Show me the Treaty

[hortysir]

With Iran.

Terms? Agreements? Concessions?
Who signed it? How many?

.pdf format is fine

 

[Roadrunner]

With Iran.

Terms? Agreements? Concessions?
Who signed it? How many?

.pdf format is fine

There is no treaty.

Obama/Kerry would not dare put their collaboration with evil on paper and in front of the Senate.

 

[Katzndogz]

There isn't one. obama insisted that it not be put in writing. Maybe if there is a formal agreement in June.

 

[Rozman]

Obama said it's a historic achievement....
No need for anyone to know the details....
Obama does have a promise from Iran that He and his family will get at least
a 24 hr head start before Iran starts the launch sequence.

 

[Missouri_Mike]

I don't have a PDF since they won't even write it down but here's what would be in a transcript.

Iran: We get to keep doing what we do and you stop sanctions. So fuck you or no deal.
Obie: That sounds reasonable.
Iran: And we get to fuck you in the ass.
Obie: Fair enough.
Kerry: Hey don't forget about me!
Iran: Of course, you can lick our balls while we fuck him in the ass.
Obie/Kerry: Deal!

 

[Roadrunner]

I don't have a PDF since they won't even write it down but here's what would be in a transcript.

Iran: We get to keep doing what we do and you stop sanctions. So fuck you or no deal.
Obie: That sounds reasonable.
Iran: And we get to fuck you in the ass.
Obie: Fair enough.
Kerry: Hey don't forget about me!
Iran: Of course, you can lick our balls while we fuck him in the ass.
Obie/Kerry: Deal!

I hear Kerry insisted he get to lick his shit off the ayatollahs' dicks first.

 

[Clementine]

With Iran.

Terms? Agreements? Concessions?
Who signed it? How many?

.pdf format is fine

It's apparently a verbal agreement that is not legally binding. The left is just shocked that some of us want more than that.

Only thing I've seen in writing after the deal were the signs saying, 'Death to America' as the Iranians and their leaders chanted the same. Looks like the deal is that Iran does whatever the hell it wants. They still hate us, Israel and a bunch of others and will kill us if the mood strikes. This is what the left calls progress and we're all supposed to feel safer now.

 

[MarathonMike]

Not off to a good start when Obama makes his bold statements about Iran's enrichment program and Iran comes out and basically calls BS on every single point. So if you don't even know what deal you made, how do have any clue it's a "good deal"?

 

[Avatar4321]

I'd love to see the agreement myself. But the problem is I don't know Farsi so I'd never be able to verify that their version says the same thing.

 

[Siete]

you mean show you the framework (outline) .. the agreement that won't be reached until June

of course idiots think it has ...

 

[hortysir]

you mean show you the framework (outline) .. the agreement that won't be reached until June

of course idiots think it has ...

So there's nothing

 

[Siete]

you mean show you the framework (outline) .. the agreement that won't be reached until June

of course idiots think it has ...

So there's nothing

sure there is ..

Here s the text of the Iran nuclear framework agreement - Business Insider

get off your ass/brain and study up ..


!
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
Enrichment
•
Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
•
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
•
Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
•
All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
•
Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
•
Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
•
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
•
Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
•
Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
•
Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

#
•
Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
•
Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
•
Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
•
Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
•
For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
•
The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
•
Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
•
Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
•
Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
•
All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
•
A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of

$
certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
•
Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
•
Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
•
Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
•
Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
•
Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
•
The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
•
Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
•
Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
•
Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
•
Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
•
Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
•
U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.

%
•
The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
•
All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
•
However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
•
A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
•
If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
•
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
•
For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
•
For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
•
Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
•
Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

pretend you can read ..

 

[Siete]

Negotiations began in 2003 with European states in which Iran offered to limit its capacity to 3,000 centrifuges if its right to enrichment was recognised. The deal collapsed by 2005 and there was no sign of compromise for the next eight years, as the international community ratcheted up sanctions and Iran responded defiantly by expanding its nuclear programme, moving from production of low-enriched uranium to 20%-enriched uranium, a major step towards the capacity to make weapons-grade fissile material.

The confrontation continued to escalate until 2013 and the election of a pragmatist president in Iran, Hassan Rouhani, who acted swiftly to establish lines of communication with the White House and between Kerry and Zarif. An interim deal was agreed in November 2013 that halted production of 20%-enriched uranium and eliminated Iran’s stockpile of the material in return for access to $700m a month of its assets frozen around the world.

The interim deal, known as the joint plan of action, bought time for a comprehensive agreement which was initially intended to be completed by July last year. The negotiators gave themselves another four months until November, and then after marathon talks in Vienna, it was postponed again, setting 30 June as the new deadline.

 

[hortysir]

nothing is agreed until everything is agreed[\Quote]
= nothing

 

[RandallFlagg]

With Iran.

Terms? Agreements? Concessions?
Who signed it? How many?

.pdf format is fine

It's apparently a verbal agreement that is not legally binding. The left is just shocked that some of us want more than that.

Only thing I've seen in writing after the deal were the signs saying, 'Death to America' as the Iranians and their leaders chanted the same. Looks like the deal is that Iran does whatever the hell it wants. They still hate us, Israel and a bunch of others and will kill us if the mood strikes. This is what the left calls progress and we're all supposed to feel safer now.

There is no paper agreement because Islam tells their followers that a contract made between Islam and the Infidel is non binding and can be broken at any time.

Remember, to them, we are nothing more than animals.

 

[Clementine]

sure there is ..

Here s the text of the Iran nuclear framework agreement - Business Insider

get off your ass/brain and study up ..


!
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
Enrichment
•
Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
•
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
•
Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
•
All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
•
Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
•
Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
•
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
•
Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
•
Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
•
Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

#
•
Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
•
Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
•
Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
•
Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
•
For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
•
The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
•
Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
•
Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
•
Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
•
All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
•
A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of

$
certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
•
Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
•
Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
•
Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
•
Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
•
Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
•
The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
•
Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
•
Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
•
Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
•
Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
•
Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
•
U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.

%
•
The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
•
All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
•
However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
•
A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
•
If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
•
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
•
For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
•
For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
•
Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
•
Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

pretend you can read ..

It is non-binding. Iran has indicated they don't take it seriously by continuing their "death to America' chants. Why wasn't congress included? And why did other countries understand that Obama was acting as Iran's agent in the talks? He was there for them, not for the U.S. This 'agreement' means nothing. We have no reason at all to take Iran's word for anything. This is just more talk, which is all Obama knows how to do.

 

[Claudette]

With Iran.

Terms? Agreements? Concessions?
Who signed it? How many?

.pdf format is fine

It's apparently a verbal agreement that is not legally binding. The left is just shocked that some of us want more than that.

Only thing I've seen in writing after the deal were the signs saying, 'Death to America' as the Iranians and their leaders chanted the same. Looks like the deal is that Iran does whatever the hell it wants. They still hate us, Israel and a bunch of others and will kill us if the mood strikes. This is what the left calls progress and we're all supposed to feel safer now.

I agree.

Iran gets the sanctions lifted. Still works on that nuclear program and Kerry and Barry Boy get to feel good about an agreement that has only one winner. That winner sure as shit ain't us.

Hope Isreal decides to level Iran. End of problem.

 

[hortysir]

you mean show you the framework (outline) .. the agreement that won't be reached until June

of course idiots think it has ...

So there's nothing

sure there is ..

Here s the text of the Iran nuclear framework agreement - Business Insider

get off your ass/brain and study up ..


!
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
Enrichment
•
Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
•
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
•
Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
•
All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
•
Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
•
Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
•
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
•
Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
•
Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
•
Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

#
•
Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
•
Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
•
Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
•
Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
•
For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
•
The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
•
Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
•
Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
•
Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
•
All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
•
A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of

$
certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
•
Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
•
Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
•
Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
•
Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
•
Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
•
The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
•
Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
•
Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
•
Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
•
Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
•
Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
•
U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.

%
•
The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
•
All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
•
However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
•
A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
•
If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
•
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
•
For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
•
For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
•
Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
•
Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

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TEHRAN — With some lawmakers chanting ‘‘Death to America,’’ Iran’s Parliament voted Sunday to ban access to military sites, documents, and scientists as part of a future deal with world powers over its contested nuclear program.

The bill, if ratified, could complicate the ongoing talks in Vienna between Iran and the six-nation group — the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany — as they face a self-imposed June 30 deadline. The talks are focused on reaching a final accord that curbs Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.

Of 213 lawmakers present, 199 voted in favor of the bill, which also demands the complete lifting of all sanctions against Iran as part of any final nuclear accord. The bill must be ratified by the Guardian Council, a constitutional watchdog, to become a law.

The terms stipulated in the bill allow for international inspections of Iranian nuclear sites, but forbid any inspections of military facilities.

The bill states in part: ‘‘The International Atomic Energy Agency, within the framework of the safeguard agreement, is allowed to carry out conventional inspections of nuclear sites.’’

However, it concludes that ‘‘access to military, security, and sensitive non-nuclear sites, as well as documents and scientists, is forbidden.’’ It also would require Iran’s foreign minister to report to Parliament every six months on implementing the accord.

Iran’s nuclear negotiators say they already have agreed to grant United Nations inspectors ‘‘managed access’’ to military sites under strict control and specific circumstances. That right includes allowing inspectors to take environmental samples around military sites.

But Iranian officials, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s supreme leader, have strongly rejected the idea of Iranian scientists being interviewed.

In a statement Sunday, the US State Department said inspections remain a key part of any final deal. All parties ‘‘are well aware of what is necessary for a final deal, including the access and transparency that will meet our bottom lines,’’ the statement said. ‘‘We won’t agree to a deal without that.’’

Two diplomats told the Associated Press last week that Iran and the six powers are still apart on all the main elements of the nuclear deal and will probably have to extend their negotiations. Their comments suggest there are several obstacles to the pact, apart from the public debate on how far Iran must open its nuclear program to outside purview.

Khamenei has for weeks rebuffed US demands that UN nuclear monitors have access to military sites and nuclear scientists as they monitor Tehran’s commitments under a deal and investigate allegations of past work on atomic arms.