Legal Analysis | Living Under Drones
In the Absence of Armed Conflict, Only International Human Rights Law Applies
IHRL permits the intentional use of lethal force only when strictly necessary and proportionate. Thus, “targeted killings” as typically understood (intentional and premeditated killings) cannot be lawful under IHRL, which allows intentional lethal force only when necessary to protect against a threat to life, and where there are “no other means, such as capture or non-lethal incapacitation, of preventing that threat to life.”[55] There is little public evidence that many of the targeted killings carried out fulfill this strict legal test. Indeed, and as described above, many particular strikes and practices suggest breaches of the test, including: signature strikes; strikes on rescuers; the administration’s apparent definition of “militant;” the lack of evidence of imminent threat; and the practice of extensive surveillance and presence on a list before killing.
The nature and effect of the US targeted killing policy may also contravene in some instances other sections of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[56] an international human rights treaty ratified by the US. Sections of the ICCPR potentially violated by US drone practice include Article 7 (prohibition on cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment), Article 9.1 (right to liberty and security), Article 17 (right to freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, and home), Article 21 (right to peaceful assembly), and Article 22 (right to freedom of association).[57] Thus, for example, Articles 21 and 22 might be violated where drone strike practices cause individuals to fear assembling in groups—as described by many interviewees—out of concern that they might be assumed to be engaged in suspicious activity that might result in a signature strike.
US Domestic Law
US drone strikes must also comply with US domestic law. Under Article II of the US Constitution, the President wields significant authority over questions involving national security and the use of force.[58] The Constitution, though, also entrusts key responsibilities, including the authority to declare war, to Congress.[59] When acting pursuant to Congressional authorization in an area delegated to him under the Constitution, the President has relatively expansive authority to act.[60]
The principal domestic legislative basis offered to justify drone strikes is the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), a joint resolution of both houses of Congress passed exactly one week after 9/11. The AUMF permits the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”[61] While subsequent legal and judicial developments expanded the government’s detention authority beyond the parameters of the AUMF,[62] the AUMF continues to provide the legal basis for the use of force against Al Qaeda. The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for example, while affirming the President’s power to detain forces “associated” with Al Qaeda and Taliban and “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,”[63] notes that “nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.”[64] Congress, which has been more engaged recently in oversight of the drone program,[65] has yet to expand or limit the authorization for the executive to use force under the AUMF at this writing.
US officials have cited the AUMF to support their position that the country is at ‘war’ not only with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but also with all alleged affiliated groups, wherever they may operate, and at any point when they emerge.[66] For example, Jeh Johnson, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, has stated that the US government considers the AUMF to authorize force against “associated forces.”[67] An associated force, according to Johnson, is “(1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with Al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”[68] The plain language of the AUMF, though, would appear only to authorize the use of force against those tied to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and not any “associated forces” who may subsequently allegedly join with Al Qaeda.[69] While the AUMF would thus cover actions against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, strikes against groups not involved with the 9/11 attacks, including, for example, the Haqqani Network and TTP, would not be covered under the currently existing language.
The express legislative authorization in the AUMF, read in conjunction with the wartime powers of the executive under Article II, endow the President with expansive authority to act on use of force questions in the post-9/11 context.[70] In addition, the President has the authority to issue findings to authorize CIA action beyond the parameters of Congressional authorization as long as such action does not otherwise violate domestic law.[71] Some argue that this allows the President to authorize the CIA to take pre-emptive lethal action in self-defense against terrorists in response to an imminent threat, without first obtaining Congressional approval.[72] While all US presidents have embraced an executive order issued by President Gerald Ford in 1976[73] prohibiting political assassination,[74] at least two presidents have reportedly relied on classified legal memoranda to conclude that “executive orders banning assassination do not prevent the president from lawfully singling out a terrorist for death by covert action.”[75]
To the extent that strikes may occur pursuant to executive findings authorizing CIA action beyond the parameters of Congressional authorization, the legal framework guiding CIA engagement must be examined. Many have questioned what rules govern the CIA,[76] with some even suggesting that the express purpose of the CIA is to safeguard vital national interests by means of covert action that may go beyond the parameters of the law.[77] The CIA’s involvement in drone strikes in Pakistan does not absolve the US from its responsibility to adhere to binding domestic law. Although the CIA is governed by a different section of the US Code (Title 50) than that which regulates the armed forces (Title 10), the CIA “may not authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States.”[78] Director of National Intelligence James Clapper explained in a January 2012 Senate Intelligence Committee hearing that the entirety of Harold Koh’s March 2010 speech at the American Society of International Law’s annual conference, which laid out the legal requirements to which the US is bound and the administration’s legal justification for targeted killings, applied equally to intelligence agencies.[79]
Executive orders to the CIA authorizing covert action (such as drone strikes), though, are not public, and thus their terms cannot be examined. Should they not provide a legal basis for actions of this sort or should the US invocation of self-defense be invalid in particular instances, individual strikes could constitute acts of illegal extrajudicial assassination. Assassination has long been condemned in the US. Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to James Madison in 1789 that “assassination, poison, [and perjury]” were all “legitimate purposes in the dark ages…but exploded and held in just horror in the 18th century.”[80] As recently as 2001, the US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk declared that “the United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations… they are extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.”[81] Strikes of this sort occurring outside of authorized armed conflict would be subject to US domestic law.[82] If US citizens are targeted, constitutional protections and due process requirements also apply.[83]