Disir
Platinum Member
- Sep 30, 2011
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Following the International Monetary Fund’s controversial actions in the Asian financial crisis of 1998, when it conditioned liquidity assistance to distressed countries on government belt-tightening, it established an independent evaluation office (IEO) to undertake arm’s-length assessments of its policies and programmes. The office has now issued a comprehensive critique of the IMF’s role in Europe’s post-2008 crisis.
Many of the IEO’s conclusions will be familiar. IMF surveillance, intended to detect economic vulnerabilities and imbalances, was inadequate. While staff sometimes pointed to booming credit, gaping current-account deficits or stagnant productivity, they downplayed the implications.
This reflected a tendency, conscious or not, to think that Europe was different. Its advanced economies did not display the same vulnerabilities as emerging markets. Strong institutions such as the European commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) had superior management skills. Monetary union, for some less-than-fully articulated reason, changed the rules of the game.
Such self-serving claims were in the interest of European officials, but why was the IMF prepared to accept them? One answer is that European governments are large shareholders in the Fund. Another is that the IMF is a predominantly European institution, with a European managing director, a heavily European staff and a European culture.
Still on familiar ground, the report goes on to criticise the IMF for acquiescing to European resistance to debt restructuring by Greece in 2010; and for setting ambitious targets for fiscal consolidation – necessary if debt restructuring was to be avoided – but underestimating austerity’s damaging economic effects.
More interestingly, the report then asks how the IMF should coordinate its operations with regional bodies such as the European commission and the ECB, the other members of the so-called troika of Greece’s official creditors. The report rejects claims that the IMF was effectively a junior member of the troika, insisting that all decisions were made by consensus.
Airing the IMF's dirty European laundry
Wash. Rinse. Repeat.
Many of the IEO’s conclusions will be familiar. IMF surveillance, intended to detect economic vulnerabilities and imbalances, was inadequate. While staff sometimes pointed to booming credit, gaping current-account deficits or stagnant productivity, they downplayed the implications.
This reflected a tendency, conscious or not, to think that Europe was different. Its advanced economies did not display the same vulnerabilities as emerging markets. Strong institutions such as the European commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) had superior management skills. Monetary union, for some less-than-fully articulated reason, changed the rules of the game.
Such self-serving claims were in the interest of European officials, but why was the IMF prepared to accept them? One answer is that European governments are large shareholders in the Fund. Another is that the IMF is a predominantly European institution, with a European managing director, a heavily European staff and a European culture.
Still on familiar ground, the report goes on to criticise the IMF for acquiescing to European resistance to debt restructuring by Greece in 2010; and for setting ambitious targets for fiscal consolidation – necessary if debt restructuring was to be avoided – but underestimating austerity’s damaging economic effects.
More interestingly, the report then asks how the IMF should coordinate its operations with regional bodies such as the European commission and the ECB, the other members of the so-called troika of Greece’s official creditors. The report rejects claims that the IMF was effectively a junior member of the troika, insisting that all decisions were made by consensus.
Airing the IMF's dirty European laundry
Wash. Rinse. Repeat.