“It is not clear that Maliki wanted that many troops,” said
Colin H. Kahl, who was deputy assistant secretary of defense at the time and closely involved in the talks. “Indeed, he was conscious of the extreme unpopularity of a continued U.S. presence with his [Shiite] constituency and he had no interest in a sizable U.S. presence along the Arab-Kurd divide (which is what all our big troop options assumed). Moreover, the immunities issue would not have likely been resolved even if the administration started negotiations earlier and offered more. It was simply too toxic, politically, for Iraqi politicians to accept.”
Kahl added: “Ironically, part of the difficulty in securing an agreement stemmed from our success. The Iraqi security forces were now much more numerous and capable, so Iraqi politicians were not as desperate for us to stick around. They recognized the value of a continued U.S. presence, but it was not so valuable that it was worth the domestic political risk or to prioritize the national interest over their desire to outflank their political rivals.”