You seemed to be under the impression the CRA had been lying fallow for 30 years, when in fact it bad practices had been expanded and become wild spend inn the industry.
If CRA is guilty of anything, it is fueling the housing boom, but the Bush administration's 2004 minority homeownership policy encouraged even less strict terms for first-time home buyers. The PROBLEM is not with the intent of either of those endeavors. The PROBLEM was a total under-leveraging by the major financial institutions whose daily operations became exclusively in credit default swaps.
[/I]
1995
A Freddie Mac spokeswoman later acknowledged that the Clinton HUD’s decision on
subprime loans “forced us to go into that market to serve the targeted populations that
HUD wanted us to serve.” Clinton’s HUD Assistant Secretary William C. Apgar, Jr. has
since called the decision a “mistake,” while his former advisor Allen Fishbein called the
loans that the GSEs started buying to meet their affordable housing goals “contrary to
good lending practices,” and examples of “dangerous lending.”21 President Clinton
himself acknowledged his role in efforts to loosen mortgage lending standards when he
admitted that “there was possible danger in his administration’s policy of pressuring
Fannie Mae…to lower its credit standards for lower- and middle-income families seeking
homes.”22 These accumulated government affordable housing policies, including the
Clinton Strategy, trapped millions of Americans in mortgages they could not afford.
http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/media/pdfs/20090707HousingCrisisReport.pdf
After that, Kattie bar the door . the stampede begins
lower Lending Standards SPREAD AND cause the Housing
Bubble
Risky mortgage lending, particularly loans with very low down payments, contributed
directly to the rise of a housing bubble. Had this risky lending been contained within the
low-income segment of the market targeted by politicians advocating more “innovation”
in “affordable lending,” the damage to the wider economy might have been minimal.
However, these “innovations” in “flexible” loans products spread beyond just affordable
lending into the entire U.S. mortgage market. The lure of reduced underwriting standards
11
held true not just for borrowers of modest income but for those at all income levels.
Although the erosion of mortgage underwriting standards began in Washington with
initiatives like the CRA as a way to reduce “barriers to homeownership,” this trend
inevitably spread to the wider mortgage market.
One observer noted:
Bank regulators, who were in charge of enforcing CRA standards, could hardly
disapprove of similar loans made to better qualified borrowers. This is exactly
what occurred.23
Borrowers – regardless of income level – took advantage of the erosion of underwriting
standards that started with government affordable housing policy. As one study
observed,“[o]ver the past decade, most, if not all, the products offered to subprime
borrowers have also been offered to prime borrowers.”24 For example, Alt-A and
adjustable-rate mortgages became incredibly popular with borrowers – who were
generally not low-income – engaging in housing speculation. As home prices continued
their dizzying rise, many people decided to cash in by buying a house with an adjustablerate
mortgage featuring a low introductory teaser rate set to increase after a few years.
These borrowers, confident in the oft-cited assertion that U.S. home values had never
before fallen in the aggregate, planned to sell or refinance their investment before the
mortgage rate adjusted upward, pocketing the difference between the initial purchase
price and the subsequent appreciation in value. However, buyers failed to grasp the
effect of a government policy that had quietly eroded the prudential limits on mortgage
leverage, creating a dangerous speculative bubble.
As the size of down payments for mortgages fell, so too did borrowers’ equity stake in
the homes they purchased. This had two important effects. First, it eliminated the
borrower’s “skin in the game,” increasing the likelihood that he or she would walk away
from the mortgage if times got tough. It also increased the borrower’s leverage (debt) as
measured by the Loan-to-Value ratio.25 This leverage allows borrowers to purchase more
expensive houses than they would otherwise be able to afford at a given level of income.