Finally.........A Palestinian Contribution To Mankind

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore et al,

I don’t believe I had an intention of “refuting” (primary intention of proving the video to be wrong or false). I don’t start-out argumentative where it is not necessary. I merely outlined some of the factors not taken into account in the “strict compliance” concepts the video presents.

In every comment I make, there is always something left-out or truncated. You can write an Event-Encyclopedia or multi-volume study on the conflict and still leave something out. There is a limitation here.

The video presentation did not touch on why the Palestinians were displaced, or what dangers they pose to the peace and security to that landscape. It merely attempts, as my previous comment discussed, the strategy of trying to demonstrate that everything that does not agree with the Arab Palestinian view is illegal, improper or at fault in some fashion.

I think that the actually history of the Arab Palestinian and the political involvement of the Mufti to exploit religious disputes, demonstrates the weakness and failure of the radicalized Arab Palestinian as is creates an Islamic Resistance, a Jihadist Insurgency, and resort to a harmful new way of life that accelerates and embraces death and dishonors the people and the culture.

Arab Palestinians send their kids to Jihadist Summer Camp, yet parade the dead bodies of their children around when they intentionally perform military operations in a densely populated areas, and attempted to draw fire, to make a media event out of it.
​

When the people of the world think of a terrorist, the picture they mentally envision is that of the Arab (bomb vest optional).

All that without refuting one word of my video.

(COMMENT)

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.
HAMAS Covenant

"The Islamic Land of Palestine is one and cannot be divided.
There is no difference between Haifa and Nablus, between
Lod and Ramallah, between Jerusalem and Nazareth. Dividing
Palestine into cantons and giving recognition to the occupation
is prohibited by Sharia (Islamic religious law), since Palestinian
is Wakf (Islamic Trust) for all Moslems in the East and in the
West. No one has the right to give it up or to forsake it. The
liberation of Palestine is a mandatory obligation for all
Moslem and not only for our Palestinian nation.”
Shiekh Yuosouf Abu Sneina,
Official Cleric of the Al Aqsa Mosque,
​

Nowhere, in this reference list, does the International Body of Law, require the Jewish State of Israel to repatriate Arab-Palestinians that declared a Jihad before the Declaration of Independence of Israel. Nor does the International Body of Law, being used as a Trojan Horse, enjoin the Israeli to accept Jihadists, Fedayeen, insurgents, radical Islamist and assorted terrorists that kidnap and murder, specifically zero-in on civilians as targets of conventional and asymmetric attacks, hijackings, piracy, sabotage, bombings and other tactics that spread fear across the general population. There is no International Law that require Israel to place its citizens in jeopardy by re-admitting Arabs of Palestine that made a solemn declaration before the United Nations,before God and history, that they will never submit or yield to any power going to Palestine to enforce partition.

None of these laws are —- by absolute decree —- are applicable under the conditions of conflict, wherein the identified refugees wish to avail themselves of the RoR, yet have pledged an oath to open hostilities and to maintain hostilities until the Jewish National Home is removed. This oath was made in 1948, even before the the Declaration of Independence for the Jewish State of Israel; and before the Arab League Nations coordinated assault.

Most Respectfully,
R

In this Brief, the author argues that the right of refugees to return to their homes and properties had already achieved customary status (binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin, and prohibited mass expulsion of persons - particularly on discriminatory grounds. UN Resolution 194's consistency with international law and practice over the past five decades further strengthens its value as a normative framework for a durable solution for Palestinian refugees today.

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf

Here's a differing opinion.

In August 2010, the position paper, “The Return of Palestinian Refugees to the State of Israel,” was published by the Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought and presented to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, and to other decision-makers and academic experts. The paper examined all sources in international law dealing with questions of refugee return. It also reviewed the methods recognized throughout the world for dealing with refugee problems.

International law does not obligate/recognize the legal right of Palestinian refugees to settle in Israeli territory. Such large-scale return was not standard at the time the problem emerged, and it is not used effectively today. While the issue of the refugees needs to be dealt with seriously, Israel should be careful not to recognize a right of return for refugees under international law, since this may be the basis for new legal obligations.

The JPost

Where is the rest of it? This doesn't say anything.

 

[Phoenall]

P F Tinmore et al,

I don’t believe I had an intention of “refuting” (primary intention of proving the video to be wrong or false). I don’t start-out argumentative where it is not necessary. I merely outlined some of the factors not taken into account in the “strict compliance” concepts the video presents.

In every comment I make, there is always something left-out or truncated. You can write an Event-Encyclopedia or multi-volume study on the conflict and still leave something out. There is a limitation here.

The video presentation did not touch on why the Palestinians were displaced, or what dangers they pose to the peace and security to that landscape. It merely attempts, as my previous comment discussed, the strategy of trying to demonstrate that everything that does not agree with the Arab Palestinian view is illegal, improper or at fault in some fashion.

I think that the actually history of the Arab Palestinian and the political involvement of the Mufti to exploit religious disputes, demonstrates the weakness and failure of the radicalized Arab Palestinian as is creates an Islamic Resistance, a Jihadist Insurgency, and resort to a harmful new way of life that accelerates and embraces death and dishonors the people and the culture.

Arab Palestinians send their kids to Jihadist Summer Camp, yet parade the dead bodies of their children around when they intentionally perform military operations in a densely populated areas, and attempted to draw fire, to make a media event out of it.
​

When the people of the world think of a terrorist, the picture they mentally envision is that of the Arab (bomb vest optional).

All that without refuting one word of my video.

(COMMENT)

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.
HAMAS Covenant

"The Islamic Land of Palestine is one and cannot be divided.
There is no difference between Haifa and Nablus, between
Lod and Ramallah, between Jerusalem and Nazareth. Dividing
Palestine into cantons and giving recognition to the occupation
is prohibited by Sharia (Islamic religious law), since Palestinian
is Wakf (Islamic Trust) for all Moslems in the East and in the
West. No one has the right to give it up or to forsake it. The
liberation of Palestine is a mandatory obligation for all
Moslem and not only for our Palestinian nation.”
Shiekh Yuosouf Abu Sneina,
Official Cleric of the Al Aqsa Mosque,
​

Nowhere, in this reference list, does the International Body of Law, require the Jewish State of Israel to repatriate Arab-Palestinians that declared a Jihad before the Declaration of Independence of Israel. Nor does the International Body of Law, being used as a Trojan Horse, enjoin the Israeli to accept Jihadists, Fedayeen, insurgents, radical Islamist and assorted terrorists that kidnap and murder, specifically zero-in on civilians as targets of conventional and asymmetric attacks, hijackings, piracy, sabotage, bombings and other tactics that spread fear across the general population. There is no International Law that require Israel to place its citizens in jeopardy by re-admitting Arabs of Palestine that made a solemn declaration before the United Nations,before God and history, that they will never submit or yield to any power going to Palestine to enforce partition.

None of these laws are —- by absolute decree —- are applicable under the conditions of conflict, wherein the identified refugees wish to avail themselves of the RoR, yet have pledged an oath to open hostilities and to maintain hostilities until the Jewish National Home is removed. This oath was made in 1948, even before the the Declaration of Independence for the Jewish State of Israel; and before the Arab League Nations coordinated assault.

Most Respectfully,
R

In this Brief, the author argues that the right of refugees to return to their homes and properties had already achieved customary status (binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin, and prohibited mass expulsion of persons - particularly on discriminatory grounds. UN Resolution 194's consistency with international law and practice over the past five decades further strengthens its value as a normative framework for a durable solution for Palestinian refugees today.

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf

And the law givers say that it hasnt, and they know more than your islamonazi propagandist in the link. Who are you to overrule the ICC/ICJ who enforce the laws

 

[Phoenall]

P F Tinmore et al,

I don’t believe I had an intention of “refuting” (primary intention of proving the video to be wrong or false). I don’t start-out argumentative where it is not necessary. I merely outlined some of the factors not taken into account in the “strict compliance” concepts the video presents.

In every comment I make, there is always something left-out or truncated. You can write an Event-Encyclopedia or multi-volume study on the conflict and still leave something out. There is a limitation here.

The video presentation did not touch on why the Palestinians were displaced, or what dangers they pose to the peace and security to that landscape. It merely attempts, as my previous comment discussed, the strategy of trying to demonstrate that everything that does not agree with the Arab Palestinian view is illegal, improper or at fault in some fashion.

I think that the actually history of the Arab Palestinian and the political involvement of the Mufti to exploit religious disputes, demonstrates the weakness and failure of the radicalized Arab Palestinian as is creates an Islamic Resistance, a Jihadist Insurgency, and resort to a harmful new way of life that accelerates and embraces death and dishonors the people and the culture.

Arab Palestinians send their kids to Jihadist Summer Camp, yet parade the dead bodies of their children around when they intentionally perform military operations in a densely populated areas, and attempted to draw fire, to make a media event out of it.
​

When the people of the world think of a terrorist, the picture they mentally envision is that of the Arab (bomb vest optional).

All that without refuting one word of my video.

(COMMENT)

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.
HAMAS Covenant

"The Islamic Land of Palestine is one and cannot be divided.
There is no difference between Haifa and Nablus, between
Lod and Ramallah, between Jerusalem and Nazareth. Dividing
Palestine into cantons and giving recognition to the occupation
is prohibited by Sharia (Islamic religious law), since Palestinian
is Wakf (Islamic Trust) for all Moslems in the East and in the
West. No one has the right to give it up or to forsake it. The
liberation of Palestine is a mandatory obligation for all
Moslem and not only for our Palestinian nation.”
Shiekh Yuosouf Abu Sneina,
Official Cleric of the Al Aqsa Mosque,
​

Nowhere, in this reference list, does the International Body of Law, require the Jewish State of Israel to repatriate Arab-Palestinians that declared a Jihad before the Declaration of Independence of Israel. Nor does the International Body of Law, being used as a Trojan Horse, enjoin the Israeli to accept Jihadists, Fedayeen, insurgents, radical Islamist and assorted terrorists that kidnap and murder, specifically zero-in on civilians as targets of conventional and asymmetric attacks, hijackings, piracy, sabotage, bombings and other tactics that spread fear across the general population. There is no International Law that require Israel to place its citizens in jeopardy by re-admitting Arabs of Palestine that made a solemn declaration before the United Nations,before God and history, that they will never submit or yield to any power going to Palestine to enforce partition.

None of these laws are —- by absolute decree —- are applicable under the conditions of conflict, wherein the identified refugees wish to avail themselves of the RoR, yet have pledged an oath to open hostilities and to maintain hostilities until the Jewish National Home is removed. This oath was made in 1948, even before the the Declaration of Independence for the Jewish State of Israel; and before the Arab League Nations coordinated assault.

Most Respectfully,
R

In this Brief, the author argues that the right of refugees to return to their homes and properties had already achieved customary status (binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin, and prohibited mass expulsion of persons - particularly on discriminatory grounds. UN Resolution 194's consistency with international law and practice over the past five decades further strengthens its value as a normative framework for a durable solution for Palestinian refugees today.

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf

Here's a differing opinion.

In August 2010, the position paper, “The Return of Palestinian Refugees to the State of Israel,” was published by the Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought and presented to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, and to other decision-makers and academic experts. The paper examined all sources in international law dealing with questions of refugee return. It also reviewed the methods recognized throughout the world for dealing with refugee problems.

International law does not obligate/recognize the legal right of Palestinian refugees to settle in Israeli territory. Such large-scale return was not standard at the time the problem emerged, and it is not used effectively today. While the issue of the refugees needs to be dealt with seriously, Israel should be careful not to recognize a right of return for refugees under international law, since this may be the basis for new legal obligations.

The JPost

Where is the rest of it? This doesn't say anything.

Have they disabled links on your computer because you become agitated

 

[RoccoR]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

 

[Hollie]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Try reading what Rocco delineated for you.

 

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Try reading what Rocco delineated for you.

I did. He gave some reasons why the UNCCP failed but that did not change the law.

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf

 

[Hollie]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Try reading what Rocco delineated for you.

I did. He gave some reasons why the UNCCP failed but that did not change the law.

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf

Which was refuted, here: The JPost

 

[RoccoR]

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,​

Indeed, that is the key.

Second, the Resolution affirms that return must be guided by the individual choice of each refugee. According to the UN Mediator’s report, it was an "unconditional right" of the refugees "to make a free choice [which] should be fully respected." Reviewing the drafting history of Resolution 194, the UN Secretariat stated that paragraph 11 “intended to confer upon the refugees as individuals the right of exercising a free choice as to their future.”

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf​

 

[Phoenall]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

 

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

When was that determined.

Link?

 

[Phoenall]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,​

Indeed, that is the key.

Second, the Resolution affirms that return must be guided by the individual choice of each refugee. According to the UN Mediator’s report, it was an "unconditional right" of the refugees "to make a free choice [which] should be fully respected." Reviewing the drafting history of Resolution 194, the UN Secretariat stated that paragraph 11 “intended to confer upon the refugees as individuals the right of exercising a free choice as to their future.”

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf​

This outpouring of islamonazi propaganda sums it up perfectly.

Did you read the remit of the site


BADIL-Briefs
aim to support the Palestinian-Arab and internatio
nal debate
about strategies for promotion of Palestinian refug
ees' right of return,
restitution, and compensation in the framework of a
just and durable solution
of the Palestinian/Arab - Israeli conflict.


Very biased against the Jews and their rights under international law, which is why you used it

 

[Phoenall]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

When was that determined.

Link?

Read the words in the UN resolution were it says that, the link is posted if you bother to look

 

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,​

Indeed, that is the key.

Second, the Resolution affirms that return must be guided by the individual choice of each refugee. According to the UN Mediator’s report, it was an "unconditional right" of the refugees "to make a free choice [which] should be fully respected." Reviewing the drafting history of Resolution 194, the UN Secretariat stated that paragraph 11 “intended to confer upon the refugees as individuals the right of exercising a free choice as to their future.”

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf​

This outpouring of islamonazi propaganda sums it up perfectly.

Did you read the remit of the site


BADIL-Briefs
aim to support the Palestinian-Arab and internatio
nal debate
about strategies for promotion of Palestinian refug
ees' right of return,
restitution, and compensation in the framework of a
just and durable solution
of the Palestinian/Arab - Israeli conflict.


Very biased against the Jews and their rights under international law, which is why you used it

They want to follow the law.

Israel hates law.

 

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

When was that determined.

Link?

Read the words in the UN resolution were it says that, the link is posted if you bother to look

You didn't understand the question. Try again.

 

[Hollie]

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,​

Indeed, that is the key.

Second, the Resolution affirms that return must be guided by the individual choice of each refugee. According to the UN Mediator’s report, it was an "unconditional right" of the refugees "to make a free choice [which] should be fully respected." Reviewing the drafting history of Resolution 194, the UN Secretariat stated that paragraph 11 “intended to confer upon the refugees as individuals the right of exercising a free choice as to their future.”

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf​

The Arabs-Moslems have consistently rejected the live at peace, meme.

Have you read the Hamas charter and listened to the putrid bile being spewed by the various Islamist Death Cults occupying the disputed territories?

 

[Hollie]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(binding international law) by 1948. UN Resolution 194, therefore, simply reaffirms international legal principles that were already binding and which required states to allow refugees to return to their places of origin,​

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,​

Indeed, that is the key.

Second, the Resolution affirms that return must be guided by the individual choice of each refugee. According to the UN Mediator’s report, it was an "unconditional right" of the refugees "to make a free choice [which] should be fully respected." Reviewing the drafting history of Resolution 194, the UN Secretariat stated that paragraph 11 “intended to confer upon the refugees as individuals the right of exercising a free choice as to their future.”

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf​

This outpouring of islamonazi propaganda sums it up perfectly.

Did you read the remit of the site


BADIL-Briefs
aim to support the Palestinian-Arab and internatio
nal debate
about strategies for promotion of Palestinian refug
ees' right of return,
restitution, and compensation in the framework of a
just and durable solution
of the Palestinian/Arab - Israeli conflict.


Very biased against the Jews and their rights under international law, which is why you used it

They want to follow the law.

Israel hates law.

Link?

 

[P F Tinmore]

P F Tinmore,

Well, this is arguable on a couple of points.

(COMMENT)

UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III), when it was adopted, was not an enforceable and binding Resolution.

A/RES/194(III) clearly states "Resolves" and NOT "Reaffirms:"

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
​

UNCCP OFFICIAL RECORDS: SIXTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 18 (A/1985)
While the UNCCP had some very broad powers, there were limitations. But the primary mandate remained always the same, "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;" through a process of mutual compromise (give and take). That is, that no one can intelligently view A/RES/194(III), as a carved-in stone, strict compliance, requirements. It was always assumed that like all wars though-out history, the victors had some advantages in the negotiated outcomes.

49. It was further pointed out that the terms of reference and the powers of the Commission were defined in resolution 194 (III) and subsequent resolutions. The Commission had no authority to assume any functions or powers beyond those assigned to it by the General Assembly. By resolution 194 (III) the Commission had been given the primary mandate "to take steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". In entrusting the Commission with this responsibility, the Assembly had purposely refrained from restricting the Commission's authority within narrow limits. On the contrary, the Assembly expected the Commission to exercise its judgment as to the best ways and means to be adopted in facilitating the return of peace in Palestine and had instructed it to assume, in so far as it considered necessary, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

50. Particularly in its mediatory role, the Commission had not only the right but the duty to make realistic give-and-take proposals on all outstanding questions--those which had been the subject of specific General Assembly recommendations as well as those which had not. In drawing up the comprehensive pattern of proposals which it had submitted to the parties, the Commission had not held itself aloof from the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It had carefully designed the proposals as a means by which the spirit of these resolutions could be implemented in the best interests of all concerned: the Arab States, the State of Israel, the refugees and the world community.
​

There were a number of considerations that prevented the success of the UNCCP and a return to peace. The Arab Delegations made it clear that they would NOT give consideration to the "non-aggression pact" as a supplement to the Armistice Agreements. And this spread an unspoken suspicion and consequence "with regard to the repatriation of refugees." The Israel Delegation stated that two of their major considerations in the Conciliation Process were defense imperative, political and economic stability. The mere fact that the Arab Delegations were unwilling to accept the non-aggression language in the preamble made many outside observers think there was some hidden future agenda (and as it turned out, there was). The Arab Delegation saw no need to go beyond the Armistice Agreement, the Conciliation language something they considered unnecessary. This made the yet undefined parameters of a return of Arab refugees much more difficult.

In the 65 years since that Final Report by the UNCCP, there were the 1956 conflict, the 1967 conflict and the 1973 conflict. The mandate to achieve some sort of lasting peace did not materialize. Only Egypt and Jordan have advanced to a return to peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria have not even formerly entered into Peace Talks; and the Palestinians have not been able to advance beyond the Oslo Accord in any meaningful way. Even after the 2005 Withdrawal, the Palestinians returned to open hostilities.

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,​

Indeed, that is the key.

Second, the Resolution affirms that return must be guided by the individual choice of each refugee. According to the UN Mediator’s report, it was an "unconditional right" of the refugees "to make a free choice [which] should be fully respected." Reviewing the drafting history of Resolution 194, the UN Secretariat stated that paragraph 11 “intended to confer upon the refugees as individuals the right of exercising a free choice as to their future.”

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf​

This outpouring of islamonazi propaganda sums it up perfectly.

Did you read the remit of the site


BADIL-Briefs
aim to support the Palestinian-Arab and internatio
nal debate
about strategies for promotion of Palestinian refug
ees' right of return,
restitution, and compensation in the framework of a
just and durable solution
of the Palestinian/Arab - Israeli conflict.


Very biased against the Jews and their rights under international law, which is why you used it

They want to follow the law.

Israel hates law.

Link?

How many do you want?

 

[Hollie]

OK, so where does that negate the Palestinian's RoR?

Here

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,


If you read what it says and understand what it means. It says that the arab muslims have to give assurances that they will not resort to any form of violence or belligerence before being allowed to return. Any that have a proven record of attacks against Israel are not welcome and will be deported straight away. The arab muslims that are Israeli citizens met the criteria and are allowed to stay

P F Tinmore, et al,

RoR is not a binding demand, as the UNCCP enunciated.

No law needed to be changed. The UDHR and the A/RES/194 are not laws. And none of the other citations may be implemented if they do not achieve the return of peace in Palestine.

(COMMENT)

Thus not being a demand (non-binding) but a negotiated outcome from the efforts of the UNCCP, the inability of the UNCCP to strike a mutual agreement in the

" 56. The refusal of the Arab States to subscribe to the undertakings requested by the Conciliation Commission and the very terms of the declaration which they wished to substitute indicated, in the view of the delegation of Israel, that they had no intention of promoting the achievement of peace but that, on the contrary, their intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force."

57. ... ... ... The Commission stated that it should be clearly understood that neither the form nor the substance of the declaration of either party could alter the obligations assumed by the parties in accordance either with the provisions of the Armistice Agreements or with the terms of the United Nations Charter. It was equally apparent that such declarations could not alter the import of the resolutions of the Security Council.
​

The UNCCP remarked in conclusion that:

"81. This pattern of proposals comprised practical arrangements for a solution of the refugee question, and a method of revising or amending the Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel and her neighbours with a view to promoting the return of peace in Palestine.

82. In linking those two issues together in a comprehensive pattern of proposals the Commission took account of two factors:

(a) that the Armistice Agreements, although of a military character, were designed as a means of transition from war to peace and provided for procedures by which that aim could be attained; and

(b) that positive progress in the transition from war to peace in Palestine is impossible if the refugee problem remains unsolved."
​

The BIG Catch 22 here in the discussions is that the UNCCP understood that Paragraph 11 of A/RES/194(III) (RoR) could not be implemented.

NOTHING negates the idea of RoR, what prevents it from implementation is that the conditions then were not set:

• No peace in the RoR
• No security with the RoR

84. In particular, the Government of Israel is not prepared to implement the part of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 which resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.

85. The Arab Governments, on the other hand, are not prepared fully to implement paragraph 5 of the said resolution, which calls for the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them and Israel. The Arab Governments in their contacts with the Commission have evinced no readiness to arrive at such a peace settlement with the Government of Israel.
​

Remembering that the paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of A/RES/194(III) 11 December 1948 outlined the intend.

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Meaning:
• wishing to return to their homes
• live at peace with their neighbors
​

In 1948, the Arab Delegation stipulated that they would never accept a Jewish National Home in Arab Territory. And in 1951, (the UNCCP Para 56 above) the Arab "intention was to continue all activities which a war entailed, short of the use of military force." The conditions for RoR were not met then, and deteriorated significant over time to the present date. There is no reasonable expectation that the Arab-Palestinians (refugees) or Lebanon or Syria will reach an accommodation.

Most Respectfully,
R

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,​

Indeed, that is the key.

Second, the Resolution affirms that return must be guided by the individual choice of each refugee. According to the UN Mediator’s report, it was an "unconditional right" of the refugees "to make a free choice [which] should be fully respected." Reviewing the drafting history of Resolution 194, the UN Secretariat stated that paragraph 11 “intended to confer upon the refugees as individuals the right of exercising a free choice as to their future.”

http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/Badil_docs/bulletins-and-briefs/Brief-No.8.pdf​

This outpouring of islamonazi propaganda sums it up perfectly.

Did you read the remit of the site


BADIL-Briefs
aim to support the Palestinian-Arab and internatio
nal debate
about strategies for promotion of Palestinian refug
ees' right of return,
restitution, and compensation in the framework of a
just and durable solution
of the Palestinian/Arab - Israeli conflict.


Very biased against the Jews and their rights under international law, which is why you used it

They want to follow the law.

Israel hates law.

Link?

How many do you want?

Do your usual spam and flood the thread with silly YouTube videos.