Statistical and strategic case against the supposed "decisive" role of lend-lease in soviet victory.

Stalin initially refused to believe repeated warnings of invasion and reacted with paralysis in the opening days.

The truth.

Ringo is probably a Russian paid Julius Streicher who is so easy to catch out on false narratives.

He will probably tell the Ukranians did not turn the highway into Kiev in a thirty mile Russian junkyard at the beginning of the wa.
 
1. 1.Stalin initially refused to believe repeated warnings of invasion

2. Ringo is probably a Russian paid Julius Streicher who is so easy to catch out on false narratives.
1.
Let's ask ourselves: why did Hitler's main ploy to start the war fail, and why did Stalin stubbornly resist information about its precise start until the evening of June 21?
He didn't resist at all.
The leader analyzed them and believed that, under any pretext, he could delay the outbreak of war for at least two or three months.
Even though armed clashes with the Germans on the border were occurring several times and every day. But he still hoped.
From mid-spring 1941 alone to June 21, Stalin received 84 (!) warnings about the outbreak of war. In total, there were about two hundred such messages since the beginning of the year. Among them, 32 were different interpretations.

That is, different dates for the start of the invasion were given. Stalin also knew that Hitler himself, roughly speaking, was also wavering on the go-ahead. (For example, one of the attack dates was proposed for mid-May, so that the Russians wouldn't be able to burn the green grain behind them.)

From the diary of Joseph Goebbels:
"May 16, 1941, Friday. In the East, it should begin on May 22. But that depends to some extent on the weather."
So we must understand: Hitler himself didn't know exactly when he would attack. How could Stalin know this?
Here's an even more damning admission from Goebbels: "June 18, 1941, Wednesday. We've flooded the world with such a flood of rumors that even I can hardly keep my bearings. Our latest trick: we're planning to convene a major peace conference, including Russia."
Stalin understands all this: a complex international political game is being played. He just hardly fully realizes that he's dealing with paranoid swindlers. Because any politician with even the slightest bit of common sense would never have started a war on two huge fronts without a basic fuel shortage. But the frenzied Hitler started it...

2.
You resort to cheap, dirty tricks, my dear. It's a sign of weakness. Did you learn that from that village idiot here named #Litwin?
 
That’s not true. During those days, Stalin ran the country on a daily basis, receiving numerous visitors and issuing orders—all of which is documented. I could provide examples for each day, but that would involve a lot of translation work...
All right, let’s talk about the early days.

On the first day of the war, 16 people visited the leader’s office. Ten of them came two or more times.
Before leaving for his dacha, Stalin—who hadn’t slept for a day and a half—called the military registration office and asked that his three sons be drafted into the army immediately (including his adopted son, A.F. Sergeyev).

On June 23, Stalin arrived at the Kremlin at 3:20 a.m. and remained at his workplace until half past seven. He returned again at 6:45 p.m.
He received 13 people. (From the “Log of Visits to Comrade Stalin’s Office”). On the same day, the General Headquarters Staff (not yet the GKO) was established. But then along came “a certain professor” V.M. Zhukhrai, who wrote: “For three days—June 23, 24, and 25, 1941—Stalin lay flat on his back, saw no one, and ate nothing.”

June 24. The Politburo met for several hours. Eight important resolutions were adopted. Neither the military command, nor the party leadership, nor the overwhelming majority of the population yet fully grasped the full tragedy of the total German offensive. Stalin received 20 people. The Evacuation Council was formed.

June 25. From 1:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m., Stalin received 11 people. He returned to his office at 7:40 p.m. and received 14 people. He received Beria, Vatutin, Voznesensky, and Admiral Kuznetsov twice.

June 26. From 12:30 p.m. to 11:20 p.m., Stalin received 19 visitors. By the most conservative estimates, Stalin made over fifty phone calls that day. (On other days, many more!) In general, however, the leader’s phone conversations were never recorded by anyone. And, of course, it goes without saying that Stalin could call any Soviet citizen at any time of day or night and get through to them! The issue of evacuating Lenin’s body has been resolved.

June 27. Several resolutions were adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR: “On the Procedure for the Evacuation and Relocation of Personnel,” “On the removal from Leningrad of valuables and paintings from the Hermitage, the Russian Museum, and other museums,” “On the removal from Moscow of state reserves of precious metals, precious stones, the USSR diamond fund, and valuables from the Armory.” Meanwhile, the Red Army was retreating in all directions.

Needless to say, such reports from the front did little to lift the leader’s spirits. He ordered the creation of mobile control and blocking detachments on roads and at railway junctions, as well as for clearing the forests. Stalin personally went to inspect the bomb shelter for the country’s leadership at 43, Kirov Street. Stalin remained in the Kremlin from 4:30 p.m. until 2:40 a.m. the following day. The sixth day of the war (just like all the previous and subsequent ones) passed for the leader of the country, the party, and the army in the most intense labor.

June 28. Stalin summoned the members of the Politburo and, for the first time, spoke to them about his own address to the nation. He sensed that he could no longer put off explaining the situation to the country. The people were eagerly awaiting answers from the Communist leader to the questions of what was happening to them and how something had become possible that had previously been unthinkable.
Stalin had been in his office since 7:35 p.m. He left at 12:50 a.m. after a long conversation with V.N. Merkulov. The People’s Commissar of State Security reported that over five hundred people had been sent to the rear for sabotage operations. More than a dozen people had visited Stalin.
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Well, does all this sound like Khrushchev’s lies? He was the one who started this whole story about “Stalin’s panic.” Here’s what that scoundrel wrote:
“I know what a hero he (Stalin) was! I saw him when he was paralyzed with fear of Hitler, like a rabbit hypnotized by a boa constrictor. Beria told me that Stalin was completely crushed. He said exactly that. “I,” he said, “am stepping down from leadership”—and left. He left, got into a car, and drove off to a nearby dacha."
You seem to be arguing against a very specific claim: that Stalin completely collapsed, stopped governing, and withdrew from leadership in the opening days.

Fine. The visitor logs and meetings suggest the reality was more complicated than Khrushchev's later account.

I'll grant that.

But disproving total paralysis isn't the same as proving Stalin handled the opening of the war well.

The broader criticism remains:

Stalin did not believe Hitler would attack when he did, despite repeated warnings. Soviet forces were deployed in vulnerable forward positions after the territorial expansion westward. Command structures were disrupted by previous purges. Orders against retreat contributed to catastrophic encirclements in the opening phase of the invasion.

And those weren't orderly withdrawals. In many cases they were outright routs.

The scale of the early disaster is difficult to overstate: enormous losses in men, equipment, prisoners, and territory within months.

I will give Stalin credit where it's due. He adapted. Soviet wartime leadership improved significantly over time, and later strategic decisions were often far better than earlier ones.

But acknowledging that Stalin remained active and held meetings in June 1941 doesn't remove responsibility for serious strategic and political failures that helped create the conditions for those early catastrophes.

Those are separate questions.
 

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