National war powers commission report

[Intense]

Famously, ours is a “government of laws, and not of men.” As a result, many
expect clarity about the most fundamental features of our constitutional
structure. Despite such expectations, the respective war powers of the President
and Congress remain unsettled after more than two centuries of constitutional
history. Indeed, few areas of American constitutional law engender more fi erce
debate. And few areas of contested constitutional law have received less defi nitive
attention from the courts. As a result, the issue today remains vexed in ways
that can undermine policy and confi dence in the integrity of law itself. The
relevant law now on the books — the War Powers Resolution of 1973 — tends to
be honored in the breach rather than by observance.
We accepted the Miller Center’s invitation to serve as members of the
National War Powers Commission not to resolve constitutional conundrums
that war powers questions present — only defi nitive judicial action or a constitutional
amendment could do that. Instead, we chose to serve on the Commission
to see if we could identify a practical solution to help future Executive and
Legislative Branch leaders deal with the issue. Our guiding principles in working
on this project were the rule of law, bipartisanship, and an equal respect for
the three branches of government.
The Commission convened regularly over the past year in Washington,
D.C. as well as at our partnering institutions: the University of Virginia, Rice
University, and Stanford University. In preparation for these meetings and
during our deliberations, we interviewed scores of witnesses from all political
perspectives and professional vantage points, and we greatly thank them for
their time. We also drew on the collective experiences of the Commission and
its advisors in government, the armed forces, private enterprise, the law, the
press, and academia. Finally, we reviewed and studied much of the law, history,
and other background literature on this subject.
The Commission’s intent was not to criticize or praise individual Presidents
LETTER
FROM THE COMMISSIONERS
4 M I L L E R C E N T E R O F P U B L I C A F F A I R S
or Congresses for how they exercised their respective war powers. Instead, our
aim was to issue a report that should be relied upon by future leaders and furnish
them practical ways to proceed in the future. The result of our efforts is
the report that follows, which we hope will persuade the next President and
Congress to repeal the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and enact in its place the
War Powers Consultation Act of 2009.
Often expert reports end up collecting dust rather than catalyzing changes
in policy. We hope ours will avoid that fate. While recognizing that our recommendations
will be the subject of criticism from various directions, we hope
that a solid, bipartisan majority in the next Congress will see merit in our suggestions
and, with the support of the next President, enact the statute, and
adopt the other measures we propose.
The Commission’s report is organized in four parts. Part I is an executive
summary of the Commission’s recommendations. Part II is the full report,
including the text of the proposed statute and illustrative historical anecdotes
prepared by the Commission’s Historical Advisor, Doris Kearns Goodwin.
Part III is a letter from W. Taylor Reveley, III, and John C. Jeffries, Jr., of the
College of William & Mary and the University of Virginia, respectively, who
helped conceive of the idea for the Commission, served as its Co-Directors, and
provided invaluable guidance. Part IV is biographical material regarding the
Commission’s members and staff, as well as a list of the witnesses we interviewed
(none of whom were asked to review or endorse this report before it
was published). Finally, posted for the reader’s reference on the Commission’s
website, National War Powers Commission - Miller Center of Public Affairs, are the appendices cited in the body
of the report, a bibliography of war powers literature, and other reference and
research materials. These website materials refl ect due diligence done by the
Commission’s staff, but not necessarily the views of the Commission.
On behalf of the National War Powers Commission:
James A. Baker, III
Co-Chair
61st Secretary of State
Warren Christopher
Co-Chair
63rd Secretary of State
L E T T E R F R O M T H E C O M M I S S I O N E R S

http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/National War Powers Commission Report.pdf

Just wondering where we find ourselves here.

 

[shintao]

Famously, ours is a “government of laws, and not of men.” As a result, many
expect clarity about the most fundamental features of our constitutional
structure. Despite such expectations, the respective war powers of the President
and Congress remain unsettled after more than two centuries of constitutional
history. Indeed, few areas of American constitutional law engender more fi erce
debate. And few areas of contested constitutional law have received less defi nitive
attention from the courts. As a result, the issue today remains vexed in ways
that can undermine policy and confi dence in the integrity of law itself. The
relevant law now on the books — the War Powers Resolution of 1973 — tends to
be honored in the breach rather than by observance.
We accepted the Miller Center’s invitation to serve as members of the
National War Powers Commission not to resolve constitutional conundrums
that war powers questions present — only defi nitive judicial action or a constitutional
amendment could do that. Instead, we chose to serve on the Commission
to see if we could identify a practical solution to help future Executive and
Legislative Branch leaders deal with the issue. Our guiding principles in working
on this project were the rule of law, bipartisanship, and an equal respect for
the three branches of government.
The Commission convened regularly over the past year in Washington,
D.C. as well as at our partnering institutions: the University of Virginia, Rice
University, and Stanford University. In preparation for these meetings and
during our deliberations, we interviewed scores of witnesses from all political
perspectives and professional vantage points, and we greatly thank them for
their time. We also drew on the collective experiences of the Commission and
its advisors in government, the armed forces, private enterprise, the law, the
press, and academia. Finally, we reviewed and studied much of the law, history,
and other background literature on this subject.
The Commission’s intent was not to criticize or praise individual Presidents
LETTER
FROM THE COMMISSIONERS
4 M I L L E R C E N T E R O F P U B L I C A F F A I R S
or Congresses for how they exercised their respective war powers. Instead, our
aim was to issue a report that should be relied upon by future leaders and furnish
them practical ways to proceed in the future. The result of our efforts is
the report that follows, which we hope will persuade the next President and
Congress to repeal the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and enact in its place the
War Powers Consultation Act of 2009.
Often expert reports end up collecting dust rather than catalyzing changes
in policy. We hope ours will avoid that fate. While recognizing that our recommendations
will be the subject of criticism from various directions, we hope
that a solid, bipartisan majority in the next Congress will see merit in our suggestions
and, with the support of the next President, enact the statute, and
adopt the other measures we propose.
The Commission’s report is organized in four parts. Part I is an executive
summary of the Commission’s recommendations. Part II is the full report,
including the text of the proposed statute and illustrative historical anecdotes
prepared by the Commission’s Historical Advisor, Doris Kearns Goodwin.
Part III is a letter from W. Taylor Reveley, III, and John C. Jeffries, Jr., of the
College of William & Mary and the University of Virginia, respectively, who
helped conceive of the idea for the Commission, served as its Co-Directors, and
provided invaluable guidance. Part IV is biographical material regarding the
Commission’s members and staff, as well as a list of the witnesses we interviewed
(none of whom were asked to review or endorse this report before it
was published). Finally, posted for the reader’s reference on the Commission’s
website, National War Powers Commission - Miller Center of Public Affairs, are the appendices cited in the body
of the report, a bibliography of war powers literature, and other reference and
research materials. These website materials refl ect due diligence done by the
Commission’s staff, but not necessarily the views of the Commission.
On behalf of the National War Powers Commission:
James A. Baker, III
Co-Chair
61st Secretary of State
Warren Christopher
Co-Chair
63rd Secretary of State
L E T T E R F R O M T H E C O M M I S S I O N E R S

http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/National War Powers Commission Report.pdf

Just wondering where we find ourselves here.

Ummm, how about the President can go to war without Congress for X-Amount(??) of days. Surprise!!



The War Powers Consultation Act of 2009:

Provides that the president shall consult with Congress before deploying U.S. troops into "significant armed conflict" – i.e., combat operations lasting, or expected to last, more than a week.
Defines the types of hostilities that would or would not be considered "significant armed conflicts."
Creates a new Joint Congressional Consultation Committee, which includes leaders of both Houses as well as the chair and ranking members of key committees.
Establishes a permanent bipartisan staff with access to the national security and intelligence information necessary to conduct its work.
Calls on Congress to vote up or down on significant armed conflicts within 30 days.

 

[Intense]

How about taking the time to check out the report and give an honest assessment. What do you agree with, what troubles you?

 

[Intense]

President Barack Obama has again flip-flopped on national security—and we can all be grateful. Having kept Guantanamo Bay open, resumed military commission trials for terrorists, and expanded the use of drones, the president has now ordered the U.S. military into action without Congress's blessing.

Imagine the uproar if President Bush had unilaterally launched air attacks against Libya's Moammar Gadhafi. But since it's Mr. Obama's finger on the trigger, Democratic leaders in Congress have kept quiet—demonstrating that their opposition to presidential power during the Bush years was political, not principled.

Mr. Obama's exercise of war powers in Libya is firmly in the tradition of American foreign policy. Throughout our history, neither presidents nor Congress have acted under the belief that the Constitution requires a declaration of war before the U.S. can conduct military hostilities abroad. We have used force abroad more than 100 times but declared war in only five cases: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars, and World Wars I and II.

Without any approval from Congress, presidents have sent forces to battle Indians, Barbary Pirates and Russian revolutionaries, to fight North Korean and Chinese Communists in Korea, to engineer regime changes in South and Central America, and to prevent human rights disasters in the Balkans. Other conflicts, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, received legislative "authorization" but not declarations of war.

Since Vietnam, however, antiwar Democrats have sought to replace the Constitution's reliance on swift presidential action in war with a radically different system appropriate for peacetime: Congress makes policy, the president implements it. In 1973, they passed the War Powers Resolution to require congressional permission for any military intervention abroad, but no president has accepted the law's constitutionality.

John Yoo: Antiwar Senator, War-Powers President - WSJ.com

 

[Intense]

Some George W. Bush-era Republicans are having another I-told-you-so moment over President Obama and Libya.


Witness John Yoo.

Yoo -- a former Justice Department officials much criticized for his advocacy of sweeping executive power during the Bush years -- writes in The Wall Street Journal that Obama "has again flip-flopped on national security -- and we can all be grateful."

"Having kept Guantanamo Bay open, resumed military commission trials for terrorists and expanded the use of drones, the president has now ordered the U.S. military into action without Congress's blessing," Yoo says.

Some lawmakers -- including Republicans, we should note -- have criticized Obama for not seeking congressional approval before launching the Libyan operation.



Yoo, as he did while working for the Bush administration, said congressional approval is unnecessary for military action ordered by the commander in chief.

"Congress is too fractured, slow and inflexible to manage war," Yoo writes. "Its loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats loom. The Framers understood that Congress's real power would lie in the purse. ... If Congress opposes action, it can reduce funding for the military, eliminate units or freeze supplies."

Bush aide Yoo on Obama: 'Anti-war senator, war powers president' - The Oval: Tracking the Obama presidency

 

[LordBrownTrout]

Plus, Syria is now mowing down citizens.....but Iran did the same thing and O did nothing and Libya did the same thing and O tomahawked em and...