Pretty interesting overview of the post WWII Middle East, and the three different government models that all, so far, have failed. It's more about no tradition of centralized government that can oversee an entire people, most of these countries have been tribal in nature, and any attempt to control power is always partnered with so much corruption.
This tragic history has unfolded in three overlapping and interconnected waves. First was pan-Arab nationalism, which in the postcolonial era overthrew traditional monarchies in Egypt, Iraq and Libya. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, the most important leader of the movement, articulated a vision that centralized power ostensibly in the pursuit of national dignity. But his pseudo-socialist, Soviet-style diktats — “ism” No. 2 — led inevitably to economic disaster. Baath Party regimes in Syria and Iraq embraced similar ideals and achieved similar results.
Still, Arab nationalism and socialism had a decades-long run, motivating masses and fueling wars in the 1960s and 1970s. The cynical embrace of the Palestinian cause offered a form of life support for these regimes, intended to distract attention from their other manifest failures. Ultimately, however, the ventilator gave out.
Inability to uphold lofty promises opened space for yet another “ism” — Islamism — to gain strength in the region. Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Islamic State “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi all promised utopias but delivered disappointment and worse.
The religious appeal of purist Islamism — a construct that rejects any divide between government, religion and culture — is powerful. In its idealized version, neither politics nor profit corrupt life under the dictates of the Quran. Nor does such a system tolerate the subjugation of Muslims under Christians or Jews.
The arrival of Islamism was long in the making. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, warned in the 1930s against what he called “blind imitation” of the ideologies that predated his recommended Islamism. Islam, he wrote, is the superior alternative and the “road to salvation from Western colonialism.”
But the violence that lies at its core also appeared early. Egypt outlawed the Brotherhood in 1948 after it launched a wave of terrorism directed at the monarchy and its constitutional system. Al-Banna, assassinated the following year, never saw his vision come to life.
Throughout the Arab socialist heyday, the Muslim Brotherhood and related Islamist movements — both Sunni and Shiite — grew in strength behind the scenes. In parallel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the export of its own Wahhabi brand of Salafism, or originalist Sunni Islam.
The hinge point came in 1979. Egypt’s Anwar Sadat repudiated both Nasser’s Soviet alliance and the losing effort to rid the region of the state of Israel. Iranians overthrew their U.S.-aligned shah and embraced Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. Soon after, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
The outgrowth of these dramatic events was an explosion of terrorism rooted in three different flavors of extremist Islamism: Iranian-sponsored groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon; Brotherhood-rooted groups such as Hamas in Gaza, which also enjoyed Iranian support; and Salafi Saudi-backed groups like al-Qaeda, which ultimately turned on Riyadh. These trend lines were not distinct. While al-Qaeda and Hezbollah and Hamas prioritized different goals, their Islamist credos — both Sunni and Shiite — were similar: Down with the West and its local puppets, death to Israel and a return to the tenets of the Quran.
What has this radical Islamism delivered, whether to the Iranian people, the Palestinians or the Muslim Middle East? Just like the “isms” that preceded it, the short answer is nothing good.
WaPo
This tragic history has unfolded in three overlapping and interconnected waves. First was pan-Arab nationalism, which in the postcolonial era overthrew traditional monarchies in Egypt, Iraq and Libya. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, the most important leader of the movement, articulated a vision that centralized power ostensibly in the pursuit of national dignity. But his pseudo-socialist, Soviet-style diktats — “ism” No. 2 — led inevitably to economic disaster. Baath Party regimes in Syria and Iraq embraced similar ideals and achieved similar results.
Still, Arab nationalism and socialism had a decades-long run, motivating masses and fueling wars in the 1960s and 1970s. The cynical embrace of the Palestinian cause offered a form of life support for these regimes, intended to distract attention from their other manifest failures. Ultimately, however, the ventilator gave out.
Inability to uphold lofty promises opened space for yet another “ism” — Islamism — to gain strength in the region. Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Islamic State “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi all promised utopias but delivered disappointment and worse.
The religious appeal of purist Islamism — a construct that rejects any divide between government, religion and culture — is powerful. In its idealized version, neither politics nor profit corrupt life under the dictates of the Quran. Nor does such a system tolerate the subjugation of Muslims under Christians or Jews.
The arrival of Islamism was long in the making. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, warned in the 1930s against what he called “blind imitation” of the ideologies that predated his recommended Islamism. Islam, he wrote, is the superior alternative and the “road to salvation from Western colonialism.”
But the violence that lies at its core also appeared early. Egypt outlawed the Brotherhood in 1948 after it launched a wave of terrorism directed at the monarchy and its constitutional system. Al-Banna, assassinated the following year, never saw his vision come to life.
Throughout the Arab socialist heyday, the Muslim Brotherhood and related Islamist movements — both Sunni and Shiite — grew in strength behind the scenes. In parallel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the export of its own Wahhabi brand of Salafism, or originalist Sunni Islam.
The hinge point came in 1979. Egypt’s Anwar Sadat repudiated both Nasser’s Soviet alliance and the losing effort to rid the region of the state of Israel. Iranians overthrew their U.S.-aligned shah and embraced Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. Soon after, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
The outgrowth of these dramatic events was an explosion of terrorism rooted in three different flavors of extremist Islamism: Iranian-sponsored groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon; Brotherhood-rooted groups such as Hamas in Gaza, which also enjoyed Iranian support; and Salafi Saudi-backed groups like al-Qaeda, which ultimately turned on Riyadh. These trend lines were not distinct. While al-Qaeda and Hezbollah and Hamas prioritized different goals, their Islamist credos — both Sunni and Shiite — were similar: Down with the West and its local puppets, death to Israel and a return to the tenets of the Quran.
What has this radical Islamism delivered, whether to the Iranian people, the Palestinians or the Muslim Middle East? Just like the “isms” that preceded it, the short answer is nothing good.
WaPo
