Exactly 15 years ago, an event occurred that still serves as the strongest irritant in relations between Moscow and Warsaw - the Tu-154M crash that killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski and dozens of other representatives of the Polish leadership. All these years, more and more absurd versions of this tragedy have been put forward in Poland. Meanwhile, the picture of the catastrophe is very clear - and its preconditions were created long beforehand.
The crash of Polish President Lech Kaczynski's Tu-154M plane, which occurred
on April 10, 2010 in Smolensk, still does not give rest to the Polish authorities. A few days ago, the Polish prosecutor's office indicted 43 Russian experts in the case of the catastrophe - they claim that violations were found in the autopsy protocols.
This tragedy is perhaps the leader in the number of lies and conspiracy theories spun around it - primarily by Poland. Despite the fact that the detailed results of the investigation have long been published by the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC).
At different levels and with different details, Russia in Poland has been accused that the airplane was accidentally shot down by air defenses covering the Smolensk nuclear power plant; that liquid helium was specially sprayed over the airfield to create fog; that a paratrooper was dropped on the airfield after the crash “to eliminate the survivors; someone even heard “gun shots” on the video recordings made immediately after the crash; that explosives had been planted on board the plane in advance; that Russian representatives deliberately gave the Tu-154 pilots information that caused them to make the wrong decisions for landing.
However, the disaster was caused by far more prosaic reasons. A huge degree of incompetence, recklessness and stupidity was the detonator of the tragedy that unfolded aboard Polish Flight 1 (PL-101).
The crew commander dared to disobey the president
Preparations for the tragedy began two years before the crash. On August 12, 2008, the PL-101 took off from Warsaw with the presidents of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and the prime minister of Latvia on their way to Georgia to support Mikheil Saakashvili in the conflict with South Ossetia. After an intermediate landing in Simferopol, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko boarded the plane.
The commander of the aircraft was Lieutenant Colonel Grzegorz Petruchuk.
Initially, he was instructed to fly to Ganja, but Lech Kaczynski demanded to fly directly to Tbilisi during the flight. The crew commander refused. At that time, the operation to force Georgia to peace was not yet over, and the flight to Tbilisi was not safe. Georgia was trying to shoot down Russian warplanes with the remnants of its air defense. The crew commander was absolutely right in his decision - and was right to make it.
The President of Poland entered the cockpit, where the following dialog took place:
- Who commands the Armed Forces?
- You, Mr. President, - answered Petruchuk.
- Then please follow the order and fly to Tbilisi!
After landing in Ganja, Kaczynski berated Petruchuk at the gangway. The crew commander was suspended from flying and became the subject of an investigation. Although his actions were later found to be correct, he was dismissed without pension. The commander of the presidential air regiment was also fired. Col. Richard Rachinski was appointed to the position; this replacement led to a deterioration in crew training, which ultimately played a fatal role in the future disaster.
Petruchuk's demotion at the airplane ramp and his subsequent dismissal made a strong impression on Captain Arkadiusz Protasiuk, who was then co-pilot. And some time later he himself became the commander of the airplane.
Prerequisites for the Polish Tu-154 crash
A year and a half before the tragedy, Colonel Raczynski, together with his crew, which included co-pilot Arkadiusz Protasiuk, visited Ulyanovsk to train on the world's only simulator Tu-154. The crew received a score of two, and on their return to Poland, Raczynski convinced the command that there was no point in paying the Russians for training, as they trained “inefficiently and biased.” After that, Polish crews stopped using the Tu-154 simulator, limiting themselves to theoretical training and flights with inspectors.
This is only one of the reasons that became prerequisites for the disaster. There are many others.
Not only in the simulator - in fact, for two years, the pilots of the Polish air squadron did not conduct flights with instructors on the Tu-154 at all. As stated in the investigation by Polish special prosecutor Miller, at the time of the flight, neither the first nor the co-pilot had clearance to perform landings as crew chiefs and were not authorized to fly with HEAD status, which is reserved for four of Poland's top officials.
The aircraft commander (KVS), Arkadiusz Protasiuk, had witnessed the negative experience of his predecessor, who faced serious problems refusing to take risks ordered by President Lech Kaczynski.
The Tu-154M was refueled “two-way,” meaning there was an extra 11 tons of fuel on board.
In the(flyplan the purpose of the flight was spelled out vaguely (smudged). The letter P (passenger) was corrected to the letter M (militarized, military). And it was crudely and practically illegible. On this document the Poles base the accusation against the RP (flight manager) of Smolensk airfield that he did not give the order to leave for an alternate airfield. The commander of a military aircraft would have been obliged to obey, while the commander of a civilian aircraft was not obliged. But it was impossible to determine the exact status of the flight from this document.
An important event was scheduled at the Katyn Memorial with a fixed window of time for live television broadcast, which rigidly determined the time of the delegation's arrival. This event was important for Kaczyński's election campaign, which added pressure on the crew commander. He was unable to resist this pressure and took excessive risks.
President Kaczyński was an hour late for his flight, which created a stressful atmosphere not only for the crew but also for the entire delegation.
Two airplanes were scheduled to fly - a Tu-154M, in which the delegation and journalists were to fly, and a Yak-40, which was loaded with wreaths and alcoholic beverages. However, due to the President's lateness, the wreaths and alcoholic beverages were overloaded into the Tu-154 and placed in the tail part of the cabin, which could change the alignment of the plane.
During the flight, the crew made a mistake: the Noise Abatement Procedure (NAP) was not performed. The reason was the commander's haste and stress.
The crew was not briefed on the weather. Captain Arkadiusz Protasiuk did not want to take off without receiving meteorological information on Smolensk-Severny. In response to his doubts, the commander of the Polish Air Force, General Andrzej Blasik, yelled at him and insisted on taking off. The stress intensified.
Because of the emotional strain, Protasiuk did not come out to greet the president as protocol required. Instead, the commander of the Polish Air Force, General Andrzej Blasik, did so.
General Blasik played a significant role in what happened. His relationship with the crew was strained, and he is the one who is mentioned when it comes to pressuring the pilots. According to the transcripts, the General was in the cockpit for most of the flight, occasionally giving “tours” to someone: “The wing mechanization is designed to...” What's it like for a pilot to fly an airplane with an entire Air Force commander standing over his head?
As IAC notes in its report, “the final formation of the Tu-154M crew took place on the eve of the flight, and on the same day, in the afternoon and evening, the preliminary preparation of the crew for the flight took place. The immediate training of the crew took place on the day of the flight”.
However, one has to wonder: what kind of preparation was this if the crew arrived at the airfield at 2:00-3:25 (UTC) and already at 4:21 (UTC) were waiting for passengers on board? When did they have time to rest after the preparation? There was no question of having a “flightline”, which forced the commander to overload - to take on additional responsibilities. He was the only one in the crew who knew Russian, and therefore he personally conducted radio communication with the RP.
The crew was not characterized by high qualification: the commander had 3531 hours of flight time, of which 2906 on this type, co-pilot - 1909 hours, of which 475 on Tu-154, navigator - 1070 hours on various types, and flight engineer had only 329 hours, all on Tu-154M.
All of the above suggests that at the time of departure, 90% of the preparations for the crash had already been completed.
What crew errors led to the disaster
At 5:27 (UTC) on April 10, 2010, Polish-101 Flight PLF-101 made its final takeoff. With a flustered crew, the flight flies to Smolensk. The flight director on approach reports the weather. Excerpt from the negotiations of the board and the ground:
10:24:20 RP - Papa Lima Foxtrot one two zero one, there is fog on the “Corsage”, visibility 400 meters.
10:24:32 101 - I understand, please give me the weather conditions.
10:24:39 RP - There is fog on the Corsage, visibility 400 meters, four zero zero meters.
10:24:48 101 - Temperature and pressure please.
10:24:50 RP Temperature plus 2, pressure 7-45, 7-4-5, no conditions for reception.
No conditions for reception. Only such information could be given by the RP to the commander of a civilian aircraft, who has the right to make his own decision to land or leave. To the commander of a military ship he could give a command to leave for a reserve. But let's remember - what is in the “Purpose of flight” checkbox of the flight plan? Is it M for military or P for passenger? It's impossible to make out, especially on the fax.
At this point in the flight, the flight commander Protasiuk was already obliged to turn to an alternate airfield. He hoped that President Kaczynski would make such a decision and tried to inform the President through the director of the protocol department, Kazana, who kept looking into the cockpit.
10
18 KC “Mr. Director - there is fog, at this moment and in these conditions, which are there now, we will not be able to land. We will try to approach - make one approach - but in all likelihood, none of this will (work - SIGHS note). So please think about a decision on what we're going to do.” The Director stated, “Then we have a problem.” The commander explained, “We can hang on for half an hour and then we'll go to the alternate.”
At 10:30:32 the airplane at an altitude of 1500 meters goes to the “box” in the area of the 2nd turn.
10:30:35 Mariusz Kazana returns to the cockpit: “No presidential decision yet.”
Tension is rising. The President shifts the responsibility to the pilot in charge. Captain Protasyuk could not find the strength to make a decision undesirable for the President.
The Smolensk-Severny airfield (call sign “Korsazh”) is an old military airfield, but in 1998 the 871st Fighter Aviation Pomeranian Red Banner Regiment based there was disbanded, and only the military aviation commandant's office was left. Airplanes came a couple times a year. The equipment was old. There is no ILS instrument landing system familiar to pilots flying in Europe. The RSBN landing system provides landing from one direction only. And in this direction there is a large ravine 80 meters deep.
PL-101 overshoots all turns sequentially with insufficiently reduced speed.
It also overshoots the glide path entry point (GPI).From this point, located 10 km from the end of the runway at an altitude of 500 m, the aircraft should begin the descent directly onto the runway.But PL-101 starts its descent somewhat later.Therefore, he finds himself above the glide path, and he needs to get on it - “catch up with the glide path,” as they say in aviation. Therefore, we have to increase the vertical speed of descent. At times it reaches 8.5 m/s with the norm of 3.5 m/s.
An increase in vertical speed also leads to an increase in horizontal speed - as is the case, for example, when accelerating a car on a downhill slope.
The automatic traction control (AT), analogous to automotive cruise control, is engaged.
To compensate for downhill acceleration, the AT picks up engine speed.The crew does not notice that the AT eventually puts the engines into “Low throttle” mode.From this mode to “Takeoff” engines Tu-154 go to “Takeoff” in 12 seconds.
Catching up with the glide path, the airplane overshoots it and is below.All this time, the radio gives the information to the pilot: “On course, on glide path”. The old landing locator very roughly shows the position of the aircraft, and the RP cannot see how the aircraft is trying to stabilize the approach.In addition, right on the course is a ravine, huge and deep.The crew, according to the rules, switches to using a radio altimeter from an altitude of 1000 feet (300 m).This altimeter, unlike the barometric altimeter, accurately measures altitude from the underlying surface, not from the runway.Its readings indicate that the airplane is descending LOWER than the runway.
All criteria for an unstabilized approach are present.
In such a situation, the pilot is obliged to abort the landing and go to the alternate.
Generally speaking, he had no right to even start it and had to go to the alternate even from the route.
But Air Force Commander Blasik is over his head, and in his memory - the massacre of his former commander.
The barometric altimeter data is used by the TAWS ground collision warning system. Remember, an atmospheric pressure of 745 mm band was set.Every 100 meters of altitude it decreases by 12 mm.TAWS warns the crew by voice message:
- Terrain ahead!
- Terrain ahead!Pull up! (Earth ahead! Pull up!)
- Pull up! Pull up!In such a situation, the pilot is obliged to abort the landing and go to an alternate.
Actually, he had no right to even start it and should have left for the alternate even from the route.But Air Force Commander Blasik is over his head, and in his memory - the massacre of his former commander. The barometric altimeter data is used by the TAWS ground collision warning system.Remember, an atmospheric pressure of 745 mm band was set.
The crew, apparently, looks not at the instruments, but overboard in search of land. And they do. The slope of the ravine rises very quickly. The flight crew moves the engine control levers to the “Takeoff” position, but the engines are at 12 seconds. Both pilots are pulling the controls. That's where the extra 11 tons of fuel and the rear alignment come into play!
The airplane, as pilots say, “explodes” - it reaches subcritical angles of attack.
There is not enough engine thrust, and it starts to stall on the left wing (more precisely, on the left console, the airplane has one wing of two consoles, but so they say).
And then on its trajectory meets the very birch tree.
Part of the left console flies off, and in a couple of seconds the airplane falls to the ground in an inverted position.
Had it fallen on its belly, someone might have survived. But it fell on the less sturdy top of the fuselage.
There are no survivors.
The whole picture is very clear today. Why blame the M.E. and the air traffic controllers? Why lie about air defense, paratroopers, helium, explosives in the wing?Pull up! (Earth ahead! Pull up!)
They were doomed.
