GavanPeacefan
Gold Member
Executive Summary:
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to believe that negotiating an end to his war against Ukraine directly with the United States will maximize his chance of success. Putin hopes to revive the āspirit of Anchorage,ā even though the abridged summit at the Elmendorf-Richardson base in August 2025 was ultimately a missed opportunity for the Kremlin (Meduza, February 11; RIA Novosti, March 5). Putinās understanding that U.S. President Donald Trumpās attention has shifted profoundly to the Middle East is, nevertheless, informing the Kremlinās perception that the āsituational pauseā in talks on a peace deal will be indefinite (RBC; Izvestiya, March 19). The Kremlin believes that the United States will not soon have the bandwidth to focus on Ukraine because it assumes that Tehran will outlast U.S.āIsraeli airstrikes and the United States will have a dubious claim to victory in Iran (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 20). Russian commentators have speculated that the United States may then attempt regime change in Cuba to cover up events in Iran. U.S. engagement in Cuba would expose Russiaās inability to help yet another traditional ally and further weaken U.S. engagement on ending Russiaās war against Ukraine (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 17; The Insider, March 18).
Russian mainstream commentators increasingly focus on messaging from Europe about playing a more active role in negotiations with Russia (RIAC, March 19). These commentators are hesitant to criticize Trump directly. For many months, Kremlin-approved discourse portrayed Europe as a āparty of war.ā It asserted the unfeasibility and unacceptability of a peace plan that would deploy a European ācoalition of the willingā to guarantee Ukraineās post-war security (Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 24). The Kremlin did not release any official information about top French diplomat Emmanuel Bonneās visit to Moscow, but Russian experts have dubbed the meetings a complete failure (News.ru, March 16). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov ridiculed the French, German, U.K., and Italian national security advisersā visits to Geneva during the last round of the RussiaāU.S.āUkraine talks because these officials were not directly included (Vedomosti, February 22). The Kremlin continues to reject European participation in the established negotiation formats, but the apparent lack of any progress may make it practical and perhaps even necessary to open new channels (Argumenty i Fakty, March 18).
Putin may be counting on the United Statesā apparent reluctance to involve the Europeans in peace negotiations (Izvestiya, March 16). Still, he can hardly expect generous offers from Washington. Some European capitals, in contrast, are signaling possible flexibility. Finnish President Alexander Stubb said on March 17, āFinland or any European country will never ever accept a de jure land swap. De facto might be a reality, but de jure, itās simply not going to happenā (YouTube/@DRMNewsInternational, March 17; RBC, March 18). The Kremlin was apparently surprised that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ended the pause in peace talks by dispatching his top negotiating team to Miami on March 20 (RIA Novosti, March 21). Zelenskyyās recent visits to Paris, London, and Madrid, which Russian pundits eagerly portrayed as him begging for more aid, apparently influenced this move (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 18; Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 19). Zelenskyyās European trips over the last few weeks have forged the consensus underpinning German Chancellor Friedrich Merzās proposal to change the format of peace talks to include more European participation (Novaya Gazeta Europe, March 13; Gazeta.ru, March 19).
Russian media described the March 19 European Council meeting as a complete fiasco that exposed the European Unionās inability to defend its interests even amid the Iran conflict (Kommersant, March 20). The meeting concluded with a clear message that the European Union will not join U.S.āIsraeli airstrikes on Iran and a firm re-assertion that the European Union should have diplomatic involvement in ending Russiaās war against Ukraine. These messages may signify an important advance in building a coherent European foreign and security policy. Russian pundits are eager to claim that the European Unionās inability to overcome Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor OrbĆ”nās veto on disbursing the 90 billion euro ($104 billion) support loan to Ukraine signifies a crisis in EU policy (RIA Novosti; Vzglyad, March 20). European leadersā outrage over OrbĆ”nās veto, however, is a testament to the strength of overall European solidarity with Ukraine and its resolve to continue supporting Kyiv (Meduza, March 20).
Sober Russian voices still argue that Russia can ill afford a long pause in peace talks (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 16). Though Russian jingoist propaganda keeps beating its drum, government-affiliated economists are discussing the depth and duration of the unfolding recession, which cannot be mitigated by another small interest rate cut by Russiaās Central Bank (Izvestiya; The Bell, March 20). Economic expectations in the business community and among the populace are growing darker, and the calculated increase in oil revenues following shortages resulting from the Iran conflict makes little difference (The Moscow Times, March 20). Russian tiredness from the 49-month-long war keeps accumulating, and combat operations are not yielding even symbolic territorial gains (The Insider, March 20). Opinion polls show that Russians, while largely in favor of ending the war, do not expect peace anytime soon (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 17). The as-yet fruitless peace talks inform this pessimism. Some pro-war pundits seek to deepen this attitude by asserting that the United States cannot be an impartial mediator because it remains the leader of the hostile coalition (RIAC, March 16).
The U.S. attack on Iran has made Putin believe that U.S. attention is changeable. Even though he clearly prefers engaging with Washington rather than Brussels, the Kremlin is increasingly likely to view working with Europe as the most reliable path to stable peace. Moscow sees Europe as a major threat to its autocratic regime, but has good reasons to assume that this intrinsically hostile neighbor would not attempt a ādecapitatingā strike on Russia. Putin has become so obsessed with personal safety that he cancelled his public appearances for the twelfth anniversary of Russiaās annexation of Crimea last week. Even street cameras are treated as a security risk (TopWar.ru, March 17). Staying on the war course has been Putinās preferred option for many months, but the undeniable disappearance of military gains means that persisting with the demand for Ukraineās retreat from all of Donbas will only dig Russia into a deeper hole.
The post Moscow Reconsidering Europeās Role in Ending War Against Ukraine appeared first on Jamestown.
Remote : Mon, 23 Mar 2026 19:57:05 +0000
Local : 2026-03-23(Monday) 20 : 57 : 05
Found via Nicer.App WebOS homepage
Time for Zelenskyy to get "dethroned in public" again, i'm afraid
He's gotta give up the Donbass. The Russians need it. Ukraine does not.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin believes negotiating an end to his war against Ukraine directly with the United States will maximize his chances of success. Putinās understanding that Washingtonās attention has shifted to Iran informs his perception that the āsituational pauseā could be indefinite.
- Kremlin narratives have long rejected European participation. Increasing diplomatic activism by actors linked to European Union initiatives and outreach by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, however, is gradually reshaping Russian expectations about negotiation formats that include Europe.
- Mounting Russian economic problems, battlefield stagnation, and declining public support for the war are compelling Russian elites to consider greater diplomatic engagement with Europe even as Moscow continues to frame European states as adversarial actors.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to believe that negotiating an end to his war against Ukraine directly with the United States will maximize his chance of success. Putin hopes to revive the āspirit of Anchorage,ā even though the abridged summit at the Elmendorf-Richardson base in August 2025 was ultimately a missed opportunity for the Kremlin (Meduza, February 11; RIA Novosti, March 5). Putinās understanding that U.S. President Donald Trumpās attention has shifted profoundly to the Middle East is, nevertheless, informing the Kremlinās perception that the āsituational pauseā in talks on a peace deal will be indefinite (RBC; Izvestiya, March 19). The Kremlin believes that the United States will not soon have the bandwidth to focus on Ukraine because it assumes that Tehran will outlast U.S.āIsraeli airstrikes and the United States will have a dubious claim to victory in Iran (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 20). Russian commentators have speculated that the United States may then attempt regime change in Cuba to cover up events in Iran. U.S. engagement in Cuba would expose Russiaās inability to help yet another traditional ally and further weaken U.S. engagement on ending Russiaās war against Ukraine (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 17; The Insider, March 18).
Russian mainstream commentators increasingly focus on messaging from Europe about playing a more active role in negotiations with Russia (RIAC, March 19). These commentators are hesitant to criticize Trump directly. For many months, Kremlin-approved discourse portrayed Europe as a āparty of war.ā It asserted the unfeasibility and unacceptability of a peace plan that would deploy a European ācoalition of the willingā to guarantee Ukraineās post-war security (Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 24). The Kremlin did not release any official information about top French diplomat Emmanuel Bonneās visit to Moscow, but Russian experts have dubbed the meetings a complete failure (News.ru, March 16). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov ridiculed the French, German, U.K., and Italian national security advisersā visits to Geneva during the last round of the RussiaāU.S.āUkraine talks because these officials were not directly included (Vedomosti, February 22). The Kremlin continues to reject European participation in the established negotiation formats, but the apparent lack of any progress may make it practical and perhaps even necessary to open new channels (Argumenty i Fakty, March 18).
Putin may be counting on the United Statesā apparent reluctance to involve the Europeans in peace negotiations (Izvestiya, March 16). Still, he can hardly expect generous offers from Washington. Some European capitals, in contrast, are signaling possible flexibility. Finnish President Alexander Stubb said on March 17, āFinland or any European country will never ever accept a de jure land swap. De facto might be a reality, but de jure, itās simply not going to happenā (YouTube/@DRMNewsInternational, March 17; RBC, March 18). The Kremlin was apparently surprised that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ended the pause in peace talks by dispatching his top negotiating team to Miami on March 20 (RIA Novosti, March 21). Zelenskyyās recent visits to Paris, London, and Madrid, which Russian pundits eagerly portrayed as him begging for more aid, apparently influenced this move (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 18; Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 19). Zelenskyyās European trips over the last few weeks have forged the consensus underpinning German Chancellor Friedrich Merzās proposal to change the format of peace talks to include more European participation (Novaya Gazeta Europe, March 13; Gazeta.ru, March 19).
Russian media described the March 19 European Council meeting as a complete fiasco that exposed the European Unionās inability to defend its interests even amid the Iran conflict (Kommersant, March 20). The meeting concluded with a clear message that the European Union will not join U.S.āIsraeli airstrikes on Iran and a firm re-assertion that the European Union should have diplomatic involvement in ending Russiaās war against Ukraine. These messages may signify an important advance in building a coherent European foreign and security policy. Russian pundits are eager to claim that the European Unionās inability to overcome Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor OrbĆ”nās veto on disbursing the 90 billion euro ($104 billion) support loan to Ukraine signifies a crisis in EU policy (RIA Novosti; Vzglyad, March 20). European leadersā outrage over OrbĆ”nās veto, however, is a testament to the strength of overall European solidarity with Ukraine and its resolve to continue supporting Kyiv (Meduza, March 20).
Sober Russian voices still argue that Russia can ill afford a long pause in peace talks (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 16). Though Russian jingoist propaganda keeps beating its drum, government-affiliated economists are discussing the depth and duration of the unfolding recession, which cannot be mitigated by another small interest rate cut by Russiaās Central Bank (Izvestiya; The Bell, March 20). Economic expectations in the business community and among the populace are growing darker, and the calculated increase in oil revenues following shortages resulting from the Iran conflict makes little difference (The Moscow Times, March 20). Russian tiredness from the 49-month-long war keeps accumulating, and combat operations are not yielding even symbolic territorial gains (The Insider, March 20). Opinion polls show that Russians, while largely in favor of ending the war, do not expect peace anytime soon (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 17). The as-yet fruitless peace talks inform this pessimism. Some pro-war pundits seek to deepen this attitude by asserting that the United States cannot be an impartial mediator because it remains the leader of the hostile coalition (RIAC, March 16).
The U.S. attack on Iran has made Putin believe that U.S. attention is changeable. Even though he clearly prefers engaging with Washington rather than Brussels, the Kremlin is increasingly likely to view working with Europe as the most reliable path to stable peace. Moscow sees Europe as a major threat to its autocratic regime, but has good reasons to assume that this intrinsically hostile neighbor would not attempt a ādecapitatingā strike on Russia. Putin has become so obsessed with personal safety that he cancelled his public appearances for the twelfth anniversary of Russiaās annexation of Crimea last week. Even street cameras are treated as a security risk (TopWar.ru, March 17). Staying on the war course has been Putinās preferred option for many months, but the undeniable disappearance of military gains means that persisting with the demand for Ukraineās retreat from all of Donbas will only dig Russia into a deeper hole.
The post Moscow Reconsidering Europeās Role in Ending War Against Ukraine appeared first on Jamestown.
Remote : Mon, 23 Mar 2026 19:57:05 +0000
Local : 2026-03-23(Monday) 20 : 57 : 05
Found via Nicer.App WebOS homepage
Time for Zelenskyy to get "dethroned in public" again, i'm afraid
He's gotta give up the Donbass. The Russians need it. Ukraine does not.
