Government's Failure at Business

[EdwardBaiamonte]

Concerned that down payments were a barrier, Bush persuaded Congress to spend as much as $200 million a year to help first-time buyers with down payments and closing costs.

And he pushed to allow first-time buyers to qualify for government insured mortgages with no money down

yes yes Bush was a liberal who interfered with the free market to get people into homes the free market said they could not afford.

So now dumbto3 is a conservative?

There is no free market.

and it is primarily because liberals lack the IQ to understand how the free market works.

 

[Dad2three]

Don't be afraid.....just answer the question:

If FDR had not abused the US Constitution, and decided to invade the private sector with the GSE's......

......would there have been a mortgage meltdown?


Then you can be afraid....very afraid.

Don't be afraid.....just answer the question:

If FDR had not abused the US Constitution, and decided to invade the private sector with the GSE's......

......would there have been a mortgage meltdown?


What did the GSE's that worked for 70 years, have to do with Dubyas regulator failure as the Bankters created a WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST?


Wall Street, Not Fannie and Freddie, Led Mortgage Meltdown

Mortgages financed by Wall Street from 2001 to 2008 were 4½ times more likely to be seriously delinquent than mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddie.


“The idea that they were leading this charge is just absurd,” said Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance, an authoritative trade publication. “Fannie and Freddie have always had the tightest underwriting on earth…They were opposite of subprime.”

Wall Street, Not Fannie and Freddie, Led Mortgage Meltdown - The Daily Beast


MORE ON DUBYA'S REGULATOR FAILURE


http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

Let me answer for you, you coward: no.

Bankters created a WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST



Jun 16th 2005


The worldwide rise in house prices is the biggest bubble in history. Prepare for the economic pain when it pops



The global housing boom: In come the waves | The Economist

DUBYA ALLOWED A SUBPRIME BUBBLE TO HAPPEN!!!!

 

[PoliticalChic]

Don't be afraid.....just answer the question:

If FDR had not abused the US Constitution, and decided to invade the private sector with the GSE's......

......would there have been a mortgage meltdown?


What did the GSE's that worked for 70 years, have to do with Dubyas regulator failure as the Bankters created a WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST?


Wall Street, Not Fannie and Freddie, Led Mortgage Meltdown

Mortgages financed by Wall Street from 2001 to 2008 were 4½ times more likely to be seriously delinquent than mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddie.


“The idea that they were leading this charge is just absurd,” said Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance, an authoritative trade publication. “Fannie and Freddie have always had the tightest underwriting on earth…They were opposite of subprime.”

Wall Street, Not Fannie and Freddie, Led Mortgage Meltdown - The Daily Beast


MORE ON DUBYA'S REGULATOR FAILURE


http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

Let me answer for you, you coward: no.

Bankters created a WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST



Jun 16th 2005


The worldwide rise in house prices is the biggest bubble in history. Prepare for the economic pain when it pops



The global housing boom: In come the waves | The Economist

DUBYA ALLOWED A SUBPRIME BUBBLE TO HAPPEN!!!!

No....bankers must work withing the structure and regulations of the politicians.

That is why the blame for the mortgage meltdown must be laid squarely at the feet of the Democrats/Liberals/Progressives.



For your edification:


It all began with Democrat megalomaniac Franklin Roosevelt, who, when not appointing KKK members to the Supreme Court, decided to invade the private economy with the creation of GREs.


You were unable to deny that he did so....but you were afraid to answer whether the meltdown would have occurred sans the efforts of this Democrat.

It would not have.
Too bad FDR would not give due respect to the Constitution.

Now....Democrat debilitation via contemporary efforts......



Take notes:



a. Congress passed a bill in 1975 requiring banks to provide the government with information on their lending activities in poor urban areas. Two years later, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which gave regulators the power to deny banks the right to expand if they didn’t lend sufficiently in those neighborhoods. In 1979 the FDIC used the CRA to block a move by the Greater NY Savings Bank for not enough lending.


b. In 1986, when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now [Democrat associate] (Acorn)threatened to oppose an acquisition by a southern bank, Louisiana Bancshares, until it agreed to new “flexible credit and underwriting standards” for minority borrowers—for example, counting public assistance and food stamps as income.


c. In 1987, Acorn led a coalition of advocacy groups calling for industry-wide changes in lending standards. Among the demanded reforms were the easing of minimum down-payment requirements and of the requirement that borrowers have enough cash at a closing to cover two to three months of mortgage payments (research had shown that lack of money in hand was a big reason some mortgages failed quickly).


d. ACORN then attacked Fannie Mae, the giant quasi-government agency that bought loans from banks in order to allow them to make new loans. Its underwriters were “strictly by-the-book interpreters” of lending standards and turned down purchases of unconventional loans, charged Acorn. The pressure eventually paid off. In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring Fannie Mae and the similar Freddie Mac to devote 30 percent of their loan purchases to mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers.


e. Clinton Administration housing secretary, Henry Cisneros, declared that he would expand homeownership among lower- and lower-middle-income renters. His strategy: pushing for no-down-payment loans; expanding the size of mortgages that the government would insure against losses; and using the CRA and other lending laws to direct more private money into low-income programs.


f. Shortly after Cisneros announced his plan, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to begin buying loans under new, looser guidelines. Freddie Mac, for instance, started approving low-income buyers with bad credit histories or none at all, so long as they were current on rent and utilities payments. Freddie Mac also said that it would begin counting income from seasonal jobs and public assistance toward its income minimum, despite the FHA disaster of the sixties.


g. Freddie Mac began an “alternative qualifying” program with the Sears Mortgage Corporation that let a borrower qualify for a loan with a monthly payment as high as 50 percent of his income, at a time when most private mortgage companies wouldn’t exceed 33 percent. The program also allowed borrowers with bad credit to get mortgages if they took credit-counseling classes administered by Acorn and other nonprofits. Subsequent research would show that such classes have little impact on default rates.


h. Pressuring nonbank lenders to make more loans to poor minorities [Democrat policy] didn’t stop with Sears. If it didn’t happen, Clinton officials warned, they’d seek to extend CRA regulations to all mortgage makers. In Congress, [Democrat] Representative Maxine Waters called financial firms not covered by the CRA “among the most egregious redliners.”


i. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) shocked the financial world by signing a 1994 agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pledging to increase lending to minorities and join in new efforts to rewrite lending standards. The first MBA member to sign up: [Democrat bagman] Countrywide Financial, the mortgage firm that would be at the core of the subprime meltdown.


j. A 1998 sales pitch by a Bear Stearns managing director advised banks to begin packaging their loans to low-income borrowers into securities that the firm could sell. Forget traditional underwriting standards [Democrat policy] when considering these loans, the director advised. For a low-income borrower, he continued in all-too-familiar terms, owning a home was “a near-sacred obligation. A family will do almost anything to meet that monthly mortgage payment.”
Bunk, says Stan Liebowitz, a professor of economics at the University of Texas: “The claim that lower-income homeowners are somehow different in their devotion to their home is a purely emotional claim with no evidence to support it.”[Democrat policy]


k. Any concern was quickly dismissed. When in early 2000 the FDIC proposed increasing capital requirements for lenders making “subprime” loans [Republican policy] —loans to people with questionable credit, that is—Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney of New York told a congressional hearing that she feared that the step would dry up CRA loans. Her fellow New York Democrat John J. LaFalce urged regulators “not to be premature” in imposing new regulations.[Democrat policy]


l. In July 1999, HUD proposed new levels for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s low-income lending; in September, Fannie Mae agreed to begin purchasing loans made to “borrowers with slightly impaired credit”—that is, with credit standards even lower than the government had been pushing for a generation.[Democrat policy]


m. In 2004 Congress pressed new affordable-housing goals on the two mortgage giants, which through 2007 purchased some $1 trillion in loans to lower- and moderate-income buyers. The buying spree helped spark a massive increase in securitization of mortgages to people with dubious credit.[Democrat policy]


n. In October 1994, Fannie Mae head James Johnson had reminded a banking convention that mortgages with small down payments had a much higher risk of defaulting. (A Duff & Phelps study found that they were nearly three times more likely to default than conventional mortgages.)

Yet the very next month, Fannie Mae said that it expected to back loans to low-income home buyers with a 97 percent loan-to-value ratio[Democrat policy] —that is, loans in which the buyer puts down just 3 percent—as part of a commitment, made earlier that year to Congress, to purchase $1 trillion in affordable-housing mortgages by the end of the nineties. According to Edward Pinto, who served as the company’s chief credit officer, the program was the result of political pressure on Fannie Mae trumping lending standards.
[Democrat policy- 'political pressure']



o. In 1992, the Boston Fed produced an extraordinary 29-page document that codified the new lending wisdom.[Democrat policy]

Conventional mortgage criteria, the report argued, might be “unintentionally biased” because they didn’t take into account “the economic culture of urban, lower-income and nontraditional customers.”[Democrat policy]

Lenders should thus consider junking the industry’s traditional income-to-payments ratio and stop viewing an applicant’s “lack of credit history” as a “negative factor.” [Democrat policy]

Further, if applicants had bad credit, banks should “consider extenuating circumstances”[Democrat policy]

—even though a study by mortgage insurance companies would soon show, not surprisingly, that borrowers with no credit rating or a bad one were far more likely to default. If applicants didn’t have enough savings for a down payment, the Boston Fed urged, banks should allow loans from nonprofits or government assistance agencies to count toward one. A later study of Freddie Mac mortgages would find that a borrower who made a down payment with third-party funds was four times more likely to default, a reminder that traditional underwriting standards weren’t arbitrary but based on historical lending patterns. [Republican wisdom]


p. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus launched Hogar in 2003, an initiative that pushed for easing lending standards [Democrat policy]for immigrants, including touting so-called seller-financed mortgages in which a builder provided down-payment aid to buyers via contributions to nonprofit groups. As a result, mortgage lending to Hispanics soared. And today, in districts where Hispanics make up at least 25 percent of the population, foreclosure rates are now nearly 50 percent higher than the national average, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.


q. Republicans and Democrats, meanwhile, have scrambled to reignite the housing market through ill-conceived tax credits and renewed federal subsidies for mortgages, including the Obama administration’s mortgage bailout plan, which recalls the New Deal’s HOLC. [Democrat policy]

Behind these efforts is a fundamental misconception among politicians [Democrat policy]that housing drives the American economy and therefore demands subsidy at virtually any cost. Our praiseworthy initial efforts—to eliminate housing discrimination and provide all Americans an equal opportunity to buy a home[Democrat policy]—were eventually turned on their heads by advocates and politicians, who instead tried to ensure equality of outcomes.[Democrat policy]
Obsessive Housing Disorder by Steven Malanga, City Journal Spring 2009



Timeline shows Dems were warned:
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMnSp4qEXNM]Timeline shows Bush, McCain warning Dems of financial and housing crisis; meltdown - YouTube[/ame]





During the seventies and eighties, CRA enforcement was perfunctory. Regulators asked banks to demonstrate that they were trying to reach their entire "assessment area" by advertising in minority-oriented newspapers or by sending their executives to serve on the boards of local community groups.

The [Democrat] Clinton administration changed this state of affairs dramatically. Ignoring the sweeping transformation of the banking industry since the CRA was passed, the Clinton Treasury Department's 1995 regulations made getting a satisfactory CRA rating much harder. [/B

]The new regulations de-emphasized subjective assessment measures in favor of strictly numerical ones. Bank examiners would use federal home-loan data, broken down by neighborhood, income group, and race, to rate banks on performance. There would be no more A's for effort. Only results—specific loans, specific levels of service—would count. Where and to whom have home loans been made? Have banks invested in all neighborhoods within their assessment area? Do they operate branches in those neighborhoods?
The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock, City Journal Winter 2000

 

[Dad2three]

Let me answer for you, you coward: no.

Bankters created a WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST



Jun 16th 2005


The worldwide rise in house prices is the biggest bubble in history. Prepare for the economic pain when it pops



The global housing boom: In come the waves | The Economist

DUBYA ALLOWED A SUBPRIME BUBBLE TO HAPPEN!!!!

No....bankers must work withing the structure and regulations of the politicians.

That is why the blame for the mortgage meltdown must be laid squarely at the feet of the Democrats/Liberals/Progressives.



For your edification:


It all began with Democrat megalomaniac Franklin Roosevelt, who, when not appointing KKK members to the Supreme Court, decided to invade the private economy with the creation of GREs.


You were unable to deny that he did so....but you were afraid to answer whether the meltdown would have occurred sans the efforts of this Democrat.

It would not have.
Too bad FDR would not give due respect to the Constitution.

Now....Democrat debilitation via contemporary efforts......



Take notes:



a. Congress passed a bill in 1975 requiring banks to provide the government with information on their lending activities in poor urban areas. Two years later, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which gave regulators the power to deny banks the right to expand if they didn’t lend sufficiently in those neighborhoods. In 1979 the FDIC used the CRA to block a move by the Greater NY Savings Bank for not enough lending.


b. In 1986, when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now [Democrat associate] (Acorn)threatened to oppose an acquisition by a southern bank, Louisiana Bancshares, until it agreed to new “flexible credit and underwriting standards” for minority borrowers—for example, counting public assistance and food stamps as income.


c. In 1987, Acorn led a coalition of advocacy groups calling for industry-wide changes in lending standards. Among the demanded reforms were the easing of minimum down-payment requirements and of the requirement that borrowers have enough cash at a closing to cover two to three months of mortgage payments (research had shown that lack of money in hand was a big reason some mortgages failed quickly).


d. ACORN then attacked Fannie Mae, the giant quasi-government agency that bought loans from banks in order to allow them to make new loans. Its underwriters were “strictly by-the-book interpreters” of lending standards and turned down purchases of unconventional loans, charged Acorn. The pressure eventually paid off. In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring Fannie Mae and the similar Freddie Mac to devote 30 percent of their loan purchases to mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers.


e. Clinton Administration housing secretary, Henry Cisneros, declared that he would expand homeownership among lower- and lower-middle-income renters. His strategy: pushing for no-down-payment loans; expanding the size of mortgages that the government would insure against losses; and using the CRA and other lending laws to direct more private money into low-income programs.


f. Shortly after Cisneros announced his plan, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to begin buying loans under new, looser guidelines. Freddie Mac, for instance, started approving low-income buyers with bad credit histories or none at all, so long as they were current on rent and utilities payments. Freddie Mac also said that it would begin counting income from seasonal jobs and public assistance toward its income minimum, despite the FHA disaster of the sixties.


g. Freddie Mac began an “alternative qualifying” program with the Sears Mortgage Corporation that let a borrower qualify for a loan with a monthly payment as high as 50 percent of his income, at a time when most private mortgage companies wouldn’t exceed 33 percent. The program also allowed borrowers with bad credit to get mortgages if they took credit-counseling classes administered by Acorn and other nonprofits. Subsequent research would show that such classes have little impact on default rates.


h. Pressuring nonbank lenders to make more loans to poor minorities [Democrat policy] didn’t stop with Sears. If it didn’t happen, Clinton officials warned, they’d seek to extend CRA regulations to all mortgage makers. In Congress, [Democrat] Representative Maxine Waters called financial firms not covered by the CRA “among the most egregious redliners.”


i. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) shocked the financial world by signing a 1994 agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pledging to increase lending to minorities and join in new efforts to rewrite lending standards. The first MBA member to sign up: [Democrat bagman] Countrywide Financial, the mortgage firm that would be at the core of the subprime meltdown.


j. A 1998 sales pitch by a Bear Stearns managing director advised banks to begin packaging their loans to low-income borrowers into securities that the firm could sell. Forget traditional underwriting standards [Democrat policy] when considering these loans, the director advised. For a low-income borrower, he continued in all-too-familiar terms, owning a home was “a near-sacred obligation. A family will do almost anything to meet that monthly mortgage payment.”
Bunk, says Stan Liebowitz, a professor of economics at the University of Texas: “The claim that lower-income homeowners are somehow different in their devotion to their home is a purely emotional claim with no evidence to support it.”[Democrat policy]


k. Any concern was quickly dismissed. When in early 2000 the FDIC proposed increasing capital requirements for lenders making “subprime” loans [Republican policy] —loans to people with questionable credit, that is—Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney of New York told a congressional hearing that she feared that the step would dry up CRA loans. Her fellow New York Democrat John J. LaFalce urged regulators “not to be premature” in imposing new regulations.[Democrat policy]


l. In July 1999, HUD proposed new levels for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s low-income lending; in September, Fannie Mae agreed to begin purchasing loans made to “borrowers with slightly impaired credit”—that is, with credit standards even lower than the government had been pushing for a generation.[Democrat policy]


m. In 2004 Congress pressed new affordable-housing goals on the two mortgage giants, which through 2007 purchased some $1 trillion in loans to lower- and moderate-income buyers. The buying spree helped spark a massive increase in securitization of mortgages to people with dubious credit.[Democrat policy]


n. In October 1994, Fannie Mae head James Johnson had reminded a banking convention that mortgages with small down payments had a much higher risk of defaulting. (A Duff & Phelps study found that they were nearly three times more likely to default than conventional mortgages.)

Yet the very next month, Fannie Mae said that it expected to back loans to low-income home buyers with a 97 percent loan-to-value ratio[Democrat policy] —that is, loans in which the buyer puts down just 3 percent—as part of a commitment, made earlier that year to Congress, to purchase $1 trillion in affordable-housing mortgages by the end of the nineties. According to Edward Pinto, who served as the company’s chief credit officer, the program was the result of political pressure on Fannie Mae trumping lending standards.
[Democrat policy- 'political pressure']



o. In 1992, the Boston Fed produced an extraordinary 29-page document that codified the new lending wisdom.[Democrat policy]

Conventional mortgage criteria, the report argued, might be “unintentionally biased” because they didn’t take into account “the economic culture of urban, lower-income and nontraditional customers.”[Democrat policy]

Lenders should thus consider junking the industry’s traditional income-to-payments ratio and stop viewing an applicant’s “lack of credit history” as a “negative factor.” [Democrat policy]

Further, if applicants had bad credit, banks should “consider extenuating circumstances”[Democrat policy]

—even though a study by mortgage insurance companies would soon show, not surprisingly, that borrowers with no credit rating or a bad one were far more likely to default. If applicants didn’t have enough savings for a down payment, the Boston Fed urged, banks should allow loans from nonprofits or government assistance agencies to count toward one. A later study of Freddie Mac mortgages would find that a borrower who made a down payment with third-party funds was four times more likely to default, a reminder that traditional underwriting standards weren’t arbitrary but based on historical lending patterns. [Republican wisdom]


p. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus launched Hogar in 2003, an initiative that pushed for easing lending standards [Democrat policy]for immigrants, including touting so-called seller-financed mortgages in which a builder provided down-payment aid to buyers via contributions to nonprofit groups. As a result, mortgage lending to Hispanics soared. And today, in districts where Hispanics make up at least 25 percent of the population, foreclosure rates are now nearly 50 percent higher than the national average, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.


q. Republicans and Democrats, meanwhile, have scrambled to reignite the housing market through ill-conceived tax credits and renewed federal subsidies for mortgages, including the Obama administration’s mortgage bailout plan, which recalls the New Deal’s HOLC. [Democrat policy]

Behind these efforts is a fundamental misconception among politicians [Democrat policy]that housing drives the American economy and therefore demands subsidy at virtually any cost. Our praiseworthy initial efforts—to eliminate housing discrimination and provide all Americans an equal opportunity to buy a home[Democrat policy]—were eventually turned on their heads by advocates and politicians, who instead tried to ensure equality of outcomes.[Democrat policy]
Obsessive Housing Disorder by Steven Malanga, City Journal Spring 2009



Timeline shows Dems were warned:
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMnSp4qEXNM]Timeline shows Bush, McCain warning Dems of financial and housing crisis; meltdown - YouTube[/ame]





During the seventies and eighties, CRA enforcement was perfunctory. Regulators asked banks to demonstrate that they were trying to reach their entire "assessment area" by advertising in minority-oriented newspapers or by sending their executives to serve on the boards of local community groups.

The [Democrat] Clinton administration changed this state of affairs dramatically. Ignoring the sweeping transformation of the banking industry since the CRA was passed, the Clinton Treasury Department's 1995 regulations made getting a satisfactory CRA rating much harder. [/B

]The new regulations de-emphasized subjective assessment measures in favor of strictly numerical ones. Bank examiners would use federal home-loan data, broken down by neighborhood, income group, and race, to rate banks on performance. There would be no more A's for effort. Only results—specific loans, specific levels of service—would count. Where and to whom have home loans been made? Have banks invested in all neighborhoods within their assessment area? Do they operate branches in those neighborhoods?
The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock, City Journal Winter 2000

Bush’s President’s Working Group on Financial Markets October 2008

“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”

KEEP UP THE BULLSHIT

http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

 

[PoliticalChic]

Bankters created a WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST



Jun 16th 2005


The worldwide rise in house prices is the biggest bubble in history. Prepare for the economic pain when it pops



The global housing boom: In come the waves | The Economist

DUBYA ALLOWED A SUBPRIME BUBBLE TO HAPPEN!!!!

No....bankers must work withing the structure and regulations of the politicians.

That is why the blame for the mortgage meltdown must be laid squarely at the feet of the Democrats/Liberals/Progressives.



For your edification:


It all began with Democrat megalomaniac Franklin Roosevelt, who, when not appointing KKK members to the Supreme Court, decided to invade the private economy with the creation of GREs.


You were unable to deny that he did so....but you were afraid to answer whether the meltdown would have occurred sans the efforts of this Democrat.

It would not have.
Too bad FDR would not give due respect to the Constitution.

Now....Democrat debilitation via contemporary efforts......



Take notes:



a. Congress passed a bill in 1975 requiring banks to provide the government with information on their lending activities in poor urban areas. Two years later, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which gave regulators the power to deny banks the right to expand if they didn’t lend sufficiently in those neighborhoods. In 1979 the FDIC used the CRA to block a move by the Greater NY Savings Bank for not enough lending.


b. In 1986, when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now [Democrat associate] (Acorn)threatened to oppose an acquisition by a southern bank, Louisiana Bancshares, until it agreed to new “flexible credit and underwriting standards” for minority borrowers—for example, counting public assistance and food stamps as income.


c. In 1987, Acorn led a coalition of advocacy groups calling for industry-wide changes in lending standards. Among the demanded reforms were the easing of minimum down-payment requirements and of the requirement that borrowers have enough cash at a closing to cover two to three months of mortgage payments (research had shown that lack of money in hand was a big reason some mortgages failed quickly).


d. ACORN then attacked Fannie Mae, the giant quasi-government agency that bought loans from banks in order to allow them to make new loans. Its underwriters were “strictly by-the-book interpreters” of lending standards and turned down purchases of unconventional loans, charged Acorn. The pressure eventually paid off. In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring Fannie Mae and the similar Freddie Mac to devote 30 percent of their loan purchases to mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers.


e. Clinton Administration housing secretary, Henry Cisneros, declared that he would expand homeownership among lower- and lower-middle-income renters. His strategy: pushing for no-down-payment loans; expanding the size of mortgages that the government would insure against losses; and using the CRA and other lending laws to direct more private money into low-income programs.


f. Shortly after Cisneros announced his plan, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to begin buying loans under new, looser guidelines. Freddie Mac, for instance, started approving low-income buyers with bad credit histories or none at all, so long as they were current on rent and utilities payments. Freddie Mac also said that it would begin counting income from seasonal jobs and public assistance toward its income minimum, despite the FHA disaster of the sixties.


g. Freddie Mac began an “alternative qualifying” program with the Sears Mortgage Corporation that let a borrower qualify for a loan with a monthly payment as high as 50 percent of his income, at a time when most private mortgage companies wouldn’t exceed 33 percent. The program also allowed borrowers with bad credit to get mortgages if they took credit-counseling classes administered by Acorn and other nonprofits. Subsequent research would show that such classes have little impact on default rates.


h. Pressuring nonbank lenders to make more loans to poor minorities [Democrat policy] didn’t stop with Sears. If it didn’t happen, Clinton officials warned, they’d seek to extend CRA regulations to all mortgage makers. In Congress, [Democrat] Representative Maxine Waters called financial firms not covered by the CRA “among the most egregious redliners.”


i. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) shocked the financial world by signing a 1994 agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pledging to increase lending to minorities and join in new efforts to rewrite lending standards. The first MBA member to sign up: [Democrat bagman] Countrywide Financial, the mortgage firm that would be at the core of the subprime meltdown.


j. A 1998 sales pitch by a Bear Stearns managing director advised banks to begin packaging their loans to low-income borrowers into securities that the firm could sell. Forget traditional underwriting standards [Democrat policy] when considering these loans, the director advised. For a low-income borrower, he continued in all-too-familiar terms, owning a home was “a near-sacred obligation. A family will do almost anything to meet that monthly mortgage payment.”
Bunk, says Stan Liebowitz, a professor of economics at the University of Texas: “The claim that lower-income homeowners are somehow different in their devotion to their home is a purely emotional claim with no evidence to support it.”[Democrat policy]


k. Any concern was quickly dismissed. When in early 2000 the FDIC proposed increasing capital requirements for lenders making “subprime” loans [Republican policy] —loans to people with questionable credit, that is—Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney of New York told a congressional hearing that she feared that the step would dry up CRA loans. Her fellow New York Democrat John J. LaFalce urged regulators “not to be premature” in imposing new regulations.[Democrat policy]


l. In July 1999, HUD proposed new levels for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s low-income lending; in September, Fannie Mae agreed to begin purchasing loans made to “borrowers with slightly impaired credit”—that is, with credit standards even lower than the government had been pushing for a generation.[Democrat policy]


m. In 2004 Congress pressed new affordable-housing goals on the two mortgage giants, which through 2007 purchased some $1 trillion in loans to lower- and moderate-income buyers. The buying spree helped spark a massive increase in securitization of mortgages to people with dubious credit.[Democrat policy]


n. In October 1994, Fannie Mae head James Johnson had reminded a banking convention that mortgages with small down payments had a much higher risk of defaulting. (A Duff & Phelps study found that they were nearly three times more likely to default than conventional mortgages.)

Yet the very next month, Fannie Mae said that it expected to back loans to low-income home buyers with a 97 percent loan-to-value ratio[Democrat policy] —that is, loans in which the buyer puts down just 3 percent—as part of a commitment, made earlier that year to Congress, to purchase $1 trillion in affordable-housing mortgages by the end of the nineties. According to Edward Pinto, who served as the company’s chief credit officer, the program was the result of political pressure on Fannie Mae trumping lending standards.
[Democrat policy- 'political pressure']



o. In 1992, the Boston Fed produced an extraordinary 29-page document that codified the new lending wisdom.[Democrat policy]

Conventional mortgage criteria, the report argued, might be “unintentionally biased” because they didn’t take into account “the economic culture of urban, lower-income and nontraditional customers.”[Democrat policy]

Lenders should thus consider junking the industry’s traditional income-to-payments ratio and stop viewing an applicant’s “lack of credit history” as a “negative factor.” [Democrat policy]

Further, if applicants had bad credit, banks should “consider extenuating circumstances”[Democrat policy]

—even though a study by mortgage insurance companies would soon show, not surprisingly, that borrowers with no credit rating or a bad one were far more likely to default. If applicants didn’t have enough savings for a down payment, the Boston Fed urged, banks should allow loans from nonprofits or government assistance agencies to count toward one. A later study of Freddie Mac mortgages would find that a borrower who made a down payment with third-party funds was four times more likely to default, a reminder that traditional underwriting standards weren’t arbitrary but based on historical lending patterns. [Republican wisdom]


p. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus launched Hogar in 2003, an initiative that pushed for easing lending standards [Democrat policy]for immigrants, including touting so-called seller-financed mortgages in which a builder provided down-payment aid to buyers via contributions to nonprofit groups. As a result, mortgage lending to Hispanics soared. And today, in districts where Hispanics make up at least 25 percent of the population, foreclosure rates are now nearly 50 percent higher than the national average, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.


q. Republicans and Democrats, meanwhile, have scrambled to reignite the housing market through ill-conceived tax credits and renewed federal subsidies for mortgages, including the Obama administration’s mortgage bailout plan, which recalls the New Deal’s HOLC. [Democrat policy]

Behind these efforts is a fundamental misconception among politicians [Democrat policy]that housing drives the American economy and therefore demands subsidy at virtually any cost. Our praiseworthy initial efforts—to eliminate housing discrimination and provide all Americans an equal opportunity to buy a home[Democrat policy]—were eventually turned on their heads by advocates and politicians, who instead tried to ensure equality of outcomes.[Democrat policy]
Obsessive Housing Disorder by Steven Malanga, City Journal Spring 2009



Timeline shows Dems were warned:
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMnSp4qEXNM]Timeline shows Bush, McCain warning Dems of financial and housing crisis; meltdown - YouTube[/ame]





During the seventies and eighties, CRA enforcement was perfunctory. Regulators asked banks to demonstrate that they were trying to reach their entire "assessment area" by advertising in minority-oriented newspapers or by sending their executives to serve on the boards of local community groups.

The [Democrat] Clinton administration changed this state of affairs dramatically. Ignoring the sweeping transformation of the banking industry since the CRA was passed, the Clinton Treasury Department's 1995 regulations made getting a satisfactory CRA rating much harder. [/B

]The new regulations de-emphasized subjective assessment measures in favor of strictly numerical ones. Bank examiners would use federal home-loan data, broken down by neighborhood, income group, and race, to rate banks on performance. There would be no more A's for effort. Only results—specific loans, specific levels of service—would count. Where and to whom have home loans been made? Have banks invested in all neighborhoods within their assessment area? Do they operate branches in those neighborhoods?
The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock, City Journal Winter 2000

Bush’s President’s Working Group on Financial Markets October 2008

“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”

KEEP UP THE BULLSHIT

http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

So you couldn't point out one error???

Good.

Now back under your rock.

 

[Dad2three]

Let me answer for you, you coward: no.

Bankters created a WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST



Jun 16th 2005


The worldwide rise in house prices is the biggest bubble in history. Prepare for the economic pain when it pops



The global housing boom: In come the waves | The Economist

DUBYA ALLOWED A SUBPRIME BUBBLE TO HAPPEN!!!!

No....bankers must work withing the structure and regulations of the politicians.

That is why the blame for the mortgage meltdown must be laid squarely at the feet of the Democrats/Liberals/Progressives.



For your edification:


It all began with Democrat megalomaniac Franklin Roosevelt, who, when not appointing KKK members to the Supreme Court, decided to invade the private economy with the creation of GREs.


You were unable to deny that he did so....but you were afraid to answer whether the meltdown would have occurred sans the efforts of this Democrat.

It would not have.
Too bad FDR would not give due respect to the Constitution.

Now....Democrat debilitation via contemporary efforts......



Take notes:



a. Congress passed a bill in 1975 requiring banks to provide the government with information on their lending activities in poor urban areas. Two years later, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which gave regulators the power to deny banks the right to expand if they didn’t lend sufficiently in those neighborhoods. In 1979 the FDIC used the CRA to block a move by the Greater NY Savings Bank for not enough lending.


b. In 1986, when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now [Democrat associate] (Acorn)threatened to oppose an acquisition by a southern bank, Louisiana Bancshares, until it agreed to new “flexible credit and underwriting standards” for minority borrowers—for example, counting public assistance and food stamps as income.


c. In 1987, Acorn led a coalition of advocacy groups calling for industry-wide changes in lending standards. Among the demanded reforms were the easing of minimum down-payment requirements and of the requirement that borrowers have enough cash at a closing to cover two to three months of mortgage payments (research had shown that lack of money in hand was a big reason some mortgages failed quickly).


d. ACORN then attacked Fannie Mae, the giant quasi-government agency that bought loans from banks in order to allow them to make new loans. Its underwriters were “strictly by-the-book interpreters” of lending standards and turned down purchases of unconventional loans, charged Acorn. The pressure eventually paid off. In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring Fannie Mae and the similar Freddie Mac to devote 30 percent of their loan purchases to mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers.


e. Clinton Administration housing secretary, Henry Cisneros, declared that he would expand homeownership among lower- and lower-middle-income renters. His strategy: pushing for no-down-payment loans; expanding the size of mortgages that the government would insure against losses; and using the CRA and other lending laws to direct more private money into low-income programs.


f. Shortly after Cisneros announced his plan, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to begin buying loans under new, looser guidelines. Freddie Mac, for instance, started approving low-income buyers with bad credit histories or none at all, so long as they were current on rent and utilities payments. Freddie Mac also said that it would begin counting income from seasonal jobs and public assistance toward its income minimum, despite the FHA disaster of the sixties.


g. Freddie Mac began an “alternative qualifying” program with the Sears Mortgage Corporation that let a borrower qualify for a loan with a monthly payment as high as 50 percent of his income, at a time when most private mortgage companies wouldn’t exceed 33 percent. The program also allowed borrowers with bad credit to get mortgages if they took credit-counseling classes administered by Acorn and other nonprofits. Subsequent research would show that such classes have little impact on default rates.


h. Pressuring nonbank lenders to make more loans to poor minorities [Democrat policy] didn’t stop with Sears. If it didn’t happen, Clinton officials warned, they’d seek to extend CRA regulations to all mortgage makers. In Congress, [Democrat] Representative Maxine Waters called financial firms not covered by the CRA “among the most egregious redliners.”


i. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) shocked the financial world by signing a 1994 agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pledging to increase lending to minorities and join in new efforts to rewrite lending standards. The first MBA member to sign up: [Democrat bagman] Countrywide Financial, the mortgage firm that would be at the core of the subprime meltdown.


j. A 1998 sales pitch by a Bear Stearns managing director advised banks to begin packaging their loans to low-income borrowers into securities that the firm could sell. Forget traditional underwriting standards [Democrat policy] when considering these loans, the director advised. For a low-income borrower, he continued in all-too-familiar terms, owning a home was “a near-sacred obligation. A family will do almost anything to meet that monthly mortgage payment.”
Bunk, says Stan Liebowitz, a professor of economics at the University of Texas: “The claim that lower-income homeowners are somehow different in their devotion to their home is a purely emotional claim with no evidence to support it.”[Democrat policy]


k. Any concern was quickly dismissed. When in early 2000 the FDIC proposed increasing capital requirements for lenders making “subprime” loans [Republican policy] —loans to people with questionable credit, that is—Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney of New York told a congressional hearing that she feared that the step would dry up CRA loans. Her fellow New York Democrat John J. LaFalce urged regulators “not to be premature” in imposing new regulations.[Democrat policy]


l. In July 1999, HUD proposed new levels for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s low-income lending; in September, Fannie Mae agreed to begin purchasing loans made to “borrowers with slightly impaired credit”—that is, with credit standards even lower than the government had been pushing for a generation.[Democrat policy]


m. In 2004 Congress pressed new affordable-housing goals on the two mortgage giants, which through 2007 purchased some $1 trillion in loans to lower- and moderate-income buyers. The buying spree helped spark a massive increase in securitization of mortgages to people with dubious credit.[Democrat policy]


n. In October 1994, Fannie Mae head James Johnson had reminded a banking convention that mortgages with small down payments had a much higher risk of defaulting. (A Duff & Phelps study found that they were nearly three times more likely to default than conventional mortgages.)

Yet the very next month, Fannie Mae said that it expected to back loans to low-income home buyers with a 97 percent loan-to-value ratio[Democrat policy] —that is, loans in which the buyer puts down just 3 percent—as part of a commitment, made earlier that year to Congress, to purchase $1 trillion in affordable-housing mortgages by the end of the nineties. According to Edward Pinto, who served as the company’s chief credit officer, the program was the result of political pressure on Fannie Mae trumping lending standards.
[Democrat policy- 'political pressure']



o. In 1992, the Boston Fed produced an extraordinary 29-page document that codified the new lending wisdom.[Democrat policy]

Conventional mortgage criteria, the report argued, might be “unintentionally biased” because they didn’t take into account “the economic culture of urban, lower-income and nontraditional customers.”[Democrat policy]

Lenders should thus consider junking the industry’s traditional income-to-payments ratio and stop viewing an applicant’s “lack of credit history” as a “negative factor.” [Democrat policy]

Further, if applicants had bad credit, banks should “consider extenuating circumstances”[Democrat policy]

—even though a study by mortgage insurance companies would soon show, not surprisingly, that borrowers with no credit rating or a bad one were far more likely to default. If applicants didn’t have enough savings for a down payment, the Boston Fed urged, banks should allow loans from nonprofits or government assistance agencies to count toward one. A later study of Freddie Mac mortgages would find that a borrower who made a down payment with third-party funds was four times more likely to default, a reminder that traditional underwriting standards weren’t arbitrary but based on historical lending patterns. [Republican wisdom]


p. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus launched Hogar in 2003, an initiative that pushed for easing lending standards [Democrat policy]for immigrants, including touting so-called seller-financed mortgages in which a builder provided down-payment aid to buyers via contributions to nonprofit groups. As a result, mortgage lending to Hispanics soared. And today, in districts where Hispanics make up at least 25 percent of the population, foreclosure rates are now nearly 50 percent higher than the national average, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.


q. Republicans and Democrats, meanwhile, have scrambled to reignite the housing market through ill-conceived tax credits and renewed federal subsidies for mortgages, including the Obama administration’s mortgage bailout plan, which recalls the New Deal’s HOLC. [Democrat policy]

Behind these efforts is a fundamental misconception among politicians [Democrat policy]that housing drives the American economy and therefore demands subsidy at virtually any cost. Our praiseworthy initial efforts—to eliminate housing discrimination and provide all Americans an equal opportunity to buy a home[Democrat policy]—were eventually turned on their heads by advocates and politicians, who instead tried to ensure equality of outcomes.[Democrat policy]
Obsessive Housing Disorder by Steven Malanga, City Journal Spring 2009



Timeline shows Dems were warned:
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMnSp4qEXNM]Timeline shows Bush, McCain warning Dems of financial and housing crisis; meltdown - YouTube[/ame]





During the seventies and eighties, CRA enforcement was perfunctory. Regulators asked banks to demonstrate that they were trying to reach their entire "assessment area" by advertising in minority-oriented newspapers or by sending their executives to serve on the boards of local community groups.

The [Democrat] Clinton administration changed this state of affairs dramatically. Ignoring the sweeping transformation of the banking industry since the CRA was passed, the Clinton Treasury Department's 1995 regulations made getting a satisfactory CRA rating much harder. [/B

]The new regulations de-emphasized subjective assessment measures in favor of strictly numerical ones. Bank examiners would use federal home-loan data, broken down by neighborhood, income group, and race, to rate banks on performance. There would be no more A's for effort. Only results—specific loans, specific levels of service—would count. Where and to whom have home loans been made? Have banks invested in all neighborhoods within their assessment area? Do they operate branches in those neighborhoods?
The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock, City Journal Winter 2000

June 17, 2004

Fannie, Freddie to Suffer Under New Rule, Frank Says

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would suffer financially under a Bush administration requirement that they channel more mortgage financing to people with low incomes, said the senior Democrat on a congressional panel that sets regulations for the companies.


So if your narrative is "GSEs are to blame" then you have to blame bush



http://democrats.financialservices....s/112/06-17-04-new-Fannie-goals-Bloomberg.pdf


Lower lending standards started in late 2004 which caused the Bush Mortgage Bubble. Putting in people in homes they couldn't afford


"(In 2000, CLINTON ) HUD restricted Freddie and Fannie, saying it would not credit them for loans they purchased that had abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay."

How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed The Crisis

"In 2004 (BUSH), the 2000 rules were dropped and high‐risk loans were again counted toward affordable housing goals."


http://www.prmia.org/sites/default/files/references/Fannie_Mae_and_Freddie_Mac_090911_v2.pdf


June 17, 2004


Home builders, realtors and others are preparing to fight a Bush administration plan that would require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase financing of homes for low-income people, a home builder group said Thursday

Home builders fight Bush's low-income housing - Jun. 17, 2004


Bush’s President’s Working Group on Financial Markets October 2008

“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”





Right-wingers Want To Erase How George Bush's "Homeowner Society" Helped Cause The Economic Collapse

http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

 

[Dad2three]

No....bankers must work withing the structure and regulations of the politicians.

That is why the blame for the mortgage meltdown must be laid squarely at the feet of the Democrats/Liberals/Progressives.



For your edification:


It all began with Democrat megalomaniac Franklin Roosevelt, who, when not appointing KKK members to the Supreme Court, decided to invade the private economy with the creation of GREs.


You were unable to deny that he did so....but you were afraid to answer whether the meltdown would have occurred sans the efforts of this Democrat.

It would not have.
Too bad FDR would not give due respect to the Constitution.

Now....Democrat debilitation via contemporary efforts......



Take notes:



a. Congress passed a bill in 1975 requiring banks to provide the government with information on their lending activities in poor urban areas. Two years later, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which gave regulators the power to deny banks the right to expand if they didn’t lend sufficiently in those neighborhoods. In 1979 the FDIC used the CRA to block a move by the Greater NY Savings Bank for not enough lending.


b. In 1986, when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now [Democrat associate] (Acorn)threatened to oppose an acquisition by a southern bank, Louisiana Bancshares, until it agreed to new “flexible credit and underwriting standards” for minority borrowers—for example, counting public assistance and food stamps as income.


c. In 1987, Acorn led a coalition of advocacy groups calling for industry-wide changes in lending standards. Among the demanded reforms were the easing of minimum down-payment requirements and of the requirement that borrowers have enough cash at a closing to cover two to three months of mortgage payments (research had shown that lack of money in hand was a big reason some mortgages failed quickly).


d. ACORN then attacked Fannie Mae, the giant quasi-government agency that bought loans from banks in order to allow them to make new loans. Its underwriters were “strictly by-the-book interpreters” of lending standards and turned down purchases of unconventional loans, charged Acorn. The pressure eventually paid off. In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring Fannie Mae and the similar Freddie Mac to devote 30 percent of their loan purchases to mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers.


e. Clinton Administration housing secretary, Henry Cisneros, declared that he would expand homeownership among lower- and lower-middle-income renters. His strategy: pushing for no-down-payment loans; expanding the size of mortgages that the government would insure against losses; and using the CRA and other lending laws to direct more private money into low-income programs.


f. Shortly after Cisneros announced his plan, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to begin buying loans under new, looser guidelines. Freddie Mac, for instance, started approving low-income buyers with bad credit histories or none at all, so long as they were current on rent and utilities payments. Freddie Mac also said that it would begin counting income from seasonal jobs and public assistance toward its income minimum, despite the FHA disaster of the sixties.


g. Freddie Mac began an “alternative qualifying” program with the Sears Mortgage Corporation that let a borrower qualify for a loan with a monthly payment as high as 50 percent of his income, at a time when most private mortgage companies wouldn’t exceed 33 percent. The program also allowed borrowers with bad credit to get mortgages if they took credit-counseling classes administered by Acorn and other nonprofits. Subsequent research would show that such classes have little impact on default rates.


h. Pressuring nonbank lenders to make more loans to poor minorities [Democrat policy] didn’t stop with Sears. If it didn’t happen, Clinton officials warned, they’d seek to extend CRA regulations to all mortgage makers. In Congress, [Democrat] Representative Maxine Waters called financial firms not covered by the CRA “among the most egregious redliners.”


i. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) shocked the financial world by signing a 1994 agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pledging to increase lending to minorities and join in new efforts to rewrite lending standards. The first MBA member to sign up: [Democrat bagman] Countrywide Financial, the mortgage firm that would be at the core of the subprime meltdown.


j. A 1998 sales pitch by a Bear Stearns managing director advised banks to begin packaging their loans to low-income borrowers into securities that the firm could sell. Forget traditional underwriting standards [Democrat policy] when considering these loans, the director advised. For a low-income borrower, he continued in all-too-familiar terms, owning a home was “a near-sacred obligation. A family will do almost anything to meet that monthly mortgage payment.”
Bunk, says Stan Liebowitz, a professor of economics at the University of Texas: “The claim that lower-income homeowners are somehow different in their devotion to their home is a purely emotional claim with no evidence to support it.”[Democrat policy]


k. Any concern was quickly dismissed. When in early 2000 the FDIC proposed increasing capital requirements for lenders making “subprime” loans [Republican policy] —loans to people with questionable credit, that is—Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney of New York told a congressional hearing that she feared that the step would dry up CRA loans. Her fellow New York Democrat John J. LaFalce urged regulators “not to be premature” in imposing new regulations.[Democrat policy]


l. In July 1999, HUD proposed new levels for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s low-income lending; in September, Fannie Mae agreed to begin purchasing loans made to “borrowers with slightly impaired credit”—that is, with credit standards even lower than the government had been pushing for a generation.[Democrat policy]


m. In 2004 Congress pressed new affordable-housing goals on the two mortgage giants, which through 2007 purchased some $1 trillion in loans to lower- and moderate-income buyers. The buying spree helped spark a massive increase in securitization of mortgages to people with dubious credit.[Democrat policy]


n. In October 1994, Fannie Mae head James Johnson had reminded a banking convention that mortgages with small down payments had a much higher risk of defaulting. (A Duff & Phelps study found that they were nearly three times more likely to default than conventional mortgages.)

Yet the very next month, Fannie Mae said that it expected to back loans to low-income home buyers with a 97 percent loan-to-value ratio[Democrat policy] —that is, loans in which the buyer puts down just 3 percent—as part of a commitment, made earlier that year to Congress, to purchase $1 trillion in affordable-housing mortgages by the end of the nineties. According to Edward Pinto, who served as the company’s chief credit officer, the program was the result of political pressure on Fannie Mae trumping lending standards.
[Democrat policy- 'political pressure']



o. In 1992, the Boston Fed produced an extraordinary 29-page document that codified the new lending wisdom.[Democrat policy]

Conventional mortgage criteria, the report argued, might be “unintentionally biased” because they didn’t take into account “the economic culture of urban, lower-income and nontraditional customers.”[Democrat policy]

Lenders should thus consider junking the industry’s traditional income-to-payments ratio and stop viewing an applicant’s “lack of credit history” as a “negative factor.” [Democrat policy]

Further, if applicants had bad credit, banks should “consider extenuating circumstances”[Democrat policy]

—even though a study by mortgage insurance companies would soon show, not surprisingly, that borrowers with no credit rating or a bad one were far more likely to default. If applicants didn’t have enough savings for a down payment, the Boston Fed urged, banks should allow loans from nonprofits or government assistance agencies to count toward one. A later study of Freddie Mac mortgages would find that a borrower who made a down payment with third-party funds was four times more likely to default, a reminder that traditional underwriting standards weren’t arbitrary but based on historical lending patterns. [Republican wisdom]


p. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus launched Hogar in 2003, an initiative that pushed for easing lending standards [Democrat policy]for immigrants, including touting so-called seller-financed mortgages in which a builder provided down-payment aid to buyers via contributions to nonprofit groups. As a result, mortgage lending to Hispanics soared. And today, in districts where Hispanics make up at least 25 percent of the population, foreclosure rates are now nearly 50 percent higher than the national average, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.


q. Republicans and Democrats, meanwhile, have scrambled to reignite the housing market through ill-conceived tax credits and renewed federal subsidies for mortgages, including the Obama administration’s mortgage bailout plan, which recalls the New Deal’s HOLC. [Democrat policy]

Behind these efforts is a fundamental misconception among politicians [Democrat policy]that housing drives the American economy and therefore demands subsidy at virtually any cost. Our praiseworthy initial efforts—to eliminate housing discrimination and provide all Americans an equal opportunity to buy a home[Democrat policy]—were eventually turned on their heads by advocates and politicians, who instead tried to ensure equality of outcomes.[Democrat policy]
Obsessive Housing Disorder by Steven Malanga, City Journal Spring 2009



Timeline shows Dems were warned:
Timeline shows Bush, McCain warning Dems of financial and housing crisis; meltdown - YouTube





During the seventies and eighties, CRA enforcement was perfunctory. Regulators asked banks to demonstrate that they were trying to reach their entire "assessment area" by advertising in minority-oriented newspapers or by sending their executives to serve on the boards of local community groups.

The [Democrat] Clinton administration changed this state of affairs dramatically. Ignoring the sweeping transformation of the banking industry since the CRA was passed, the Clinton Treasury Department's 1995 regulations made getting a satisfactory CRA rating much harder. [/B

]The new regulations de-emphasized subjective assessment measures in favor of strictly numerical ones. Bank examiners would use federal home-loan data, broken down by neighborhood, income group, and race, to rate banks on performance. There would be no more A's for effort. Only results—specific loans, specific levels of service—would count. Where and to whom have home loans been made? Have banks invested in all neighborhoods within their assessment area? Do they operate branches in those neighborhoods?
The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock, City Journal Winter 2000

Bush’s President’s Working Group on Financial Markets October 2008

“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”

KEEP UP THE BULLSHIT

http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

So you couldn't point out one error???

Good.

Now back under your rock.

ONE ERROR? TIMELINE WAS BAD ON THE BANKSTERS CREATED WORLD WIDE BUBBLE TO BEGIN WITH, AND DUBYA'S REGULATOR FAILURE TO STOP IT

An official government report was produced in April 2011 by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) and Ranking Member Tom Coburn (R-OK), titled Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse. The “Levin-Coburn Report,” a 639-page document, including 2,849 footnotes unanimously and unambiguously concluded that “the [2008] crisis was not a natural disaster, but the result of high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street.”


Myth 3

The financial crisis was brought about because the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 forced banks to lend to people with low incomes who could not afford to pay back their mortgages: The FCIC Majority and Primary Dissent roundly reject this myth, leaving the Solo Dissent as the lone proponent (1 OF 4 GOPers) of this shaky story.


"Since 1995 there has been essentially no change in the basic CRA rules or enforcement process that can be reasonably linked to the subprime lending activity. This fact weakens the link between the CRA and the current crisis since the crisis is rooted in poor performance of mortgage loans made between 2004 and 2007. "


http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081203_analysis.pdf



Bush’s President’s Working Group on Financial Markets October 2008

“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”

CRA? lol

 

[Dad2three]

No....bankers must work withing the structure and regulations of the politicians.

That is why the blame for the mortgage meltdown must be laid squarely at the feet of the Democrats/Liberals/Progressives.



For your edification:


It all began with Democrat megalomaniac Franklin Roosevelt, who, when not appointing KKK members to the Supreme Court, decided to invade the private economy with the creation of GREs.


You were unable to deny that he did so....but you were afraid to answer whether the meltdown would have occurred sans the efforts of this Democrat.

It would not have.
Too bad FDR would not give due respect to the Constitution.

Now....Democrat debilitation via contemporary efforts......



Take notes:



a. Congress passed a bill in 1975 requiring banks to provide the government with information on their lending activities in poor urban areas. Two years later, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which gave regulators the power to deny banks the right to expand if they didn’t lend sufficiently in those neighborhoods. In 1979 the FDIC used the CRA to block a move by the Greater NY Savings Bank for not enough lending.


b. In 1986, when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now [Democrat associate] (Acorn)threatened to oppose an acquisition by a southern bank, Louisiana Bancshares, until it agreed to new “flexible credit and underwriting standards” for minority borrowers—for example, counting public assistance and food stamps as income.


c. In 1987, Acorn led a coalition of advocacy groups calling for industry-wide changes in lending standards. Among the demanded reforms were the easing of minimum down-payment requirements and of the requirement that borrowers have enough cash at a closing to cover two to three months of mortgage payments (research had shown that lack of money in hand was a big reason some mortgages failed quickly).


d. ACORN then attacked Fannie Mae, the giant quasi-government agency that bought loans from banks in order to allow them to make new loans. Its underwriters were “strictly by-the-book interpreters” of lending standards and turned down purchases of unconventional loans, charged Acorn. The pressure eventually paid off. In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring Fannie Mae and the similar Freddie Mac to devote 30 percent of their loan purchases to mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers.


e. Clinton Administration housing secretary, Henry Cisneros, declared that he would expand homeownership among lower- and lower-middle-income renters. His strategy: pushing for no-down-payment loans; expanding the size of mortgages that the government would insure against losses; and using the CRA and other lending laws to direct more private money into low-income programs.


f. Shortly after Cisneros announced his plan, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to begin buying loans under new, looser guidelines. Freddie Mac, for instance, started approving low-income buyers with bad credit histories or none at all, so long as they were current on rent and utilities payments. Freddie Mac also said that it would begin counting income from seasonal jobs and public assistance toward its income minimum, despite the FHA disaster of the sixties.


g. Freddie Mac began an “alternative qualifying” program with the Sears Mortgage Corporation that let a borrower qualify for a loan with a monthly payment as high as 50 percent of his income, at a time when most private mortgage companies wouldn’t exceed 33 percent. The program also allowed borrowers with bad credit to get mortgages if they took credit-counseling classes administered by Acorn and other nonprofits. Subsequent research would show that such classes have little impact on default rates.


h. Pressuring nonbank lenders to make more loans to poor minorities [Democrat policy] didn’t stop with Sears. If it didn’t happen, Clinton officials warned, they’d seek to extend CRA regulations to all mortgage makers. In Congress, [Democrat] Representative Maxine Waters called financial firms not covered by the CRA “among the most egregious redliners.”


i. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) shocked the financial world by signing a 1994 agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pledging to increase lending to minorities and join in new efforts to rewrite lending standards. The first MBA member to sign up: [Democrat bagman] Countrywide Financial, the mortgage firm that would be at the core of the subprime meltdown.


j. A 1998 sales pitch by a Bear Stearns managing director advised banks to begin packaging their loans to low-income borrowers into securities that the firm could sell. Forget traditional underwriting standards [Democrat policy] when considering these loans, the director advised. For a low-income borrower, he continued in all-too-familiar terms, owning a home was “a near-sacred obligation. A family will do almost anything to meet that monthly mortgage payment.”
Bunk, says Stan Liebowitz, a professor of economics at the University of Texas: “The claim that lower-income homeowners are somehow different in their devotion to their home is a purely emotional claim with no evidence to support it.”[Democrat policy]


k. Any concern was quickly dismissed. When in early 2000 the FDIC proposed increasing capital requirements for lenders making “subprime” loans [Republican policy] —loans to people with questionable credit, that is—Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney of New York told a congressional hearing that she feared that the step would dry up CRA loans. Her fellow New York Democrat John J. LaFalce urged regulators “not to be premature” in imposing new regulations.[Democrat policy]


l. In July 1999, HUD proposed new levels for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s low-income lending; in September, Fannie Mae agreed to begin purchasing loans made to “borrowers with slightly impaired credit”—that is, with credit standards even lower than the government had been pushing for a generation.[Democrat policy]


m. In 2004 Congress pressed new affordable-housing goals on the two mortgage giants, which through 2007 purchased some $1 trillion in loans to lower- and moderate-income buyers. The buying spree helped spark a massive increase in securitization of mortgages to people with dubious credit.[Democrat policy]


n. In October 1994, Fannie Mae head James Johnson had reminded a banking convention that mortgages with small down payments had a much higher risk of defaulting. (A Duff & Phelps study found that they were nearly three times more likely to default than conventional mortgages.)

Yet the very next month, Fannie Mae said that it expected to back loans to low-income home buyers with a 97 percent loan-to-value ratio[Democrat policy] —that is, loans in which the buyer puts down just 3 percent—as part of a commitment, made earlier that year to Congress, to purchase $1 trillion in affordable-housing mortgages by the end of the nineties. According to Edward Pinto, who served as the company’s chief credit officer, the program was the result of political pressure on Fannie Mae trumping lending standards.
[Democrat policy- 'political pressure']



o. In 1992, the Boston Fed produced an extraordinary 29-page document that codified the new lending wisdom.[Democrat policy]

Conventional mortgage criteria, the report argued, might be “unintentionally biased” because they didn’t take into account “the economic culture of urban, lower-income and nontraditional customers.”[Democrat policy]

Lenders should thus consider junking the industry’s traditional income-to-payments ratio and stop viewing an applicant’s “lack of credit history” as a “negative factor.” [Democrat policy]

Further, if applicants had bad credit, banks should “consider extenuating circumstances”[Democrat policy]

—even though a study by mortgage insurance companies would soon show, not surprisingly, that borrowers with no credit rating or a bad one were far more likely to default. If applicants didn’t have enough savings for a down payment, the Boston Fed urged, banks should allow loans from nonprofits or government assistance agencies to count toward one. A later study of Freddie Mac mortgages would find that a borrower who made a down payment with third-party funds was four times more likely to default, a reminder that traditional underwriting standards weren’t arbitrary but based on historical lending patterns. [Republican wisdom]


p. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus launched Hogar in 2003, an initiative that pushed for easing lending standards [Democrat policy]for immigrants, including touting so-called seller-financed mortgages in which a builder provided down-payment aid to buyers via contributions to nonprofit groups. As a result, mortgage lending to Hispanics soared. And today, in districts where Hispanics make up at least 25 percent of the population, foreclosure rates are now nearly 50 percent higher than the national average, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.


q. Republicans and Democrats, meanwhile, have scrambled to reignite the housing market through ill-conceived tax credits and renewed federal subsidies for mortgages, including the Obama administration’s mortgage bailout plan, which recalls the New Deal’s HOLC. [Democrat policy]

Behind these efforts is a fundamental misconception among politicians [Democrat policy]that housing drives the American economy and therefore demands subsidy at virtually any cost. Our praiseworthy initial efforts—to eliminate housing discrimination and provide all Americans an equal opportunity to buy a home[Democrat policy]—were eventually turned on their heads by advocates and politicians, who instead tried to ensure equality of outcomes.[Democrat policy]
Obsessive Housing Disorder by Steven Malanga, City Journal Spring 2009



Timeline shows Dems were warned:
Timeline shows Bush, McCain warning Dems of financial and housing crisis; meltdown - YouTube





During the seventies and eighties, CRA enforcement was perfunctory. Regulators asked banks to demonstrate that they were trying to reach their entire "assessment area" by advertising in minority-oriented newspapers or by sending their executives to serve on the boards of local community groups.

The [Democrat] Clinton administration changed this state of affairs dramatically. Ignoring the sweeping transformation of the banking industry since the CRA was passed, the Clinton Treasury Department's 1995 regulations made getting a satisfactory CRA rating much harder. [/B

]The new regulations de-emphasized subjective assessment measures in favor of strictly numerical ones. Bank examiners would use federal home-loan data, broken down by neighborhood, income group, and race, to rate banks on performance. There would be no more A's for effort. Only results—specific loans, specific levels of service—would count. Where and to whom have home loans been made? Have banks invested in all neighborhoods within their assessment area? Do they operate branches in those neighborhoods?
The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock, City Journal Winter 2000

Bush’s President’s Working Group on Financial Markets October 2008

“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”

KEEP UP THE BULLSHIT

http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

So you couldn't point out one error???

Good.

Now back under your rock.

Given CEOs' proclivity for government bashing, any lenders being driven to write bad loans by the CRA would have been on CNBC screaming at the top of their lungs.

But that dog that didn't bark.



There was no requirement in the Community Reinvestment Act that required banks to lend to marginal borrowers, just encouragement to try to lend to weaker borrowers in areas where the banks opened branches.

Further, most all sub-prime loans were not done by banks. They were done by “non-bank” lenders which were not covered by the CRA.


George W. Bush was a major proponent of the kind of mortgages that banks had started making under the CRA. He urged low-to-no doc mortgages and the elimination of downpayments, just like the CRA regulators had long done. “We certainly don't want there to be a fine print preventing people from owning their home,” the President said in a 2002 speech. “We can change the print, and we've got to.”


Right-wingers Want To Erase How George Bush's "Homeowner Society" Helped Cause The Economic Collapse


http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

 

[Dad2three]

No....bankers must work withing the structure and regulations of the politicians.

That is why the blame for the mortgage meltdown must be laid squarely at the feet of the Democrats/Liberals/Progressives.



For your edification:


It all began with Democrat megalomaniac Franklin Roosevelt, who, when not appointing KKK members to the Supreme Court, decided to invade the private economy with the creation of GREs.


You were unable to deny that he did so....but you were afraid to answer whether the meltdown would have occurred sans the efforts of this Democrat.

It would not have.
Too bad FDR would not give due respect to the Constitution.

Now....Democrat debilitation via contemporary efforts......



Take notes:



a. Congress passed a bill in 1975 requiring banks to provide the government with information on their lending activities in poor urban areas. Two years later, it passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which gave regulators the power to deny banks the right to expand if they didn’t lend sufficiently in those neighborhoods. In 1979 the FDIC used the CRA to block a move by the Greater NY Savings Bank for not enough lending.


b. In 1986, when the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now [Democrat associate] (Acorn)threatened to oppose an acquisition by a southern bank, Louisiana Bancshares, until it agreed to new “flexible credit and underwriting standards” for minority borrowers—for example, counting public assistance and food stamps as income.


c. In 1987, Acorn led a coalition of advocacy groups calling for industry-wide changes in lending standards. Among the demanded reforms were the easing of minimum down-payment requirements and of the requirement that borrowers have enough cash at a closing to cover two to three months of mortgage payments (research had shown that lack of money in hand was a big reason some mortgages failed quickly).


d. ACORN then attacked Fannie Mae, the giant quasi-government agency that bought loans from banks in order to allow them to make new loans. Its underwriters were “strictly by-the-book interpreters” of lending standards and turned down purchases of unconventional loans, charged Acorn. The pressure eventually paid off. In 1992, Congress passed legislation requiring Fannie Mae and the similar Freddie Mac to devote 30 percent of their loan purchases to mortgages for low- and moderate-income borrowers.


e. Clinton Administration housing secretary, Henry Cisneros, declared that he would expand homeownership among lower- and lower-middle-income renters. His strategy: pushing for no-down-payment loans; expanding the size of mortgages that the government would insure against losses; and using the CRA and other lending laws to direct more private money into low-income programs.


f. Shortly after Cisneros announced his plan, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed to begin buying loans under new, looser guidelines. Freddie Mac, for instance, started approving low-income buyers with bad credit histories or none at all, so long as they were current on rent and utilities payments. Freddie Mac also said that it would begin counting income from seasonal jobs and public assistance toward its income minimum, despite the FHA disaster of the sixties.


g. Freddie Mac began an “alternative qualifying” program with the Sears Mortgage Corporation that let a borrower qualify for a loan with a monthly payment as high as 50 percent of his income, at a time when most private mortgage companies wouldn’t exceed 33 percent. The program also allowed borrowers with bad credit to get mortgages if they took credit-counseling classes administered by Acorn and other nonprofits. Subsequent research would show that such classes have little impact on default rates.


h. Pressuring nonbank lenders to make more loans to poor minorities [Democrat policy] didn’t stop with Sears. If it didn’t happen, Clinton officials warned, they’d seek to extend CRA regulations to all mortgage makers. In Congress, [Democrat] Representative Maxine Waters called financial firms not covered by the CRA “among the most egregious redliners.”


i. Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) shocked the financial world by signing a 1994 agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pledging to increase lending to minorities and join in new efforts to rewrite lending standards. The first MBA member to sign up: [Democrat bagman] Countrywide Financial, the mortgage firm that would be at the core of the subprime meltdown.


j. A 1998 sales pitch by a Bear Stearns managing director advised banks to begin packaging their loans to low-income borrowers into securities that the firm could sell. Forget traditional underwriting standards [Democrat policy] when considering these loans, the director advised. For a low-income borrower, he continued in all-too-familiar terms, owning a home was “a near-sacred obligation. A family will do almost anything to meet that monthly mortgage payment.”
Bunk, says Stan Liebowitz, a professor of economics at the University of Texas: “The claim that lower-income homeowners are somehow different in their devotion to their home is a purely emotional claim with no evidence to support it.”[Democrat policy]


k. Any concern was quickly dismissed. When in early 2000 the FDIC proposed increasing capital requirements for lenders making “subprime” loans [Republican policy] —loans to people with questionable credit, that is—Democratic representative Carolyn Maloney of New York told a congressional hearing that she feared that the step would dry up CRA loans. Her fellow New York Democrat John J. LaFalce urged regulators “not to be premature” in imposing new regulations.[Democrat policy]


l. In July 1999, HUD proposed new levels for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s low-income lending; in September, Fannie Mae agreed to begin purchasing loans made to “borrowers with slightly impaired credit”—that is, with credit standards even lower than the government had been pushing for a generation.[Democrat policy]


m. In 2004 Congress pressed new affordable-housing goals on the two mortgage giants, which through 2007 purchased some $1 trillion in loans to lower- and moderate-income buyers. The buying spree helped spark a massive increase in securitization of mortgages to people with dubious credit.[Democrat policy]


n. In October 1994, Fannie Mae head James Johnson had reminded a banking convention that mortgages with small down payments had a much higher risk of defaulting. (A Duff & Phelps study found that they were nearly three times more likely to default than conventional mortgages.)

Yet the very next month, Fannie Mae said that it expected to back loans to low-income home buyers with a 97 percent loan-to-value ratio[Democrat policy] —that is, loans in which the buyer puts down just 3 percent—as part of a commitment, made earlier that year to Congress, to purchase $1 trillion in affordable-housing mortgages by the end of the nineties. According to Edward Pinto, who served as the company’s chief credit officer, the program was the result of political pressure on Fannie Mae trumping lending standards.
[Democrat policy- 'political pressure']



o. In 1992, the Boston Fed produced an extraordinary 29-page document that codified the new lending wisdom.[Democrat policy]

Conventional mortgage criteria, the report argued, might be “unintentionally biased” because they didn’t take into account “the economic culture of urban, lower-income and nontraditional customers.”[Democrat policy]

Lenders should thus consider junking the industry’s traditional income-to-payments ratio and stop viewing an applicant’s “lack of credit history” as a “negative factor.” [Democrat policy]

Further, if applicants had bad credit, banks should “consider extenuating circumstances”[Democrat policy]

—even though a study by mortgage insurance companies would soon show, not surprisingly, that borrowers with no credit rating or a bad one were far more likely to default. If applicants didn’t have enough savings for a down payment, the Boston Fed urged, banks should allow loans from nonprofits or government assistance agencies to count toward one. A later study of Freddie Mac mortgages would find that a borrower who made a down payment with third-party funds was four times more likely to default, a reminder that traditional underwriting standards weren’t arbitrary but based on historical lending patterns. [Republican wisdom]


p. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus launched Hogar in 2003, an initiative that pushed for easing lending standards [Democrat policy]for immigrants, including touting so-called seller-financed mortgages in which a builder provided down-payment aid to buyers via contributions to nonprofit groups. As a result, mortgage lending to Hispanics soared. And today, in districts where Hispanics make up at least 25 percent of the population, foreclosure rates are now nearly 50 percent higher than the national average, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis.


q. Republicans and Democrats, meanwhile, have scrambled to reignite the housing market through ill-conceived tax credits and renewed federal subsidies for mortgages, including the Obama administration’s mortgage bailout plan, which recalls the New Deal’s HOLC. [Democrat policy]

Behind these efforts is a fundamental misconception among politicians [Democrat policy]that housing drives the American economy and therefore demands subsidy at virtually any cost. Our praiseworthy initial efforts—to eliminate housing discrimination and provide all Americans an equal opportunity to buy a home[Democrat policy]—were eventually turned on their heads by advocates and politicians, who instead tried to ensure equality of outcomes.[Democrat policy]
Obsessive Housing Disorder by Steven Malanga, City Journal Spring 2009



Timeline shows Dems were warned:
Timeline shows Bush, McCain warning Dems of financial and housing crisis; meltdown - YouTube





During the seventies and eighties, CRA enforcement was perfunctory. Regulators asked banks to demonstrate that they were trying to reach their entire "assessment area" by advertising in minority-oriented newspapers or by sending their executives to serve on the boards of local community groups.

The [Democrat] Clinton administration changed this state of affairs dramatically. Ignoring the sweeping transformation of the banking industry since the CRA was passed, the Clinton Treasury Department's 1995 regulations made getting a satisfactory CRA rating much harder. [/B

]The new regulations de-emphasized subjective assessment measures in favor of strictly numerical ones. Bank examiners would use federal home-loan data, broken down by neighborhood, income group, and race, to rate banks on performance. There would be no more A's for effort. Only results—specific loans, specific levels of service—would count. Where and to whom have home loans been made? Have banks invested in all neighborhoods within their assessment area? Do they operate branches in those neighborhoods?
The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock, City Journal Winter 2000

Bush’s President’s Working Group on Financial Markets October 2008

“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”

KEEP UP THE BULLSHIT

http://www.usmessageboard.com/economy/362889-facts-on-dubya-s-great-recession.html

So you couldn't point out one error???

Good.

Now back under your rock.

Loans that were under government regulation did better than private loans, especially if they were regulated by the "Community Reinvestment Act."




Center for Public Integrity reported in 2011, mortgages financed by Wall Street from 2001 to 2008 were 4½ times more likely to be seriously delinquent than mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddie.

 

[OnePercenter]

yes yes Bush was a liberal who interfered with the free market to get people into homes the free market said they could not afford.

So now dumbto3 is a conservative?

There is no free market.

and it is primarily because liberals lack the IQ to understand how the free market works.

Why don't you provide a current example of the free market.

 

[EdwardBaiamonte]

There is no free market.

and it is primarily because liberals lack the IQ to understand how the free market works.

Why don't you provide a current example of the free market.

dear, there is little of the free market left because liberals oppose the free market. They oppose only because they lack the IQ to understand how it works. With incredible stupidity they favor the non free markets of USSR and Red China even though they killed 150 million.
Either they are stupid or brainwashed

 

[EdwardBaiamonte]

Center for Public Integrity reported in 2011, mortgages financed by Wall Street from 2001 to 2008 were 4½ times more likely to be seriously delinquent than mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddie.

this is because Fan Fred took the good mortgages. Do you understand now??

 

[OnePercenter]

and it is primarily because liberals lack the IQ to understand how the free market works.

Why don't you provide a current example of the free market.

dear, there is little of the free market left because liberals oppose the free market. They oppose only because they lack the IQ to understand how it works. With incredible stupidity they favor the non free markets of USSR and Red China even though they killed 150 million.
Either they are stupid or brainwashed

You mean liberal like WalMart? (Direct answer please, No bloviating)

 

[EdwardBaiamonte]

Why don't you provide a current example of the free market.

dear, there is little of the free market left because liberals oppose the free market. They oppose only because they lack the IQ to understand how it works. With incredible stupidity they favor the non free markets of USSR and Red China even though they killed 150 million.
Either they are stupid or brainwashed

You mean liberal like WalMart? (Direct answer please, No bloviating)

dear, please state the question in good english?

 

[Dad2three]

Center for Public Integrity reported in 2011, mortgages financed by Wall Street from 2001 to 2008 were 4½ times more likely to be seriously delinquent than mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddie.

this is because Fan Fred took the good mortgages. Do you understand now??

But I thought Barney and the Dems FORCED the PRIVATE MARKETS to give loans so F/F could buy or guarantee them? If they took the best, why did the PRIVATE MARKETS lower lending standards? For what purpose? lol

“The idea that they were leading this charge is just absurd,” said Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance, an authoritative trade publication. “Fannie and Freddie have always had the tightest underwriting on earth…They were opposite of subprime.”

 

[EdwardBaiamonte]

If they took the best, why did the PRIVATE MARKETS lower lending standards? For what purpose? lol

Dear please think before you post. If Fan Fred took all the good customers, the others had to lower standards to get other customers and stay in business. Simple enough??

 

[OnePercenter]

dear, there is little of the free market left because liberals oppose the free market. They oppose only because they lack the IQ to understand how it works. With incredible stupidity they favor the non free markets of USSR and Red China even though they killed 150 million.
Either they are stupid or brainwashed

You mean liberal like WalMart? (Direct answer please, No bloviating)

dear, please state the question in good english?

You're bloviating.

 

[EdwardBaiamonte]

You mean liberal like WalMart? (Direct answer please, No bloviating)

dear, please state the question in good english?

You're bloviating.

dear, 8 words is not talking at length. It pays to know the definition of a word before you use it, liberal!

 

[Dad2three]

If they took the best, why did the PRIVATE MARKETS lower lending standards? For what purpose? lol

Dear please think before you post. If Fan Fred took all the good customers, the others had to lower standards to get other customers and stay in business. Simple enough??

LOL, THAT'S how the 'free market' works? If one side takes the 'good customers' the other 'markets' must lower their standards?

GROW A BRAIN

US MORTGAGE MARKET WENT FROM $1 TRILLION (2000) TO $4 TRILLION BY 2004

HMM

F/F CAUSED THAT? BANKSTER WORLD WIDE CREDIT BUBBLE AND BUST

 

[EdwardBaiamonte]

LOL, THAT'S how the 'free market' works? If one side takes the 'good customers' the other 'markets' must lower their standards?

dear, the free market works without huge huge govt interference from Fan Fred Fed, not with huge huge interference from them. See why we say slow?

Do you understand?