Just to make sure I am certain that what you wrote is what you meant, I have below presented a brief discussion of the orthodoxy of original intentionalism.
Many of the issues explored during ratification continue to be debated today. For instance, the issue of interpreting the Constitution by considering the intent behind its provisions has been recast in modern times as the theory of originalism. One of the early assertions of this doctrine was known as “intentionalism,” or original intent,
a theory which envisioned that all laws should be applied based on the subjective intent of the Constitution’s authors. Thus, for instance, since the authors of the Constitution would be the Founding Fathers who drafted it, intentionalism theory would involve studying the writings of those men at the Philadelphia Convention and their relevant outside writing.
One of the early proponents of intentionalism was Judge Robert Bork, a former judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Judge Bork recognized that the application of an original intent standard would not always be easy. For instance, the application of any theory of Constitutional intent must deal with the problem of generality. Judge Bork recognized that the framers, because they were using terms that could have broad application, could not have anticipated all possible fact patterns in which a particular constitutional provision could be applied. Thus, Judge Bork suggested that the task of an intentionalist judge is not to determine what the Founding Fathers would have felt about a particular application of the Constitution. Rather,
a court seeking to interpret a Constitutional provision would need to state a core value, a major premise, that the framers intended to protect, and then supply the minor premise necessary to protect the constitutional freedom at issue. In this manner, a judge can apply the Constitution to unforeseen facts without forgoing adherence to the intended constitutional intent of the subject provision.
One such example is determining the meaning of the term “equal protection” as found in the Fourteenth Amendment. An originalist could easily ascertain that the intention of the
14th Amendment, based on the expressed intent of the drafters, was to protect black citizens from having a state limit or deny their individual rights. However, most people would agree that this would be an unnecessarily limited view of the use of the broad term “equal protection.” Thus, according to Judge Bork, a court should apply the amendment “neutrally,” so as to enforce the core idea of racial equality, regardless of which race is being discriminated against. Thus,
if one were to extend Judge Bork’s reasoning, one could argue that the decision in a case such as
Grutter v. Bollinger, which upheld the affirmative action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School, was wrongly decided. According to Justice Bork’s theory, such a decision would be based, not on policy preferences, but on purely judicial grounds.
That leaves the problem, however, of just how high the level of generality for the term “equal protection” should be set. For instance,
the Supreme Court has held that, in some cases, it is a violation of the Constitution for the government to discriminate based on gender. Judge Bork argues that the drafters of
the 14th Amendment did not intend that the Equal Protection Clause would extend to laws which treated women differently from men, and that there is no other legitimate basis on which to extend such constitutional protections beyond race and ethnicity.
Judge Bork admits that the language of the
14th Amendment, broadly written to prevent a state from
“deny[ing] any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law,” does not explicitly contain such a limitation. However, he points to a
failure of the Court to adequately explain why some groups beyond race and ethnic groups would be included, while others would be denied. According to Judge Bork (and echoed years later by Justice Scalia),
the problem of levels of generality is solved by choosing a level of generality no higher than that which interpretation of the words, structure, and history of the Constitution fairly support.
The theory of original intent, however, quickly came under critical scrutiny by other commentators. The first criticism was that
the Constitution was drafted after a good deal of political compromise, so that it would be nearly impossible to ascertain a single collective intent of a large group of individuals, each of whom may have had different intentions. Second, as discussed above,
historical evidence could be viewed as suggesting that the framers in fact intended for future generations not to interpret the Constitution according to their intent, but according to the “common sense meaning” of the document. Thus, for instance,
the framers’ desire to keep the records of the proceedings of the Convention secret could be seen as intended to prevent those proceedings from being used in interpretation.