Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Because, of course, a propagandist for RedState has been right so often over the past eight years.
Don't you wingnuts get it??? YOU FAILED!!!
Because, of course, a propagandist for RedState has been right so often over the past eight years.
Don't you wingnuts get it??? YOU FAILED!!!
Because, of course, a propagandist for RedState has been right so often over the past eight years.
Don't you wingnuts get it??? YOU FAILED!!!
Because, of course, a propagandist for RedState has been right so often over the past eight years.
Don't you wingnuts get it??? YOU FAILED!!!
and that somehow gives Obama a pass to fail also ? Cmon Jillian. Nuff of the partisan crap.
Because, of course, a propagandist for RedState has been right so often over the past eight years.
Don't you wingnuts get it??? YOU FAILED!!!
Because, of course, a propagandist for RedState has been right so often over the past eight years.
Don't you wingnuts get it??? YOU FAILED!!!
In the absence of any changes in policy, CBO projects
that the economy will produce about $1 trillion less output
per year than its estimated potential in each of 2009
and 2010 and significantly less than its potential in 2011
and 2012 as well (see Figure 12). The unemployment rate
is forecast to rise above 9 percent by early next year.
Many economists believe that a stimulative fiscal policy
(that is, an increase in spending or reduction in taxes
designed to foster faster economic growth in the short
run) is desirable under the current economic conditions.
Recessions are characterized by a self-reinforcing cycle—
firms cut production and employment because of a
shock, such as a falloff in sales—and the resulting reduction
in income and confidence among workers leads
them to reduce purchases, and sales fall even further. Fiscal
stimulus may dampen that cycle by increasing spending
by households, businesses, or governments. Some
degree of fiscal stimulus is automatic in a recession, as
lower incomes mean lower taxes and increased spending
for unemployment insurance benefits and nutrition assistance
(as described on page 4). Additional stimulus can
be provided through tax cuts or transfer payments (such
as expanded unemployment insurance) or by direct purchases
of goods and services by the federal government or
state and local governments.
Another significant source of economic stimulus is monetary
policy. The Federal Reserve has provided substantial
monetary stimulus, but with the financial sector in such
turmoil and a broad lack of confidence in the economy,
easing the availability of credit may not be enough to
both stabilize the financial system and provide a significant
boost to economic activity.
The uncertainty of the economic outlook suggests
another possible justification for a stimulative fiscal policy.
The problems in financial markets could be worse
than CBO’s forecast anticipates, and, as a result, the
economy could experience a more protracted period of
recession and subpar growth than indicated by that forecast.
An effective fiscal stimulus could serve as an insurance
policy against that risk.
In general, fiscal stimulus policies are most effective if
they are timely, cost-effective, and consistent with longrun
budget objectives:
B
The timeliness of fiscal stimulus is critical. Ideally, the
economic effects of the stimulus should match the
period of economic weakness.
•
The timing of the economic effects of fiscal stimulus
will depend both on when the policies are
enacted and when the policies affect spending by
consumers, firms, and governments. When a recession
is already under way and aggregate demand is
declining, the most effective stimulus policy would
be one that was enacted rapidly and that would
affect spending quickly; otherwise, the policy
would risk postponing stimulative effects until the
economy was already recovering.
•
A fiscal stimulus that continues after the period
of economic weakness runs the risk of causing
higher inflation and interest rates. (That period,
however, could encompass some time after the
recession when the economy may still be producing
well below its potential output.) But a fiscal
stimulus that ends before the economy has started
to regain its footing runs the risk of exacerbating
that weakness when the stimulus ends.
B
A desirable stimulus policy should increase aggregate
demand as much as possible for a given budgetary
cost; that is, it should be cost-effective.
•
The most cost-effective policies would provide
additional resources to the households, firms, or
governments most likely to use them for additional
purchases of goods and services. Different policies
that might be included in a stimulus package differ
widely in this respect.
•
Efforts to push out spending too quickly may
result in a less well considered or less efficient use
of taxpayers’ money.
•
Policies that accelerate costs that the government
will ultimately incur in any event (for example,
delaying tax liabilities or accelerating planned
spending) would have little net cost but might provide
economic benefits.
B
It is desirable that efforts at short-term fiscal stimulus
not significantly exacerbate the nation’s long-run
fiscal imbalance.
•
Policies that may be desirable and beneficial in the
short term may or may not be beneficial in addressing
the nation’s long-term fiscal challenges.
•
Fiscal stimulus adds to the federal debt, already a
concern in the light of growing demands on the
federal budget from the aging of the baby boomers
and, especially, from the rising cost of health care.
For every $100 billion in additional federal debt,
future taxpayers will probably have to pay about $5
billion a year in interest costs.
•
Large and persistent federal deficits tend to slow
economic growth in the long term. They reduce
the national saving rate and capital accumulation
and thereby slow the growth of the economy’s
capacity to produce.
•
Spending and tax policies that enhance future productive
capacity offset some of the potential
adverse long-run effects of the additional debt associated
with short-term stimulus.
•
A large increase in debt poses risks. At some point
investors here and abroad might decide that they
have enough Treasury securities in their portfolios:
From then on, they might continue to purchase
those securities only if offered higher interest rates.
The accumulation of Treasury debt risks the possibility
that, in some future financial crisis, investors
might not “flee to quality” by buying U.S. Treasury
securities but would instead purchase some other
assets, leaving the government with less flexibility
or much higher costs for dealing with such a
situation.
•
Finally, spending or tax changes intended to be
temporary may be difficult to reverse later.
The size of the effects of fiscal stimulus on the economy is
quite uncertain and subject to considerable debate among
economists. Some argue, for example, that last summer’s
fiscal stimulus had little effect; others argue that it had a
more significant effect. But there is generally little dispute
that spending increases or tax cuts would increase GDP
in the short run under the current circumstances.
Did it REALLY say that?
Or is this just more REPUBLICAN SPIN?
This from the REPORT, itself...
source
I don't know about you guys, but what I read from the above is basically this:
Done well, it might help. Done badly it might hurt.
Well no shit, sherlock!
How many fucking years does one have to study economics to understand that?
The more economic forcasts I read, the more I think that our economists are the astrologers of our age.
Revered by kings as wise pronosticators of the future and completely and totally full of shit.
Nobody knows nuttin, folks.
The genuiuses are all flying by the seat of their pants and praying that they have a clue.