Turkey has announced its intention to restart its civilian nuclear program. It already has a very significant nuclear infrastructure. Its main research center (Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center) has two modern (1986) pilot installations for conversion and fuel fabrication.[51] The involvement of several Turkish firms in the AQ Khan network indicates that there is industrial know-how in the country which could be of use to a uranium enrichment program. However, Ankara claims to be uninterested by enrichment.[52] The country operates two research reactors: a light-water 5 MWth reactor;[53] and a small Triga Mark-II unit, which is being converted to operated on LEU.[54] It also has a small waste treatment facility (Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility). Scientists have made computer simulations of reprocessing with the Purex process.[55] Generally speaking, nuclear science and technology is very active in the country. Also, Turkey is one of the only States in the region to have started setting up the regulatory mechanisms needed for larger-scale nuclear programs, under the aegis of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK). Turkey is moderately worried about the Iranian nuclear program. It has generally good relations with its neighbor. It is covered by a formal nuclear guarantee, backed by a multilateral alliance, and has nuclear weapons on its territory (including for use by Turkish aircraft). However, Ankara may be losing its sense of confidence about NATO. At two occasions—1991 and 2003—its allies were perceived as hesitant to fulfill their security commitments. The new generation of Turkish officers do not trust NATO as much as the previous one.[56] In addition, political relations with the West have become more difficult because of Iraq, controversy about the 1915 events, and a European reluctance to give a clear perspective for entry into the European Union. Turkish public opinion has an extremely negative view of the United States.[57] (It is also opposed to the continued stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons.)[58] Ankara’s perception of the Western security guarantee will be a key for its future nuclear choices.[59] The military option would be an extreme one: a choice in that direction would require a deepening of the crisis in confidence with both the United States and Europe. Additionally, domestic power games may come into play: a nuclear program might be a way to consolidate the place of the military in the political decision-making process. Defiance vis-à -vis Iran is stronger in the so-called “kemalist” circles.[60]
