Deadstick
Platinum Member
Make your mind up.
Stalin
- Thread starter eagle7-31
- Start date
Litwin
Diamond Member
+1.
koba was the worst pedofile out there, thats why out Moscow imerlists love him so much
Time to move to Moscow 
empire for some traditional family values neighbors. Hi neighbor, my name is Scott. Hello, I am Evo, what's your last name? Ritter!
commie Evo Morales (Bolivian stalin) kept a 15 year old girl as a sex slave.
The prosecutor who issued the arrest warrant against Evo Morales for crimes of statutory rape and human trafficking has been removed from office in Bolivia.
www.usmessageboard.com
...
empire for some traditional family values neighbors. Hi neighbor, my name is Scott. Hello, I am Evo, what's your last name? Ritter!
commie Evo Morales (Bolivian stalin) kept a 15 year old girl as a sex slave.
The prosecutor who issued the arrest warrant against Evo Morales for crimes of statutory rape and human trafficking has been removed from office in Bolivia.
What did Lenin Think of pedophile koba (Stalin)? I Stalin and his lover aged 13
Lenin on his death bed: "Stalin, I don't think you should be the next leader. I'm afraid that the people won't follow you." Stalin: "Do not worry. Half of them will follow me. The other half will follow you" Stalin and his lover aged 13 Serov reported back to Khrushchev that, amazingly, the...
www.usmessageboard.com
putin in action :
Blood and Iron: How Nationalist Imperialism Became Russia’s State Ideology
The nationalist-imperialist worldview that the Putin regime is imposing on Russians is intended to feed on the past and exploit historical memories and concepts to reshape and manage the mass consciousness of the Russian people.
Litwin
Diamond Member
Litwin
Diamond Member
Litwin
Diamond Member
JoeB131
Diamond Member
Oh, he was talking to Moroni... an Angel he made up.
We have medications for that now.
Probably closer to 2 million if you take out the famines. Famines happened before we got agriculture right in this world.
Churchill let a famine kill 3 million people in India, and then joked, "Has Ghandi Starved yet?"
No, it wasn't 60 million.
Here's the thing. The population of the USSR in 1926 was 147 Million.
by 1939, on the eve of the war, it was 170 Million.
By the time Stalin kicked off, 191 million.
NOW. Even factoring in Russia's losses in WWII, how could Stalin have killed 60 million people, and STILL increase the population of the USSR by 30%?
(By way of comparison, the US had a population of 117 Million in 1926, a population of 158 MM in 1954. We enjoyed a 35% increase in population. Not really a lot better, after you factor out immigration and relatively low losses of life in WWII compared to the rest of the world.)
Litwin
Diamond Member
WHERE did you find it ? in PRAVDA ?
Statistical Falsification in the Soviet Union
Long article explains why Soviet official harvest data for 1931-1932 are not harvest data but forecasts, and shows that the annual report data from the peasants in 1932 are the only reliable harvest data for 1932 and show that the famine resulted
www.academia.edu
Stalin Falsified the Data, Then Killed the Statisticians
How the Soviet Union facilitated the famine of the 1930s that killed millions of Ukrainians, then buried the evidence.
foreignpolicy.com
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Thank you Joe for trying to make great points.
I go by the book "The black book of communism" It was printed in France but in English in 1997 and the second printing in 1999. It hits all the marks. It was printed by the Harvard University Press of MA, London and Cambridge. It is really rated as the very best source.
The Cheka known as the Secret police was managed by 60 people. It is fair to say that Stalin himself never personally killed anybody. Yet the Soviets killed millions. As the Government grew, hundreds carried out the PMRC. Since Stalin ruled Russia, with others also in the Government, he as Trump said is the Buck that stop with him. The true Death toll thanks to Communism in the Soviet Union is put at around 25 million persons.
Last edited:
Ringo
Gold Member
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Some of his speech was not honest. Germany as far as he was concerned, would never ever rise. When I was in Berlin in 1962, I saw two cities. Berlin as managed at the time by the USA, France and England essentially had recovered from much of the war damage in it's part of the city. Where the Communists ran the show, I saw massive parts of the city as rebuilt by Stalin as poor quality or plain still piled up in rubble buildings they and the allies destroyed. If you see current photos of Gaza, you see what the Russians did to Berlin. And construction by the Soviets was very very low grade work. What you see today in Russia is not what I saw done by them in East Berlin at all.
- Sep 9, 2022
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Some of his speech was not honest. Germany as far as he was concerned, would never ever rise. When I was in Berlin in 1962, I saw two cities. Berlin as managed at the time by the USA, France and England essentially had recovered from much of the war damage in it's part of the city. Where the Communists ran the show, I saw massive parts of the city as rebuilt by Stalin as poor quality or plain still piled up in rubble buildings they and the allies destroyed. If you see current photos of Gaza, you see what the Russians did to Berlin. And construction by the Soviets was very very low grade work. What you see today in Russia is not what I saw done by them in East Berlin at all.
Litwin
Diamond Member
Ringo
Gold Member
Vasilevsky A.M.
“The strongest and most colorful figure of strategic command.”
VASILEVSKY Alexander Mikhailovich (1895-1977), Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945).
In the Great Patriotic War, deputy chief, from June 1942 chief of the General Staff. In 1942-44 he coordinated the actions of a number of fronts in major operations. In 1945 Commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, then Commander-in-Chief of Soviet troops in the Far East during the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army. From 1946 Chief of the General Staff. In 1949-53 Minister of the Armed Forces (Minister of War) of the USSR, in 1953-57 1st Deputy and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR.
...I had good relations with I. S. Khrushchev in the first postwar years. But they changed dramatically after I did not support his statements that Stalin did not understand operational and strategic issues and unskilled in directing the actions of troops as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I still can not understand how he could assert this. Being a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the military council of a number of fronts, N.S. Khrushchev could not have known how high the authority of the Stavka and Stalin was in matters of military operations. He also could not have been unaware that the commanders of the fronts and armies had great respect for Stavka and Stalin and appreciated them for their exceptional competence in leading the armed struggle ...
...I would like to say a few words about Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
I believe that my official position during the war, my constant, almost daily communication with Stalin and, finally, my participation in meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the State Defense Committee, which considered one or another fundamental issues of the armed struggle, gives me the right to say about him. At the same time I will not fully touch upon his party, political and state activities during the war, since I do not consider myself sufficiently competent in this matter.
Was it justified that Stalin headed the Supreme High Command? After all, he was not a professional military figure.
Of course, it was justified ...
...In my deepest conviction, Stalin. V. Stalin, especially from the second half of the Great Patriotic War, was the strongest and most colorful figure of the strategic command. He successfully led the fronts, all military efforts of the country on the basis of the Party line and was able to exert significant influence on the leading political and military figures of the Allied countries on the war. Working with him was interesting and at the same time incredibly difficult, especially in the first period of the war. He remained in my memory as a stern, strong-willed military leader, but at the same time not devoid of personal charm.
Stalin possessed not only a great natural intelligence, but also surprisingly great knowledge. His ability to think analytically had to be observed during meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party. State Defense Committee and in the constant work in the Stavka. He leisurely, slightly slouching, walking, listening attentively to speakers, sometimes asking questions, giving remarks. And when the discussion was over, he would clearly formulate conclusions and summarize the results. His conclusions were not wordy, but deep in content and, as a rule, formed the basis of resolutions of the Central Committee of the Party or GKO, as well as directives or orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
...I have already written that in the first months of the war, he sometimes slipped a desire for frontal straightforward actions of the Soviet troops. After the Battle of Stalingrad and especially the Battle of Kursk, he rose to the heights of strategic leadership. Now Stalin thinks in terms of modern warfare, well versed in all matters of preparation and conduct of operations. He already requires that military actions were conducted creatively, with full consideration of military science, that they were both decisive and maneuverable, involving dismemberment and encirclement of the enemy. In his military thinking is noticeably manifested tendency to massing forces and means, a diverse application of all possible options for the start of operations and its conduct.
Stalin became well versed not only in military strategy, which was given to him easily, because he excelled in the art of political strategy, but also in the operational art.
I think Stalin during the strategic offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces showed all the basic qualities of the Soviet commander. He skillfully directed the actions of the fronts, and all the Soviet military art during the years of war showed strength, creative character, was much higher than the military art praised in the West German-Fascist military school.
Stalin had a great influence pa the creation of business style of work Stavka. If we consider this style since the fall of 1942, it was characterized by: reliance on collective experience in the development of operational and strategic plans, high demanding, efficiency, constant communication with the troops, accurate knowledge of the situation at the fronts.
An integral part of the style of Stalin's work as Supreme Commander-in-Chief was his high demanding nature. And it was not only harsh, which, in fact, justified, especially in war conditions. He never forgave vagueness in the work, the inability to bring things to a conclusion, even if it is allowed and very necessary and did not have a single comment before the comrade.
In confirmation of this, I will allow myself to cite one example - about a serious trouble, which had to endure one of the most experienced pa6otniks of the Operational Department of the General Staff, V. D. Ivanov.
During the events at Khalkhin-Gol in 1939, as is known, the Soviet command from the Soviet and Mongolian troops was created 1st Army Group under the command of Komkor G. K. Zhukov, and to coordinate the actions of these troops on the basis of the Transbaikal District was formed front group under the command of Commander 2nd rank G. M. Stern.
Timely arrival from Moscow to Mongolia - the area of combat operations - the government and the People's Commissar of Defense attached great importance. The organization of the flight was entrusted to the General Staff, and direct and hourly supervision of the flight was entrusted by the Chief of the General Staff temporarily acting head of the Operations Directorate VD Ivanov. Using Ivanov's information, BM Shaposhnikov periodically reported on the progress of the flight to the government and Stalin. On the appointed day and hour, Stern flew to Chita, in order to immediately fly to the final destination, which required only less than an hour of time.
The next morning B.M. Shaposhnikov, when he received a call from Stalin, reported that Stern is already in place, that is, reported what he had just been reported to Ivanov. Some time passed, and again Stalin calls Shaposhnikov and begins to angrily reprimand:
- Your people are lying. I have in my hands a telegram from Stern, he is still in Chita. Sort it out, and the culprit under the tribunal.
V.D. Ivanov was sure that the flight from Chita to Mongolia, a trifling distance in terms of distance, was made, did not check this, while the storm that played out in Chita and on the highway delayed the plane.
In the tribunal VD Ivanov still not transferred, tried by the court of honor and dismissed from the General Staff, and later he was appointed Chief of Staff of one of the Far Eastern armies. With the outbreak of war, he immediately appealed to the Chief of General Staff with an insistent request to transfer him to work at the front. In the winter of 1941/42, when the General Staff and especially the Operations Directorate were in dire need of experienced staff workers, I, after consulting with some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, returned him to work at the General Staff. Everything went well, and he worked well. But one day, before going to Stalin, I took Ivanov with me and upon arrival in the Kremlin himself went to Stalin's office, and he asked him to stay in the room telegraph negotiations Stavka and establish communication with the command of the Southern Front, but no one to the apparatus until my instructions.
I received from Stalin, as it often happened, a reprimand, in this case for the difficult situation in the south and instructions to immediately contact by telegraph with the commander of the Southern Front, Lieutenant-General R. Y. Malinovsky, to clarify from him at the moment the front situation and to get answers to a number of questions of interest to the Stavka. During my conversation with Malinovsky, which was also attended by V. D. Ivanov, in the intercom. D. Ivanov, Stalin entered the meeting room, accompanied by some of the members of the Politburo. After listening to my conversation, Stalin hand removed me from the apparatus and, without talking about himself, himself led a conversation with Malinovsky, and a conversation much more impressive and lucid than mine. Malinovsky then shared with me that he immediately could not understand what was going on, but very quickly he realized that it is not Vasilevsky, and Stalin himself.
After finishing his conversation with Malinovsky, Stalin returned to the office, and I continued to talk to Rodion Yakovlevich. When I then entered Stalin, he asked me sternly:
- Is this the same Ivanov who lied to us about Stern? He's back in his warm seat. Expel him immediately!
I began to beg to leave him in the apparatus of the Operative Department, because there is a lot of work, and there are few qualified workers.
Stalin was silent, silent, then replied:
- Well, all right, just so that here I never saw him again.
Vladimir Dmitrievich worked well and helped me. During the Stalingrad operation and operations on the Upper Don he was with me at the front and during the struggle for Kharkov he was seriously wounded and evacuated. After his recovery he continued to carry out excellent responsible work at the front, in particular, during the Far Eastern campaign in 1945 in the role of deputy commander of the Transbaikal front he performed a number of extremely important tasks. After the war, until his death, he also worked very well in very important positions in the Armed Forces-first deputy chief of the General Staff and then chief of the General Staff Academy.
I cited this case with VD Ivanov to once again show how intolerant Stalin was intolerant of the slightest sloppiness in the performance of official tasks and how difficult it was to regain his confidence. Stalin's sharpness and severity in such cases knew no limits.
Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief in most cases demanded fairly, albeit harshly, His directives and orders pointed out to the front commanders of errors and shortcomings, taught skillful leadership of all sorts of military actions. We, representatives of the Stavka, sometimes received appropriate instructions. In the book I have given many examples of this. I will cite one more. First, because it is in itself quite curious, and secondly, it characterizes to a certain extent military thinking and efficiency of Stalin in decision-making. V. Stalin in decision-making.
It was in 1943 in the battles for the Dnieper. When I emphasized in a regular telephone report to Stalin that the delay in the rapid implementation of our plans on the Lower Dnieper is caused by the lack of forces, which we, implementing the decisions approved and dictated by the Stavka, have to split here between several directions, solving a number of problems at the same time, Stalin replied:
- If this is so, then it is not necessary to attack everywhere at once. Put Tolbukhin in defense, rob him and give everything you can Malinovsky, let him attack. Then, when the main tasks facing Malinovsky will be solved, put him on the defense, rob him, give the maximum possible to Tolbukhin and push him on the offensive. That will be the proper coordination of the forces of the two fronts.
I have purposely left intact the expressions used by the Supreme to convey to the reader the usual flavor of his speech. He spoke, as a rule, accurately, sparingly and directly.
I have heard different things about Stalin's personal acquaintance with the life of the fronts. He really, as I have already noted, traveled to the Western and Kalinin fronts in August 1943. The trip by automobile lasted two days and certainly had an impact on the morale of the troops.
In my opinion, for Stalin, who headed the leadership of the party, the country as a whole, there was no urgent need for such trips. The most advantageous for both the front and the country was his stay in the Central Committee of the Party and Stavka, where all the threads of telephone and telegraphic communication converged and the flow of various information. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was regularly informed by the front commanders about the situation at the fronts and all significant changes in it.
At the fronts, in addition, there were representatives of the General Staff and the main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Much information went to Stavka also from the political departments of the fronts through the Main Political Department of the Red Army. So the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had extensive information for every day, and sometimes every hour on the course of military operations, the needs and difficulties of the command of the fronts, and he could, being in Moscow, promptly and correctly make decisions.
Stalin had an amazingly strong memory. I have not met people who would remember as much as he did. Stalin knew not only all the commanders of the fronts and armies, and there were over a hundred of them, but also some of the commanders of corps and divisions, as well as senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense, not to mention the senior staff of the central and regional party and state apparatus. Throughout the war, Stalin constantly remembered the composition of the strategic reserves and could at any time to name this or that formation.
I will refer to one small case, which discouraged me, but which to some extent confirms what has been said.
In one of the November evenings of 1941, during the period of the fiercest defensive battles for Moscow, Stalin, during my personal report to him on the situation at the front, having established that I, as a result of strenuous work excessively overworked, called in the office of his secretary Poskrebyshev and asked him to immediately find out in the sanatorium Arkhangelskoye, whether it is possible to provide a good rest that night Vasilevsky. I quickly received a reply that the sanatorium was ready to receive me. Stalin ordered me immediately on my return to go to the sanatorium and until morning to sleep properly ... In the General Staff I was already waiting for the head of the Main Military Sanitary Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense Efim Ivanovich Smirnov. Following Stalin's instructions, we went to Arkhangelskoye.
Dinner was ready for our arrival, but no sooner had I sat down at the table than Stalin called me to the phone. He asked me to remind him where the Ivanovo-Voznesensk militia division was located. “I forgot something,” he added.
I did not complain in those days about my memory, but hesitated-division redeployed, and I could not immediately name the exact location of its location at the moment. Stalin waited for a while, and then he said:
“Okay, no need, I remembered,” and hung up the phone. Such a memory gave Stalin an advantage as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
He did not need constant references, well aware of the situation at the fronts, the positive aspects and shortcomings of military leaders, the ability of industry to meet the demands of the fronts, the availability at the disposal of the Stavka stocks of weapons, artillery, tanks, airplanes, ammunition, fuel, so necessary for the troops, and himself distributed them to the fronts.
Stalin was inherent great organizational skills. He himself worked hard, but also knew how to make work to the fullest extent of the forces of others, squeeze out of them all that they could give.
However, it would be wrong to consider Stalin only from one point of view. Bluntly say that his character was rarely easy, fiery, volatile. Stalin is difficult to get along with a person, long looked at him. I have already written how not immediately allowed him to work in the Stavka Deputy Chief of General Staff AI Antonov.
But as soon as he got to know him, imbued him with respect, and when it came time in 1945 to switch me to work as Komfront, he went to appoint him Chief of the General Staff.
If Stalin was dissatisfied with anything, and in the war, especially at its beginning, there were many reasons for this, he could scold sharply and unfairly. But in the course of the war, he changed noticeably. To us, employees of the General Staff and the main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, commanders of the fronts, began to treat more restrained, calmer, even when there was something wrong at the front. It became much easier to meet with him than before. Apparently, the war, its twists and turns, our failures and successes have influenced the character of Stalin.
The same thought was once expressed by KE Voroshilov.
In the last days of March, 1944 I met with him, as already mentioned, in Melitopol, to solve the issues related to the interaction of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front with the troops of the Separate Seaside Army, where Voroshilov was the representative of the Stavka. When all the issues were resolved, we stayed with Kliment Efremovich alone in his carriage and talked about various topics, including the character of Stalin. The evening was warm, quiet, and the weather, and the situation at the front dispose to a “heart-to-heart” conversation, and Kliment Efremovich quite willingly answered my questions.
When I asked whether it had not been possible earlier to raise objections to Stalin when necessary, because now, during the war, at meetings of the Politburo or the State Committee of Defense, when discussing one or another fundamental issue concerning the conduct of the armed struggle or the development of the national economy, contrary to the opinion expressed by Stalin, members of the Politburo quite boldly and persistently make their proposals, and they are not only not rejected by Stalin, but are willingly discussed; and if the proposal is reasonable, it is accepted.
Similarly, when working in the Stavka, we, the military, directly related to the armed struggle, make our proposals, and Stalin considers us.
Kliment Efremovich, after thinking, replied:
- Stalin used to be different. Probably the war taught him a lot. He must have realized that he can make mistakes and his decisions may not always be the best and that the knowledge and experience of others can also be useful. Affected on Stalin and years: before the war he was younger and more self-confident ...
On the personal life of Stalin I write almost nothing to write. Yes, apparently, it does not matter. According to my observations, Stalin had little time for recreation and cultural entertainment, except for occasional visits to the theater and watching movies. Stalin led the life of a man fully occupied with the affairs of state.
After the Soviet troops liberated Minsk, Stalin was in a wonderful, elated mood. One evening he invited a group of military leaders to his apartment to celebrate such a great event. At the reception to Stalin S.M. Budyonny came with an accordion, and this created a relaxed festive atmosphere. Stalin was the first to initiate frankness and friendliness in relations between those present. They made toasts, sang, some danced. Stalin enjoyed looking at the dancing, encouraged, and then all hugged and some even kissed. During the failures of the Soviet troops, he suffered a lot, now he was deeply satisfied with the course of military action at the fronts and did not want to hide his feelings.
Stalin has firmly entered military history. His undoubted merit is that under his direct leadership as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Soviet Armed Forces withstood the defensive campaigns and brilliantly conducted all offensive operations. But he, as far as I could observe him, never spoke of his merits.
At any rate, I never heard it. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the title of Generalissimo by a written submission to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party of front commanders. And he had fewer awards than the commanders of fronts and armies. About the miscalculations made during the war, he told the people honestly and directly in his speech at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the commanders of the Red Army on May 24, 1945
“The strongest and most colorful figure of strategic command.”
VASILEVSKY Alexander Mikhailovich (1895-1977), Soviet military leader, Marshal of the Soviet Union (1943), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945).
In the Great Patriotic War, deputy chief, from June 1942 chief of the General Staff. In 1942-44 he coordinated the actions of a number of fronts in major operations. In 1945 Commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, then Commander-in-Chief of Soviet troops in the Far East during the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army. From 1946 Chief of the General Staff. In 1949-53 Minister of the Armed Forces (Minister of War) of the USSR, in 1953-57 1st Deputy and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR.
...I had good relations with I. S. Khrushchev in the first postwar years. But they changed dramatically after I did not support his statements that Stalin did not understand operational and strategic issues and unskilled in directing the actions of troops as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I still can not understand how he could assert this. Being a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the military council of a number of fronts, N.S. Khrushchev could not have known how high the authority of the Stavka and Stalin was in matters of military operations. He also could not have been unaware that the commanders of the fronts and armies had great respect for Stavka and Stalin and appreciated them for their exceptional competence in leading the armed struggle ...
...I would like to say a few words about Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
I believe that my official position during the war, my constant, almost daily communication with Stalin and, finally, my participation in meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the State Defense Committee, which considered one or another fundamental issues of the armed struggle, gives me the right to say about him. At the same time I will not fully touch upon his party, political and state activities during the war, since I do not consider myself sufficiently competent in this matter.
Was it justified that Stalin headed the Supreme High Command? After all, he was not a professional military figure.
Of course, it was justified ...
...In my deepest conviction, Stalin. V. Stalin, especially from the second half of the Great Patriotic War, was the strongest and most colorful figure of the strategic command. He successfully led the fronts, all military efforts of the country on the basis of the Party line and was able to exert significant influence on the leading political and military figures of the Allied countries on the war. Working with him was interesting and at the same time incredibly difficult, especially in the first period of the war. He remained in my memory as a stern, strong-willed military leader, but at the same time not devoid of personal charm.
Stalin possessed not only a great natural intelligence, but also surprisingly great knowledge. His ability to think analytically had to be observed during meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party. State Defense Committee and in the constant work in the Stavka. He leisurely, slightly slouching, walking, listening attentively to speakers, sometimes asking questions, giving remarks. And when the discussion was over, he would clearly formulate conclusions and summarize the results. His conclusions were not wordy, but deep in content and, as a rule, formed the basis of resolutions of the Central Committee of the Party or GKO, as well as directives or orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
...I have already written that in the first months of the war, he sometimes slipped a desire for frontal straightforward actions of the Soviet troops. After the Battle of Stalingrad and especially the Battle of Kursk, he rose to the heights of strategic leadership. Now Stalin thinks in terms of modern warfare, well versed in all matters of preparation and conduct of operations. He already requires that military actions were conducted creatively, with full consideration of military science, that they were both decisive and maneuverable, involving dismemberment and encirclement of the enemy. In his military thinking is noticeably manifested tendency to massing forces and means, a diverse application of all possible options for the start of operations and its conduct.
Stalin became well versed not only in military strategy, which was given to him easily, because he excelled in the art of political strategy, but also in the operational art.
I think Stalin during the strategic offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces showed all the basic qualities of the Soviet commander. He skillfully directed the actions of the fronts, and all the Soviet military art during the years of war showed strength, creative character, was much higher than the military art praised in the West German-Fascist military school.
Stalin had a great influence pa the creation of business style of work Stavka. If we consider this style since the fall of 1942, it was characterized by: reliance on collective experience in the development of operational and strategic plans, high demanding, efficiency, constant communication with the troops, accurate knowledge of the situation at the fronts.
An integral part of the style of Stalin's work as Supreme Commander-in-Chief was his high demanding nature. And it was not only harsh, which, in fact, justified, especially in war conditions. He never forgave vagueness in the work, the inability to bring things to a conclusion, even if it is allowed and very necessary and did not have a single comment before the comrade.
In confirmation of this, I will allow myself to cite one example - about a serious trouble, which had to endure one of the most experienced pa6otniks of the Operational Department of the General Staff, V. D. Ivanov.
During the events at Khalkhin-Gol in 1939, as is known, the Soviet command from the Soviet and Mongolian troops was created 1st Army Group under the command of Komkor G. K. Zhukov, and to coordinate the actions of these troops on the basis of the Transbaikal District was formed front group under the command of Commander 2nd rank G. M. Stern.
Timely arrival from Moscow to Mongolia - the area of combat operations - the government and the People's Commissar of Defense attached great importance. The organization of the flight was entrusted to the General Staff, and direct and hourly supervision of the flight was entrusted by the Chief of the General Staff temporarily acting head of the Operations Directorate VD Ivanov. Using Ivanov's information, BM Shaposhnikov periodically reported on the progress of the flight to the government and Stalin. On the appointed day and hour, Stern flew to Chita, in order to immediately fly to the final destination, which required only less than an hour of time.
The next morning B.M. Shaposhnikov, when he received a call from Stalin, reported that Stern is already in place, that is, reported what he had just been reported to Ivanov. Some time passed, and again Stalin calls Shaposhnikov and begins to angrily reprimand:
- Your people are lying. I have in my hands a telegram from Stern, he is still in Chita. Sort it out, and the culprit under the tribunal.
V.D. Ivanov was sure that the flight from Chita to Mongolia, a trifling distance in terms of distance, was made, did not check this, while the storm that played out in Chita and on the highway delayed the plane.
In the tribunal VD Ivanov still not transferred, tried by the court of honor and dismissed from the General Staff, and later he was appointed Chief of Staff of one of the Far Eastern armies. With the outbreak of war, he immediately appealed to the Chief of General Staff with an insistent request to transfer him to work at the front. In the winter of 1941/42, when the General Staff and especially the Operations Directorate were in dire need of experienced staff workers, I, after consulting with some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, returned him to work at the General Staff. Everything went well, and he worked well. But one day, before going to Stalin, I took Ivanov with me and upon arrival in the Kremlin himself went to Stalin's office, and he asked him to stay in the room telegraph negotiations Stavka and establish communication with the command of the Southern Front, but no one to the apparatus until my instructions.
I received from Stalin, as it often happened, a reprimand, in this case for the difficult situation in the south and instructions to immediately contact by telegraph with the commander of the Southern Front, Lieutenant-General R. Y. Malinovsky, to clarify from him at the moment the front situation and to get answers to a number of questions of interest to the Stavka. During my conversation with Malinovsky, which was also attended by V. D. Ivanov, in the intercom. D. Ivanov, Stalin entered the meeting room, accompanied by some of the members of the Politburo. After listening to my conversation, Stalin hand removed me from the apparatus and, without talking about himself, himself led a conversation with Malinovsky, and a conversation much more impressive and lucid than mine. Malinovsky then shared with me that he immediately could not understand what was going on, but very quickly he realized that it is not Vasilevsky, and Stalin himself.
After finishing his conversation with Malinovsky, Stalin returned to the office, and I continued to talk to Rodion Yakovlevich. When I then entered Stalin, he asked me sternly:
- Is this the same Ivanov who lied to us about Stern? He's back in his warm seat. Expel him immediately!
I began to beg to leave him in the apparatus of the Operative Department, because there is a lot of work, and there are few qualified workers.
Stalin was silent, silent, then replied:
- Well, all right, just so that here I never saw him again.
Vladimir Dmitrievich worked well and helped me. During the Stalingrad operation and operations on the Upper Don he was with me at the front and during the struggle for Kharkov he was seriously wounded and evacuated. After his recovery he continued to carry out excellent responsible work at the front, in particular, during the Far Eastern campaign in 1945 in the role of deputy commander of the Transbaikal front he performed a number of extremely important tasks. After the war, until his death, he also worked very well in very important positions in the Armed Forces-first deputy chief of the General Staff and then chief of the General Staff Academy.
I cited this case with VD Ivanov to once again show how intolerant Stalin was intolerant of the slightest sloppiness in the performance of official tasks and how difficult it was to regain his confidence. Stalin's sharpness and severity in such cases knew no limits.
Stalin as Supreme Commander-in-Chief in most cases demanded fairly, albeit harshly, His directives and orders pointed out to the front commanders of errors and shortcomings, taught skillful leadership of all sorts of military actions. We, representatives of the Stavka, sometimes received appropriate instructions. In the book I have given many examples of this. I will cite one more. First, because it is in itself quite curious, and secondly, it characterizes to a certain extent military thinking and efficiency of Stalin in decision-making. V. Stalin in decision-making.
It was in 1943 in the battles for the Dnieper. When I emphasized in a regular telephone report to Stalin that the delay in the rapid implementation of our plans on the Lower Dnieper is caused by the lack of forces, which we, implementing the decisions approved and dictated by the Stavka, have to split here between several directions, solving a number of problems at the same time, Stalin replied:
- If this is so, then it is not necessary to attack everywhere at once. Put Tolbukhin in defense, rob him and give everything you can Malinovsky, let him attack. Then, when the main tasks facing Malinovsky will be solved, put him on the defense, rob him, give the maximum possible to Tolbukhin and push him on the offensive. That will be the proper coordination of the forces of the two fronts.
I have purposely left intact the expressions used by the Supreme to convey to the reader the usual flavor of his speech. He spoke, as a rule, accurately, sparingly and directly.
I have heard different things about Stalin's personal acquaintance with the life of the fronts. He really, as I have already noted, traveled to the Western and Kalinin fronts in August 1943. The trip by automobile lasted two days and certainly had an impact on the morale of the troops.
In my opinion, for Stalin, who headed the leadership of the party, the country as a whole, there was no urgent need for such trips. The most advantageous for both the front and the country was his stay in the Central Committee of the Party and Stavka, where all the threads of telephone and telegraphic communication converged and the flow of various information. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief was regularly informed by the front commanders about the situation at the fronts and all significant changes in it.
At the fronts, in addition, there were representatives of the General Staff and the main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Much information went to Stavka also from the political departments of the fronts through the Main Political Department of the Red Army. So the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had extensive information for every day, and sometimes every hour on the course of military operations, the needs and difficulties of the command of the fronts, and he could, being in Moscow, promptly and correctly make decisions.
Stalin had an amazingly strong memory. I have not met people who would remember as much as he did. Stalin knew not only all the commanders of the fronts and armies, and there were over a hundred of them, but also some of the commanders of corps and divisions, as well as senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense, not to mention the senior staff of the central and regional party and state apparatus. Throughout the war, Stalin constantly remembered the composition of the strategic reserves and could at any time to name this or that formation.
I will refer to one small case, which discouraged me, but which to some extent confirms what has been said.
In one of the November evenings of 1941, during the period of the fiercest defensive battles for Moscow, Stalin, during my personal report to him on the situation at the front, having established that I, as a result of strenuous work excessively overworked, called in the office of his secretary Poskrebyshev and asked him to immediately find out in the sanatorium Arkhangelskoye, whether it is possible to provide a good rest that night Vasilevsky. I quickly received a reply that the sanatorium was ready to receive me. Stalin ordered me immediately on my return to go to the sanatorium and until morning to sleep properly ... In the General Staff I was already waiting for the head of the Main Military Sanitary Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense Efim Ivanovich Smirnov. Following Stalin's instructions, we went to Arkhangelskoye.
Dinner was ready for our arrival, but no sooner had I sat down at the table than Stalin called me to the phone. He asked me to remind him where the Ivanovo-Voznesensk militia division was located. “I forgot something,” he added.
I did not complain in those days about my memory, but hesitated-division redeployed, and I could not immediately name the exact location of its location at the moment. Stalin waited for a while, and then he said:
“Okay, no need, I remembered,” and hung up the phone. Such a memory gave Stalin an advantage as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
He did not need constant references, well aware of the situation at the fronts, the positive aspects and shortcomings of military leaders, the ability of industry to meet the demands of the fronts, the availability at the disposal of the Stavka stocks of weapons, artillery, tanks, airplanes, ammunition, fuel, so necessary for the troops, and himself distributed them to the fronts.
Stalin was inherent great organizational skills. He himself worked hard, but also knew how to make work to the fullest extent of the forces of others, squeeze out of them all that they could give.
However, it would be wrong to consider Stalin only from one point of view. Bluntly say that his character was rarely easy, fiery, volatile. Stalin is difficult to get along with a person, long looked at him. I have already written how not immediately allowed him to work in the Stavka Deputy Chief of General Staff AI Antonov.
But as soon as he got to know him, imbued him with respect, and when it came time in 1945 to switch me to work as Komfront, he went to appoint him Chief of the General Staff.
If Stalin was dissatisfied with anything, and in the war, especially at its beginning, there were many reasons for this, he could scold sharply and unfairly. But in the course of the war, he changed noticeably. To us, employees of the General Staff and the main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense, commanders of the fronts, began to treat more restrained, calmer, even when there was something wrong at the front. It became much easier to meet with him than before. Apparently, the war, its twists and turns, our failures and successes have influenced the character of Stalin.
The same thought was once expressed by KE Voroshilov.
In the last days of March, 1944 I met with him, as already mentioned, in Melitopol, to solve the issues related to the interaction of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front with the troops of the Separate Seaside Army, where Voroshilov was the representative of the Stavka. When all the issues were resolved, we stayed with Kliment Efremovich alone in his carriage and talked about various topics, including the character of Stalin. The evening was warm, quiet, and the weather, and the situation at the front dispose to a “heart-to-heart” conversation, and Kliment Efremovich quite willingly answered my questions.
When I asked whether it had not been possible earlier to raise objections to Stalin when necessary, because now, during the war, at meetings of the Politburo or the State Committee of Defense, when discussing one or another fundamental issue concerning the conduct of the armed struggle or the development of the national economy, contrary to the opinion expressed by Stalin, members of the Politburo quite boldly and persistently make their proposals, and they are not only not rejected by Stalin, but are willingly discussed; and if the proposal is reasonable, it is accepted.
Similarly, when working in the Stavka, we, the military, directly related to the armed struggle, make our proposals, and Stalin considers us.
Kliment Efremovich, after thinking, replied:
- Stalin used to be different. Probably the war taught him a lot. He must have realized that he can make mistakes and his decisions may not always be the best and that the knowledge and experience of others can also be useful. Affected on Stalin and years: before the war he was younger and more self-confident ...
On the personal life of Stalin I write almost nothing to write. Yes, apparently, it does not matter. According to my observations, Stalin had little time for recreation and cultural entertainment, except for occasional visits to the theater and watching movies. Stalin led the life of a man fully occupied with the affairs of state.
After the Soviet troops liberated Minsk, Stalin was in a wonderful, elated mood. One evening he invited a group of military leaders to his apartment to celebrate such a great event. At the reception to Stalin S.M. Budyonny came with an accordion, and this created a relaxed festive atmosphere. Stalin was the first to initiate frankness and friendliness in relations between those present. They made toasts, sang, some danced. Stalin enjoyed looking at the dancing, encouraged, and then all hugged and some even kissed. During the failures of the Soviet troops, he suffered a lot, now he was deeply satisfied with the course of military action at the fronts and did not want to hide his feelings.
Stalin has firmly entered military history. His undoubted merit is that under his direct leadership as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Soviet Armed Forces withstood the defensive campaigns and brilliantly conducted all offensive operations. But he, as far as I could observe him, never spoke of his merits.
At any rate, I never heard it. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the title of Generalissimo by a written submission to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party of front commanders. And he had fewer awards than the commanders of fronts and armies. About the miscalculations made during the war, he told the people honestly and directly in his speech at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the commanders of the Red Army on May 24, 1945
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JoeB131
Diamond Member
Yeah, that's considered a bunch of silly propaganda. No one takes it seriously except far right scholars who live in mortal fear of single payer health care.
Whereas chapters of the book that describe the events in separate Communist states were praised for the most part, some generalizations made by Courtois in the introduction to the book became a subject of criticism both on scholarly and political grounds. Moreover, three of the book's main contributors (Karel Bartosek, Jean-Louis Margolin, and Nicolas Werth)<a href=" publicly disassociated themselves from Courtois' statements in the introduction and criticized his editorial conduct.<a and rejected the comparison between Communism and Nazism.
No one is denying Stalin killed his political enemies. It's just that the 25 million number is absurd on its face.
Probably closer to 2 million political killings.
Bad, but it's not 25 million.
AGAIN- look at the population numbers. How could Stalin kill 25 million people, lose another 20 million in WWII, and then still manage to post a 30% population increase?
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Joe, I notice you reject education. Some allege Stalin's government murdered up to 60 million citizens. I gave you the book about this saying only 25 million were killed. Joe, he ran Russia for many years. Not one year as you suggest. Stalin had 29 years of killing, not just one year as what you tell us is about a year is all.
Ringo
Gold Member
Some? What are some? The scum from Dr. Goebbels' propaganda ministry, who were picked up from the dustbin of history after the war and given jobs at various "Voices of Americ"a and CIA-sponsored organizations? After their work, the result is not surprising. ... I remember Sean Hannity on TV in the 90's talking about "the terrible USSR", where 100, no, 150 million people were killed! And all with a serious face...
What a bunch of pathetic clowns you are.
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Good question so you deserve a good answer.
I believe anti Communists tell the story Stalin being in charge had as many as 60 million Soviets executed. I found that is not correct. He was ruler for 29 years and had less than that executed. When Stalin is talked of, it means his leaders who even executed Generals of the Soviet Army.
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I do not watch him. What were your blessings under Stalin then? Is he your hero?
Commandant Miller
Litwin
Diamond Member
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