Can science answer moral questions?

[JBeukema]

science not only can but it should start to answer these questions. Difficult questions of right and wrong can be examined scientifically and we can find a scientific answer to these questions which are hard to contest.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hj9oB4zpHww

Great, the Darwinists are back...

 

[JBeukema]

Sure it can, in some cases and it often has, too.

Very few of us imagine that a mental illness is the result of demons.

We have science to thank for that.

When your appendix bursts, few of you are likely to appeal to a shamen to petition some spirit for relief.

You can thank science for that.

People do not often throw Virgins into volcanos to appease the volcano god.

You have science to thank for that change in morals, too.

Understanding the world (science of all kinds, including social sciences) helps mankind find new moral paths to creating better societies.

Science is never, however, going to replace humanism as the ultimate souce of morality.

All it can do is give us clues about how the world works, and we'll adjust out Moral POVs based on that.

Science and religion are not necessarily at odds with each other.

Some religious people might want to make the case that they are, but those people are mistaken.

None of those are moral questions.

Moral questions are, for example 'is it wrong to steal or kill?'

 

[JBeukema]

This is one of the TED talks which gave me a pause. I tend to believe what Sam Harris is saying here, that science not only can but it should start to answer these questions. Difficult questions of right and wrong can be examined scientifically and we can find a scientific answer to these questions which are hard to contest.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hj9oB4zpHww

mostly, yes.


science (and logic and reason) can answer MOST moral questions

it can certainly answer most moral question better than MOST religions can

q: what moral questions?

homosexuality?
sex outside of marriage?
divorce?
drinking? smoking pot? snorting cocaine?
discriminating against identifiable groups of people?
slavery?


science can certainly provide BETTER ANSWERS to these moral questions

How are those questions?

Science can tell us what might contribute to or cause homosexual behaviors; it cannot tell us whether it is 'wrong' to be homosexual

of course, using your reasoning, science could tell us rape is moral and right because it's 'natural' and 'conducive to the propagation of the species'
see:
[ame=http://www.amazon.com/Natural-History-Rape-Biological-Coercion/dp/0262201259]Amazon.com: A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion (9780262201254): Randy Thornhill, Craig T. Palmer, Margo I. Wilson: Books[/ame]


We've heard this shit all before
see:[ame=http://www.amazon.com/Darwin-Hitler-Evolutionary-Eugenics-Germany/dp/1403965021]Amazon.com: From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany (9781403965028): Richard Weikart: Books[/ame]

 

[JBeukema]

I don't science could judge that much worse than religion has over time, don't know if it's possible.

Science cannot rule on matters or morality and ethics.

If it tries to, it becomes pseudoscience and religion.

Then come the arguments that 'good' and 'moral' mean what's good for the propagation of the species- and its finest members- of the best race

We've seen where that leads.

 

[JBeukema]

Morals vary.

Ethics don't.

No? then why is it fine to spit on the sidewalk in some places and not others?

Why do laws vary? Law is nothing more than ethics enforced through an established system recognized as having authority to rule on ethical matters and administer punishment for violations of the social contract

 

[JBeukema]

Morals vary.

Ethics don't.

Science is merely an observer and an explainer. Science is systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation. To try and make science do more leads to eugenics and all sorts of horrible things that have occured in the name of "science".

Ethics vary by culture and religion.
Ethics are moral principles so explain how they do not vary.

You're confusing ethics and morals. It is never ethical to murder someone but some societies consider it to be OK under certain circumstances, hence the term "moral relativism".

Professional ethics, not professional morals

The difference between ethics and morals can seem somewhat arbitrary to many, but there is a basic, albeit subtle, difference. Morals define personal character, while ethics stress a social system in which those morals are applied. In other words, ethics point to standards or codes of behavior expected by the group to which the individual belongs. This could be national ethics, social ethics, company ethics, professional ethics, or even family ethics. So while a person’s moral code is usually unchanging, the ethics he or she practices can be other-dependent.
When considering the difference between ethics and morals, it may be helpful to consider a criminal defense lawyer. Though the lawyer’s personal moral code likely finds murder immoral and reprehensible, ethics demand the accused client be defended as vigorously as possible, even when the lawyer knows the party is guilty and that a freed defendant would potentially lead to more crime. Legal ethics must override personal morals for the greater good of upholding a justice system in which the accused are given a fair trial and the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

What is the Difference Between Ethics and Morals?

 

[JBeukema]

however, science, reason and logic tells us that homosexuals are
decent and honorable people.

No, it doesn't. Science can't make such personal judgments.

where-as science, logic and reason would argue that slavery is NOT a good thing

Define: good

How can we objectively measure it? What standard of measurement can we use? Show me 'good; in a petri dish or demonstrate how it can be measured scientifically

where-as science and logic and reason, especially in our times, where we can prevent most sexually related problems, show us that sex out side of marriage is normal

Normalcy is subjective

, most people have sex outside of marriage, and people who engage in sex outside of marriage should not be punished for it

That's a personal opinion and a subjective moral stance. No mathematical formula can reach that conclusion

divorce;
the 2 major religions insist that divorce is bad.
but science, reason and logic tell us that it is ridiculous (BAD, even) for 2 people to remain in a bad marriage, and that it is better for people to get divorced so they can go on to lead happier lives

This is part of plate tectonics? Thermodynamics?

religious morals tend to be outdated, archaic, overly punitive and unhealthy

In your view

morals based upon logic and reason (and science) make much more sense

Actually, morals based on science are impossible by definition

 

[whitehall]

"Science", at least the academic elitist "science" we endure today has become an arm of the liberal political establishment. The fake theory of global warming is a perfect example of how "science" can be corrupted for a political goal and grant money. Would I trust the corrupt academic "scientific" establishment to answer moral questions? Don't make me laugh.

 

[westwall]

Ethics vary by culture and religion.
Ethics are moral principles so explain how they do not vary.

You're confusing ethics and morals. It is never ethical to murder someone but some societies consider it to be OK under certain circumstances, hence the term "moral relativism".

Professional ethics, not professional morals

The difference between ethics and morals can seem somewhat arbitrary to many, but there is a basic, albeit subtle, difference. Morals define personal character, while ethics stress a social system in which those morals are applied. In other words, ethics point to standards or codes of behavior expected by the group to which the individual belongs. This could be national ethics, social ethics, company ethics, professional ethics, or even family ethics. So while a person’s moral code is usually unchanging, the ethics he or she practices can be other-dependent.
When considering the difference between ethics and morals, it may be helpful to consider a criminal defense lawyer. Though the lawyer’s personal moral code likely finds murder immoral and reprehensible, ethics demand the accused client be defended as vigorously as possible, even when the lawyer knows the party is guilty and that a freed defendant would potentially lead to more crime. Legal ethics must override personal morals for the greater good of upholding a justice system in which the accused are given a fair trial and the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

What is the Difference Between Ethics and Morals?

Ethics is the "science of morality". Morality is defined by culture, religion etc. thus is changeable whereas ethics is unalterable.

Ethics - Definition

The Definition of Morality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[JBeukema]

Codes of conduct out forth are ethics. It is the very meaning of the word. That is why we speak of 'professional ethics' and not of 'professional morality'. Mortality is inherently personal and internal, limited to the individual mind. This is why we have moral philosophy- morality itself is a philosophical construct built upon internal instinctual drives (see: the 'moral instinct'; evolutionary psychology)

Where you're getting confused is the use of 'ethics' in a wholly difference sense to describe the study of morality and ethics as used in the first sense.

That which is moral and that which is ethical are not always the same. For instance, I might find it immoral to have sex before marriage, yet it might not be considered unethical in the society in which I live. If it is unethical, then those ethics might or might not be codified into Law and enforced as such.

Ethics, then can be used in two very different senses:
-As the rules regarding acceptable and unacceptable behavior agreed to, explicitly or implicitly, by society (see: social contract)
-As the study of the above and/or of morality

 

[rikules]

however, science, reason and logic tells us that homosexuals are
decent and honorable people.

No, it doesn't. Science can't make such personal judgments.

where-as science, logic and reason would argue that slavery is NOT a good thing

Define: good

How can we objectively measure it? What standard of measurement can we use? Show me 'good; in a petri dish or demonstrate how it can be measured scientifically

Normalcy is subjective

That's a personal opinion and a subjective moral stance. No mathematical formula can reach that conclusion

This is part of plate tectonics? Thermodynamics?

religious morals tend to be outdated, archaic, overly punitive and unhealthy

In your view

morals based upon logic and reason (and science) make much more sense

Actually, morals based on science are impossible by definition

if we can only choose between morals based upon religion or morals based upon science, reason and logic then I'll pick the latter


science, reason and logic show me that morals based upon outdated religious superstitions and primitive beliefs tend to be irrational, illogical, unfair and dangerous

 

[rikules]

"Science", at least the academic elitist "science" we endure today has become an arm of the liberal political establishment. The fake theory of global warming is a perfect example of how "science" can be corrupted for a political goal and grant money. Would I trust the corrupt academic "scientific" establishment to answer moral questions? Don't make me laugh.

and I don't trust the FAKE theories of primitive religions

 

[JBeukema]

"Science", at least the academic elitist "science" we endure today has become an arm of the liberal political establishment. The fake theory of global warming is a perfect example of how "science" can be corrupted for a political goal and grant money. Would I trust the corrupt academic "scientific" establishment to answer moral questions? Don't make me laugh.

and I don't trust the FAKE theories of primitive religions

How can a theory be fake?

 

[jwil59]

Harris' proposal confirms that science generally supports the moral absolutes taught by Jesus and the Apostles, which moves us back in the direction of Biblical Truth. The existence of moral law argues for the existence of a moral lawgiver. With science there is always the law of unintended consequences but I digress.

I've got nothing against Science, but people like Harris think it disproves the existence of God and that simply isn't true.

 

[Cecilie1200]

Morals are a perspective, a way of looking at life, and a way of deciding what we do and don't value, and how much. As such, morality cannot be decided by science. Science intersects morality in the sense that it can provide us with the knowledge and data that we need to make informed decisions about how we look at life and what we value.

Take abortion, as an example. Science can tell us - DOES tell us - that a fetus is a separate, living organism. It can tell us at what point each stage of development happens: detectable heartbeat, developing brain, viability outside the womb. It can even tell us how to MAKE a fetus viable outside the womb at earlier and earlier points in the pregnancy.

What science CANNOT do is tell us what we should think or feel about those facts. Some people, looking at those facts, say that they are so important that they should trump every other concern. Others, using those facts, say that they should take priority over other concerns, EXCEPT for "X,Y, and Z", whatever those might be for those people. Still others, knowing the EXACT SAME FACTS, say, "It doesn't matter, THIS is still more important", whatever "this" may be for them.

The facts don't change, but the perspective, values, and moral standards based on them DO.

 

[MHanson]

I looked up a few words in my dictionary:

morality |məˈralətē; mô-|
noun ( pl. -ties)
principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior.
• behavior as it is affected by the observation of these principles : the past few years have seen a sharp decline in morality.
• a particular system of values and principles of conduct, esp. one held by a specified person or society : a bourgeois morality.
• the extent to which an action is right or wrong : behind all the arguments lies the issue of the morality of the possession of nuclear weapons.
• behavior or qualities judged to be good : they saw the morality of equal pay.
See note at goodness .
ORIGIN late Middle English : from Old French moralite or late Latin moralitas, from Latin moralis (see moral ).

moral |ˈmôrəl; ˈmär-|
adjective
concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character : the moral dimensions of medical intervention | a moral judgment.
• concerned with or adhering to the code of interpersonal behavior that is considered right or acceptable in a particular society : an individual's ambitions may get out of step with the general moral code.
• holding or manifesting high principles for proper conduct : he is a caring, efficient, moral man.
• derived from or based on ethical principles or a sense of these : the moral obligation of society to do something about the inner city's problems.
• [ attrib. ] examining the nature of ethics and the foundations of good and bad character and conduct : moral philosophers.
noun
1 a lesson, esp. one concerning what is right or prudent, that can be derived from a story, a piece of information, or an experience : the moral of this story was that one must see the beauty in what one has.
2 ( morals) a person's standards of behavior or beliefs concerning what is and is not acceptable for them to do : the corruption of public morals.
• standards of behavior that are considered good or acceptable : they believe addicts have no morals and cannot be trusted.
ORIGIN late Middle English : from Latin moralis, from mos, mor- ‘custom,’ (plural) mores ‘morals.’ As a noun the word was first used to translate Latin Moralia, the title of St. Gregory the Great's moral exposition of the Book of Job, and was subsequently applied to the works of various classical writers.

ethics |ˈeθiks|
plural noun
1 [usu. treated as pl. ] moral principles that govern a person's or group's behavior : Judeo-Christian ethics.
• the moral correctness of specified conduct : the ethics of euthanasia.
2 [usu. treated as sing. ] the branch of knowledge that deals with moral principles.
Schools of ethics in Western philosophy can be divided, very roughly, into three sorts. The first, drawing on the work of Aristotle, holds that the virtues (such as justice, charity, and generosity) are dispositions to act in ways that benefit both the person possessing them and that person's society. The second, defended particularly by Kant, makes the concept of duty central to morality: humans are bound, from a knowledge of their duty as rational beings, to obey the categorical imperative to respect other rational beings. Thirdly, utilitarianism asserts that the guiding principle of conduct should be the greatest happiness or benefit of the greatest number.
DERIVATIVES
ethicist |ˈeθisist| noun
ethic |ˈeθik|
noun [in sing. ]
a set of moral principles, esp. ones relating to or affirming a specified group, field, or form of conduct : the puritan ethic was being replaced by the hedonist ethic.
adjective rare of or relating to moral principles or the branch of knowledge dealing with these.
ORIGIN late Middle English (denoting ethics or moral philosophy; also used attributively): from Old French éthique, from Latin ethice, from Greek (h&#275 ēthikē (tekhn&#275 ‘(the science of) morals,’ based on ēthos (see ethos ).

So my answer would be no, as both morality and ethics are either followed religiously or philosophically according to a person's chosen values. Science may answer what a certain group of people valued as "good" or "bad," but what is actually "good" or "bad?" - it all depends on one's interpretation, religion, philosophy, and the like.

 

[Lyte]

Here we disagree, I don't see why these issues cannot be viewed through science. Facts are facts and if we know the ultimate goal (of "well-being" - I know you don't accept it) then logical steps to that goal can be found out with the scientific method.

The problem is that, as you mentioned above, science wants to look at things by comparing two different things and determining which is better/worse based on a specific set of criteria. That's not how morality and values work. These are Principles of Faith, not necessarily mathematical equations. In these ideals, 1+ 1 often equals 11 instead of 2. Science doesn't like things of that sort, or deal well with them.

I have to quote Mr. Harris here:

So what I'm arguing is that values reduce to facts, facts about the conscious experience of conscious beings, therefore we can visualise a space of possible changes in the experience of these beings. I think this is a kind of a moral landscape with peaks and valleys which correspond to differences in a well being of conscious creatures both personal and collective.
(SNIP)
Let me be clear about what I'm not saying, I'm not saying that science is guaranteed to map this space (moral landscape), that we will have a scientific answer to every concievable moral question. I don't think for instance that you one day consult a supercomputer to learn whether you should have a second child, or whether we should bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, whether you should deduct the full cost of TED as a business expense. But questions that affect human well being, then they do have answers wether or not we can find them and just admitting this, just admitting that there are right and wrong answers how humans flourish will change the way we talk about morality and it will change our expectations of human cooperation in the future.

His thesis is that well being of conscious creatures is one of the goals of increasing morality. That well being of conscious creatures is always right and suffering, pain, misery of conscious beings is always wrong. You made a claim that this isn't true, that sometimes "that which makes one miserable, unhealthy, and uncomfortable may be the absolute RIGHT thing." And I pointed out that it is the absolutely RIGHT thing only if it results to something more right in a larger context. That in itself, if you take the act of causing someone to be miserable, unhealthy, and uncomfortable - you put it in a "box" where it cannot affect anything else outside. It is NEVER a morally right thing to do. Can you contest this, can you make an argument that sometimes the well being is not a goal of increasing morality (morality = principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior), or are you willing to give this one to me?

 

[editec]

Knowledge doesn't tell us what is Moral or Immoral

It merely tells us what IS.

We decide (or we tell ourselves God tells us) what is good or bad.

 

[godspeaker]

Science and religion are just alike. They both are a result of blind men who worship their own ideas.

 

[Lyte]

At this point, I'm seeing a lot of comments about how morality is entirely subjective, therefore there can be no universal thruths to say about what is right and what is wrong. Here is how Harris replies (emphasizes are mine):

And the necessity of grounding moral truth in things that people “actually value, or desire, or care about” also misses the point. People often act against their deeper preferences—or live in ignorance of what their preferences would be if they had more experience and information What if we could change Alice’s preference themselves? Should we? Obviously we can’t answer this question by relying on the very preferences we would change. Contrary to Blackford’s assertion, I’m not simply claiming that morality is “fully determined by an objective reality, independent of people’s actual values and desires.” I am claiming that people’s actual values and desires are fully determined by an objective reality, and that we can conceptually get behind all of this—indeed, we must—in order to talk about what is actually good. This becomes clear the moment we ask whether it would be good to alter people values and desires.
Consider how we would view a situation in which all of us miraculously began to behave so as to maximize our collective well-being. Imagine that on the basis of remarkable breakthroughs in technology, economics, and politic skill, we create a genuine utopia on earth. Needless to say, this wouldn’t be boring, because we will have wisely avoided all the boring utopias. Rather, we will have created a global civilization of astonishing creativity, security, and happiness.

However, some people were not ready for this earthly paradise once it arrived. Some were psychopaths who, despite enjoying the general change in quality of life, were nevertheless eager to break into their neighbors’ homes and torture them from time to time. A few had preferences that were incompatible with the flourishing of whole societies: Try as he might, Kim Jong Il just couldn’t shake the feeling that his cognac didn’t taste as sweet without millions of people starving beyond his palace gates. Given our advances in science, however, we were able to alter preferences of this kind. In fact, we painlessly delivered a firmware update to everyone. Now the entirety of the species is fit to live in a global civilization that is as safe, and as fun, and as interesting, and as filled with love as it can be.

It seems to me that this scenario cuts through the worry that the concept of well-being might leave out something that is worth caring about: for if you care about something that is not compatible with a peak of human flourishing—given the requisite changes in your brain, you would recognize that you were wrong to care about this thing in the first place. Wrong in what sense? Wrong in the sense that you didn’t know what you were missing. This is the core of my argument: I am claiming that there must be frontiers of human well-being that await our discovery—and certain interests and preferences surely blind us to them.

So, as far as I understand, Sam is saying here that well-being, a peak of human flourishing is an universal goal of morality. If you have moral standards which don't result to a peak of human flourishing, you are simply wrong. Wrong as your morals don't result to a peak of human flourishing therefore your morals are measurable inferior to morals which do.

So it is not all for grabs, Taliban are wrong - fundamentally measurably wrong as the human well being in their society is not good.

At this point most of you pop a question: how to measure well-being? (emphasizes are mine)

The Value Problem
My critics have been especially exercised over the subtitle of my book, “how science can determine human values.” The charge is that I haven’t actually used science to determine the foundational value (well-being) upon which my proffered science of morality would rest. Rather, I have just assumed that well-being is a value, and this move is both unscientific and question-begging. Here is Blackford:

If we presuppose the well-being of conscious creatures as a fundamental value, much else may fall into place, but that initial presupposition does not come from science. It is not an empirical finding… Harris is highly critical of the claim, associated with Hume, that we cannot derive an “ought” solely from an “is” - without starting with people’s actual values and desires. He is, however, no more successful in deriving “ought” from “is” than anyone else has ever been. The whole intellectual system of The Moral Landscape depends on an “ought” being built into its foundations.

Again, the same can be said about medicine, or science as a whole. As I point out in my book, science is based on values that must be presupposed—like the desire to understand the universe, a respect for evidence and logical coherence, etc. One who doesn’t share these values cannot do science. But nor can he attack the presuppositions of science in a way that anyone should find compelling. Scientists need not apologize for presupposing the value of evidence, nor does this presupposition render science unscientific. In my book, I argue that the value of well-being—specifically the value of avoiding the worst possible misery for everyone—is on the same footing. There is no problem in presupposing that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and worth avoiding and that normative morality consists, at an absolute minimum, in acting so as to avoid it. To say that the worst possible misery for everyone is “bad” is, on my account, like saying that an argument that contradicts itself is “illogical.” Our spade is turned. Anyone who says it isn’t simply isn’t making sense. The fatal flaw that Blackford claims to have found in my view of morality could just as well be located in science as a whole—or reason generally. Our “oughts” are built right into the foundations. We need not apologize for pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps in this way. It is far better than pulling ourselves down by them.

Blackford raises another issue with regard to the concept of well-being:

[There could be situations where the question of which course of action might maximize well-being has no determinate answer, and not merely because well-being is difficult to measure in practice but because there is some room for rational disagreement about exactly what it is. If it’s shorthand for the summation of various even deeper values, there could be room for legitimate disagreement on exactly what these are, and certainly on how they are to be weighted. But if that is so, there could end up being legitimate disagreement on what is to be done, with no answer that is objectively binding on all the disagreeing parties.

Couldn’t the same be said about human health? What if there are trade-offs with respect to human performance that we just can’t get around—what if, for instance, an ability to jump high always comes at the cost of flexibility? Will there be disagreements between orthopedists who specialize in basketball and those who specialize in yoga? Sure. So what? We will still be talking about very small deviations from a common standard of “health”—one which does not include anencephaly or a raging case of smallpox.

[Harris] acknowledges the theoretical possibility that two courses of action, or, say, two different systems of customs and laws could be equal in the amount of well-being that they generate. In such cases, the objectively correct and determinate answer to the question of which is morally better would be: “They are equal.” However, he is not prepared to accept a situation where two people who have knowledge of all the facts could legitimately disagree on what ought to be done. The closest they could come to that would be agreement that two (or more) courses of action are equally preferable, so either could be pursued with the same moral legitimacy as the other.

This is not quite true. My model of the moral landscape does allow for multiple peaks—many different modes of flourishing, admitting of irreconcilable goals. Thus, if you want to move society toward peak 19746X, while I fancy 74397J, we may have disagreements that simply can’t be worked out. This is akin to trying to get me to follow you to the summit of Everest while I want to drag you up the slopes of K2. Such disagreements do not land us back in moral relativism, however: because there will be right and wrong ways to move toward one peak or the other; there will be many more low spots on the moral landscape than peaks (i.e. truly wrong answers to moral questions); and for all but the loftiest goals and the most disparate forms of conscious experience, moral disagreements will not be between sides of equal merit. Which is to say that for most moral controversies, we need not agree to disagree; rather, we should do our best to determine which side is actually right.

In any case, I suspect that radically disjoint peaks are unlikely to exist for human beings. We are far too similar to one another to be that different. If we each could sample all possible states of human experience, and were endowed with perfect memories so that we could sort our preferences, I think we would converge on similar judgments of what is good, what is better, and what is best. Differences of opinion might still be possible, and would themselves be explicable in terms of differences at the level of our brains. Consequently, even such disagreements would not be a problem for my account, because to talk about what is truly good, we must also include the possibility (in principle, if not in practice) of changing peoples desires, preferences, and intuitions as a means of moving across the moral landscape. I will discuss the implications of this below.

Generally speaking, I think that the problem of disagreement and indeterminacy that Blackford raises is a product of incomplete information (we will never be able to know all the consequences of an action, estimate all the relevant probabilities, or compare counterfactual states of the world) combined with the inevitable looseness with which certain terms must be defined. Once again, I do not see this as a problem for my view.

The whole "response to critics" can be found here.