SAYIT, et al,
This is very applicable to the "Question of Palestine." Certainly nothing about the range of possible answers is a given.
Can Palestinians Govern "Palestine?"
• it illustrates the failure of Palestinians to establish an electoral democracy and a genuinely functional state.
• Fatah correctly sees cooperation with Israel and the international community as the path to an independent state.
• Hamas sees the destruction of Israel as the only solution.
(COMMENT)
There are some huge chunks of considerations that need to be addressed.
• The "knowledge, skills, and abilities," (KSAs) to actually form a collection of personnel that can handle the functions of government.
∆ The knowledge being the experience or education in practical understanding of a governance.
∆ The skills in the performance of specific tasks that render a desired results --- within a given amount of time, energy, and fiscal limitations.
∆ The abilities the varied physical capacities and the essential materials to necessary to assemble a functioning entity.
• A citizenry that actually "wants" to exert the effort to assemble a self-governing, autonomous nation. Or, one nation (Palestine) with two autonomous Provinces (The West Bank and Gaza Strip); the union these two entities as a single sovereign state.
If the Palestinians really "wanted" a measure of autonomy, surely they would have been able to demonstrate that sometime during the last 70 years. The fact of the matter is that they have set the political and diplomatic conditions necessary to achieve that goal. The fact that they have not means that either they:
• Do not have the prerequisite KSAs to accomplish the establishment of government.
• Do not have the motivation to establish the government.
• Do not have either KSAs or the motivation to create a functional government.
The international community can build a KSA base from which the prerequisites could establish an autonomous government. But it is impossible to inject motivation and leadership when the mindset of the Arab Palestinian is pointed in a hostile direction:
The High Commissioner wishing the Advisory Council to approximate as closely as possible to the abortive Legislative council, proposed to reconstitute it on the lines suggested for the latter body, that is to say with 10 officials and 8 Moslem, 2 Christians and 2 Jewish Palestinians. But of the 10 Arabs whom he nominated, 7 withdrew their acceptance under political pressure. The High Commissioner did not wish to replace them with men of less standing. It thus proved impossible to constitute a representative Advisory Council.
Later in 1923, a third attempt was made to establish an institution through which the Arab population of Palestine could be brought into cooperation with the government. The mandatory Power now proposed “the establishment of an Arab Agency in Palestine which will occupy a position exactly analogous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency”. The Arab Agency would have the right to be consulted on all matters relating to immigration, on which it was recognised that “the views of the Arab community were entitled to special consideration”. The Arab leaders declined that this offer on the ground that it would not satisfy the aspirations of the Arab people. They added that, never having recognised the status of the Jewish Agency, they had no desire for the establishment of an Arab Agency on the same basis.
The UN Palestine Commission asked the Arab Delegation for representation in early 1948. Of course the answer was "no."
"You can lead a horse to water --- but you can't make it drink, swim or snorkel."
Most Respectfully,
R