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It's torture. Not enhanced interrogation techniques. It doesn't work. If it was 100% foolproof then we wouldn't be calling it torture. But, it's not. If I torture you then you will tell me anything and everything that I want to hear whether it is true or not. You are not going to give a flying fuck.
Let me clarify....I did not mean we keep those countries as our own territory...I meant keeping them from going back to the muslim terrorists like isis. We fought hard and lost lives taking this territory to keep the muslim terrorists from using them, and as a side line, it also gave the people of those countries a chance at real peace and freedom...and obama just cleared out our troops and handed them back over to the head choppers...
That is what I was trying to say....
It's torture. Not enhanced interrogation techniques. It doesn't work. If it was 100% foolproof then we wouldn't be calling it torture. But, it's not. If I torture you then you will tell me anything and everything that I want to hear whether it is true or not. You are not going to give a flying fuck.
Sorry, the actual interrogators said it worked and led to bin laden....and you have no idea how they do it or you wouldn't have posted this.....you can say anything to make the interrogation stop....and then they check out your answers and if you lied....guess what.....you get interrogated again....until you stop lying.....
The report describes extensive waterboarding as a “series of near drownings” and suggests that more prisoners were subjected to waterboarding than the three prisoners the C.I.A. has acknowledged in the past. The report also describes detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation for up to a week, medically unnecessary “rectal feeding” and death threats. Conditions at one prison, described by a clandestine officer as a “dungeon,” were blamed for the death of a detainee, and the harsh techniques were described as leading to “psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.”
According to the Senate report,
Rodriguez does not equivocate over Feinstein’s charge that interrogation was not critical to finding Osama bin Laden.
“That’s total bullshit. It’s crap,” he said.
He said information gleaned from a black-site interrogation led to the initial focus on the courier who led the U.S. to bin Laden’s compound, outlining in brief the account he wrote in his 2011 book, Hard Measures, about the interrogation program.
He said the messenger, who went by the name Abu Ahmed al Kuwaiti, was first described as a member of bin Laden’s security detail, by a detainee held by the U.S. military.
“Then we heard at a black site that he was bin Laden’s courier,” during an interrogation of detainee Ammar Al Baluchi—an alleged facilitator of the 9/11 attacks who is now being held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
“And then what turned on the lights for me was when Abu Faraj al Libi, who we captured after, said he was informed that he had been elevated to chief of operations through bin Laden’s courier,” he said.
The clincher for Rodriguez was when CIA officers intercepted a message passed by detainee Khalid Sheikh Mohammed “instructing his fellow detainees not to talk about the courier.” He said that’s when CIA officers knew the courier was the man to watch.
“Not the key piece? OK, perhaps,” Rodriguez concedes. “I think the key piece was getting al-Kuwaiti’s true name, but it was significant.”
According to the Senate report, the critical pieces of information that led to discovering the identity of the bin Laden courier, Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, (Ahmed the Kuwaiti) whose activities eventually pointed the CIA to bin Laden's hiding place in Pakistan, were provided by an al-Qaeda detainee before he was subjected to CIA coercive interrogation, and was based also upon information that was provided by detainees that were held in the custody of foreign governments. (The report is silent on the interesting question of whether any of these unnamed foreign governments obtained any of their information by using torture.)
Further critical information about the Kuwaiti was also provided by conventional intelligence techniques and was not elicited by the interrogations of any of the CIA detainees, according to the report
Or don't read it and continue to prove you're a moron.
That guys a waste of time. Who cares what he thinks.
7 Key Points From the C.I.A. Torture Report
By JEREMY ASHKENAS, HANNAH FAIRFIELD, JOSH KELLER and PAUL VOLPE DEC. 9, 2014
The report released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence discloses new details about the C.I.A.’s torture practices.
More coverage: Related Article | Does Torture Work? | A History of the Program
1. The C.I.A.’s interrogation techniques were more brutal and employed more extensively than the agency portrayed.
The report describes extensive waterboarding as a “series of near drownings” and suggests that more prisoners were subjected to waterboarding than the three prisoners the C.I.A. has acknowledged in the past. The report also describes detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation for up to a week, medically unnecessary “rectal feeding” and death threats. Conditions at one prison, described by a clandestine officer as a “dungeon,” were blamed for the death of a detainee, and the harsh techniques were described as leading to “psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.”
2. The C.I.A. interrogation program was mismanaged and was not subject to adequate oversight.
- Waterboarding is called “a series of near-drownings” (Page 86)
- Detainees with psychological and behavioral issues (Page 114)
The report cites dissatisfaction among intelligence officers about the competence and training of interrogators. Those found to have violated agency policy were “rarely held accountable.” The architects of the program had never carried out a real interrogation. The report states that the C.I.A. resisted congressional oversight, restricted access to information, declined to answer questions about the program and “impeded oversight” by the agency's inspector general by providing false information.
3. The C.I.A. misled members of Congress and the White House about the effectiveness and extent of its brutal interrogation techniques.
- An officer with no previous experience conducting interrogations (Page 50)
- C.I.A. officers were "rarely held accountable" for death, injury or wrongful detention. (Page 14)
The report says that the C.I.A. provided false and misleading information to members of Congress, the White House and the director of national intelligence about the program’s effectiveness. It asserts that a review of cases, in which the agency claims to have collected “actionable intelligence” it would have been unable to obtain by other means, calls into question the connection between the information and any “counterterrorism success.”
The report includes dozens of examples from C.I.A. Director Michael Hayden's April 12, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that highlight how his statements directly contradicted internal C.I.A records.
- How the C.I.A. represented the program’s effectiveness (Page 172)
- Examples of inaccurate C.I.A. testimony (Page 462)
Hayden’s Testimony
“Now in June, after about four months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value. He was, to our eye, employing classic resistance to interrogation techniques and employing them quite effectively. And it was clear to us that we were unlikely to be able to overcome those techniques without some significant intervention.”
C.I.A. Records
C.I.A. records do not show that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with interrogators. He had provided information on Qaeda activities, leadership and training, but had not given information about future attacks on the United States, which the C.I.A. believed he was witholding. He was put into isolation for 47 days when the interrogation team traveled, and during his next interrogation, the team used enhanced techniques, including waterboarding.
4. Interrogators in the field who tried to stop the brutal techniques were repeatedly overruled by senior C.I.A. officials.
C.I.A. personnel reported on multiple occasions to being “disturbed” by waterboarding and concerned over its legality. Officials, including the program’s architects, described the interrogation as a “template for future interrogation” of detainees. In one instance, a senior official pushed back against concern over the “legal limit” of brutal interrogation techniques by stating that the “guidelines for this activity” had been “vetted at the most senior levels of the agency.”
5. The C.I.A. repeatedly underreported the number of people it detained and subjected to harsh interrogation techniques under the program.
- C.I.A. personnel concerned over waterboarding (Page 44)
- Counterterrorism official pushes back on questions of legality. (Page 43)
The report states that the C.I.A. never produced an accurate count or list of those it had detained or subjected to brutal interrogation techniques. The agency said it detained “fewer than 100 individuals,” but a review of agency records indicated that it held 119. It also underreported the number of detainees who were subjected to torture.
![]()
The report includes the names of the 119 people detained from 2002 to 2008. Orange bars are those who were subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.
’07
’05
’06
2002
2004
2003
HELD BY
C.I.A.
1 YEAR
2 YEARS
3 YEARS
Muhammed Rahim
About 240 days held
4 YEARS
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
About 1,260 days held
Abu Zubaydah
About 1,590 days held by the C.I.A.
6. At least 26 detainees were wrongfully held and did not meet the government’s standard for detention.
The report found that at least 26 detainees “were wrongfully held,” including an “intellectually challenged” man who was used as “leverage” to obtain information from a family member, two former intelligence sources and two individuals identified as threats by a detainee subjected to torture. Agency records were often incomplete and, in some cases, lacked sufficient information to justify keeping detainees in custody.
7. The C.I.A. leaked classified information to journalists, exaggerating the success of interrogation methods in an effort to gain public support.
The report found that the C.I.A. provided classified information to journalists but that the agency did not push to prosecute or investigate many of the leaks. C.I.A. officials asked officers to “compile information on the success” of the program to be shared with the news media in order to shape public opinion. The C.I.A. also mischaracterized events and provided false or incomplete information to the news media in an effort to gain public support.
Or don't read it and continue to prove you're a moron.
That guys a waste of time. Who cares what he thinks.
7 Key Points From the C.I.A. Torture Report
By JEREMY ASHKENAS, HANNAH FAIRFIELD, JOSH KELLER and PAUL VOLPE DEC. 9, 2014
The report released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence discloses new details about the C.I.A.’s torture practices.
More coverage: Related Article | Does Torture Work? | A History of the Program
1. The C.I.A.’s interrogation techniques were more brutal and employed more extensively than the agency portrayed.
The report describes extensive waterboarding as a “series of near drownings” and suggests that more prisoners were subjected to waterboarding than the three prisoners the C.I.A. has acknowledged in the past. The report also describes detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation for up to a week, medically unnecessary “rectal feeding” and death threats. Conditions at one prison, described by a clandestine officer as a “dungeon,” were blamed for the death of a detainee, and the harsh techniques were described as leading to “psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.”
2. The C.I.A. interrogation program was mismanaged and was not subject to adequate oversight.
- Waterboarding is called “a series of near-drownings” (Page 86)
- Detainees with psychological and behavioral issues (Page 114)
The report cites dissatisfaction among intelligence officers about the competence and training of interrogators. Those found to have violated agency policy were “rarely held accountable.” The architects of the program had never carried out a real interrogation. The report states that the C.I.A. resisted congressional oversight, restricted access to information, declined to answer questions about the program and “impeded oversight” by the agency's inspector general by providing false information.
3. The C.I.A. misled members of Congress and the White House about the effectiveness and extent of its brutal interrogation techniques.
- An officer with no previous experience conducting interrogations (Page 50)
- C.I.A. officers were "rarely held accountable" for death, injury or wrongful detention. (Page 14)
The report says that the C.I.A. provided false and misleading information to members of Congress, the White House and the director of national intelligence about the program’s effectiveness. It asserts that a review of cases, in which the agency claims to have collected “actionable intelligence” it would have been unable to obtain by other means, calls into question the connection between the information and any “counterterrorism success.”
The report includes dozens of examples from C.I.A. Director Michael Hayden's April 12, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that highlight how his statements directly contradicted internal C.I.A records.
- How the C.I.A. represented the program’s effectiveness (Page 172)
- Examples of inaccurate C.I.A. testimony (Page 462)
Hayden’s Testimony
“Now in June, after about four months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value. He was, to our eye, employing classic resistance to interrogation techniques and employing them quite effectively. And it was clear to us that we were unlikely to be able to overcome those techniques without some significant intervention.”
C.I.A. Records
C.I.A. records do not show that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with interrogators. He had provided information on Qaeda activities, leadership and training, but had not given information about future attacks on the United States, which the C.I.A. believed he was witholding. He was put into isolation for 47 days when the interrogation team traveled, and during his next interrogation, the team used enhanced techniques, including waterboarding.
4. Interrogators in the field who tried to stop the brutal techniques were repeatedly overruled by senior C.I.A. officials.
C.I.A. personnel reported on multiple occasions to being “disturbed” by waterboarding and concerned over its legality. Officials, including the program’s architects, described the interrogation as a “template for future interrogation” of detainees. In one instance, a senior official pushed back against concern over the “legal limit” of brutal interrogation techniques by stating that the “guidelines for this activity” had been “vetted at the most senior levels of the agency.”
5. The C.I.A. repeatedly underreported the number of people it detained and subjected to harsh interrogation techniques under the program.
- C.I.A. personnel concerned over waterboarding (Page 44)
- Counterterrorism official pushes back on questions of legality. (Page 43)
The report states that the C.I.A. never produced an accurate count or list of those it had detained or subjected to brutal interrogation techniques. The agency said it detained “fewer than 100 individuals,” but a review of agency records indicated that it held 119. It also underreported the number of detainees who were subjected to torture.
![]()
The report includes the names of the 119 people detained from 2002 to 2008. Orange bars are those who were subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.
’07
’05
’06
2002
2004
2003
HELD BY
C.I.A.
1 YEAR
2 YEARS
3 YEARS
Muhammed Rahim
About 240 days held
4 YEARS
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
About 1,260 days held
Abu Zubaydah
About 1,590 days held by the C.I.A.
6. At least 26 detainees were wrongfully held and did not meet the government’s standard for detention.
The report found that at least 26 detainees “were wrongfully held,” including an “intellectually challenged” man who was used as “leverage” to obtain information from a family member, two former intelligence sources and two individuals identified as threats by a detainee subjected to torture. Agency records were often incomplete and, in some cases, lacked sufficient information to justify keeping detainees in custody.
7. The C.I.A. leaked classified information to journalists, exaggerating the success of interrogation methods in an effort to gain public support.
The report found that the C.I.A. provided classified information to journalists but that the agency did not push to prosecute or investigate many of the leaks. C.I.A. officials asked officers to “compile information on the success” of the program to be shared with the news media in order to shape public opinion. The C.I.A. also mischaracterized events and provided false or incomplete information to the news media in an effort to gain public support.
Or don't read it and continue to prove you're a moron.
That guys a waste of time. Who cares what he thinks.
7 Key Points From the C.I.A. Torture Report
By JEREMY ASHKENAS, HANNAH FAIRFIELD, JOSH KELLER and PAUL VOLPE DEC. 9, 2014
The report released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence discloses new details about the C.I.A.’s torture practices.
More coverage: Related Article | Does Torture Work? | A History of the Program
1. The C.I.A.’s interrogation techniques were more brutal and employed more extensively than the agency portrayed.
The report describes extensive waterboarding as a “series of near drownings” and suggests that more prisoners were subjected to waterboarding than the three prisoners the C.I.A. has acknowledged in the past. The report also describes detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation for up to a week, medically unnecessary “rectal feeding” and death threats. Conditions at one prison, described by a clandestine officer as a “dungeon,” were blamed for the death of a detainee, and the harsh techniques were described as leading to “psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.”
2. The C.I.A. interrogation program was mismanaged and was not subject to adequate oversight.
- Waterboarding is called “a series of near-drownings” (Page 86)
- Detainees with psychological and behavioral issues (Page 114)
The report cites dissatisfaction among intelligence officers about the competence and training of interrogators. Those found to have violated agency policy were “rarely held accountable.” The architects of the program had never carried out a real interrogation. The report states that the C.I.A. resisted congressional oversight, restricted access to information, declined to answer questions about the program and “impeded oversight” by the agency's inspector general by providing false information.
3. The C.I.A. misled members of Congress and the White House about the effectiveness and extent of its brutal interrogation techniques.
- An officer with no previous experience conducting interrogations (Page 50)
- C.I.A. officers were "rarely held accountable" for death, injury or wrongful detention. (Page 14)
The report says that the C.I.A. provided false and misleading information to members of Congress, the White House and the director of national intelligence about the program’s effectiveness. It asserts that a review of cases, in which the agency claims to have collected “actionable intelligence” it would have been unable to obtain by other means, calls into question the connection between the information and any “counterterrorism success.”
The report includes dozens of examples from C.I.A. Director Michael Hayden's April 12, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that highlight how his statements directly contradicted internal C.I.A records.
- How the C.I.A. represented the program’s effectiveness (Page 172)
- Examples of inaccurate C.I.A. testimony (Page 462)
Hayden’s Testimony
“Now in June, after about four months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value. He was, to our eye, employing classic resistance to interrogation techniques and employing them quite effectively. And it was clear to us that we were unlikely to be able to overcome those techniques without some significant intervention.”
C.I.A. Records
C.I.A. records do not show that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with interrogators. He had provided information on Qaeda activities, leadership and training, but had not given information about future attacks on the United States, which the C.I.A. believed he was witholding. He was put into isolation for 47 days when the interrogation team traveled, and during his next interrogation, the team used enhanced techniques, including waterboarding.
4. Interrogators in the field who tried to stop the brutal techniques were repeatedly overruled by senior C.I.A. officials.
C.I.A. personnel reported on multiple occasions to being “disturbed” by waterboarding and concerned over its legality. Officials, including the program’s architects, described the interrogation as a “template for future interrogation” of detainees. In one instance, a senior official pushed back against concern over the “legal limit” of brutal interrogation techniques by stating that the “guidelines for this activity” had been “vetted at the most senior levels of the agency.”
5. The C.I.A. repeatedly underreported the number of people it detained and subjected to harsh interrogation techniques under the program.
- C.I.A. personnel concerned over waterboarding (Page 44)
- Counterterrorism official pushes back on questions of legality. (Page 43)
The report states that the C.I.A. never produced an accurate count or list of those it had detained or subjected to brutal interrogation techniques. The agency said it detained “fewer than 100 individuals,” but a review of agency records indicated that it held 119. It also underreported the number of detainees who were subjected to torture.
![]()
The report includes the names of the 119 people detained from 2002 to 2008. Orange bars are those who were subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.
’07
’05
’06
2002
2004
2003
HELD BY
C.I.A.
1 YEAR
2 YEARS
3 YEARS
Muhammed Rahim
About 240 days held
4 YEARS
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
About 1,260 days held
Abu Zubaydah
About 1,590 days held by the C.I.A.
6. At least 26 detainees were wrongfully held and did not meet the government’s standard for detention.
The report found that at least 26 detainees “were wrongfully held,” including an “intellectually challenged” man who was used as “leverage” to obtain information from a family member, two former intelligence sources and two individuals identified as threats by a detainee subjected to torture. Agency records were often incomplete and, in some cases, lacked sufficient information to justify keeping detainees in custody.
7. The C.I.A. leaked classified information to journalists, exaggerating the success of interrogation methods in an effort to gain public support.
The report found that the C.I.A. provided classified information to journalists but that the agency did not push to prosecute or investigate many of the leaks. C.I.A. officials asked officers to “compile information on the success” of the program to be shared with the news media in order to shape public opinion. The C.I.A. also mischaracterized events and provided false or incomplete information to the news media in an effort to gain public support.
Or don't read it and continue to prove you're a moron.
That guys a waste of time. Who cares what he thinks.
7 Key Points From the C.I.A. Torture Report
By JEREMY ASHKENAS, HANNAH FAIRFIELD, JOSH KELLER and PAUL VOLPE DEC. 9, 2014
The report released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence discloses new details about the C.I.A.’s torture practices.
More coverage: Related Article | Does Torture Work? | A History of the Program
1. The C.I.A.’s interrogation techniques were more brutal and employed more extensively than the agency portrayed.
The report describes extensive waterboarding as a “series of near drownings” and suggests that more prisoners were subjected to waterboarding than the three prisoners the C.I.A. has acknowledged in the past. The report also describes detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation for up to a week, medically unnecessary “rectal feeding” and death threats. Conditions at one prison, described by a clandestine officer as a “dungeon,” were blamed for the death of a detainee, and the harsh techniques were described as leading to “psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.”
2. The C.I.A. interrogation program was mismanaged and was not subject to adequate oversight.
- Waterboarding is called “a series of near-drownings” (Page 86)
- Detainees with psychological and behavioral issues (Page 114)
The report cites dissatisfaction among intelligence officers about the competence and training of interrogators. Those found to have violated agency policy were “rarely held accountable.” The architects of the program had never carried out a real interrogation. The report states that the C.I.A. resisted congressional oversight, restricted access to information, declined to answer questions about the program and “impeded oversight” by the agency's inspector general by providing false information.
3. The C.I.A. misled members of Congress and the White House about the effectiveness and extent of its brutal interrogation techniques.
- An officer with no previous experience conducting interrogations (Page 50)
- C.I.A. officers were "rarely held accountable" for death, injury or wrongful detention. (Page 14)
The report says that the C.I.A. provided false and misleading information to members of Congress, the White House and the director of national intelligence about the program’s effectiveness. It asserts that a review of cases, in which the agency claims to have collected “actionable intelligence” it would have been unable to obtain by other means, calls into question the connection between the information and any “counterterrorism success.”
The report includes dozens of examples from C.I.A. Director Michael Hayden's April 12, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that highlight how his statements directly contradicted internal C.I.A records.
- How the C.I.A. represented the program’s effectiveness (Page 172)
- Examples of inaccurate C.I.A. testimony (Page 462)
Hayden’s Testimony
“Now in June, after about four months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value. He was, to our eye, employing classic resistance to interrogation techniques and employing them quite effectively. And it was clear to us that we were unlikely to be able to overcome those techniques without some significant intervention.”
C.I.A. Records
C.I.A. records do not show that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with interrogators. He had provided information on Qaeda activities, leadership and training, but had not given information about future attacks on the United States, which the C.I.A. believed he was witholding. He was put into isolation for 47 days when the interrogation team traveled, and during his next interrogation, the team used enhanced techniques, including waterboarding.
4. Interrogators in the field who tried to stop the brutal techniques were repeatedly overruled by senior C.I.A. officials.
C.I.A. personnel reported on multiple occasions to being “disturbed” by waterboarding and concerned over its legality. Officials, including the program’s architects, described the interrogation as a “template for future interrogation” of detainees. In one instance, a senior official pushed back against concern over the “legal limit” of brutal interrogation techniques by stating that the “guidelines for this activity” had been “vetted at the most senior levels of the agency.”
5. The C.I.A. repeatedly underreported the number of people it detained and subjected to harsh interrogation techniques under the program.
- C.I.A. personnel concerned over waterboarding (Page 44)
- Counterterrorism official pushes back on questions of legality. (Page 43)
The report states that the C.I.A. never produced an accurate count or list of those it had detained or subjected to brutal interrogation techniques. The agency said it detained “fewer than 100 individuals,” but a review of agency records indicated that it held 119. It also underreported the number of detainees who were subjected to torture.
![]()
The report includes the names of the 119 people detained from 2002 to 2008. Orange bars are those who were subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques.
’07
’05
’06
2002
2004
2003
HELD BY
C.I.A.
1 YEAR
2 YEARS
3 YEARS
Muhammed Rahim
About 240 days held
4 YEARS
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
About 1,260 days held
Abu Zubaydah
About 1,590 days held by the C.I.A.
6. At least 26 detainees were wrongfully held and did not meet the government’s standard for detention.
The report found that at least 26 detainees “were wrongfully held,” including an “intellectually challenged” man who was used as “leverage” to obtain information from a family member, two former intelligence sources and two individuals identified as threats by a detainee subjected to torture. Agency records were often incomplete and, in some cases, lacked sufficient information to justify keeping detainees in custody.
7. The C.I.A. leaked classified information to journalists, exaggerating the success of interrogation methods in an effort to gain public support.
The report found that the C.I.A. provided classified information to journalists but that the agency did not push to prosecute or investigate many of the leaks. C.I.A. officials asked officers to “compile information on the success” of the program to be shared with the news media in order to shape public opinion. The C.I.A. also mischaracterized events and provided false or incomplete information to the news media in an effort to gain public support.
He used to not be like this.
I don't buy the crying from the report.
First year undergrad criminal justice students understand that torture elicits false confessions.
They don't care as long as the terrorists kill more jewsThe report describes extensive waterboarding as a “series of near drownings” and suggests that more prisoners were subjected to waterboarding than the three prisoners the C.I.A. has acknowledged in the past. The report also describes detainees being subjected to sleep deprivation for up to a week, medically unnecessary “rectal feeding” and death threats. Conditions at one prison, described by a clandestine officer as a “dungeon,” were blamed for the death of a detainee, and the harsh techniques were described as leading to “psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.”
Waterboarding is not even close to "near drownings" and nothing in this post comes close to actual torture...you twits.....
They blew up the Kobar towers, the blew a hole in the U.S.S. Cole, they tried to blow up the World Trade Center the first time.....and we did exactly what you people want to do from this point forward....no harsh interrogation techniques, the FBI investigated, arrests were made.....secret documents were exposed to the defense counsel.....
And they came back and flew 2 jets full of innocent people into the World Trade Center.......that is what we willl get with your ideas on gathering intelligence on these guys....
What was said.....WE knew nothing about al queda before the attacks on 9/11...nothing.......that is what your methods get us....3,000 dead, innocent Americans....we used harsh techniques against committed monsters....not criminals....monsters trained to resist interrogation and familiar with military techniques.....so we had to use harsher methods....
You twits are going to kill Americans.....
When Republicans found no mishandling of the Benghazi attack, you blamed it on dems as well.
We'll see what Trey Gowdy and the Select Committee find....
You must hate that people care about Americans and not terroristsWhen Republicans found no mishandling of the Benghazi attack, you blamed it on dems as well.
We'll see what Trey Gowdy and the Select Committee find....
Huh???? How many goddamned reports on Benghazi do need???
You must hate that people care about Americans and not terroristsWhen Republicans found no mishandling of the Benghazi attack, you blamed it on dems as well.
We'll see what Trey Gowdy and the Select Committee find....
Huh???? How many goddamned reports on Benghazi do need???
tapatalk
By reading it , dummyYou must hate that people care about Americans and not terroristsWhen Republicans found no mishandling of the Benghazi attack, you blamed it on dems as well.
We'll see what Trey Gowdy and the Select Committee find....
Huh???? How many goddamned reports on Benghazi do need???
tapatalk
How did you get that from his posts?