Question for Iraq war supporters

Good.
So now, your argument is... what?

1. My point is still that war is hell and death. We should not be quick to go to war. When we decide to go to war, we should take time to overly-prepare. Knowing that we can’t think of every possibility, we should think of as many possibilities as we can and then get twice as many vehicles, twice as much armor, and twice as many soldiers as we think that we will need.

2. While no war is perfectly planned for every possible eventuality, I think that Bush handled the Iraq war very poorly. At the very least, he should have had hospitals inspected for a possible influx of injured soldiers. He should have also seen to it that our soldiers had a huge surplus of armor for protection.
 
The biggest mistake we made was allowing the Republican Guard to avoid battle and disappear into the country side. The second biggest mistake we made was dismissing the entire army after we did not destroy it.
At least you admit some mistakes were made. The "go with the army you've got" statement was a callous remark made by the SOD to a question poised by a soldier who wanted to why they did not have enough body armor or armored Humvees. Rumsfeld, a civilian, refused to listen to the military planners--before and after military operations began. He also quibbled over each item going to the theater of operations and forced units to improvise on the fly, instead of fighting as trained. Rumsfleds directives has lead to needless fatalities. This is documented in both Fiasco by Thomas E. Rick and Not A Good Day To Die by Sean Naylor. I stand by my statement that the biggest mistake of the war was having Donald Rumsfled as Secertary of Defense but I'd add that listening to Paul Wolfowitz and L. Paul Bremer was equally misguided.
 
When we decide to go to war, we should take time to overly-prepare. Knowing that we can’t think of every possibility, we should think of as many possibilities as we can and then get twice as many vehicles, twice as much armor, and twice as many soldiers as we think that we will need.
I see.
Then your criticism isnt founded in reality.
 
By what criteria do you judge if a military endeavour is well planned or badly planned?
There are many critera. Problem is, the information necessary to judge them is often unavailable.

The outcome of the operation, or how well the operation went, or difficulties encountered in that operation, are not, alone, sufficient to judge anything.
 
There are many critera. Problem is, the information necessary to judge them is often unavailable.

The outcome of the operation, or how well the operation went, or difficulties encountered in that operation, are not, alone, sufficient to judge anything.

I agree that the outcome of the operation is generally insufficient to judge whether a military endeavour was well or poorly planned. But, acknowledging that one can never (or very, very rarely) have all the information, what are the main criteria by which you would judge if a military action were well or poorly planned?
 
I agree that the outcome of the operation is generally insufficient to judge whether a military endeavour was well or poorly planned.
....even though that's the majority basis for the argument that the operation in Iraq was poorly planned...
...But, acknowledging that one can never (or very, very rarely) have all the information, what are the main criteria by which you would judge if a military action were well or poorly planned?
Knowing that I cannot possibly have all the information necessary for such a judgement, it is -impossible- to make that judgement.
 
Knowing that I cannot possibly have all the oinformation necessary for such a judgement, it is -impossible- to make that judgement.

So, in hindsight, your response to my original question "Do you think it is possible to say that any military action is better planned for than any other military action?", your answer is "no" because one never has all the information. Is that correct?
 
So, in hindsight, your response to my original question "Do you think it is possible to say that any military action is better planned for than any other military action?", your answer is "no" because one never has all the information. Is that correct?
No, its quite possible to say that some are better planned than others, because alsmost necessarily, some -must- be better planned than others.

The question, oif course, is: can you determine which operations are, comparitively, better planned?

And that depends on the information you have available.

At this point, the only information available regarding Iraq is that some non-combat troops didn't have the body armor and armored vehicles normally issued only to combat troops when they found themelves in combat. Arguing that this means the war was poorly planeed is, at best, an 'outcome of operation' judgement.
 
No, its quite possible to say that some are better planned than others, because alsmost necessarily, some -must- be better planned than others.

The question, oif course, is: can you determine which operations are, comparitively, better planned?

And that depends on the information you have available.

At this point, the only information available regarding Iraq is that some non-combat troops didn't have the body armor and armored vehicles normally issued only to combat troops when they found themelves in combat. Arguing that this means the war was poorly planeed is, at best, an 'outcome of operation' judgement.

So, with enough information (short of complete or nearly complete information - which is impossible), one can say whether a military action was well planned or poorly planned. Sorry to harp on this, but imagining a scenario like Grenada or D-Day, what criteria do you use to determine whether an operation was well planned or poorly planned?

It would just be easier to discuss issues like this if I knew what criteria you thought were important in making a judgement like this.
 
apples and oranges
Allow me to enlighten you...prior to the battle of Bull Run many in the political establishment thought the War Between the States would be easy, a cake walk so to speak. Many left Washington with pick-nick baskets to go watch the Union troops whip the rebels. After the battle and the Union troops and the political observers retreated back into the battle works surrounding capital, they realized this war would be much harder than previously thought.

Likewise, in run up to continuing the conflict with Iraq from Gulf War I, Paul Wolfowitz and others said removing Saddam would be easy and American troops would be greeted as liberators. The common politcal preconception's turned out to be overly optimistic just like those politcal views prior to the battle of Bull Run. In both cases, the actual conflict turned out to be much harder than the politicians thought.

War is ugly, bloody, and painful: whether it be in the times of Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great or Tommy Franks. The lessons are the same. So don't discount what was learned in another conflict to easily. War is the use of organized violence to impose the state's will on another state, or to defend the state from having another state's will impose on them.
 
So, with enough information (short of complete or nearly complete information - which is impossible), one can say whether a military action was well planned or poorly planned.
I would think so, yes.
After all, results only say so much.

Sorry to harp on this, but imagining a scenario like Grenada or D-Day, what criteria do you use to determine whether an operation was well planned or poorly planned?
You would have to see the plans themselves, especially in terms of what they expected to face and how they planned to deal with it. You'd also need to see what forces were available, their state of supply, etc.

Then, you'd take the information you have, and apply to them both the principles of war and the thrreads of continutiy to see if they held to thoe principles.

I knew Montgomery couldn't take Caen on D-day or D-plus-10.
And I said so.
 
Youw woudl have to see the plans themselves, especially in terms of what they expected to face and how they planned to deal with it. You'd also need to see what forces were available, their state of supply, etc.

Then, you'd take the information you have, and apply to them both the principles of war and the thrreads of continutiy to see if they held to thoe principles.

I knew Montgomery couldn't take Caen on D-day or D-plus-10.
And I said so.

By what criteria do you judge a plan? For instance, if the plan envisioned taking objective A on day 3, but objective A wasn't captured until day 8, does that mean it was a bad plan? Was it necessarily poorly drawn up, executed, etc.? Did something necessarily go wrong (assuming events mid-stream didn't change objectives)?

If not meeting the objectives as envisioned isn't the criteria, then what is the criteria for judging a plan, or troop levels, or troop readiness, or anything else? How do we know if a plan or state of readiness was insufficient or poorly designed?

Sorry. That is a lot of questions.
 
How is it not? It is possible.
Its possoible to say, sure.

But "Plan for everything you can think of and then double what you think need' isnt possible in reality.

See, in reality, you have limits, limits that cannot be ignored or moved at the wave of a hand or dimissed by simply saying that 'we are the most powerful nation in the world'. No matter how hard you try, some things just can't be done, for any number of reasons, many of which are quite often completely out of your control.

There isnt a military planner, through the course of recorded history, that would not have LOVED to be able to 'figure out what you need and double it'. Few, if any at all, have ever had the luxury to be able to do that.

If you knew -anything- about military planning, you'd understand.
 
By what criteria do you judge a plan? For instance, if the plan envisioned taking objective A on day 3, but objective A wasn't captured until day 8, does that mean it was a bad plan? Was it necessarily poorly drawn up, executed, etc.? Did something necessarily go wrong (assuming events mid-stream didn't change objectives)?
I think I addressed this.

And, as you agreed, outcome-of-operation isnt, in and of itself, a valid criteria.

Two things are certain in war:
-The enemy rarely will do what you expect, and never what you want, them to do;
-No OPLAN ever survives initial contact.
 
Its possoible to say, sure.

But "Plan for everything you can think of and then double what you think need' isnt possible in reality.

See, in reality, you have limits, limits that cannot be ignored or moved at the wave of a hand or dimissed by simply saying that 'we are the most powerful nation in the world'. No matter how hard you try, some things just can't be done, for any number of reasons, many of which are quite often completely out of your control.

There isnt a military planner, through the course of recorded history, that would not have LOVED to be able to 'figure out what you need and double it'. Few, if any at all, have ever had the luxury to be able to do that.

If you knew -anything- about military planning, you'd understand.

I know enough about the sorts of contingency plans that the Pentagon has always wasted its time on to KNOW that they certainly have enough manpower (if not civilian brainpower) to have planned for the contingency that shiites, who, while in the minority, had been brutally subjegated by sunni baathists, would, when Saddam was gone, not want to play nice with the now leader-less sunni minority.
 
I think I addressed this.

And, as you agreed, outcome-of-operation isnt, in and of itself, a valid criteria.

Two things are certain in war:
-The enemy rarely will do what you expect, and never what you want, them to do;
-No OPLAN ever survives initial contact.

I agree that outcome is insufficient, and I have my own criteria for how I judge these endeavours which is basically the same as I judge all endeavours. I am just wondering how you judge these endeavours.

Taking a step back from actual military operations (tactics) and looking at strategies, assuming you had all the information you could want, and assuming that the US planned an occupation of Iraq (for at least 2 years at a minimum in this hypothetical) how would you judge if we sent an adequate number of troops to control Iraq post-invasion? What are the criteria that you would use to make this judgment - acknowledging that outcome is only one factor? What information is necessary to you in order to make this judgement?
 
Taking a step back from actual military operations (tactics) and looking at strategies, assuming you had all the information you could want, and assuming that the US planned an occupation of Iraq (for at least 2 years at a minimum in this hypothetical) how would you judge if we sent an adequate number of troops to control Iraq post-invasion? What are those criteria - acknowledging that outcome is only one factor? What information is necessary to make this judgement?
I havent a clue. See, I know I know a lot. I know there are things I don't know. And there are things I don't know I don't know. I'd need to know all these things.

One of the things I -do- know is that, long term, its very hard to predict what an adversary will do, to the level that, two years before he does it, you can make sure you have the right equipment in the right place at the right time. No one has that sort of foresight, and it rather to silly to argue that someone should.
 

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