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I'm still wondering why it's any skin off of anyone's nose if these two people get married:
http://www.imdb.com/media/rm2841156352/nm0005577
I'd also put money on the fact that if they were bonking in a porn film, half the people who complain about gay marriage would pay money to watch.
Does the 2nd Amendment say that the people of the US have the right to bear arms? Yes. What makes San Fransicko, CA so special that it can ignore the Supreme Law of the Land?So you support having courts overturn the will of the people based on your interpretation of the 2nd Amendment. Your comment does not refute anything that I said.
So you admit you are wrong?mattskramer said:No. I support letting the people decided in both circumstances.
I’m just exhibiting your double standard.
Frankly, my dear, nobody really gives a damn.jillian said:I'm still wondering why it's any skin off of anyone's nose if these two people get married:
http://www.imdb.com/media/rm2841156352/nm0005577
I'd also put money on the fact that if they were bonking in a porn film, half the people who complain about gay marriage would pay money to watch.
Does the 2nd Amendment say that the people of the US have the right to bear arms? Yes. What makes San Fransicko, CA so special that it can ignore the Supreme Law of the Land?
So you admit you are wrong?
However, I don't have a "double standard". All I do is follow the Constitution of the United States and when in California, the constitution of CA....as long as it follows the higher laws of the Constitution of the US.
Frankly, my dear, nobody really gives a damn.
If you want to marry a woman in a private ceremony go right ahead. If you want to watch a porn flick about it go right ahead. Nobody is stopping you.
Just don't have your LIBERAL FASCIST judges force the majority of us and our children to accept your deviant ways in mainstream society.
Just don't have your CONSERVATIVE FASCIST judge on gun ownership force the majority of those in San Francisco and their children to accept your conservative ways in mainstream society.
Yet, you had no problem with judges interpreting the constitution the way that you wanted it interpreted and thumbing their noses at the majority of San Francisco voters who wanted a gun ban in their city.
This let the citizens vote reason is so phony. It is such a red herring that it is laughable.
Once again the Court did NOT cite the supposed violation of the Constitution in this case. What exactly did the law violate? That is required unless the court is just legislating from the bench, which is illegal.
In the case of gun control the reason the law was overturned WAS cited and is there for all to see.
[6] Plaintiffs contend that by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, California's marriage statutes violate a number of provisions of the California Constitution.FN28 In particular, plaintiffs contend that the challenged statutes violate a same-sex couple's fundamental right to marry as guaranteed by the privacy, free speech, and due process clauses of the California Constitution ( Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 2, 7), and additionally violate the equal protection clause of the California Constitution ( Cal. Const., art. I, § 7).FN29 Because the question whether the challenged aspect of the marriage statutes violates or impinges upon the fundamental right to marry may be determinative in deciding the appropriate standard of review to be applied in evaluating plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, we first address the question whether the challenged statutes independently infringe a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by the California Constitution.
A
[7] [8] Although our state Constitution does not contain any explicit reference to a right to marry, past California cases establish beyond question that the right to marry is a fundamental right whose protection is guaranteed to all persons by the California Constitution. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 161, 219 Cal.Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760 ( Valerie N.) [The right to marriage and procreation are now recognized as fundamental, constitutionally protected interests. [Citations.] ... These rights are aspects of the right of privacy which ... is express in section 1 of article I of the California Constitution which includes among the inalienable rights possessed by all persons in this state, that of privacy ]; Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 577, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341, 853 P.2d 507 [we have ... recognized that [t]he concept of personal liberties and fundamental human rights entitled to protection against overbroad intrusion or regulation by government ... extends to ... such basic civil liberties and rights not explicitly listed in the Constitution [as] the right to marry, establish a home and bring up children ]; Ortiz v. Los Angeles Police Relief Assn. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1303, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 [under the state Constitution, the right to marry and the right of intimate association are virtually synonymous.... [W]e will refer to the privacy right in this case as the right to marry]; In re Carrafa (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 788, 791, 143 Cal.Rptr. 848[[t]he right to marry is a fundamental constitutional right].) The United States Supreme Court initially discussed the constitutional right to marry as an aspect of the fundamental substantive liberty protected by the due process clause of the federal Constitution (see Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042), but thereafter in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 ( Griswold ), the federal high court additionally identified the right to marry as a component of a right of privacy protected by the federal Constitution. ( Griswold, at p. 486.) With California's adoption in 1972 of a constitutional amendment explicitly adding privacy to the inalienable rights of all Californians protected by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution - an amendment whose history demonstrates that it was intended, among other purposes, to encompass the federal constitutional right of privacy, particularly as it developed beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut [, supra,] 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 28, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633) - the state constitutional right to marry, while presumably still embodied as a component of the liberty protected by the state due process clause,FN30 now also clearly falls within the reach of the constitutional protection afforded to an individual's interest in personal autonomy by California's explicit state constitutional privacy clause. (See, e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 34, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633 [the interest in personal autonomy protected by the state constitutional privacy clause includes the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships]; Valerie N., supra, 40 Cal.3d 143, 161, 219 Cal.Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760.) FN31
Although all parties in this proceeding agree that the right to marry constitutes a fundamental right protected by the state Constitution, there is considerable disagreement as to the scope and content of this fundamental state constitutional right. The Court of Appeal concluded that because marriage in California (and elsewhere) historically has been limited to opposite-sex couples, the constitutional right to marry under the California Constitution properly should be interpreted to afford only a right to marry a person of the opposite sex, and that the constitutional right that plaintiffs actually are asking the court to recognize is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. In the absence of any historical or precedential support for such a right in this state, the Court of Appeal determined that plaintiffs' claim of the denial of a fundamental right under the California Constitution must be rejected.
*27 Plaintiffs challenge the Court of Appeal's characterization of the constitutional right they seek to invoke as the right to same-sex marriage, and on this point we agree with plaintiffs' position. In Perez v. Sharp, supra, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 - this court's 1948 decision holding that the California statutory provisions prohibiting interracial marriage were unconstitutional - the court did not characterize the constitutional right that the plaintiffs in that case sought to obtain as a right to interracial marriage and did not dismiss the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge on the ground that such marriages never had been permitted in California.FN32 Instead, the Perez decision focused on the substance of the constitutional right at issue - that is, the importance to an individual of the freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice - in determining whether the statute impinged upon the plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional right. ( 32 Cal.2d at pp. 715, 717, 198 P.2d 17, italics added.) Similarly, in Valerie N., supra, 40 Cal.3d 143, 219 Cal.Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760 - which involved a challenge to a statute limiting the reproductive freedom of a developmentally disabled woman - our court did not analyze the scope of the constitutional right at issue by examining whether developmentally disabled women historically had enjoyed a constitutional right of reproductive freedom, but rather considered the substance of that constitutional right in determining whether the right was one that properly should be interpreted as extending to a developmentally disabled woman. ( 40 Cal.3d at pp. 160-164, 219 Cal.Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760.) And, in addressing a somewhat analogous point, the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 concluded that its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 had erred in narrowly characterizing the constitutional right sought to be invoked in that case as the right to engage in intimate homosexual conduct, determining instead that the constitutional right there at issue properly should be understood in a broader and more neutral fashion so as to focus upon the substance of the interests that the constitutional right is intended to protect. ( 539 U.S. at pp. 565-577.) FN33
The flaw in characterizing the constitutional right at issue as the right to same-sex marriage rather than the right to marry goes beyond mere semantics. It is important both analytically and from the standpoint of fairness to plaintiffs' argument that we recognize they are not seeking to create a new constitutional right - the right to same-sex marriage - or to change, modify, or (as some have suggested) deinstitutionalize the existing institution of marriage. Instead, plaintiffs contend that, properly interpreted, the state constitutional right to marry affords same-sex couples the same rights and benefits - accompanied by the same mutual responsibilities and obligations - as this constitutional right affords to opposite-sex couples.FN34 For this reason, in evaluating the constitutional issue before us, we consider it appropriate to direct our focus to the meaning and substance of the constitutional right to marry, and to avoid the potentially misleading implications inherent in analyzing the issue in terms of same-sex marriage.
*28 Accordingly, in deciding whether the constitutional right to marry protected by the California Constitution applies to same-sex couples as well as to opposite-sex couples and, further, whether the current California marriage and domestic partnership statutes deny same-sex couples this fundamental constitutional right, we shall examine the nature and substance of the interests protected by the constitutional right to marry. In undertaking this inquiry, we put to the side for the moment the question whether the substantive rights embodied within the constitutional right to marry include the right to have the couple's official relationship designated by the name marriage rather than by some other term, such as domestic partnership. The latter issue is addressed below. (See, post, pp. 80-82.)
In discussing the constitutional right to marry in Perez v. Sharp, supra, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 ( Perez ), then Justice Traynor in the lead opinion quoted the seminal passage from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042. There the high court, in describing the scope of the liberty protected by the due process clause of the federal Constitution, stated that [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. ( Perez, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 714, 198 P.2d 17, italics added [to marry italicized by Perez ], quoting Meyer, supra, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042.) The Perez decision continued: Marriage is thus something more than a civil contract subject to regulation by the state; it is a fundamental right of free men. ( Perez, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 714, 198 P.2d 17, italics added.)
Like Perez, subsequent California decisions discussing the nature of marriage and the right to marry have recognized repeatedly the linkage between marriage, establishing a home, and raising children in identifying civil marriage as the means available to an individual to establish, with a loved one of his or her choice, an officially recognized family relationship. In DeBurgh v. DeBurgh (1952) 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598, for example, in explaining the public interest in the institution of marriage ( id. at p. 863, 250 P.2d 598), this court stated: The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life. It channels biological drives that might otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures the care and education of children in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from one generation to another; it nurtures and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free people. Since the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster and preserve marriage. ( Id. at pp. 863-864, 250 P.2d 598.)
*29 In Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d 267, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582, in rejecting the claim that persons in an unmarried cohabitant relationship that allegedly was akin to a marital relationship should be treated similarly to married persons for purposes of bringing an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, this court explained that [m]arriage is accorded [a special] degree of dignity in recognition that [t]he joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime. (46 Cal.3d at pp. 274-275, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582, italics added, quoting Nieto v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 464, 188 Cal.Rptr. 31, quoting Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106.) The court in Elden v. Sheldon further explained: Our emphasis on the state's interest in promoting the marriage relationship is not based on anachronistic notions of morality. The policy favoring marriage is rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities in organized society. [Citation.] Formally married couples are granted significant rights and bear important responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by those who cohabit without marriage .... Plaintiff does not suggest a convincing reason why cohabiting unmarried couples, who do not bear such legal obligations toward one another, should be permitted to recover for injuries to their partners to the same extent as those who undertake these responsibilities. (46 Cal.3d at p. 275, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582, italics added.)
In Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th 561, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341, 853 P.2d 507, a case in which a criminal statute that prohibited contributing to the delinquency of a minor was challenged on the ground the statute was unconstitutionally vague, this court stated: Plaintiffs emphasize the fundamental nature of the rights at stake in matters of child rearing. We need no convincing of their significance; we have already recognized that [t]he concept of personal liberties and fundamental human rights entitled to protection against overbroad intrusion or regulation by government ... extends to ... such basic civil liberties and rights not listed in the Constitution [as] the right to marry, establish a home and bring up children ...; the right to educate one's children as one chooses ...; ... and the right to privacy and to be let alone by the government in the private realm of family life. (5 Cal.3d at p. 577, 96 Cal.Rptr. 697, 488 P.2d 1.)
*30 And in Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club (1995) 10 Cal.4th 594, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 896 P.2d 776, in discussing the types of relationship that fall within the scope of the constitutionally protected right of intimate association (one component of our state constitutional right of privacy ( id. at pp. 629-630, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 896 P.2d 776)), we explained that the highly personal relationships that are sheltered by this constitutional guaranty are exemplified by those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family - marriage ..., childbirth ..., the raising and education of children ... and cohabitation with one's relatives....' ... Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one's life. (10 Cal.4th at p. 624, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 896 P.2d 776, italics added, quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 619-620, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462.) The constitutional right to marry thus may be understood as constituting a subset of the right of intimate association - a subset possessing its own substantive content and affording a distinct set of constitutional protections and guarantees.
[9] As these and many other California decisions make clear, the right to marry represents the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one's choice, and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society and to the individual.FN35
Frankly, my dear, nobody really gives a damn.
If you want to marry a woman in a private ceremony go right ahead. If you want to watch a porn flick about it go right ahead. Nobody is stopping you.
Just don't have your LIBERAL FASCIST judges force the majority of us and our children to accept your deviant ways in mainstream society.
Then take the state out of Marriage. Either its religious or its not. You can't let the state control it, and then when gays want in on it say ", oh, well its religious".
Theocracy my ass. Has the government forced you to believe in Christianity lately?
I'm sorry you don't understand the connection.
Yeah, what? You are referring to the Constitution of California?
Bigotry my ass. I'm talking about preserving the traditions and established morals of our society that have served us well for 200 years. If anyone is the bigot, it is the gay mafia gnashing its teeth at anybody with an opposing viewpoint.
Tell us how it conflicted.
Again, tell us how it conflicted.
The State Department of California .along with their flock of legal eagles.
There are two Asian-American justices (Chin and Kennard), one Hispanic justice (Moreno) and four white justices.
Six justices are Republicans (George, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Corrigan)[citation needed] and one Democrat (Moreno)[citation needed], although most of the Republicans tend to be moderate.
The justices come from principally Roman-Catholic and Protestant denominations but avoid public mention.
Once again the Court did NOT cite the supposed violation of the Constitution in this case. What exactly did the law violate? That is required unless the court is just legislating from the bench, which is illegal.
In the case of gun control the reason the law was overturned WAS cited and is there for all to see.
The Supreme Court of California overturned the ban on same-sex marriage they did not create law. They did not legislate from the bench. They overturned a law probably based on their general interpretation of the 14th amendment.
The opinion, written by Chief Justice Ronald George, cited the court's 1948 decision that reversed the state's interracial marriages ban. It found that "equal respect and dignity" of marriage is a "basic civil right" that cannot be withheld from same-sex couples, that sexual orientation is a protected class like race and gender, and that any classification or discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the California State Constitution.
How does a decision about race compare to homosexuality? Equal rights protection is there to protect condition, not behavior.As the quote reflects, the decision was based on the equal protection provisions of the California State Constitution. I am figuring they made the decision in that manner so it couldn't be overturned by the Federal Courts.
How does a decision about race compare to homosexuality? Equal rights protection is there to protect condition, not behavior.
The fact still remains these activist judges broke their covenant with the People of California...as there is nothing that actually condones gay marriage.
People don't "choose" being attracted to more than one person either. Is that also a genetic predisposition? People don't "choose" being attracted to one's sibling either. Is that also a genetic predisposition?It goes to how one views homosexuality. People don't choose homosexuality. It seems that at least in large part, it's a genetic predisposition. But we do know that people can't force themselves to be sexually attracted to the same sex (or the opposite sex) if they aren't.
Law is inherently discriminatory in nature. Nothing wrong with that. For example, we discriminate against thieves and jaywalkers. Discrimination in and of itself is not wrong. You are just throwing around a political PC word that is supposed to elicit a pavlovian response.And, I disagree. The Court protected them from a discriminatory law, which is exactly their job. I hope they do the same if someone discriminates against you by legislation one day.
