Islamic and Arab Imperialism and Irredentism is driving the conflict between the river and the sea
The prevailing paradigm concerning the conflict over the land from the Jordan to the Mediterranean runs roughly as follows. Israel is the last manifestation of Western imperialism and colonialism, the most pernicious and pervasive imperialism the world has ever known, something Western democracies renounced after World War II. They came in the 20th century, displaced the natives and stole their land. Palestinian violence against Israelis is fully justified in response to this terrible offense.
Michael Merriman-Lotze
articulates it clearly in comparing the violence that comes from the Israeli and the Arab side:
in short it is my opinion that Israeli violence is the violence that must be exercised to maintain a neo-colonial military occupation and apartheid-like inequality. Palestinian violence is the inevitable response to that occupation and apartheid-like inequality. Violence therefore will only end when the occupation and Israeli apartheid end.
Although I think this narrative, and the justification it gives to some otherwise unimaginable behavior, is mistaken, both empirically and morally, I think it has every right to be articulated in the public sphere and taken seriously. I donāt, however, think itās appropriate for this point of view to demand from its audience that they not familiarise themselves with alternative analyses. Here is my serious response.
Consider the imperial-colonial paradigm and the insight it offers us in understanding how imperial and colonial impulses have contributed to this enduring conflict. There is no question that the thirst for dominion and supremacy play a key role in many wars, usually resolved by a battle in which one side destroys the otherās military and establishes its dominion. The pattern of hardened warriors coming from the margins of a society, committed to a supra-moral solidarity (my side right or wrong), defeating an empire gone soft with success, becoming in a few generations soft in turn, and victim to another hungry tribe, inspired the social historian Ibn Khaldoun, to take it as a law of political behavior.
But empires are not merely militarily superior, they have a cultural force that is best observed in the colonial aspect of their activities, their day-to-day superiority over their conquered peoples. When Western progressives oppose ācolonial imperialismā they oppose cultures whose sense of superiority over others is so great that they have the right to subject them and exploit them under threat of destroying them. And as any progressive can tell you, these are things we categorically reject.
But were progressive anti-imperialists to acknowledge that their (āWesternā) culture is ā so far ā the only imperial culture to renounce the right of dominion, and to consider that observationās implications, they would realise a fundamental conceptual error: in renouncing dominion, the West (at the height of its military hegemony), rejected an international norm that had governed international culture the world over for millennia. Thus, exotic āothersā like the populations and cultures of the Orient, have always, and still play by
la raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure. Rule or be ruled. Do onto others before they do onto you.
ARAB-MUSLIM IMPERIAL-COLONIALISM
However, thinking that the West is the
only imperial force worth discussing (and condemning), progressive historians have a marked tendency to ignore the millennium and a half-long history of
Islamic and Arab imperialism. And yet, that is precisely the path of thought and analysis that leads to a progressive resolution to the profound conflict.
Of all the ancient empires that rose and fell, the most enduring was the last, the monotheistic empire of Islam. In Muhammadās day, Arabs were warrior tribes, primarily based in the Saudi peninsula. And yet, within a century of his teachings, Islam had spread and covered the area from Iran to Spain. For both extent and durability, it was the most stunning imperial conquest in the history of the world.
One of the most important indicators of the penetration of a conquest concerns its impact on language. Take England. When Angles and Saxons invaded in the 6th and 7th centuries, they chased out the Celtic inhabitants and replaced their tongue with a Germanic one (Anglo-Saxon). When Scandinavians invaded in the 9th-11th centuries, they had limited impact on the English tongue. When post-millennial Europeanised Normans invaded in 1066, the language war between their aristocratic French and native commoner English went on for centuries, eventually producing a marriage of tongues that made English one of the richest languages known.
In the case of the two extreme points of Muslim conquest, Arabic did not dominate. Shiāi Iran kept its language and much of its culture; and in Spain the conquest was turned around beginning in the 11th century, leaving a limited mark on the language of the natives. But from Iraq to Morocco something much more colonial and invasive occurred. Arabs came in as victorious Muslims, and dominated so thoroughly every aspect of this vast swath of cultures and languages that their language (and many mores) dominated everywhere, largely suppressing and replacing almost all the local ones (cf. Berbers).
I note this because itās important to understand the remarkable continuity between this conquest and the Arab world today. Indeed, the similarity between the attitudes of Arabs in modern times, and in the early Middle Ages are remarkable on key points:
- Tribal loyalties: the clan structure has shown great durability in Arab culture: us-them loyalties (my side right or wrong), self-help justice, vendettas.
- Importance of Warrior Honor: one is not a man without killing another man, inflicting humiliation a source of honor, shame is social death, blackened honor is bleached in blood.
- Alpha Male dominance: gender roles are governed by the male need to assert honor by controlling the sexuality of his women. According to some readings, Muhammad opposed honor-killings, and yet they prevail in most Arab and Muslim cultures (Pakistan, Afghanistan) today.
- Strong horse politics: power and the ability to instill fear and inspire loyalty with violence are coin of the realm. Power relations constantly disrupted by power-challenges and vendettas.
- Triumphalist Religiosity: a form of religious belief that insists on public displays of its superiority, itās honor, over all other religions. Triumphalists feel the need for public signs of respect for their superiority over others. Right up to Westphalia (1648), Christian triumphalism had legitimated wars, including on civilians. The US constitution constitutes the first time in the history of Christianity, that the winners chose tolerance.
- Monotheistic Imperialism: Triumphalist religiosity is a widespread phenomenon among the nations. Certainly, the Greeks had no doubt of their cultural superiority and expected everyone to acknowledge it in the places they conquered. But monotheism takes imperialism to new heights, with its political formula āOne God, one ruler, one faith,ā and its doctrinal claims to a monopoly on salvation for all mankind.
The unimaginable success of the imperial expansion of the first century of Islam fed this triumphalist strain among followers of the Prophet. It led to the division of the world into
dar al Islam and
dar al Harb: where Muslims rule is the realm of submission, where they do not, is the realm of the sword where infidels who have yet to submit to Islam are
harbi ā destined to the sword.
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Richard Landes is a historian of millennialism living in Jerusalem; his most recent book, Can āThe Whole Worldā be Wrong?: Lethal Journalism, Antisemitism, and Global Jihad. Introduction: Rethink...
fathomjournal.org
THE ROLE OF ARAB-MUSLIM IMPERIAL-COLONIALISM ON THE CURRENT CONFLICT WITH THE JEWS
The reason why the Arab world, and the Muslim-Arab world in particular, find Israel categorically unacceptable goes back to the doctrine of
Dar al Harb, Dar al Islam. The land between the river and sea became a key part of the exploding Arab-Muslim empire ā
Dar al Islam ā in the 7th century. Fast forward some 14 centuries, and the dissolution of the Caliphate in 1924 (the first
āNakbaā) put an end to
Dar al Islam formally. In the eyes of the West, Islam, the millennia-long foe, had been put in its place.
But this triumphalist vision of a world ultimately entirely submitted to Allah (through Islam) lived on, taking on a more modern form, more powerful and effective than the Ottoman basket case. Hassan al-Banna formed the Muslim Brotherhood (1927), a multi-generational plan to revive true Islam, fight the forces of secular modernity making inroads in the Arab world whose progress al-Banna saw as a regression to the āJahaliyya,ā i.e. the āIgnoranceā of the pre-Islamic Arab world. He sought a long-term, multi-generational goal of a new salvific and eventually global Caliphate in which Muslims ruled according to Sharia: Where there was
Dar al Harb, there shall be
Dar al Islam.
For al-Banna, his triumphalist followers and sympathisers, the demotion of Islam in the eyes of the nations that had occurred through the military and cultural success of Western imperial-colonialists, threatened the very religion itself: ā
a declaration of war on all shapes of Islam.ā For them, Islam must dominate. Few forces today that seek global hegemony are so open about their imperial ambitions.
In the minds of supremacists like al Banna, therefore, the creation of Israel was a further catastrophe in this long war on Islam, the loss of territory in the heart of what was
and should be dar al Islam, and a denial of Muslim imperial claims. The core of the Arab-Muslim irredentist demand that Israel be destroyed, is a direct expression of this imperialist Islam from its first century. Free infidels are anathema to Islamās triumphalist sovereignty. āWe cannot concede a grain of sand to Jews.ā For Abul Aāla al-Maududi, the most systematic thinker of modern Islam explained, Jews must exist in the state of submission. āThe purpose for which the Muslims are required to fight is ⦠to put an end to their sovereignty and supremacy.ā
[1] To have the dissolution of the Caliphate followed two decades later by a
Jewish state in the heart of what should be Dar al Islam was a continuation of the same war āagainst all shapes of Islam.ā For triumphalist Muslims like al-Banna, Islam
necessitated dominion. Its demotion on the world stage was an existential threat. Hence, losing the battle with the Jews threatened to be an unmitigated disaster, utter humiliation on a global scale in response to which, in complete confidence in their impending victory, the Arab League
promised historic massacres. To lose would fatally wound triumphalist Islamās need for visible dominion. To Muslims such as these, Israel was a blasphemy against the Prophet (PBUH). An intolerable degradation. Another
nakba. Indeed, The Muslim Brotherhood, initially a weak movement, only came into its own in the fight against Zionism.
[2]
THE NAKBA
This hard zero-sum mentality ā if you win (anything) I lose; in order for me to win you must lose (everything) ā has characterised one of the dominant currents in Arab attitudes towards Jews in the modern period. Itās not that more egalitarian, mutually respectful relations didnāt exist. The large influx of both Jews and Arabs in the first half of the 20th century, with far greater growth where Jews and Arabs lived together (Haifa) than where Arabs lived alone (and dominant), attests to the possibility of civil, voluntary relations between the two populations.
[3] The current situation in Israeli hospitals is a rare case of a large Muslim minority integrated into the workings of professional democratic institutions. Israel has better relations with its Arab-Muslim citizens than any European country currently, despite having twice as large a population as any other democracy.
The Zionists put great importance on that reciprocity, and unlike European imperialism (which they saw themselves as explicitly rejecting), they purchased and
worked the land, and played by the prevailing rules rather than conquering and then settling the land of displaced populations. They understood that their ability to live in the (former)
Dar al Islam (i.e. among Muslim-majority nations), depended on that civil, demotic model of non-coercive, contractual relations prevailing. Their declaration of independence makes it clear that they operated in the liberal-progressive tradition of egalitarianism and self-determination rather than authoritarian imperialism.
The Great Arab Revolt of 1936-39, in which the Muslim Brotherhood played an important role, asserted the hard zero-sum triumphalist position. People who participated in the assault on both the British imperialists and the Zionists, did so to restore Arab honor. The Peel Commission made a point of asking Arab rioters how come, if things had so dramatically improved since the arrival of the Zionists, were they attacking Jews? Responded one rioter: āYou say we are better off: you say my house has been enriched by the strangers who have entered it. But it is
my house, and I did not invite the strangers in, or ask them to enrich it. Better a mat of my own than a shared house.ā In other words, āI prefer poverty as a member of the dominant group, to sharing in wealthā. One might call it a lose-lose: I can only āwinā (live in poverty) if you lose.
What we have here is a good example of what, mutatis mutandis, became of the spirit of Muslim imperial-colonialism over the many centuries in the land between the river and the sea. By the later Ottoman period, this was a classic case of so many
prime-divider societies where the ruling elites dominate the vast majority of commoners living in poverty, and the backwater of a failing system: Muslim peasants ā fellahin ā and other commoners were in dire shape, impoverished by natural conditions, Bedouin raids, exploitative absentee landlords, and heavy state taxation,
living at the edge of subsistence.
Their condition was far from the glorious triumphalism of their ancestors, but that apparently did not mean they renounced the proud sense of superiority appropriate to the conquest, but now threadbare ā¦
A mat of my own. When the Muslim Brotherhood
and the Arab Nationalists denounced Western imperial-colonial aggression, they did so accurately: both sides were engaged in
la raison du plus fort. But what they opposed to that aggression was their own, robust, millennia-long, imperial-colonialism, the so-called āresistanceā was imperial competition for dominion.
This framework clarifies the Muslim stakes in Israelās creation. Nothing could be more catastrophic than the Jews, historically the weakest and most cowardly of the dhimmi, establishing an autonomous state in the heart of (what should be) Dar al Islam. (Scholars of shame-honor cultures note that as long as a humiliating fact [e.g. a wifeās infidelity] isnāt made public, it is bearable.) A Jewish state in Palestine was just such a public announcement of Muslim impotence.
And yet, that is precisely what happened. And the response to the catastrophe was to imprison the refugees from Palestine in ārefugee campsā (where most still live) and swear eternal enmity to the āZionist entity.ā Here one finds the key triumphalist response among Arabs to Israelās inexplicable and blasphemous success, a response that has dominated Arab leaders with few exceptions, to present:
make your own people suffer as a way to promote the war you wonāt admit you lost.
Hamas explains:
The day the enemies conquer some part of the Muslim land, jihad becomes a personal duty of every Muslim. In the face of the Jewish occupation of Palestine, it is necessary to raise the banner of jihad. This requires the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses, locally [in Palestine], in the Arab world and in the Islamic world. It is necessary to instill the spirit of jihad in the nation, engage the enemies and join the ranks of the jihad fighters.
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Richard Landes is a historian of millennialism living in Jerusalem; his most recent book, Can āThe Whole Worldā be Wrong?: Lethal Journalism, Antisemitism, and Global Jihad. Introduction: Rethink...
fathomjournal.org