GOP Plans 'Revolt' Against Iran Deal

[ogibillm]

again, we don't have that money. that money is frozen throughout the world, and whether or not we release sanctions other people will.

The whole idea is to release the sanctions, right? Or did I read the deal wrong?

By "we" I mean the countries who signed this Chamberlain-esque deal.

the whole idea is to prevent iran from building a nuclear weapon. see, they only ever get sanction relief if they meet the requirements of the agreement. that means a reduction in uranium, the dis-assembly of their plutonium plant, and the decommissioning of thousands of centrifuges.
if it was only about lifting sanctions none of that would be happening.

This deal does not keep iran from nuclear arms ... it makes it more easy and all because fools like you and him hate jews

Sent from my SM-G386T1 using Tapatalk

thank you for your well thought out and insightful input. now would you like to add something of value? and i'm not just talking about to this thread, i mean anywhere.

 

[ogibillm]

nuclear inspectors have access to nuclear sites on a daily basis. they track the uranium coming out of the mines. if there is a site we suspect has undeclared nuclear activity we can face up to a 24 day delay. nuclear experts say that that is insufficient time to hide or move nuclear programs.

Just for kicks, since you know a great deal about the ... deal, how about linking me to some of this information. Please?

The good news, at least, is that if and when the intelligence community identifies a potential unknown facility, the equipment IAEA has at its disposal will be able to sniff it out, even with that 24-day grace period.

“The problem is that if you tool up and then have to tear it down, that’s a pretty expensive game, as well as a very high-risk one, when it comes down to the stuff that’s going to be detectable,” explains Cordesman. “While 24 days sounds like a lot of time, if it involves any radioactive material, it is damn hard to get rid of.”

The Tools Inspectors Can Use to Catch Iran’s Nuclear Hijinks
here's an article where concerns are expressed, but even there it's pretty well recognized that hiding anything of significance in 24 days would be difficult. additionally, 24 days is not guaranteed, it's the maximum.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/w...-challenged-by-some-nuclear-experts.html?_r=0

 

[NYcarbineer]

nuclear inspectors have access to nuclear sites on a daily basis. they track the uranium coming out of the mines. if there is a site we suspect has undeclared nuclear activity we can face up to a 24 day delay. nuclear experts say that that is insufficient time to hide or move nuclear programs.

Just for kicks, since you know a great deal about the ... deal, how about linking me to some of this information. Please?

Why were you acting as though you know what's in the deal then, as you did in post 111?

 

[ogibillm]

nuclear inspectors have access to nuclear sites on a daily basis. they track the uranium coming out of the mines. if there is a site we suspect has undeclared nuclear activity we can face up to a 24 day delay. nuclear experts say that that is insufficient time to hide or move nuclear programs.

Just for kicks, since you know a great deal about the ... deal, how about linking me to some of this information. Please?

Dude. I linked to the full text of the agreement in this topic.

TWICE!

And? I didn't ask for the full text. I've had it open in my browser for a while now. I'm asking ogi to cite where in the deal he is basing his statement on. Would you care to act in his stead?

what part would you like me to cite?

 

[NYcarbineer]

nuclear inspectors have access to nuclear sites on a daily basis. they track the uranium coming out of the mines. if there is a site we suspect has undeclared nuclear activity we can face up to a 24 day delay. nuclear experts say that that is insufficient time to hide or move nuclear programs.

Just for kicks, since you know a great deal about the ... deal, how about linking me to some of this information. Please?

Dude. I linked to the full text of the agreement in this topic.

TWICE!

And? I didn't ask for the full text. I've had it open in my browser for a while now. I'm asking ogi to cite where in the deal he is basing his statement on. Would you care to act in his stead?

what part would you like me to cite?

The part he has no clue about, which is why linking to the entire document was the right thing to do in the first place, whoever did it.

 

[ogibillm]

nuclear inspectors have access to nuclear sites on a daily basis. they track the uranium coming out of the mines. if there is a site we suspect has undeclared nuclear activity we can face up to a 24 day delay. nuclear experts say that that is insufficient time to hide or move nuclear programs.

Just for kicks, since you know a great deal about the ... deal, how about linking me to some of this information. Please?

Dude. I linked to the full text of the agreement in this topic.

TWICE!

And? I didn't ask for the full text. I've had it open in my browser for a while now. I'm asking ogi to cite where in the deal he is basing his statement on. Would you care to act in his stead?

what part would you like me to cite?

The part he has no clue about, which is why linking to the entire document was the right thing to do in the first place, whoever did it.

to his credit he was at least willing to admit that he was wrong when he claimed that the united states was sending tax dollars to iran.

i mean that's a pretty big detail to screw up and if i were wrong i'd wonder what other misinformation i had swallowed without question, but he did man up to it.

 

[g5000]

nuclear inspectors have access to nuclear sites on a daily basis. they track the uranium coming out of the mines. if there is a site we suspect has undeclared nuclear activity we can face up to a 24 day delay. nuclear experts say that that is insufficient time to hide or move nuclear programs.

Just for kicks, since you know a great deal about the ... deal, how about linking me to some of this information. Please?

Dude. I linked to the full text of the agreement in this topic.

TWICE!

And? I didn't ask for the full text. I've had it open in my browser for a while now.

Then read it so you don't parrot any more boneheaded claims that Iran's nuclear facilities are not subject to snap inspections!

 

[TemplarKormac]

On page 42 of the agreement, it says this:

Section Q of Annex I

77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.

78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

In total 24 days would pass before any "resolution" of the IAEA's concerns could be reached.

You can bet that Iran will exploit this provision to the very limit by dragging out the time it takes to declare any absent nuclear materials and activities.

1. As per the agreement, Iran must declare the absence of nuclear materials and activities within 14 days of a request for access by the IAEA.

2. The IAEA asks for access to a part of Iran's nuclear program to ensure the absence of forbidden nuclear materials and activities.

3. Iran waits until the 13th day to declare.

4. If the IAEA cannot verify the declaration, 10 more days could pass before a resolution is reached.

5. If a resolution is reached, Iran can simply repeat the process by using the consultation as a means to drag out the process even further.

6. In that time it would be possible for Iran to move materials and personnel to a different location to make it seem as if they are complying with this agreement.

7. In addition, Iran is given the leeway of proposing its own "alternative" ways to resolve IAEA concerns (wait what? why would allow them to propose any alternatives?)

 

[Kosh]

nuclear inspectors have access to nuclear sites on a daily basis. they track the uranium coming out of the mines. if there is a site we suspect has undeclared nuclear activity we can face up to a 24 day delay. nuclear experts say that that is insufficient time to hide or move nuclear programs.

Just for kicks, since you know a great deal about the ... deal, how about linking me to some of this information. Please?

Dude. I linked to the full text of the agreement in this topic.

TWICE!

And? I didn't ask for the full text. I've had it open in my browser for a while now.

Then read it so you don't parrot any more boneheaded claims that Iran's nuclear facilities are not subject to snap inspections!

Follow your own advice before you get others to do the same thing..

 

[ogibillm]

On page 42 of the agreement, it says this:

Section Q of Annex I

77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.

78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

In total 24 days would pass before any "resolution" of the IAEA's concerns could be reached.

You can bet that Iran will exploit this provision to the very limit by dragging out the time it takes to declare any absent nuclear materials and activities.

1. As per the agreement, Iran must declare the absence of nuclear materials and activities within 14 days of a request for access by the IAEA.

2. The IAEA asks for access to a part of Iran's nuclear program to ensure the absence of forbidden nuclear materials and activities.

3. Iran waits until the 13th day to declare.

4. If the IAEA cannot verify the declaration, 10 more days could pass before a resolution is reached.

5. If a resolution is reached, Iran can simply repeat the process by using the consultation as a means to drag out the process even further.

6. In that time it would be possible for Iran to move materials and personnel to a different location to make it seem as if they are complying with this agreement.

7. In addition, Iran is given the leeway of proposing its own way to resolve IAEA concerns.

yes. at unapproved areas. but at areas where nuclear work is supposed to be happening we have daily access.
so did you have a point you wanted to make about all of that, or just sharing information?

 

[TemplarKormac]

Then read it so you don't parrot any more boneheaded claims that Iran's nuclear facilities are not subject to snap inspections!

They aren't. So, I'm little more than a third of the way through reading this "deal." What about you?

 

[ogibillm]

Then read it so you don't parrot any more boneheaded claims that Iran's nuclear facilities are not subject to snap inspections!

They aren't. So, I'm little more than a third of the way through reading this "deal." What about you?

yes, they are. other areas, areas we may suspect are doing nuclear work outside the rules of the agreement are not subject to inspection on a whim but instead need to go through the process you described in your earlier post.

 

[TemplarKormac]

On page 42 of the agreement, it says this:

Section Q of Annex I

77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.

78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

In total 24 days would pass before any "resolution" of the IAEA's concerns could be reached.

You can bet that Iran will exploit this provision to the very limit by dragging out the time it takes to declare any absent nuclear materials and activities.

1. As per the agreement, Iran must declare the absence of nuclear materials and activities within 14 days of a request for access by the IAEA.

2. The IAEA asks for access to a part of Iran's nuclear program to ensure the absence of forbidden nuclear materials and activities.

3. Iran waits until the 13th day to declare.

4. If the IAEA cannot verify the declaration, 10 more days could pass before a resolution is reached.

5. If a resolution is reached, Iran can simply repeat the process by using the consultation as a means to drag out the process even further.

6. In that time it would be possible for Iran to move materials and personnel to a different location to make it seem as if they are complying with this agreement.

7. In addition, Iran is given the leeway of proposing its own way to resolve IAEA concerns.

yes. at unapproved areas. but at areas where nuclear work is supposed to be happening we have daily access.
so did you have a point you wanted to make about all of that, or just sharing information?

Actually, I'm pointing out some loopholes. In this critical part the deal, of all places, you DO NOT give Iran leeway to propose anything. Simple compliance with IAEA demands should be all that is required here. True, the IAEA will be granted daily access only to the Natanz facility and all Pilot and standard Fuel Enrichment Plant(s) (I assume are all part of the Natanz facility), but the undeclared parts of their program, on the other hand, will not have this "daily access" until Iran declares them to the IAEA. That leaves a significant hole in this provision.

 

[ogibillm]

On page 42 of the agreement, it says this:

Section Q of Annex I

77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.

78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

In total 24 days would pass before any "resolution" of the IAEA's concerns could be reached.

You can bet that Iran will exploit this provision to the very limit by dragging out the time it takes to declare any absent nuclear materials and activities.

1. As per the agreement, Iran must declare the absence of nuclear materials and activities within 14 days of a request for access by the IAEA.

2. The IAEA asks for access to a part of Iran's nuclear program to ensure the absence of forbidden nuclear materials and activities.

3. Iran waits until the 13th day to declare.

4. If the IAEA cannot verify the declaration, 10 more days could pass before a resolution is reached.

5. If a resolution is reached, Iran can simply repeat the process by using the consultation as a means to drag out the process even further.

6. In that time it would be possible for Iran to move materials and personnel to a different location to make it seem as if they are complying with this agreement.

7. In addition, Iran is given the leeway of proposing its own way to resolve IAEA concerns.

yes. at unapproved areas. but at areas where nuclear work is supposed to be happening we have daily access.
so did you have a point you wanted to make about all of that, or just sharing information?

Actually, I'm pointing out some loopholes. In this critical part the deal, of all places, you DO NOT give Iran leeway to propose anything. Simple compliance with IAEA demands should be all that is required here. True, the IAEA will be granted daily access only to the Natanz facility and all Pilot and standard Fuel Enrichment Plant(s) (I assume are all part of the Natanz facility), but the undeclared parts of their program, on the other hand, will not have this "daily access" until Iran declares them to the IAEA. That leaves a significant hole in this provision.

it really doesn't. undeclared areas aren't allowed.
and i'll ask you, do you really think iran, or any nation, would allow inspectors to go anywhere they want on a whim?

 

[TemplarKormac]

According to the agreement, "for 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges."

This round-the-clock monitoring will explicitly include "electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies," according to the agreement.

For instance, at an Iranian facility like Natanz, where more than 5,000 centrifuges will be operating, the IAEA will have cameras that provide 24-hour monitoring, said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear specialist at the Harvard Kennedy School. In addition, the agreement says, "Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at (the Iranian nuclear facility at) Natanz ... for 15 years."

However, this sort of 24/7 surveillance will not be the rule everywhere in the Iranian nuclear archipelago.

"At most locations, inspections will be every once in a while, on a schedule the inspectors judge to be sufficient based on the sensitivity of the activities at that location, how long it would take for Iran to do something there that would make a difference, and so on," Bunn said.

For this reason,"I would not say it’s accurate that the entire program is under ‘lock, key, and camera 24 hours a day, 365 days a year,’ " Bunn said. The other sites have "the potential to be inspected at any time, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, but in reality there won’t be inspectors or cameras physically there all the time."

In fact, even if Iran ultimately agrees to a contentious inspection, the wait could be as long as 24 days.

The agreement spells out that if the IAEA and Iran can’t work out their differences over suspicions about undeclared nuclear materials or activities within 14 days, a joint commission empowered by the agreement would try to resolve the situation for another seven days. Once the commission decides what to do, Iran would have three more days to follow through.

There is wide agreement that the inspection protocols are the most stringent devised for any country not defeated in war. But there is less agreement on whether that standard is sufficient to stop a country intent on getting nuclear weapons from getting them.

Rick Brennan, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corp., a think tank, calls the protocol a "far cry" from the ironclad promises Beyer makes.

"There are a number of provisions in the monitoring regime that enable Iran to delay, obstruct, and eventually prevent IAEA inspectors from effectively monitoring any portion of the Iranian nuclear program that it seeks to hide," Brennan said. Five of the eight members of the joint commission would have to agree to both the concerns of the IAEA and the protocols involving that specific inspection, he said, calling it "an extremely high hurdle because China and Russia will almost certainly side with Iran on most issues."

Theodore R. Bromund, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, agreed.

"The real problem is this: When inspectors get delayed, denied, hassled, bugged, followed, or pelted by stones from ‘spontaneous’ mobs, what do you do? We should recall that Clinton bombed Iraq in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Will Obama do that? I very much doubt it," he said.

Deal puts Iran's nuclear program under lock, key and camera 24/7, says Rep. Don Beyer

 

[ogibillm]

According to the agreement, "for 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges."

This round-the-clock monitoring will explicitly include "electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies," according to the agreement.

For instance, at an Iranian facility like Natanz, where more than 5,000 centrifuges will be operating, the IAEA will have cameras that provide 24-hour monitoring, said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear specialist at the Harvard Kennedy School. In addition, the agreement says, "Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at (the Iranian nuclear facility at) Natanz ... for 15 years."

However, this sort of 24/7 surveillance will not be the rule everywhere in the Iranian nuclear archipelago.

"At most locations, inspections will be every once in a while, on a schedule the inspectors judge to be sufficient based on the sensitivity of the activities at that location, how long it would take for Iran to do something there that would make a difference, and so on," Bunn said.

For this reason,"I would not say it’s accurate that the entire program is under ‘lock, key, and camera 24 hours a day, 365 days a year,’ " Bunn said. The other sites have "the potential to be inspected at any time, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, but in reality there won’t be inspectors or cameras physically there all the time."

In fact, even if Iran ultimately agrees to a contentious inspection, the wait could be as long as 24 days.

The agreement spells out that if the IAEA and Iran can’t work out their differences over suspicions about undeclared nuclear materials or activities within 14 days, a joint commission empowered by the agreement would try to resolve the situation for another seven days. Once the commission decides what to do, Iran would have three more days to follow through.

There is wide agreement that the inspection protocols are the most stringent devised for any country not defeated in war. But there is less agreement on whether that standard is sufficient to stop a country intent on getting nuclear weapons from getting them.

Rick Brennan, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corp., a think tank, calls the protocol a "far cry" from the ironclad promises Beyer makes.

"There are a number of provisions in the monitoring regime that enable Iran to delay, obstruct, and eventually prevent IAEA inspectors from effectively monitoring any portion of the Iranian nuclear program that it seeks to hide," Brennan said. Five of the eight members of the joint commission would have to agree to both the concerns of the IAEA and the protocols involving that specific inspection, he said, calling it "an extremely high hurdle because China and Russia will almost certainly side with Iran on most issues."

Theodore R. Bromund, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, agreed.

"The real problem is this: When inspectors get delayed, denied, hassled, bugged, followed, or pelted by stones from ‘spontaneous’ mobs, what do you do? We should recall that Clinton bombed Iraq in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Will Obama do that? I very much doubt it," he said.

Deal puts Iran's nuclear program under lock, key and camera 24/7, says Rep. Don Beyer

does that make you feel better?

 

[TemplarKormac]

On page 42 of the agreement, it says this:

Section Q of Annex I

77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.

78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

In total 24 days would pass before any "resolution" of the IAEA's concerns could be reached.

You can bet that Iran will exploit this provision to the very limit by dragging out the time it takes to declare any absent nuclear materials and activities.

1. As per the agreement, Iran must declare the absence of nuclear materials and activities within 14 days of a request for access by the IAEA.

2. The IAEA asks for access to a part of Iran's nuclear program to ensure the absence of forbidden nuclear materials and activities.

3. Iran waits until the 13th day to declare.

4. If the IAEA cannot verify the declaration, 10 more days could pass before a resolution is reached.

5. If a resolution is reached, Iran can simply repeat the process by using the consultation as a means to drag out the process even further.

6. In that time it would be possible for Iran to move materials and personnel to a different location to make it seem as if they are complying with this agreement.

7. In addition, Iran is given the leeway of proposing its own way to resolve IAEA concerns.

yes. at unapproved areas. but at areas where nuclear work is supposed to be happening we have daily access.
so did you have a point you wanted to make about all of that, or just sharing information?

Actually, I'm pointing out some loopholes. In this critical part the deal, of all places, you DO NOT give Iran leeway to propose anything. Simple compliance with IAEA demands should be all that is required here. True, the IAEA will be granted daily access only to the Natanz facility and all Pilot and standard Fuel Enrichment Plant(s) (I assume are all part of the Natanz facility), but the undeclared parts of their program, on the other hand, will not have this "daily access" until Iran declares them to the IAEA. That leaves a significant hole in this provision.

it really doesn't. undeclared areas aren't allowed.
and i'll ask you, do you really think iran, or any nation, would allow inspectors to go anywhere they want on a whim?

So, in an effort to protect their sovereignty, you would capitulate to a demand that says "we will not allow inspectors to inspect anywhere in our nuclear program they want to." That undermines the whole thing does it not?

 

[TemplarKormac]

According to the agreement, "for 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges."

This round-the-clock monitoring will explicitly include "electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies," according to the agreement.

For instance, at an Iranian facility like Natanz, where more than 5,000 centrifuges will be operating, the IAEA will have cameras that provide 24-hour monitoring, said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear specialist at the Harvard Kennedy School. In addition, the agreement says, "Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at (the Iranian nuclear facility at) Natanz ... for 15 years."

However, this sort of 24/7 surveillance will not be the rule everywhere in the Iranian nuclear archipelago.

"At most locations, inspections will be every once in a while, on a schedule the inspectors judge to be sufficient based on the sensitivity of the activities at that location, how long it would take for Iran to do something there that would make a difference, and so on," Bunn said.

For this reason,"I would not say it’s accurate that the entire program is under ‘lock, key, and camera 24 hours a day, 365 days a year,’ " Bunn said. The other sites have "the potential to be inspected at any time, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, but in reality there won’t be inspectors or cameras physically there all the time."

In fact, even if Iran ultimately agrees to a contentious inspection, the wait could be as long as 24 days.

The agreement spells out that if the IAEA and Iran can’t work out their differences over suspicions about undeclared nuclear materials or activities within 14 days, a joint commission empowered by the agreement would try to resolve the situation for another seven days. Once the commission decides what to do, Iran would have three more days to follow through.

There is wide agreement that the inspection protocols are the most stringent devised for any country not defeated in war. But there is less agreement on whether that standard is sufficient to stop a country intent on getting nuclear weapons from getting them.

Rick Brennan, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corp., a think tank, calls the protocol a "far cry" from the ironclad promises Beyer makes.

"There are a number of provisions in the monitoring regime that enable Iran to delay, obstruct, and eventually prevent IAEA inspectors from effectively monitoring any portion of the Iranian nuclear program that it seeks to hide," Brennan said. Five of the eight members of the joint commission would have to agree to both the concerns of the IAEA and the protocols involving that specific inspection, he said, calling it "an extremely high hurdle because China and Russia will almost certainly side with Iran on most issues."

Theodore R. Bromund, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, agreed.

"The real problem is this: When inspectors get delayed, denied, hassled, bugged, followed, or pelted by stones from ‘spontaneous’ mobs, what do you do? We should recall that Clinton bombed Iraq in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Will Obama do that? I very much doubt it," he said.

Deal puts Iran's nuclear program under lock, key and camera 24/7, says Rep. Don Beyer

does that make you feel better?

No. It makes my point. Feel better?

 

[ogibillm]

According to the agreement, "for 15 years, Iran will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in storage, and are only used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges."

This round-the-clock monitoring will explicitly include "electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies," according to the agreement.

For instance, at an Iranian facility like Natanz, where more than 5,000 centrifuges will be operating, the IAEA will have cameras that provide 24-hour monitoring, said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear specialist at the Harvard Kennedy School. In addition, the agreement says, "Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested by the IAEA, to relevant buildings at (the Iranian nuclear facility at) Natanz ... for 15 years."

However, this sort of 24/7 surveillance will not be the rule everywhere in the Iranian nuclear archipelago.

"At most locations, inspections will be every once in a while, on a schedule the inspectors judge to be sufficient based on the sensitivity of the activities at that location, how long it would take for Iran to do something there that would make a difference, and so on," Bunn said.

For this reason,"I would not say it’s accurate that the entire program is under ‘lock, key, and camera 24 hours a day, 365 days a year,’ " Bunn said. The other sites have "the potential to be inspected at any time, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, but in reality there won’t be inspectors or cameras physically there all the time."

In fact, even if Iran ultimately agrees to a contentious inspection, the wait could be as long as 24 days.

The agreement spells out that if the IAEA and Iran can’t work out their differences over suspicions about undeclared nuclear materials or activities within 14 days, a joint commission empowered by the agreement would try to resolve the situation for another seven days. Once the commission decides what to do, Iran would have three more days to follow through.

There is wide agreement that the inspection protocols are the most stringent devised for any country not defeated in war. But there is less agreement on whether that standard is sufficient to stop a country intent on getting nuclear weapons from getting them.

Rick Brennan, a senior political scientist at the Rand Corp., a think tank, calls the protocol a "far cry" from the ironclad promises Beyer makes.

"There are a number of provisions in the monitoring regime that enable Iran to delay, obstruct, and eventually prevent IAEA inspectors from effectively monitoring any portion of the Iranian nuclear program that it seeks to hide," Brennan said. Five of the eight members of the joint commission would have to agree to both the concerns of the IAEA and the protocols involving that specific inspection, he said, calling it "an extremely high hurdle because China and Russia will almost certainly side with Iran on most issues."

Theodore R. Bromund, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, agreed.

"The real problem is this: When inspectors get delayed, denied, hassled, bugged, followed, or pelted by stones from ‘spontaneous’ mobs, what do you do? We should recall that Clinton bombed Iraq in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Will Obama do that? I very much doubt it," he said.

Deal puts Iran's nuclear program under lock, key and camera 24/7, says Rep. Don Beyer

does that make you feel better?

No. It makes my point. Feel better?

what point?