Morning in (racist Rethuglican) America: an intentionalist perspective
On his Morning in America radio show a few days back, Bill Bennettin the context of responding to a caller whod suggested that making abortion illegal would create more workers 20 years hencesaid:
But I do know that its true that if you wanted to reduce crime, you couldif that were your sole purpose, you could abort every black baby in this country, and your crime rate would go down. That would be an impossible, ridiculous, and morally reprehensible thing to do, but your crime rate would go down.
Predictably, the race baiters sprung immediately into action, and, instead of trying to understand Bennetts point (which has nothing to do with anything inherent to blacksand in fact, is an argument for just the opposite), decided instead to seize upon the remarks robbed of their context and intent to charge Bennett with racism and demand an apology. (For the record, Bennett was merely referencing Freakonomics, which posits the hypothesis that falling crimes rates are related to increased abortion rates decades agoa position which I take it he rejects).
Sadly, prominent Democratic leaders, pundits and lawmakers have spearheaded this smear campaign, which I suspect they see as merely one more move in the give and take of the political game; because I refuse to believe that they actually believe Bennett is racist (although some likely do), and so are instead playing gotcha by putting him on the defensive to force him to defend remarks that they know had no racist intent. Its as if because his words, taken out of context, can, to the uninformed, be taken to mean something they were never intended to mean, his words are therefore useful insofar as they can be deployed to cause him public discomfortand, by extension, to taint the whole of the Republican party by association.
And the White House, increasingly incapable of taking a principled stand, provides these disingenuous race baiters with coverpresumably still reeling from the last round of disingenuous race baiting, which came in guise of Hurricane outrage.
None of this, given our partisan culture, is unexpected. But what gives these calculated and malicious rhetorical and performative ploys their political force is twofold: first, the willingness (in this case on the part of Democrats and the press, and now, the White House) to consider Bennetts remarks outside of their argumentative context; and second, the idea that Bennetts words are still his beyond his intent to use them in a certain waywhich simply echoes the old Judith Butler axiom that actions continue to act after
the intentional subject has announced its completion, which, while true, is nevertheless incidental, and becomes dangerous as an assertion when interpretation is released from the ground of appealing back to the speakers intent. That is, what is at stake here is the role the subject plays in the meaning of the act vs. the role played by contingency in giving that act its (subsequent) meaning(s)or, to put it more specifically, what William Bennett meant vs. what his words can be made to look like they might meanby those in whose interests it is to damage him. In short, they are taking ownership of his words, resignifying them, then using that resignification to taint Bennett with the charge of racism.
All of which takes us back, of course, to our discussions of Allah in the swirly cone, the Flight 93 Memorial, and Captain Eds use of articulate. Many of Bennetts critics dont particularly care what he meant. Instead, they care that what he said can be shown to mean something other than what he meant if its removed from context and resignifiedthough they will then turn around and argue that he really did mean his comments to carry a racist component (either consciously or unconsciously). Others will argue that, even if Bennett didnt intend his argument to carry a racialist component (beyond using it as a hypothetical to make a moral point), he nevertheless should have known that some people would interpret his comments incorrectly, and so should have been more circumspect in making them.
The first argument is linguistically sound insofar as it ascribes to Bennett a particular intent; the second argument is linguistically corrupt, in that argues for some inherent meaning in the signifierthat the marks mean something beyond some intention to turn them into language by providing signification.
In this case, most of the criticism seems to me to be linguistically sound, though interpretively sloppy (and, in many cases, intentionally so). Because a fair, rigorous, and judicious reading of Bennetts comments in their original context suggest he is arguing that, for any number of reasonsfrom a history of racial divisiveness to poverty to the crutch of the welfare state to failures in public educationblacks are, statistically-speaking, more likely to commit crime (in Bennetts reading of crime statistics; others would argue that blacks are more likely to be targeted by law enforcement. But for our purposes, it is important that we understand Bennetts premises). And from that premise, he suggests that, if a society wanted a pragmatic and morally untenable way to reduce crime, it could begin aborting those more statistically likely to commit crime. But doing so would be morally untenable precisely because the procedure would also eliminate a lot more people who wouldnt, statistically speaking, fall prey to the criminal lifestyle; and so in order to correct a complex statistical issue in a way that is pragmatically expedient, society would be sanctioning something that is morally repugnant.
But why bring up race in the first place?
Well, as Bennett himself tells ABC News Jake Tapper:
"There was a lot of discussion about race and crime in New Orleans, Bennett said. There was discussion a lot of it wrong but nevertheless, media jumping on stories about looting and shooting and gangs and roving gangs and so on.
Theres no question this is on our minds, Bennett said. What I do on our show is talk about things that people are thinking
we dont hesitate to talk about things that are touchy.
Bennett said, Im sorry if people are hurt, I really am. But we cant say this is an area of American life (and) public policy that were not allowed to talk about race and crime."
And Bennett is precisely right: fear of being branded a racist simply should not keep us from discussing racial issuesthough that is precisely the practical effect in a culture where the levelling of such charges is easy and carries with it almost no consequences for the person doing the accusing, even if the accusation is made in bad faith, or is based on the flimsiest of pretenses.
Still, as it becomes more and more apparent that Bennetts argument was manifestly not informed by racism, however, and that his critics intitial interpretations appealed to an intent on Bennetts part that they incorrectly gauged I expect they will begin shifting their condemnation toward the linguistically corrupt notion that the signifier, divorced from intent, is nevertheless the responsibility of the utterer. And indeed, such a procedure is already underway:
Robert George, an African-American, Republican editorial writer for the New York Post, agrees that Bennetts comments were not meant as racist. But he worries they feed into stereotypes of Republicans as insensitive. His overall point about not making broad sociological claims and so forth, that was a legitimate point, George said. But it seems to me someone with Bennetts intelligence
should know better the impact of his words and sort of thinking these things through before he speaks."
Like scratch before him, George argues that, because other people could potentially misinterpret Bennetts meaning, Bennett himself should have been more careful in choosing his words. And such an argument effectively gives the interpreter power over the grounds of interpretation and relativizes language.
But what would Robert Georgeand scratch, and all those who argue for the primacy of the signifiersay if I were to seize upon their linguistic position to argue that, for instance, a rape victim should have known better than to wear a low cut blouse, or that a Muslim who was accosted should have known better than to wander into an area heavily effected by the 911 attacks...?
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update: To their credit, both Matt Yglesias and Brad Delong defend Bennett.
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update 2: For those of you who wish to dismiss this kerfuffle as the consequence of a soundbite culture about which Bennett, as a political pro, needs to be more cognizant, let me remind you that the way we find ourselves in a soundbite culture to begin with is that weve traded context and original intent for brevity and the kind of resignification that comes when an editor decides what to show us is representative of an original utterance. Part of this is the nature of the media beast; which is why it is so important that we be able to trust those who are doing the initial interpreting for us.
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update 3: John Cole has more. Be sure to read his comments, where youll find every conceivable justification for calling Bennett a racist, most of which boil down to, because deep inside he probably is, being a Rethuglican and all.
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update 4: For a more thorough and thoughtful critique of Bennett (including a critique of my position), see David Schraub.
I think Schraub is wrongfor one thing, his argument proceeds from the idea that, because Bennett could have chosen other social groups besides blacks to make his same point (eg., aborting males or poor whites would likewise reduce crime), that he chose blacks bespeaks a tendency to reify certain unflattering associations between race and crime at the expense of pointing out just how unexceptional the association is; but it is contextually far more likely, at least from my reading of the argument, that he chose that particular example to heighten the moral hideousness of the premise, and history has taught us associate extermination with race or tribe rather than gender or social class. From a rhetorical standpoint, then, Jews would have carried the most associative weight, but that particular group doesnt fit the remainder of the analogys terms.
Because Bennetts argument is more to do with a type of statistics-based, morally reprehensible pragmatism than it is about race and criminality per se, the association that Schraub foregrounds is less important to Bennett than his desire to make the moral point most forcefully. Or, to put it more succinctly, Schraub says Bennett was racially insensitive; I say he was rhetorically forceful. And my argument is that Bennett intended his argument to be understood as such.
Posted by Jeff Goldstein @ 01:44 PM