Is the Right of Return an Intergenerational Right?

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore, et al,

For more than a half a century, the Hostile Arab Palestinian have established and perpetuated a struggle against a decision that dates back almost a century. In fact, it will be a Century this coming May that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed. And it will be 99 Years (this coming November) since the Balfour Declaration was released.

•EXCERPT•

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return.

•EXCERPT•
The last paradox is that the tale of Palestine from the beginning until today is a simple story of colonialism and dispossession, yet the world treats it as a multifaceted and complex story - hard to understand and even harder to solve. Indeed, the story of Palestine has been told before: European settlers coming to a foreign land, settling there, and either committing genocide against or expelling the indigenous people.

(COMMENT)

At the turn of the last Century (19th

20th Century) the common meaning of what colonialism was, in a practical sense, when a National Sovereign sent explorers abroad and through the "Right of Discovery and Conquest" expanded the territorial holdings of the Exploring Sovereign.

RIGHTS OF CONQUEST​

(Reference: John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America and the Several States of the American Union, Childs & Peterson, c1856.)

CONQUEST, international law. The acquisition of the sovereignty of a country by force of arms, exercised by an independent power which reduces the vanquished to the submission of its empire.

It is a general rule, that where conquered countries have laws of their own, these laws remain in force after the conquest, until they are abrogated, unless they are contrary to our religion, or enact any malum in se. In all such cases the laws of the conquering country prevail; for it is not to be presumed that laws opposed to religion or sound morals could be sanctioned. 1 Story, Const. Sec. 150, and the cases there cited.

Conquest does not, per se, give the conqueror plenum dominium et utile, but a temporary right of possession and government. 2 Gallis. R. 486; 3 Wash. C. C. R. 101. See 8 Wheat. R. 591; 2 Bay, R. 229; 2 Dall. R. 1; 12 Pet. 410.

The right which the English government claimed over the territory now composing the United States, was not founded on conquest, but discovery. Id. Sec. 152, et seq.
​

This is somewhat different as time moves on.

International Responses to Territorial Conquest​

•TWO EXCERPT•
The central problem is that the difference between conquest and aggression are occupation is largely one of intent, and perhaps success. This project assumes such intent only when clearly manifested in conduct. There are several justifications for using this stricter definition of conquest. First, defeated attempts at conquest are certainly far fewer than the hundreds of thousands of shorter territorial encroachments that could be thought of as “transient conquests.” Second, one may expect of international reaction to consummated conquests would be different from attempted ones. In the latter case, condemnation may be slow in coming as nation’s hope the victim state will deal with the situation itself. Conquest implies a certain permanence. Conquest is regarded as worse than the aggression, so one would expect on this ground criticism to be are more readily evident when the permanent intention becomes clear.

Depending on certain coding decisions, there have been somewhere between 12 and 18 forcible conquests by existing states after the adoption of the U.N Charter. International condemnation is found in only a few cases.6 Other conquests have won overwhelming international acceptance; these interestingly include both conquests of entire nations. The majority of conquests receive no clear international response.
​

There is a difference between the views at the time the event has taken place, and the evaluation well after (in this case a near century) the event and a cascade series if consequences take place. You cannot use 21st Century Logic to unravel 19th Century thinking used in the early 20th Century.

Most Respectfully,
R

The Palestinians have always opposed colonialism/conquest/external interference.

The Palestinians still maintain their basic inalienable rights.

The right to self determination without external interference.

The right to independence and sovereignty.

The right to territorial integrity.​

 

[Boston1]

OK for whatever reason this site isn't allowing me to use quote boxes and its just cut out the body of the text and now won't allow me to correct it. Crazy but I'll try it again.

Quote from previously noted reference
149 EVALUATING THE PALESTINIANS' CLAIMED RIGHT ...

Besides the general problem of relying on formally nonbinding General Assembly resolutions to support the right of return, there are problems with claims made on the Palestinians’ behalf about specific General Assembly resolutions, particularly Resolution 194. For instance, it is implied that Resolution 194, itself, states that CIL requires the return of the refugees.258 This is false, as perusal of the text demonstrates.259 Additionally, the claim that the General Assembly’s repeated references to and reenactments of Resolution 194 have transformed the Resolution from non-binding to binding cannot be correct because even today there is no consensus that valid CIL forms in that manner—that is, solely through non- binding votes in a diplomatic forum, the U.N. General Assembly. This is particularly the case here, with the issue of refugee return. The chief proponents of the theory that the General Assembly has binding, legislative authority regarding Israel and Palestinian refugees—the Arab and Muslim states— have declared for decades in diplomatic forums that international law requires the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel.260 At the same time, many of these proponents have expelled large numbers of their own nationals

and resident aliens, including Palestinians;261 have refused to agree to minimal international standards regarding the treatment of refugees;262 and have denied Palestinian refugees who reside in their countries citizenship and some of the most basic of human rights.263 “Cheap talk”264 in diplomatic forums that is contradicted by states’ actual behavior when their own interests are at stake does not create CIL binding on other states.

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return.265 Thus, it is said, even if Resolution 194 lacks inherently binding force (recall that General Assembly declarations of this kind are undisputedly treated by the U.N. Charter as non- binding), nevertheless the General Assembly’s power to decide whether or not to admit new member states has made return of the 1947–49 refugees a binding obligation.266 The factual assertion underlying this claim—that the membership vote on Israel was conditional—is false. In fact, Arab representatives at the General Assembly meeting on May 11, 1949, concerning the admission of Israel, complained that Israel was admitted without having to

commit to refugee return, despite their attempts to make Israel comply.267 Moreover, those supporters of a Palestinian right of return who tie return to the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership ignore that the power of the General Assembly to make membership conditional on factors not mentioned in the Charter was debated in 1947, soon before Israel petitioned for membership and the Arab states’ position was rejected. At the request of the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory legal opinion on the subject in May 1948, two weeks after Israel proclaimed its independence. According to the Court, a U.N. member called upon to vote on a state’s petition for membership is not “juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph [1]” of Article 4 of the Charter.268 The relevant Charter provision provides in full: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”269 On the basis that Israel fulfilled these written requirements, the Security Council advised that Israel be admitted,270 and the General Assembly approved Israel’s admission.271 The claim that a right of return for Palestinians was created by the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership is incorrect.

Besides the general problem of relying on formally nonbinding General Assembly resolutions to support the right of return, there are problems with claims made on the Palestinians’ behalf about specific General Assembly resolutions, particularly Resolution 194. For instance, it is implied that Resolution 194, itself, states that CIL requires the return of the refugees.258 This is false, as perusal of the text demonstrates.259 Additionally, the claim that the General Assembly’s repeated references to and reenactments of Resolution 194 have transformed the Resolution from non-binding to binding cannot be correct because even today there is no consensus that valid CIL forms in that manner—that is, solely through non- binding votes in a diplomatic forum, the U.N. General Assembly. This is particularly the case here, with the issue of refugee return. The chief proponents of the theory that the General Assembly has binding, legislative authority regarding Israel and Palestinian refugees—the Arab and Muslim states— have declared for decades in diplomatic forums that international law requires the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel.260At the same time, many of these proponents have expelled large numbers of their own nationals

and resident aliens, including Palestinians;261 have refused to agree to minimal international standards regarding the treatment of refugees;262 and have denied Palestinian refugees who reside in their countries citizenship and some of the most basic of human rights.263 “Cheap talk”264 in diplomatic forums that is contradicted by states’ actual behavior when their own interests are at stake does not create CIL binding on other states.

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return
.265 Thus, it is said, even if Resolution 194 lacks inherently binding force (recall that General Assembly declarations of this kind are undisputedly treated by the U.N. Charter as non- binding), nevertheless the General Assembly’s power to decide whether or not to admit new member states has made return of the 1947–49 refugees a binding obligation.266 The factual assertion underlying this claim—that the membership vote on Israel was conditional—is false. In fact, Arab representatives at the General Assembly meeting on May 11, 1949, concerning the admission of Israel, complained that Israel was admitted without having to

commit to refugee return, despite their attempts to make Israel comply.
267 Moreover, those supporters of a Palestinian right of return who tie return to the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership ignore that the power of the General Assembly to make membership conditional on factors not mentioned in the Charter was debated in 1947, soon before Israel petitioned for membership and the Arab states’ position was rejected. At the request of the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory legal opinion on the subject in May 1948, two weeks after Israel proclaimed its independence. According to the Court, a U.N. member called upon to vote on a state’s petition for membership is not “juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph [1]” of Article 4 of the Charter.
268 The relevant Charter provision provides in full: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”
269 On the basis that Israel fulfilled these written requirements, the Security Council advised that Israel be admitted,
270 and the General Assembly approved Israel’s admission.
271 The claim that a right of return for Palestinians was created by the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership is incorrect.

End Quote

So as we can all see there is no relevance to be found in CIL that stated the palestinians have any "right" to return

Yikes what a nightmare, I give up
Go to the link and read it for your bloody selves

From your link:

This fundamental and persistent uncertainty over sovereignty, authority, borders, and citizenship has rendered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unique, and international norms developed in more ordinary circumstances arguably inapplicable.​

We are looking at the conflict from the wrong angle. The pieces of the puzzle do not fit together to form a coherent picture.

Our confusion will disappear if we place the conflict within the historical framework of decolonization struggles. Violence has accompanied decolonization whenever the goal of political independence is blocked. Violence has ceased only through outside intervention. At its core the Palestinian-Israeli clash is about political independence and ending colonial status.

Palestine and Israel: A Case of Incomplete Decolonization | Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective​

-----------------------

The last paradox is that the tale of Palestine from the beginning until today is a simple story of colonialism and dispossession, yet the world treats it as a multifaceted and complex story - hard to understand and even harder to solve. Indeed, the story of Palestine has been told before: European settlers coming to a foreign land, settling there, and either committing genocide against or expelling the indigenous people.

Accelerating the Decolonization of Palestine​

I think you have your definition of colonize mixed up. The Judaic people are the indigenous peoples of the Canaan valley area and the Arab Muslims are the colonizers who arrived some time around the 7th century and have been oppressing the local inhabitants ever since. It would appear that the Arabs are kicking and screaming after having lost their toe hold in this 1% of North Africa and lashing out in bigotry and prejudice at their former subjects.

Incomplete colonization covers it but its not few percent of todays Israeli's who returned from Europe that are doing the colonization, they simply returned to their place of origin.

 

[Boston1]

P F Tinmore, et al,

For more than a half a century, the Hostile Arab Palestinian have established and perpetuated a struggle against a decision that dates back almost a century. In fact, it will be a Century this coming May that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed. And it will be 99 Years (this coming November) since the Balfour Declaration was released.

•EXCERPT•

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return.

•EXCERPT•
The last paradox is that the tale of Palestine from the beginning until today is a simple story of colonialism and dispossession, yet the world treats it as a multifaceted and complex story - hard to understand and even harder to solve. Indeed, the story of Palestine has been told before: European settlers coming to a foreign land, settling there, and either committing genocide against or expelling the indigenous people.

(COMMENT)

At the turn of the last Century (19th

20th Century) the common meaning of what colonialism was, in a practical sense, when a National Sovereign sent explorers abroad and through the "Right of Discovery and Conquest" expanded the territorial holdings of the Exploring Sovereign.

RIGHTS OF CONQUEST​

(Reference: John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America and the Several States of the American Union, Childs & Peterson, c1856.)

CONQUEST, international law. The acquisition of the sovereignty of a country by force of arms, exercised by an independent power which reduces the vanquished to the submission of its empire.

It is a general rule, that where conquered countries have laws of their own, these laws remain in force after the conquest, until they are abrogated, unless they are contrary to our religion, or enact any malum in se. In all such cases the laws of the conquering country prevail; for it is not to be presumed that laws opposed to religion or sound morals could be sanctioned. 1 Story, Const. Sec. 150, and the cases there cited.

Conquest does not, per se, give the conqueror plenum dominium et utile, but a temporary right of possession and government. 2 Gallis. R. 486; 3 Wash. C. C. R. 101. See 8 Wheat. R. 591; 2 Bay, R. 229; 2 Dall. R. 1; 12 Pet. 410.

The right which the English government claimed over the territory now composing the United States, was not founded on conquest, but discovery. Id. Sec. 152, et seq.
​

This is somewhat different as time moves on.

International Responses to Territorial Conquest​

•TWO EXCERPT•
The central problem is that the difference between conquest and aggression are occupation is largely one of intent, and perhaps success. This project assumes such intent only when clearly manifested in conduct. There are several justifications for using this stricter definition of conquest. First, defeated attempts at conquest are certainly far fewer than the hundreds of thousands of shorter territorial encroachments that could be thought of as “transient conquests.” Second, one may expect of international reaction to consummated conquests would be different from attempted ones. In the latter case, condemnation may be slow in coming as nation’s hope the victim state will deal with the situation itself. Conquest implies a certain permanence. Conquest is regarded as worse than the aggression, so one would expect on this ground criticism to be are more readily evident when the permanent intention becomes clear.

Depending on certain coding decisions, there have been somewhere between 12 and 18 forcible conquests by existing states after the adoption of the U.N Charter. International condemnation is found in only a few cases.6 Other conquests have won overwhelming international acceptance; these interestingly include both conquests of entire nations. The majority of conquests receive no clear international response.
​

There is a difference between the views at the time the event has taken place, and the evaluation well after (in this case a near century) the event and a cascade series if consequences take place. You cannot use 21st Century Logic to unravel 19th Century thinking used in the early 20th Century.

Most Respectfully,
R

The Palestinians have always opposed colonialism/conquest/external interference.

The Palestinians still maintain their basic inalienable rights.

The right to self determination without external interference.

The right to independence and sovereignty.

The right to territorial integrity.​

The palestinians are perpetuating and instigating war on innocent civilians and as such have removed themselves from privileges afforded in peacetime to the conditions typical of war.

No country is expected to house and provide for a hostile force other than Israel.

 

[montelatici]

OK for whatever reason this site isn't allowing me to use quote boxes and its just cut out the body of the text and now won't allow me to correct it. Crazy but I'll try it again.

Quote from previously noted reference
149 EVALUATING THE PALESTINIANS' CLAIMED RIGHT ...

Besides the general problem of relying on formally nonbinding General Assembly resolutions to support the right of return, there are problems with claims made on the Palestinians’ behalf about specific General Assembly resolutions, particularly Resolution 194. For instance, it is implied that Resolution 194, itself, states that CIL requires the return of the refugees.258 This is false, as perusal of the text demonstrates.259 Additionally, the claim that the General Assembly’s repeated references to and reenactments of Resolution 194 have transformed the Resolution from non-binding to binding cannot be correct because even today there is no consensus that valid CIL forms in that manner—that is, solely through non- binding votes in a diplomatic forum, the U.N. General Assembly. This is particularly the case here, with the issue of refugee return. The chief proponents of the theory that the General Assembly has binding, legislative authority regarding Israel and Palestinian refugees—the Arab and Muslim states— have declared for decades in diplomatic forums that international law requires the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel.260 At the same time, many of these proponents have expelled large numbers of their own nationals

and resident aliens, including Palestinians;261 have refused to agree to minimal international standards regarding the treatment of refugees;262 and have denied Palestinian refugees who reside in their countries citizenship and some of the most basic of human rights.263 “Cheap talk”264 in diplomatic forums that is contradicted by states’ actual behavior when their own interests are at stake does not create CIL binding on other states.

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return.265 Thus, it is said, even if Resolution 194 lacks inherently binding force (recall that General Assembly declarations of this kind are undisputedly treated by the U.N. Charter as non- binding), nevertheless the General Assembly’s power to decide whether or not to admit new member states has made return of the 1947–49 refugees a binding obligation.266 The factual assertion underlying this claim—that the membership vote on Israel was conditional—is false. In fact, Arab representatives at the General Assembly meeting on May 11, 1949, concerning the admission of Israel, complained that Israel was admitted without having to

commit to refugee return, despite their attempts to make Israel comply.267 Moreover, those supporters of a Palestinian right of return who tie return to the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership ignore that the power of the General Assembly to make membership conditional on factors not mentioned in the Charter was debated in 1947, soon before Israel petitioned for membership and the Arab states’ position was rejected. At the request of the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory legal opinion on the subject in May 1948, two weeks after Israel proclaimed its independence. According to the Court, a U.N. member called upon to vote on a state’s petition for membership is not “juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph [1]” of Article 4 of the Charter.268 The relevant Charter provision provides in full: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”269 On the basis that Israel fulfilled these written requirements, the Security Council advised that Israel be admitted,270 and the General Assembly approved Israel’s admission.271 The claim that a right of return for Palestinians was created by the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership is incorrect.

Besides the general problem of relying on formally nonbinding General Assembly resolutions to support the right of return, there are problems with claims made on the Palestinians’ behalf about specific General Assembly resolutions, particularly Resolution 194. For instance, it is implied that Resolution 194, itself, states that CIL requires the return of the refugees.258 This is false, as perusal of the text demonstrates.259 Additionally, the claim that the General Assembly’s repeated references to and reenactments of Resolution 194 have transformed the Resolution from non-binding to binding cannot be correct because even today there is no consensus that valid CIL forms in that manner—that is, solely through non- binding votes in a diplomatic forum, the U.N. General Assembly. This is particularly the case here, with the issue of refugee return. The chief proponents of the theory that the General Assembly has binding, legislative authority regarding Israel and Palestinian refugees—the Arab and Muslim states— have declared for decades in diplomatic forums that international law requires the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel.260At the same time, many of these proponents have expelled large numbers of their own nationals

and resident aliens, including Palestinians;261 have refused to agree to minimal international standards regarding the treatment of refugees;262 and have denied Palestinian refugees who reside in their countries citizenship and some of the most basic of human rights.263 “Cheap talk”264 in diplomatic forums that is contradicted by states’ actual behavior when their own interests are at stake does not create CIL binding on other states.

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return
.265 Thus, it is said, even if Resolution 194 lacks inherently binding force (recall that General Assembly declarations of this kind are undisputedly treated by the U.N. Charter as non- binding), nevertheless the General Assembly’s power to decide whether or not to admit new member states has made return of the 1947–49 refugees a binding obligation.266 The factual assertion underlying this claim—that the membership vote on Israel was conditional—is false. In fact, Arab representatives at the General Assembly meeting on May 11, 1949, concerning the admission of Israel, complained that Israel was admitted without having to

commit to refugee return, despite their attempts to make Israel comply.
267 Moreover, those supporters of a Palestinian right of return who tie return to the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership ignore that the power of the General Assembly to make membership conditional on factors not mentioned in the Charter was debated in 1947, soon before Israel petitioned for membership and the Arab states’ position was rejected. At the request of the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory legal opinion on the subject in May 1948, two weeks after Israel proclaimed its independence. According to the Court, a U.N. member called upon to vote on a state’s petition for membership is not “juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph [1]” of Article 4 of the Charter.
268 The relevant Charter provision provides in full: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”
269 On the basis that Israel fulfilled these written requirements, the Security Council advised that Israel be admitted,
270 and the General Assembly approved Israel’s admission.
271 The claim that a right of return for Palestinians was created by the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership is incorrect.

End Quote

So as we can all see there is no relevance to be found in CIL that stated the palestinians have any "right" to return

Yikes what a nightmare, I give up
Go to the link and read it for your bloody selves

From your link:

This fundamental and persistent uncertainty over sovereignty, authority, borders, and citizenship has rendered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unique, and international norms developed in more ordinary circumstances arguably inapplicable.​

We are looking at the conflict from the wrong angle. The pieces of the puzzle do not fit together to form a coherent picture.

Our confusion will disappear if we place the conflict within the historical framework of decolonization struggles. Violence has accompanied decolonization whenever the goal of political independence is blocked. Violence has ceased only through outside intervention. At its core the Palestinian-Israeli clash is about political independence and ending colonial status.

Palestine and Israel: A Case of Incomplete Decolonization | Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective​

-----------------------

The last paradox is that the tale of Palestine from the beginning until today is a simple story of colonialism and dispossession, yet the world treats it as a multifaceted and complex story - hard to understand and even harder to solve. Indeed, the story of Palestine has been told before: European settlers coming to a foreign land, settling there, and either committing genocide against or expelling the indigenous people.

Accelerating the Decolonization of Palestine​

I think you have your definition of colonize mixed up. The Judaic people are the indigenous peoples of the Canaan valley area and the Arab Muslims are the colonizers who arrived some time around the 7th century and have been oppressing the local inhabitants ever since. It would appear that the Arabs are kicking and screaming after having lost their toe hold in this 1% of North Africa and lashing out in bigotry and prejudice at their former subjects.

Incomplete colonization covers it but its not few percent of todays Israeli's who returned from Europe that are doing the colonization, they simply returned to their place of origin.

It is hilarious to observe the bobbing and weaving of our local Zionists in their attempt to deny that the Zionists intended to colonize Palestine. The founding Zionists were quite open in declaring their intent to colonize Palestine.

All the BS Boston posts, is just BS. The facts are available in print from impeccable sources, such as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

There are many other such declarations, but these are the most poignant, the first from the 19th century and the second from the early 20th century where the Zionists were considering expanding their colonization to Transjordania and Syria.



Zionists plan to colonize Palestine in 1899 NY Times

Zionists plan to colonize Palestine in 1899 NY Times - World Bulletin


Successful Jewish Colonization Will Extend Beyond Palestine Frontier, Weizmann Tells Actions Committ
July 25, 1926



London (Jul. 23)

(Jewish Telegraphic Agency)


"................extending Jewish colonization work outside of the present Palestine frontiers, including. Transjordania and certain parts of Syria, were the main features around which the deliberations centered.............................................
“Due to the success of our colonization work in Palestine proper, it is possible that eventually our colonization work will be extended beyond the frontiers of Transjordania. It is true that the Palestine government has not taken a clear stand in regard to its economic policy, but well founded demands have every prospect of being agreed to. A great deal has been achieved during the last months,” Dr. Weizmann said.

Successful Jewish Colonization Will Extend Beyond Palestine Frontier, Weizmann Tells Actions Committ

 

[RoccoR]

montelatici, et al,

Well, that depends on your topic.

But, you can use an agreement signed a few years earlier to the aggression/conquest in question, i.e. the Charter of the United Nations.

(COMMENT)

Article 2(4) of the Charter (1945) has never actually been tested successfully in any case. It speaks to the aspect of the "use of force" and "territorial integrity." And while it is a good talking point, it was not a consideration when the Arab League was the aggressor against Israel; where all the Arab Nations crossed an international demarcation, and entered the Palestine Trusteeship and Israel.

Article 1(1) of the Charter speaks of measures for the prevention of aggression; which in 1945 was not universally defined. (Oddly Enough) The internationally accepted definition of "Aggression" was only defined in the first three Articles of the 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) Definition of Aggression. This comes after the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Tripartite Aggression, the 1967 Six-Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kipper War. Up until the 1974 Resolution, Acts of Aggression were defined on a case-by-case basis in a Chapter VII, Article 39, Security Council determination. Again - just as odd - only the Chapter VII (with emphasis on Articles 42, 50 and 51) have been the most exercised. In May 1948, the Security Council threatened to declare the action a Chapter VII issue thru S/801 Situation in Palestine - SecCo resolution 50 (1948) in the language of: "Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter."

While the Charter has tested the Self-Defense Clause and the Security Council Determination Clause, nothing else has really been given a political stress test. In the latest test, The Russian Federation annexed the Crimea. There was no drawn-out occupation, or attempt to establish a dialog for a peaceful settlement --- just a quick military supported annexation. There was no call to arms, or real political backlash. The Russian Federation just demonstrated how it is done in the 21st Century. Yes, some nations say it was illegal? But is it?

What people might think is the correct interpretation of the Charter and the Laws, is not necessarily the ways it is actually practiced.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[montelatici]

P F Tinmore, et al,

For more than a half a century, the Hostile Arab Palestinian have established and perpetuated a struggle against a decision that dates back almost a century. In fact, it will be a Century this coming May that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed. And it will be 99 Years (this coming November) since the Balfour Declaration was released.

•EXCERPT•

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return.

•EXCERPT•
The last paradox is that the tale of Palestine from the beginning until today is a simple story of colonialism and dispossession, yet the world treats it as a multifaceted and complex story - hard to understand and even harder to solve. Indeed, the story of Palestine has been told before: European settlers coming to a foreign land, settling there, and either committing genocide against or expelling the indigenous people.

(COMMENT)

At the turn of the last Century (19th

20th Century) the common meaning of what colonialism was, in a practical sense, when a National Sovereign sent explorers abroad and through the "Right of Discovery and Conquest" expanded the territorial holdings of the Exploring Sovereign.

RIGHTS OF CONQUEST​

(Reference: John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America and the Several States of the American Union, Childs & Peterson, c1856.)

CONQUEST, international law. The acquisition of the sovereignty of a country by force of arms, exercised by an independent power which reduces the vanquished to the submission of its empire.

It is a general rule, that where conquered countries have laws of their own, these laws remain in force after the conquest, until they are abrogated, unless they are contrary to our religion, or enact any malum in se. In all such cases the laws of the conquering country prevail; for it is not to be presumed that laws opposed to religion or sound morals could be sanctioned. 1 Story, Const. Sec. 150, and the cases there cited.

Conquest does not, per se, give the conqueror plenum dominium et utile, but a temporary right of possession and government. 2 Gallis. R. 486; 3 Wash. C. C. R. 101. See 8 Wheat. R. 591; 2 Bay, R. 229; 2 Dall. R. 1; 12 Pet. 410.

The right which the English government claimed over the territory now composing the United States, was not founded on conquest, but discovery. Id. Sec. 152, et seq.
​

This is somewhat different as time moves on.

International Responses to Territorial Conquest​

•TWO EXCERPT•
The central problem is that the difference between conquest and aggression are occupation is largely one of intent, and perhaps success. This project assumes such intent only when clearly manifested in conduct. There are several justifications for using this stricter definition of conquest. First, defeated attempts at conquest are certainly far fewer than the hundreds of thousands of shorter territorial encroachments that could be thought of as “transient conquests.” Second, one may expect of international reaction to consummated conquests would be different from attempted ones. In the latter case, condemnation may be slow in coming as nation’s hope the victim state will deal with the situation itself. Conquest implies a certain permanence. Conquest is regarded as worse than the aggression, so one would expect on this ground criticism to be are more readily evident when the permanent intention becomes clear.

Depending on certain coding decisions, there have been somewhere between 12 and 18 forcible conquests by existing states after the adoption of the U.N Charter. International condemnation is found in only a few cases.6 Other conquests have won overwhelming international acceptance; these interestingly include both conquests of entire nations. The majority of conquests receive no clear international response.
​

There is a difference between the views at the time the event has taken place, and the evaluation well after (in this case a near century) the event and a cascade series if consequences take place. You cannot use 21st Century Logic to unravel 19th Century thinking used in the early 20th Century.

Most Respectfully,
R

The Palestinians have always opposed colonialism/conquest/external interference.

The Palestinians still maintain their basic inalienable rights.

The right to self determination without external interference.

The right to independence and sovereignty.

The right to territorial integrity.​

The palestinians are perpetuating and instigating war on innocent civilians and as such have removed themselves from privileges afforded in peacetime to the conditions typical of war.

No country is expected to house and provide for a hostile force other than Israel.

The war was started by the European (Jewish) invasion of Palestine. Today it is the Israelis that are murdering Palestinians by the thousands in an attempt to terrorize them into leaving their land through the implementation of the Dahiya doctrine. An Israeli doctrine based on maximizing civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

 

[montelatici]

montelatici, et al,

Well, that depends on your topic.

But, you can use an agreement signed a few years earlier to the aggression/conquest in question, i.e. the Charter of the United Nations.

(COMMENT)

Article 2(4) of the Charter (1945) has never actually been tested successfully in any case. It speaks to the aspect of the "use of force" and "territorial integrity." And while it is a good talking point, it was not a consideration when the Arab League was the aggressor against Israel; where all the Arab Nations crossed an international demarcation, and entered the Palestine Trusteeship and Israel.

Article 1(1) of the Charter speaks of measures for the prevention of aggression; which in 1945 was not universally defined. (Oddly Enough) The internationally accepted definition of "Aggression" was only defined in the first three Articles of the 1974 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) Definition of Aggression. This comes after the 1948 War of Independence, the 1956 Tripartite Aggression, the 1967 Six-Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kipper War. Up until the 1974 Resolution, Acts of Aggression were defined on a case-by-case basis in a Chapter VII, Article 39, Security Council determination. Again - just as odd - only the Chapter VII (with emphasis on Articles 42, 50 and 51) have been the most exercised. In May 1948, the Security Council threatened to declare the action a Chapter VII issue thru S/801 Situation in Palestine - SecCo resolution 50 (1948) in the language of: "Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter."

While the Charter has tested the Self-Defense Clause and the Security Council Determination Clause, nothing else has really been given a political stress test. In the latest test, The Russian Federation annexed the Crimea. There was no drawn-out occupation, or attempt to establish a dialog for a peaceful settlement --- just a quick military supported annexation. There was no call to arms, or real political backlash. The Russian Federation just demonstrated how it is done in the 21st Century. Yes, some nations say it was illegal? But is it?

What people might think is the correct interpretation of the Charter and the Laws, is not necessarily the ways it is actually practiced.

Most Respectfully,
R

So, you support the land grab of Crimea by the Russians just as you support the land grab of Palestine by the European Jews. Interesting.

 

[Boston1]

P F Tinmore, et al,

For more than a half a century, the Hostile Arab Palestinian have established and perpetuated a struggle against a decision that dates back almost a century. In fact, it will be a Century this coming May that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed. And it will be 99 Years (this coming November) since the Balfour Declaration was released.

•EXCERPT•

Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on refugee return.

•EXCERPT•
The last paradox is that the tale of Palestine from the beginning until today is a simple story of colonialism and dispossession, yet the world treats it as a multifaceted and complex story - hard to understand and even harder to solve. Indeed, the story of Palestine has been told before: European settlers coming to a foreign land, settling there, and either committing genocide against or expelling the indigenous people.

(COMMENT)

At the turn of the last Century (19th

20th Century) the common meaning of what colonialism was, in a practical sense, when a National Sovereign sent explorers abroad and through the "Right of Discovery and Conquest" expanded the territorial holdings of the Exploring Sovereign.

RIGHTS OF CONQUEST​

(Reference: John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America and the Several States of the American Union, Childs & Peterson, c1856.)

CONQUEST, international law. The acquisition of the sovereignty of a country by force of arms, exercised by an independent power which reduces the vanquished to the submission of its empire.

It is a general rule, that where conquered countries have laws of their own, these laws remain in force after the conquest, until they are abrogated, unless they are contrary to our religion, or enact any malum in se. In all such cases the laws of the conquering country prevail; for it is not to be presumed that laws opposed to religion or sound morals could be sanctioned. 1 Story, Const. Sec. 150, and the cases there cited.

Conquest does not, per se, give the conqueror plenum dominium et utile, but a temporary right of possession and government. 2 Gallis. R. 486; 3 Wash. C. C. R. 101. See 8 Wheat. R. 591; 2 Bay, R. 229; 2 Dall. R. 1; 12 Pet. 410.

The right which the English government claimed over the territory now composing the United States, was not founded on conquest, but discovery. Id. Sec. 152, et seq.
​

This is somewhat different as time moves on.

International Responses to Territorial Conquest​

•TWO EXCERPT•
The central problem is that the difference between conquest and aggression are occupation is largely one of intent, and perhaps success. This project assumes such intent only when clearly manifested in conduct. There are several justifications for using this stricter definition of conquest. First, defeated attempts at conquest are certainly far fewer than the hundreds of thousands of shorter territorial encroachments that could be thought of as “transient conquests.” Second, one may expect of international reaction to consummated conquests would be different from attempted ones. In the latter case, condemnation may be slow in coming as nation’s hope the victim state will deal with the situation itself. Conquest implies a certain permanence. Conquest is regarded as worse than the aggression, so one would expect on this ground criticism to be are more readily evident when the permanent intention becomes clear.

Depending on certain coding decisions, there have been somewhere between 12 and 18 forcible conquests by existing states after the adoption of the U.N Charter. International condemnation is found in only a few cases.6 Other conquests have won overwhelming international acceptance; these interestingly include both conquests of entire nations. The majority of conquests receive no clear international response.
​

There is a difference between the views at the time the event has taken place, and the evaluation well after (in this case a near century) the event and a cascade series if consequences take place. You cannot use 21st Century Logic to unravel 19th Century thinking used in the early 20th Century.

Most Respectfully,
R

The Palestinians have always opposed colonialism/conquest/external interference.

The Palestinians still maintain their basic inalienable rights.

The right to self determination without external interference.

The right to independence and sovereignty.

The right to territorial integrity.​

The palestinians are perpetuating and instigating war on innocent civilians and as such have removed themselves from privileges afforded in peacetime to the conditions typical of war.

No country is expected to house and provide for a hostile force other than Israel.

The war was started by the European (Jewish) invasion of Palestine. Today it is the Israelis that are murdering Palestinians by the thousands in an attempt to terrorize them into leaving their land through the implementation of the Dahiya doctrine. An Israeli doctrine based on maximizing civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

So I took you off ignore because you really do post some pretty funny stuff.

So now the wars were started by the Judaic people LOL Yeah, the fledgling Israeli state declared war on Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. ;--) and Azzam Pasha didn't declare "it will be a war of annihilation"

All I can think is that your hatred has led you to a place of complete delusion. The Israeli's are merely defending themselves, against the same kinda hatred that is blinding you now Monty

 

[RoccoR]

montelatici, et al,

This is a great leap alone the timeline.

The immigration, at the direction of the Council of the League of Nations, was encouraged to facilitate the establishment of the Jewish national home in co-operation with all Jews who are willing to assist. It was not an invasion. And the Treaty of Lausanne recorded the Ottoman/Turks renouncement all rights and title over the territories to the Allied Parties to the Treaty; NOT the Arab inhabitance. The Treaty stipulated that the future of these territories were to be settled by the parties concerned. (Article 16)

I fully understand that it is very important to maintain the illusion that the poor and downtrodden Hostile Arab Palestinians, virtual victims, were invaded by some overwhelming military force. And that illusion is somewhat true as long as this overwhelming force is Identified as the British Army under the direction of the Viscount and Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, at the conclusion of hostilities, established the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (EOTA) over Levantine and Mesopotamian provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. The EOTA was replaced in mid 1920 by a Civilian Administration.

The war was started by the European (Jewish) invasion of Palestine. Today it is the Israelis that are murdering Palestinians by the thousands in an attempt to terrorize them into leaving their land through the implementation of the Dahiya doctrine. An Israeli doctrine based on maximizing civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

(COMMENT)

The Dahiya Doctrine is an alleged 21st Century Strategy. If such a strategy was implemented, it had no connection to Jewish Immigration encouraged during the Mandate [what you refer to as the European (Jewish) invasion of Palestine], or post-War (of Independence). The Dahiya Doctrine was a form of counterterrorism/counter-insurgency (S/RES/2133 (2014)) that offered a practical implementation of S/RES/1373(2001) and in particular its decisions that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists. The Dahiya Doctrine was the targeting and destruction of selected the civilian infrastructure of hostile regimes (HAMAS and Hezbollah) as a means of establishing deterrence against militant use of that infrastructure, It is entirely legal.

I don't know where you get your information from, but these types of operational concepts don't arbitrarily target civilians. Warnings, in accordance with Rule #20 to give effective advance warning prior to an attack which may affect the civilian population. The IDF Target Selection Process has the objective to selected that attack on which is expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects; and still damage or destroy the infrastructure on which the Hostile Arab Palestinian is dependent.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[Boston1]

He's desperate to ignore the fact that there is zero support within international law to support this nonsense about a "right" of return. Its a privilege, not a right.

 

[RoccoR]

montelatici, et al,

Whether I agree with a certain political-military decision or not, is irrelevant. I have no impact.

So, you support the land grab of Crimea by the Russians just as you support the land grab of Palestine by the European Jews. Interesting.

(COMMENT)

But I do understand how such decisions go through a national security decision making process and the practical application is developed. And I can see that the Crimea was critical to The Black Sea Fleet based there for more than two centuries. The fleet’s strategic position remains crucial to Russian security interests in the region.

I don't have to agree or disagree. President Vladimir Putin and the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral Alexander Vitko, won't know my thoughts and won't care what I think. What is important is to how the Russian Process works; not so dissimilar from the American Process. You cannot deny reality.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[RoccoR]

Boston1, et al,

The tragedy here is -- so many have been convinced there is.

He's desperate to ignore the fact that there is zero support within international law to support this nonsense about a "right" of return. Its a privilege, not a right.

(COMMENT)

It is almost a crime.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[montelatici]

Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

- Article 13(b) UDHR

 

[Hollie]

Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

- Article 13(b) UDHR

You might consider passing that on to Islamist majority nations across the Islamist Middle East which have purged competing religions from an entire area of the globe.

 

[RoccoR]

montelatici, et al,

The UDHR is ... Not international Law and Not Binding.

Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

- Article 13(b) UDHR

(COMMENT)

TWO Very Big Points:

• Although many people intentionally associate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) with the twin International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); and collectively call them the The International Bill of Human Rights; only the CCPR and the CESCR are actually laws in force. The UDHR is not. The UDHR could not get approved as a ratified law, so what the Human Rights bleeding heart are attempting to do is create the common belief such that the International Courts might consider it Customary Law. BUT Article 13(b) does not have the force of law. However, Article 12(2 and 4) of the CCPR, which is a Covenant with the force of law --- say: 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. AND 4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. This is something slightly different.

• Second, even the Israeli Law allows for Israelis to leave and return. In order for Article 13b of the UDHR to be applicable, the individual in question (the everyone) has be be a Citizen in order for his return to "his country."

Point 2.5 Finally, the UDHR is dated 10 December 1948. The great Nabka is normally considered by Consolidated Eligibility and Registration Instructions (CERI) as Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948. The UDHR would not have been in effect then.​

I hope this clears up your confusion.

Most Respectfully,
R

​

 

[Boston1]

Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

- Article 13(b) UDHR

LOL
You are too funny

What does that have to do with leaving a combatant force loose in the countryside ?

Your quote doesn't even remotely apply to the palestinains who've never had a country. Ergo they cannot be returning to "his country" its not "his country" And while they are certainly welcome to leave anytime, they might have to do so through someone elses borders AND Israel is under no legal obligation to allow them back in. ;--)

LMAO

The next thing you completely missed is that the UDHR isn't legally binding.

NEXT ;--)

 

[montelatici]

Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

- Article 13(b) UDHR

LOL
You are too funny

What does that have to do with leaving a combatant force loose in the countryside ?

Your quote doesn't even remotely apply to the palestinains who've never had a country. Ergo they cannot be returning to "his country" its not "his country" And while they are certainly welcome to leave anytime, they might have to do so through someone elses borders AND Israel is under no legal obligation to allow them back in. ;--)

LMAO

The next thing you completely missed is that the UDHR isn't legally binding.

NEXT ;--)

Ahh, dimwit, that's why it says country rather than state.

 

[Coyote]

This came up on a different thread, but I think deserves its own topic.

Is the RoR an intergenerational right, that is, a right which is passed on from individuals to their offspring and descendants?

Participants in this thread should be prepared to defend any qualified answer other than a simple yes/no with criteria to establish when it should or should not apply. The expectation being that all criteria should be applied consistently across all cultures, ethnic groups and political situations.

No.

And the simple reason is - how far back do you go? How do you prove that right? What happens to those, who in the succeeding years bought property in good faith? What if you are only partially descended from the original claimants - a fraction of the blood?

This is very much like the reparations for slavery claim some call for in the US.

 

[montelatici]

This came up on a different thread, but I think deserves its own topic.

Is the RoR an intergenerational right, that is, a right which is passed on from individuals to their offspring and descendants?

Participants in this thread should be prepared to defend any qualified answer other than a simple yes/no with criteria to establish when it should or should not apply. The expectation being that all criteria should be applied consistently across all cultures, ethnic groups and political situations.

No.

And the simple reason is - how far back do you go? How do you prove that right? What happens to those, who in the succeeding years bought property in good faith? What if you are only partially descended from the original claimants - a fraction of the blood?

This is very much like the reparations for slavery claim some call for in the US.

The legal bases for return can be found in eight branches of international law: (1) inter-State nationality law, (2) law of State succession, (3) human rights law, (4) humanitarian law, (5) law of State responsibility, (6) refugee law, (7) UN law, and (8) natural/customary law. These legal foundations are briefly highlighted here.

Inter-State nationality law is the starting point for refugees’ right of return. The key basis for the right of return is derived from the individual’s nationality. The individual’s possession of Palestinian nationality prior to 14 May 1948, i.e. before the establishment of Israel, constitutes the first basis for the right of return. The other bases presented in this note are derived from the bond of nationality between the refugee and the territory in which s/he habitually resided before displacement. Palestinian citizens who left the area that became Israel have the right to return, that is to recover their nationality. Each citizen who became a refugee has an individual right to acquire Israeli nationality. Descendants of these refugees have an identical right. Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian leadership might yield a political solution to the refugee problem by, for example, allowing these refugees to return to a State of Palestine established in the 1967 territory. Such a solution would not alter the right of refugees to return to Israel. The right of return based on pre-1948 nationality can be exercised exclusively by each individual who once held Palestinian nationality.

The law of State succession reflects the practice of States in regard to nationality. In almost all peace treaties reached in modern history, individuals belonging to a former State have ipso facto acquired the nationality of the succeeding State. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, under which Turkey relinquished its title to Palestine, provided the basis for the Palestine inhabitants’ nationality. It stipulated that Turkish subjects habitually residing in territories detached from Turkey would acquire the nationality of the new State, namely Palestine. The inhabitants were granted Palestinian nationality when such detachment took place. Israel cannot, according to international law, deny the nationality of Palestinians who were residing in the parts of Palestine that became Israel. In 1950, the Israel Law of Return granted Israeli nationality to any Jew who was present in or immigrated to Israel. This was applicable regardless of whether the Jew was a Palestinian citizen or not. The Arab inhabitants of Israel, who had previously held Palestinian nationality, were gradually granted Israeli citizenship based on the 1952 Israel Nationality Law. Israel could, however, decide that Palestinian nationality had ceased to exist in the area under Israel’s jurisdiction. But Israel could not withdraw the nationality from Palestinian citizens who were displaced from their places of habitual residence in the territory of Palestine in which Israel was established. The right to obtain Israeli nationality by the citizens of Mandate Palestine entails the right of return to Israel. Article 14(2) of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States stated: ‘A State concerned shall take all necessary measures to allow persons concerned who, because of events connected with the succession of States, were forced to leave their habitual residence on its territory to return thereto.’

The human rights law offers the third basis. Article 13(2) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.’ This provision represents a declaration of binding international law recognized by almost all States. It entails the freedom of Palestinians to leave their country, regardless of whether they have left that country (i.e. Mandate Palestine) as refugees or travelers, and to return thereto. Israel or any other State established in Mandate Palestine would definitively be the country of Palestinian refugees to which they are entitled to return. Likewise, Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stated: ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.’ Palestine or any of its successor States, including Israel, is considered for each refugee as his own country. These explicit rules govern the return for Palestinian citizens, including refugees.

International humanitarian law is the fourth basis for the right of return. Civilian citizens should not be removed from the occupied territory. If they leave the territory willfully or as a result of the armed conflict, civilians should be readmitted. This is an obligation incurred by the authority exercising power in the territory. Article 49(1) of the Geneva Convention IV provided: ‘Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to … any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.’ The right of return has been incorporated in Article 26 (family reunification), Article 35 (right to leave), and Article 45 (transfer to other countries). ‘The prohibition [of deportation] is absolute and allows of no exceptions,’ as pointed out by the commentator on the cited article. Even when the occupier undertakes total or partial evacuation of a given area, as paragraph 2 of the same article puts it: ‘Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.’ ‘This clause naturally applies both to evacuation inside the territory and to cases where circumstances have made it necessary to evacuate the protected persons to a place outside the occupied territory,’ the aforementioned commentator adds. The denial of return to one’s home constitutes, in effect, deportation. Deportation is considered, by Article 147 of the same Convention, as one of the grave breaches or war crime.

When the State denies refugees the right to return, it means that other States are forced to accept them. No State has an absolute obligation to accept citizens of other States. The admission of a foreigner is rather a privilege that the State may grant or withhold. Any State may, with certain restrictions, expel foreigners from its territory. If the State refuses to admit its citizens, or those who ought to be recognized by that State as its citizens, such a State commits an internationally wrongful act against the receiving State. These general principles apply to Palestinian refugees as rights holders, and to Israel as a duty bearer. Israel would be internationally responsible vis-à-vis the States in which Palestinian refugees end up. This responsibility entitles such States to adopt countermeasures to remedy damages sustained as a result of the Israeli refusal to readmit refugees, including restitution (return) and compensation.

A key role for international refugee organizations, particularly the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the repatriation, or return, of refugees to their countries of nationality. This is obvious from provisions 1, 8, and 9 of the UNHCR Statute of 14 December 1950. One of UNHCR’s major functions has been to assist governments in repatriating refugees. Although the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees provides alternative solutions to repatriation for refugees, such alternatives are mainly ‘humanitarian’ and were stipulated for providing options for the protection of refugees by any State willing to assume such protection in lieu of the State of nationality. Such solutions by no means eliminate the ‘legal right’ of return.

UN law renders the right of return unquestionable. It should first be noted that the question of Palestine is the responsibility of the General Assembly (GA) as the successor to the Council of the League of Nations, which issued and supervised the Palestine Mandate. The GA recognized the existence of two States in Palestine, an Arab State and a Jewish State, in Resolution 181(III) of 29 November 1947. In the same resolution, the GA imposed an obligation on both States to extend their nationality to their habitual residents, regardless of their religion or race. Israel, ‘the Jewish State,’ and the new State of Palestine, ‘the Arab State,’ were required to grant their nationality to all their inhabitants, Jews and Arabs. This right of nationality, as prescribed by the GA, imposes an obligation on the new States to readmit citizens who had left their territory. The right of return has been consistently confirmed by many GA resolutions relating specifically to this right, the first of which is Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948. Paragraph 11 of this resolution states that ‘the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.’ This resolution has been reaffirmed by the GA on an annual basis. The most recent of these resolutions, just to give an indication, is Resolution 65/101 of 10 December 2010. The Security Council has also advocated the right of return, including in its Resolution 237 of 1967.

All these international legal bases indicate that the right of return for refugees is a customary rule. Such a right has long been deemed to constitute a natural entitlement for any citizen. The right of return has not during the course of history been subjected to questioning by States. It could possibly be concluded that, due to the recognition of this right as part of inter-State nationality law, the law of State succession, human rights law, humanitarian law, refugee law and domestic migration law, the right of return has become a peremptory norm of general international law. Assuming that the denial of return is a grave breach of international humanitarian law, third States may be entitled to prosecute those who violate this right if minimal jurisdictional requirements are met. Besides, unlawful deportation or transfer has recently been considered as a ‘crime against humanity’ if committed in peacetime, or as a ‘war crime’ if committed during an armed conflict, according to Articles 7 and 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It may be safely concluded that the right of return for Palestinian refugees generates an obligation erga omnes for States. If this is the case, the wrongfulness of conduct in breach of this obligation can be invoked by third States. In view of the importance of the rights derived from the right of return, all States can be held to have a legal interest in its enforcement. States are consequently required to meet a set of obligations regarding the right of return. These obligations include, inter alia, the ongoing recognition of the right of return, assisting Palestinian refugees legally at the domestic level (e.g. by providing identity documentations, travel and work facilities, refugee status, and refraining from their deportation) and financially until such time as the refugees can exercise their right of return. All States must express support for the right of return.

The purpose of this discussion is to show that responsibility for the refugee problem lies with the State of Israel and with the international community. The Palestinian leadership cannot be legally held accountable if it reaches an agreement with Israel that does not include the right of return. The utmost that the Palestinian leadership can do is to grant Palestinian refugees its nationality once the State of Palestine is established, to protect them abroad, and to politically defend their right of return.

Bases for the Palestinian Refugees’ Right of Return under International Law: Beyond General Assembly Resolution 194 - CJICL

 

[Boston1]

Nonsense

general assembly resolutions are FOR THE HUNDREDTH TIME, NOT BINDING. Your inability to accept the obvious is a reflection of your bigotry and prejudice in this matter.

list and reference each instance of international law which you believe supports your view. I suspect you consistently fail to do this for the simple reason that none exists ;--)

Note and include a reference for each within established international law such that we can all agree that you have found applicable law specific to the palestinians within binding international law

;--)