But often said the claim is that securitizationand its lack of regulation after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Actis the problem. As the argument goes, by being able to sell the mortgages, which are then transformed into mortgage-backed securities, mortgage lenders do not need to worry about the money ever getting paid back, so they loosen their lending standards and make loans that wouldn't be profitable if they were forced to keep them. But this raises the question of why investors would want to buy such dodgy debt. Or to put it another way, how could mortgage lenders fool investors into not demanding high-risk premiums to cover the likely loan losses? If investors had demanded sufficiently high risk premiums, then the initial loans wouldn't have been profitable.
There are two possible explanations for this: either (1) they rationally assume that they will be able to let others take losses, or (2) these investors are incompetent and didn't understand the nature of these securitiesdidn't realize, that is, that once interest rates rose again, the subprime borrowers wouldn't be able to make their payments. Explanation number one takes us back to the moral hazard created by Greenspan's previous bailouts, as well as the guarantees that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac created for the various mortgages they bought and either kept or sold to others with that guarantee. Explanation number two also takes us back to Greenspan's bailouts, and the fact that incompetent financial firms weren't weeded out like incompetent companies are in other sectors. Either way, previous bailouts are the root cause of this problem.