I strongly suspect you (Political Chic) will be tickled pink to hear this, but I have come to view you, not as misguided or contrarian but actually, demonstrably evil. I believe you experience pleasure at doing harm to the innocent. So, here. Enjoy someone who knows this topic a lot better than you or I.
From:
James Lindsay v. Critical Race Theory
James Lindsay v. Critical Race Theory
#ConceptualDisinformation Vol. 1
What is critical race theory (CRT)?
To attempt a rough, one-sentence summary: CRT is an approach to racial scholarship born in law schools in the 1980s that operates from the premises of pervasive racial inequality and a social constructionist (i.e. anti-essentialist) conception of race; challenges the idea that the superficially colorblind nature of the law means the law is race-neutral; and seeks to explain how landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s failed to deliver on its promises of equality for the racial minorities it was supposed to uplift.
As my professor Charles Mills explains in the epilogue of his 2017 book,
Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism, critical race theorists take up two tasks. The first is descriptive: “to recognize and theorize the centrality of race and white supremacy to the making of the modern world”; and the second is prescriptive: “[to recognize and theorize] the implications for normative theory and an expanded vision of what needs to be subjected to liberatory critique to achieve social justice.”
It is important to note here that Mills is using
white supremacy to denote the political system of racial domination of whites over non-whites, not the ideology of white supremacist groups like the KKK; the term is ambiguous, and it is the former definition that is relevant for our purposes.
If you’re looking to dive deep into the scholarship on CRT, the papers compiled
here will be helpful. Before addressing James Lindsay’s farcical claims about CRT, the debunking of which is the main purpose of the present essay, let’s set the table with a more detailed definition proposed in the 1993 book,
Words That Wound, co-authored by Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlè Crenshaw:
Rather than seeing racism as aberrational, CRT scholars see it as a normal feature of American society. After all, the legacy of centuries of race-based slavery and second-class citizenship doesn’t fade away overnight.
“You can’t be neutral on a moving train,” as Howard Zinn famously
put it. CRT is well aware of this, and it contends that our inquiry would benefit from a recognition that there is no view from nowhere; we all speak from some perspective, one that is not immune to the influences of racialization. Further, the pervasive racial inequality we see in the United States is not produced merely by individual acts of discrimination. As Martin Luther King, Jr.
said in 1967, “Negroes have become aware of the deeper causes for the crudity and cruelty that governed white society's responses to their needs. They discovered that their plight was not a consequence of superficial prejudice but was
systemic” (emphasis mine).
At first glance, this may look a failure to recognize that correlation does not entail causation. But what the authors are claiming is not the naive thesis that
every racial disparity is attributable to racism. The claim is that, given the history of the United States’ treatment of racial minorities—coupled with the commitment to social constructionism about race—we can safely make a defeasible assumption that a complete causal analysis of any particular (dis)advantage along racial lines will include some racist policy or practice.
This claim may seem more controversial, but it can be interpreted in a weaker or a stronger sense. I draw here on a useful distinction made by Georgetown philosophy professor Olúfémi O. Táíwò in his excellent essay “
Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference.” According to the weaker reading, this passage articulates
standpoint epistemology, which amounts to three claims: (1) Knowledge is socially situated; (2) Marginalized people have some positional advantages in gaining some forms of knowledge; (3) Research programs ought to reflect these facts.
Indeed, it is hard to see how this could be wrong. Táíwò draws on the work of London School of Economics philosophy professor Liam Kofi Bright, who
This is precisely the sort of theoretical framework Mills employs in his work on the epistemology of ignorance.
If we read the passage in a stronger sense, however, the claim can be interpreted as much more dangerous. It might be taken to suggest, contrary to CRT’s own commitments, an essentialist account of racial identity, one where only people of color are capable of working toward the elimination of racism; whites must simply defer to the voices of their non-white peers. This is the sort of pernicious mindset Táíwò calls
deference epistemology, an approach to knowledge that is not only philosophically objectionable but politically self-destructive. In keeping with the principle of charity and the fact that I have never encountered CRT scholarship that supports deference epistemology, I read the authors’ claim in its weaker sense.
I discuss the ways in which CRT is both critical of and deeply committed to tenets of liberalism later in this essay. And finally,