCarthy misrepresents what Bachi's estimate is meant to show. Bachi is careful to identify his 900-per-year illegal Arab immigration estimate as only those discovered by the mandatory authorities. Illegal Arab immigration that went undetected and unreported is not included. He writes:

A detailed analysis presented in Appendix 6.5B on the basis of the registration of part of the illegal migratory traffic, discovered by the Palestine police, shows that legal movements (as reflected in Tables 9.4-9.7) constituted only a small fraction of total Muslim immigration.[40]
To emphasize this point, Bachi writes: "It is hardly credible that illegal movements which were actually discovered included all the illegal entrances which actually occurred, or even the majority of them."[41] As a result, Bachi can only conclude that "in the present state of knowledge, we have beenunable to even guess the size of total immigration."[42]

Such a cautionary comment finds no place in McCarthy's analysis or conclusions. Using Bachi's estimates inappropriately, deriving estimates based solely on registration lists, and ignoring completely the linkages between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses, McCarthy confidently concludes,

the vast majority of the Palestinians resident in 1947 were the sons and daughters who were living in Palestine before modern Jewish immigration began. There is no reason to believe that they were not the sons and daughters of Arabs who had been in Palestine for many centuries.[43]
Every Reason to Believe
Therein lies the ideological warfare concerning claims to territorial inheritance and national sovereignty. Contrary to McCarthy's findings or wishes, there is every reason to believe that consequential immigration of Arabs into and within Palestine occurred during the Ottoman and British mandatory periods. Among the most compelling arguments in support of such immigration is the universally acknowledged and practiced linkage between regional economic disparities and migratory impulses.

The precise magnitude of Arab immigration into and within Palestine is, as Bachi noted, unknown. Lack of completeness in Ottoman registration lists and British Mandatory censuses, and the immeasurable illegal, unreported, and undetected immigration during both periods make any estimate a bold venture into creative analysis. In most cases, those venturing into the realm of Palestinian demography—or other demographic analyses based on very crude data—acknowledge its limitations and the tentativeness of the conclusions that may be drawn.

Fred M. Gottheil is a professor in the department of economics, University of Illinois.

Posting Zionist propaganda does not change the facts. Let's look at the facts as set forth in the Survey of Palestine Vol. 1, page 212.

View attachment 62285View attachment 62285

Now this is from a professional Anglo-American survey group that took all data into consideration. Not some Zionist propagandist. Interestingly, the survey indicates that there was, on the other hand, substantial illegal Jewish immigration from Europe. The 3 volumes of the survey are available on-line at the Berman Jewish Policy Archive at NYU/Wagner.

The old Zionist propaganda has ceased to be effective since official archives have been made available online. At least for people with half a brain that can do research and is willing to discover the truth using independent source documentation.Here is the link to volume 1.
A Survey of Palestine Volume 1 | Berman Jewish Policy Archive @ NYU Wagner

Your post is an official finding with NO Analysis.
My link gives the analysis and WHY it is wrong.

Further, your link talks about Arabs who came for the purpose of permanent settlement.. ONLY.
IOW, Tens of thousands of Arabs who came for work (as they always had and will) and just happpened to be there when they rang the bell are now "refugees."

It's funny how you try Apples and Oranges, while I am a native English speaker .. and I'm straightforward/honest.
+

Your link is to a propaganda site. My link is to an historical university archive that hosts source documentation that contains fact. Big difference.

By the way the Survey contains 100s of pages of analysis regarding immigration, legal and illegal.

My link has actual facts and logical conclusions that can be disputed or confirmed.
ALL your posts Are using 'Zionist' as an epithet, or calling anyone else's posts on the other side "Propaganda", withOut addressing it.
Nonresponsive/nonconversant.

 

[montelatici]

Your link is pure propaganda. From a propaganda site.

 

[American_Jihad]

Plenty of Palestinian Passes
The heavy cost of ignoring or rewarding Palestinian hostility and hate.
February 10, 2016
Noah Beck

Reprinted from InvestigativeProject.org.

Activists who genuinely want to see peace between Israelis and Palestinians need to internalize a memorably alliterative warning: plenty of Palestinian passes perpetuate the impasse. The more global opinion ignores or rewards irresponsible behavior by Palestinians, the more likely renewed violence (rather than peace) becomes.

There are enough instances of unfair and counterproductive "Palestinian passes" to fill a tome, but here are some recent examples.

PASSING ON HAMAS BELLICOSITY

Probably the most important pass currently given to the Palestinians is the global silence over news that Hamas is preparing to launch another war against Israel while distressing ordinary Israelis with their ominous tunneling sounds. Such silence by the world's most important media, international bodies, political leaders, NGOs and academics helps keep Hamas in power, and when Hamas eventually launches new hostilities against Israel, many of the same voices that are now silent will blame Israel for the resulting suffering.

Hamas bellicosity is constant, and constantly ignored. Rather than prepare Palestinians for peace, Hamas glorifies death and promotes viciously hateful ideologies. A Hamas TV broadcast announces, "We have no problem with death. We are not like the children of Israel...we yearn for death and Martyrdom...Every mother...must nurse her children on hatred of the sons of Zion."

Last April, Iran reportedly sent Hamas tens of millions of dollars to rebuild tunnels and restock missile arsenals destroyed in 2014 by Israel during Operation Protective Edge. Instead of global sanctions or censure over its support for terrorism, Iran was rewarded with a nuclear deal that just unlocked $100 billion in frozen assets, some of which are expected to support more terrorism.

Hamas regularly starts pointless wars with Israel that doom Gaza to inevitable devastation. Then, when international sympathy and donations pour in, Hamas diverts the resources to rebuilding its offensive capabilities/tunnels (rather than destroyed homes in Gaza).

Hamas recently accelerated its tunnel-digging program. Indeed, three collapsing tunnels killed eight Hamas diggers in late January and another two last week.

Such reports establish that Hamas is diverting resources from rehabilitating Gaza to attacking Israel, and yet the world still blames Israel for Gazan misery.

PASSING ON HAMAS ABUSE OF GAZANS

Ironically, those who claim to excoriate Israel out of their concern for the welfare of Gaza don't seem to care when Hamas causes Gazan suffering. At least 160 Gazan children died digging Hamas' tunnels intended to kill Israeli children. Hamas tortures political prisoners next to a girl's school and kills its critics (it executed 25 in 2014). Hamas executed 120 Gazans for breaching a curfew. Hamas kills fellow Palestinians when its rockets fall short. Unsurprisingly, in a poll last September, Gazans actually preferred Israeli rule to Hamas.

PASSING ON PALESTINIAN INCITEMENT

Facebook tolerates Palestinian incitement but quickly responds to complaints about Jewish racism. The company is clearly able to control the threats circulating on its site, as shown by Facebook's recent decision to stop gun sale promotions, making the continued incitement against Jews and Israelis on Facebook all the more outrageous. Facebook has much to learn from its tech rival, Google, which is reportedly directing jihadi search queries to sites that deradicalize.

...

Plenty of Palestinian Passes

 

[Boston1]

There is no palestinian identity.

Its a political gimmick dreamed up by the Arab Muslims to try and destabilize Israel politically when it couldn't be done militarily

 

[American_Jihad]

Is Israel Behind the Gaza Tunnel Collapses?
As Hamas digs its way to doom.
March 8, 2016
P. David Hornik

...

True, Hamas has now replenished its rocket arsenals:

Israeli officials now assess that Hamas has roughly the number of rockets that it had in June 2014. A major difference, though, is that most of the rockets are relatively short range and of lower quality, the officials believe….

The new rockets are mostly locally produced—due to the closing of the tunnels that ran between Sinai and the Gaza Strip and the difficulty Hamas faces in smuggling standard rockets and weapons into Gaza.

We can say for sure, at least, that Israel had something to do with the closure of the Sinai-to-Gaza tunnels:

For many long years, Israel begged the Egyptians to block Hamas’ tunnels—tunnels that allowed Gaza to become a veritable storehouse of weapons, rockets and missiles. [President] Sisi adopted this mission with great zeal, and the Egyptians destroyed all of the tunnels. Some were flooded with ocean water and some were blocked up….

To sum up: Hamas, a terror organization with about forty thousand fighters, keeps pursuing the fantasy of being able to defeat and destroy Israel, recently ranked the eighth most militarily powerful country in the world. Hamas does this at the expense of a population in dire economic straits, diverting what little aid and materials still enter the Strip into the building of rockets, tunnels, and the like that are not even on a par with those Hamas used in previous wars.

There is no sign of a popular revolt in Gaza like, for instance, the attempt at a popular revolt against Iran’s Islamist regime in 2009. It could be because Hamas’s brutal repression is too fearsome, or because too much of the population still shares Hamas’s goal of fighting Israel at all costs.

It is, in any case, a picture of human irrationality at its starkest and an old, familiar Palestinian story: pursuing an endless war against Israel while mostly killing and destroying themselves.

Is Israel Behind the Gaza Tunnel Collapses?

 

[American_Jihad]

While Israel Endures Terror Attacks, Obama Seeks to Undermine an Ally
Stabbings claim the life of one American student.
March 9, 2016
Ari Lieberman

The brief lull in violence in Israel was shattered yesterday by Arab terror attacks in three cities across Israel that claimed the life of one American tourist and injured 13 others, some critically. The attacks coincided with a visit by Vice President Joe Biden, his first since 2010.

The first attack occurred in Petach Tikva. An Arab followed an Israeli into a store and began stabbing the civilian repeatedly in the upper part of his body. The civilian overcame his initial shock and in an amazing feat of courage and strength, pulled the knife out of his neck and succeeded in stabbing and killing his attacker.

The second attack occurred near the Damascus Gate in Jerusalem. An Arab terrorist on a motorcycle shot at an Israeli policeman, critically injuring him. Security forces then engaged the terrorist and killed him.

The third attack and by far the deadliest occurred in Jaffa. An Arab, identified as a 21-year-old male who was illegally in the country, went on a stabbing spree claiming the life of a 29-year-old American tourist, identified as Taylor Force, a graduate student at Vanderbilt University. The tourist’s wife is in critical condition fighting for her life. Eight others were also injured in the attack including an Israeli-Arab, a Palestinian Arab and a pregnant woman. The terrorist was neutralized near the beach promenade. The vice president was said to have been just fifteen minutes walking distance from the site where the terrorist was killed.

Since the wave of unrest that started in October 2015, 29 Israelis and 4 foreign nationals have been murdered by Arab terrorists using guns, knives, hatchets and motor vehicles. Over 170 Palestinian Arabs have been killed. Most while attempting to carry out terror attacks.

The Hamas terrorist organization, which rules the Gaza Strip, praised the attacks and termed them “heroic operations.” The Palestinian Authority, which governs the Palestinian population in Judea and Samaria (West Bank), has yet to issue any form of condemnation.

The attacks come amid a diplomatic row sparked by the Obama administration. Prime Minister Netanyahu had been scheduled to attend the annual AIPAC conference which is slated to commence on March 20. It was hoped that he would also be able to meet Obama during that time to discuss regional issues and other matters of mutual concern. Obama however, had other plans and decided to skip the AIPAC conference entirely in favor of a meeting with the despotic Castro brothers.

Another date of March 18 was offered but scheduling problems prevented a meeting on that date. Netanyahu opted instead to nix his planned U.S. visit and address the AIPAC confab via video conference. One of the reasons cited was a desire not to interfere with U.S. elections. Some of the presidential hopefuls are slated to give speeches or otherwise attend the conference and while there, would undoubtedly seek an audience with Netanyahu. He therefore thought it best to avoid the appearance of interfering with the U.S. electoral process.

...

While Israel Endures Terror Attacks, Obama Seeks to Undermine an Ally

 

[Phoenall]

Your link is pure propaganda. From a propaganda site.

Point proven yet again

 

[American_Jihad]

YouTube Suspends Account of Palestinian Media Watchdog
What happens when you expose Palestinian Jew hatred.
March 10, 2016
Ari Lieberman

...

Western audiences are rarely exposed to such obscenities. They’re accustomed to viewing polished and often sympathetic Muslim characters who speak of the importance of peace and their desire for democracy and freedom. Of course, what it said behind closed doors, in Arabic to Arabic audiences, remains behind closed doors.

Faced with such malevolence, the importance of monitoring and exposing Arab media takes on a sense of urgency. Two organizations, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and Palestinian Media Watch (PMW) have stood at the forefront of this endeavor. Their efforts have borne fruit and actually forced Western governments to confront Arab anti-Semitism and more carefully scrutinize allocation of funds. In some cases, Arab entities dependent on Western financing were compelled to modify their behavior as a condition of continued financial backing.

PMW operates a website where it hosts its translated Arabic videos and other content and also maintains an account with YouTube where viewers can screen uploaded videos. On March 3, PMW uploaded a disturbing video featuring a child on a Palestinian children’s program reciting a violent poem liberally laced with references to the destruction of Israel and murder of Jews. Shortly thereafter, YouTube suspended PMW’s account. Those who attempted to access PMW’s YouTube site to view their informative content were instead treated to a terse one-line statement that stated; “This account has been terminated due to repeated or severe violations of our Community Guidelines and/or claims of copyright infringement.”

Apparently, Ramallah was upset over the fact that someone had exposed the grubs and maggots sheltered beneath the rock and immediately filed a complaint with YouTube. YouTube, either out of ignorance or malevolence, duly complied with the request to have PMW’s account suspended.

Fortunately, the suspension was brief. A flurry of protest from YouTube users coupled with negative media exposure generated by the fallout from the suspension compelled the social media site to rethink its rash and frankly, idiotic decision.

The incident is reminiscent of several recent embarrassing Facebook faux pas involving removal of benign pro-Israel posts, while leaving intact blatantly anti-Semitic images, depicting violence against Jews or alternatively, depicting Jews with grotesquely exaggerated features, wielding undue influence over the United States. In one such episode, Facebook removed a picture of Israel’s late Prime Minister, Golda Meir, accompanied by her famous quote, “Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate us.” Apparently, someone at Facebook determined that the quotation or image represented a “genuine risk of physical harm or direct threats to public safety.” Once again, public outcry against this obscenity compelled Facebook to quickly perform an about-face and the image with the quotation was restored.

...

The social media war continues unabated with anti-Israel rejectionists utilizing these mediums as tools to further their nefarious agendas. YouTube, Facebook and other social media forums have an obligation to their users to act fairly and responsibly. Content designed to educate and inform, such as the videos featured by PMW, should not be arbitrarily removed. Conversely, content uploaded for the sole purpose of propagating hate and violence, should be removed expeditiously. Facebook and YouTube have acted irresponsibly in this regard in recent months but hopefully, with proper community monitoring and the threat of legal action, this will change.

YouTube Suspends Account of Palestinian Media Watchdog

 

[Billo_Really]

YouTube Suspends Account of Palestinian Media Watchdog
What happens when you expose Palestinian Jew hatred.
March 10, 2016
Ari Lieberman

...

Western audiences are rarely exposed to such obscenities. They’re accustomed to viewing polished and often sympathetic Muslim characters who speak of the importance of peace and their desire for democracy and freedom. Of course, what it said behind closed doors, in Arabic to Arabic audiences, remains behind closed doors.

Faced with such malevolence, the importance of monitoring and exposing Arab media takes on a sense of urgency. Two organizations, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and Palestinian Media Watch (PMW) have stood at the forefront of this endeavor. Their efforts have borne fruit and actually forced Western governments to confront Arab anti-Semitism and more carefully scrutinize allocation of funds. In some cases, Arab entities dependent on Western financing were compelled to modify their behavior as a condition of continued financial backing.

PMW operates a website where it hosts its translated Arabic videos and other content and also maintains an account with YouTube where viewers can screen uploaded videos. On March 3, PMW uploaded a disturbing video featuring a child on a Palestinian children’s program reciting a violent poem liberally laced with references to the destruction of Israel and murder of Jews. Shortly thereafter, YouTube suspended PMW’s account. Those who attempted to access PMW’s YouTube site to view their informative content were instead treated to a terse one-line statement that stated; “This account has been terminated due to repeated or severe violations of our Community Guidelines and/or claims of copyright infringement.”

Apparently, Ramallah was upset over the fact that someone had exposed the grubs and maggots sheltered beneath the rock and immediately filed a complaint with YouTube. YouTube, either out of ignorance or malevolence, duly complied with the request to have PMW’s account suspended.

Fortunately, the suspension was brief. A flurry of protest from YouTube users coupled with negative media exposure generated by the fallout from the suspension compelled the social media site to rethink its rash and frankly, idiotic decision.

The incident is reminiscent of several recent embarrassing Facebook faux pas involving removal of benign pro-Israel posts, while leaving intact blatantly anti-Semitic images, depicting violence against Jews or alternatively, depicting Jews with grotesquely exaggerated features, wielding undue influence over the United States. In one such episode, Facebook removed a picture of Israel’s late Prime Minister, Golda Meir, accompanied by her famous quote, “Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate us.” Apparently, someone at Facebook determined that the quotation or image represented a “genuine risk of physical harm or direct threats to public safety.” Once again, public outcry against this obscenity compelled Facebook to quickly perform an about-face and the image with the quotation was restored.

...

The social media war continues unabated with anti-Israel rejectionists utilizing these mediums as tools to further their nefarious agendas. YouTube, Facebook and other social media forums have an obligation to their users to act fairly and responsibly. Content designed to educate and inform, such as the videos featured by PMW, should not be arbitrarily removed. Conversely, content uploaded for the sole purpose of propagating hate and violence, should be removed expeditiously. Facebook and YouTube have acted irresponsibly in this regard in recent months but hopefully, with proper community monitoring and the threat of legal action, this will change.

YouTube Suspends Account of Palestinian Media Watchdog

Just another example of Israeli thought control.

 

[montelatici]

These Israeli children say they look forward to killing Arabs and "picture dead Arabs". Is there any difference?