Judge Engeron should be disbarred for judicial misconduct.

[Billo_Really]

The Democrat handpicked hack judge Engeron should absolutely face disbarment along with Letitia James. The arbitrary judgements made by this nut job are so far beyond reasonable punitive damages, his conduct demands his removal from the courts. If you disagree, state why.

MSN

www.msn.com

Trump committed the fraud, not Engeron.

 

[para bellum]

Ask for a refund for your law degree.

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case establishing that a sitting President of the United States has no immunity from civil law litigation, in federal court, for acts done before taking office and unrelated to the office.

Dummy, you're the one saying James couldn't start the investigate before 2021.

You just proved yourself wrong with the case I cited.

 

[meaner gene]

No logical, reasonable thinker would equate Clarence Thomas to Engoron.

Anyone who thinks Clarence Thomas is a rational arbiter of law has never read Clarence Thomas.

Thomas often writes separate opinions (both supporting and dissenting) because his judicial logic is different from everybody else on the court.

 

[meaner gene]

Dummy, you're the one saying James couldn't start the investigate before 2021.

You just proved yourself wrong with the case I cited.

Read Clinton V Jones. The USSC only said a civil case started before the person became a sitting president can continue during his presidency.

In no way did they say a civil suit could be started against a sitting president.
Such would be the same as the DOJ OLC opinion of criminal charges started against a sitting president.

 

[meaner gene]

Dummy, you're the one saying James couldn't start the investigate before 2021.

You just proved yourself wrong with the case I cited.

the Court ruled that separation of powers does not mandate that federal courts delay all private civil lawsuits against the President until the end of his term of office.

Nothing about allowing new lawsuits to be brought during his presidency.

 

[para bellum]

Read Clinton V Jones. The USSC only said a civil case started before the person became a sitting president can continue during his presidency.

In no way did they say a civil suit could be started against a sitting president.
Such would be the same as the DOJ OLC opinion of criminal charges started against a sitting president.

Wrong

No immunity means no immunity. It was about Federal cases but there are no prohibitions against the States.

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case establishing that a sitting President of the United States has no immunity from civil law litigation, in federal court, for acts done before taking office and unrelated to the office.[1] In particular, there is no temporary immunity and thus no delay of federal cases until the President leaves office

 

[meaner gene]

Wrong

No immunity means no immunity. It was about Federal cases but there are no prohibitions against the States.

Again read Clinton V Jones (not the extracts)

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)

Clinton v. Jones: The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial requires a civil lawsuit against a current President to proceed if it is unrelated to behavior that occurred during time in office, since executive immunity does not apply.

supreme.justia.com

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

If this case were being heard in a state forum, instead of advancing a separation-of-powers argument, petitioner would presumably rely on federalism and comity concerns, 13 as well as the interest in protecting federal officials from possible local prejudice that underlies the authority to remove certain cases brought against federal officers from a state to a federal court, see 28 U. S. C. § 1442(a); Mesa v. California, 489 U. S. 121, 125-126 (1989).

 

[Lastamender]

Dems run the Senate
Remember how Republicans rammed through Trumps picks?

Remember how Obama left those positions unfilled? When you are busy destroying a country some things are overlooked.

 

[para bellum]

Again read Clinton V Jones (not the extracts)

No, it's your claim, you provide the section that contradicts the primary holding.

Primary Holding
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial requires a civil lawsuit against a current President to proceed if it is unrelated to behavior that occurred during time in office, since executive immunity does not apply.

 

[meaner gene]

No, it's your claim, you provide the section that contradicts the primary holding.

Primary Holding
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial requires a civil lawsuit against a current President to proceed if it is unrelated to behavior that occurred during time in office, since executive immunity does not apply.

I showed that Clinton V Jones ruled
States were prohibited from holding civil actions against a siting president (they must be transferred to federal court)
And the federal courts hold the president immune from federal suits for his presidential acts.

Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ... to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ... to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

 

[Dadoalex]

The Democrat handpicked hack judge Engeron should absolutely face disbarment along with Letitia James. The arbitrary judgements made by this nut job are so far beyond reasonable punitive damages, his conduct demands his removal from the courts. If you disagree, state why.

MSN

www.msn.com

Because....
BECAUSE...
BECAUSE...

Trump got his fee fees hurt,

 

[Dadoalex]

How did this guy ever pass the bar exam?

Education and a pencil.

Not surprised that you appear confused.

 

[Dadoalex]

Who needs to be compensated in this case? The banks weren't the ones suing him.

The victims are the people of new york.

AS IN

THE PEOPLE V TRUMP

 

[Dadoalex]

How so? How much money did the State lose?

It's a fine for a criminal act.
A fine, not an award based on compensatory losses, a fine.

But don't let facts interfere with your whinefest.

 

[Dadoalex]

That isn't an answer. No one lost money on the deal, the government wasn't part of the deal, and the law used was only previously applied to someone convicted of fraud or found liable for fraud in a trial.

How much money does the state lose when you speed?
None you say.
There ya go.

 

[meaner gene]

It's a fine for a criminal act.
A fine, not an award based on compensatory losses, a fine.

But don't let facts interfere with your whinefest.

Actually it wasn't a fine for the criminal acts, but a disgorgement of profits from the criminal acts.
So it wasn't an arbitrary fine, but calculated amounts that Trump avoided by submitting false business records, vs what he would have paid with truthful submissions.

 

[para bellum]

I showed that Clinton V Jones ruled
States were prohibited from holding civil actions against a siting president (they must be transferred to federal court)
And the federal courts hold the president immune from federal suits for his presidential acts.

Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ... to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land," Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ... to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

That's not what the court is saying. They are saying that when the case is brought in a federal court, there are separation of powers concerns, and they explain why they rejected Clinton's immunity claim.

If the case had been brought in a State court, the court presumed that the claim would have been based on "federalism and comity concerns", but there was no need to address that in this case.

None of that confers immunity in State courts.

 

[meaner gene]

That's not what the court is saying. They are saying that when the case is brought in a federal court, there are separation of powers concerns, and they explain why they rejected Clinton's immunity claim.

If the case had been brought in a State court, the court presumed that the claim would have been based on "federalism and comity concerns", but there was no need to address that in this case.

None of that confers immunity in State courts.

Just read the decision

Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land,"
Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has
principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed,"
Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the
interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock
v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441,
445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]
bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ...
to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

Especially the last line which clearly states:
("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ... to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

In short, state courts can't handle suits against sitting federal officials

 

[Dadoalex]

Actually it wasn't a fine for the criminal acts, but a disgorgement of profits from the criminal acts.
So it wasn't an arbitrary fine, but calculated amounts that Trump avoided by submitting false business records, vs what he would have paid with truthful submissions.

OK
A penalty based on the amount of the fraud.
Like the cost of a speeding ticket going up based on speed and location.

 

[para bellum]

Just read the decision

Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land,"
Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has
principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are "faithfully executed,"
Art. II, § 3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the
interbranch separation-of-powers questions addressed here. Cf., e. g., Hancock
v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441,
445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]
bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ...
to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

Especially the last line which clearly states:
("[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials ... to take action in derogation of their ... federal responsibilities").

In short, state courts can't handle suits against sitting federal officials

Your interpretation is nonsensical. The references are about State laws that interfere with a Federal officer doing his official duties. The State of Florida tried to interfere with the Dept of AG who was distributing fertilizer in Florida that had not been State inspected.

Florida tried to stop them, and the court said the State couldn't interfere with a Federal officer doing his official duties.

That is not an injunction against civil suits against a President (or other Federal officer) for conduct outside of official acts.

The last line that you bolded is just how Tribe put it. No State can command a federal officer to take action derogatory to his official duties.