FA_Q2
Gold Member
No they do not and that is evidenced by the FACT that guns are regulated RIGHT NOW. Very heavily regulated for that matter. Almost no one is advocating for rolling back regulations for automatic weaponry for instance.Gun nuts constantly argue that “the right to bear arms shall not be infringed” is unlimitedNo one advocates that it is unlimited.It is Scalias findingFrom Scalia’s positionWrong.....this is Justice Alito writing an opinion in a case right after Heller...
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-10078_aplc.pdf
Third, the Massachusetts court said that stun guns could be banned because they were not "readily adaptable to use in the military", but the Supreme Court held that Heller rejected the argument that "only those weapons useful in warfare" were protected by the Second Amendment.[12]
----As to “dangerous,” the court below held that a weapon is “dangerous per se” if it is “ ‘designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm’ and ‘for the purpose of bodily assault or defense.’” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692 (quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303, 402 N. E. 2d 1051, 1056 (1980)).
That test may be appropriate for applying statutes criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon. See ibid., 402 N. E. 2d, at 1056. But it cannot be used to identify arms that fall outside the Second Amendment. First, the relative dangerousness of a weapon is irrelevant when the weapon belongs to a class of arms commonly used for lawful purposes. See Heller, supra, at 627 (contrasting “‘dangerous and unusual weapons’” that may be banned with protected “weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time’”).
Second, even in cases where dangerousness might be relevant, the Supreme Judicial Court’s test sweeps far too broadly.
Heller defined the “Arms” covered by the Second Amendment to include “‘any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.’” 554 U. S., at 581.
Under the decision below, however, virtually every covered arm would qualify as “dangerous.” Were there any doubt on this point, one need only look at the court’s first example of “dangerous per se” weapons: “firearms.” 470 Mass., at 779, 26 N. E. 3d, at 692.
If Heller tells us anything, it is that firearms cannot be categorically prohibited just because they are dangerous. 554 U. S., at 636. A fortiori, stun guns that the Commonwealth’s own witness described as “non-lethal force,” Tr. 27, cannot be banned on that basis.---------
The court also opined that a weapon’s unusualness depends on whether “it is a weapon of warfare to be used by the militia.” 470 Mass., at 780, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. It asserted that we followed such an approach in Miller and “approved its use in Heller.” 470 Mass., at 780, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693.
But Heller actually said that it would be a “startling reading” of Miller to conclude that “only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” 554 U. S., at 624.
Instead, Miller and Heller recognized that militia members traditionally reported for duty carrying “the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home,” and that the Second Amendment therefore protects such weapons as a class, regardless of any particular weapon’s suitability for military use.
554 U. S., at 627; see id., at 624–625. Indeed, Heller acknowledged that advancements in military technology might render many commonly owned weapons ineffective in warfare. Id., at 627–628. But such “modern developments . . . cannot change our interpretation of the right.” Ibid.
In any event, the Supreme Judicial Court’s assumption that stun guns are unsuited for militia or military use is untenable.
2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, con- cealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of fire- arms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54–56.
Yes....felons, the dangerously mentally ill....and by leaving Miller in there you also leave in the fact that military weapons are protected...thanks....
And again...
That analysis misreads Heller.
The question under Heller is not whether citizens have adequate alternatives available for self-defense.
Rather, Heller asks whether the law bans types of firearms commonly used for a lawful purpose—regardless of whether alternatives exist. 554 U. S., at 627–629. And Heller draws a distinction between such firearms and weapons specially adapted to unlawful uses and not in common use, such as sawed-off shotguns. Id., at 624–625.
The City’s ban is thus highly suspect because it broadly prohibits common semiautomatic firearms used for lawful purposes.
Roughly five million Americans own AR-style semiautomatic rifles. See 784 F. 3d, at 415, n. 3. The overwhelming majority of citizens who own and use such rifles do so for lawful purposes, including self-defense and target shooting. See ibid. Under our precedents, that is all that is needed for citizens to have a right under the Second Amendment to keep such weapons. See McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767–768; Heller, supra, at 628–629.
Gun rights are not unlimited
Not being unlimited does not equate to being able to ignore it outright. Just as it is not unlimited, it is also not meaningless.
The courts disagree
You want to make the gun advocates extremists. Sorry, that bullshit does not fly.