Have you noticed Obama operatives talking about the last two years of sanctions crippling Iran; but not about how Iran has stalled in its efforts to build a nuclear bomb? Shouldn't those two things logically go hand and hand?
I don't follow this as closely as I should, but here is my understanding. It takes three things to have an effective nuclear weapon (as opposed to a radiological weapon which is much easier to achieve) : 1) a sufficient amount of weapons-grade fissile material, 2) an effective bomb to put the fissile material in, and 3) a delivery system for the bomb. Most of the discussion has been about the first issue, and I think it is fair to say that Iran has enough fissile material for several radiological weapons and 1--2 nuclear weapons. They will be able to produce enough fissile material for 2--3 weapons per year.
There is a claim floating around that Iran does not yet have a workable bomb to put the material into. As this is the easiest of the the three components, I wonder about this. Even if true, I don't see how this would slow Iran down by more than a few months. I think there is no question that Iran has a theater-range missile capability.
So that is where it stands regarding capacity; what do we know of intentions? Based on behavior rather than rhetoric, Iran seems to be reasonably circumspect. They have had a "dirty bomb" capacity for several years but show no signs of moving in that direction. They put up a facade of wanting only a peaceful nuclear program rather than using the nuclear program for sabre-rattling. The sanctions have obviously reached a tipping point and the economic damage is cumulative (especially the European oil embargo in that Europeans are finding other suppliers and may never switch back). Continuing the status quo has become an unacceptable option.
So if waiting it out is no longer an option, Iran has a choice between two courses of action. One is to pull a Khaddafi and get the best deal it can in exchange for a real denuclearization. The other is to develop and test a weapon, then try to negotiate. The goal of US policy has been to make the status quo unacceptable, and this has been done. The logical follow-on strategy would be to make the prospects of negotiation after a nuclear test unpalatable to Iran. We are not quite there yet.
I think the chances of Iran using a nuclear weapon in a first strike is remote. They are simply not that fanatic. I think their purpose is political and the object is not Israel, it is the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Iran wants regional hegemony and control of a large part of the world's oil supply. A major danger is that while distracted by the nuclear issue, the West will not detect Iranian involvement in fomenting revolution in the Gulf. Right now Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey are also providing a distraction. This is what most worries me.
Finally, does the US have any real military options available? I think we do, but they are not likely to be anything that is talked about in public. I would hold that both a nuclear strike and a substantial ground presence are not considered feasible. Air strikes, drone attacks, and special forces actions, as well as unconventional action such as cyberwarfare
aimed at the softer targets in the Iranian system (radar, command, communication & control systems, missile launch sites, blockade, naval capacity, selective industrial and transportation targets) could be successful in halting further development and rendering existing stocks of weapons unusable in practice. I don't have high hopes for military action and it is high risk, but if military action becomes necessary, this is what I would expect. If it comes to this, military action should be unilateral and not involve Israel in any way. Remember the assets we most care about are in the Gulf and vulnerable to subversion.
So if anyone wants to put away the political sound bites and have a realistic discussion of our options (please, no more "We will not let...." comments; the question is HOW), let's have at it.
