My debit card and checkbook both involve reserves.
Mmmmm....toast and milk.
One could also use the same logic with dollar bills. Personal "reserves" isn't quite the same thing.
Hmmm... still hungry and thirsty
Personal "reserves" isn't quite the same thing.
Bank reserves, not personal reserves.
oh?? Did it cause the depression it was designed to avoid? What is the evidence of a mistake???
- It didn't do much of anything.
you mean banks were not happy to get rid of toxic securities??
- First, nice non sequitur.
Second, the Fed wasn't buying securities which were "toxic". They bought Treasuries, which are basically riskless, and MBS, which weren't toxic. These were GSE securities, and quite safe. The issue is that they were hard to valuate.
Third, the reason QE didn't do much of anything is that it had no objective which was ever achieved. Initially, the objective was to prevent deflation. Then the objective morphed into "freeing up bank lending".
Krugman believed that QE would be inflationary, but that's because he doesn't understand how banking works. He can't be bothered to learn. QE results in the creation of reserves, which Krugman believes enables banks to lend. He could have asked Greenspan when he came up with the idea, and Greenspan would have told him "uhm no, Paul. Fail. Banks can't lend reserves nor can they leverage them into loans".
By the time of QE 1, Bernanke of course knew that about banks, but hoped that a truly massive program might have some marginal effect. Did it? Who knows?
Bernanke then refined his theory, believing that the cleanup of the banks' balance sheets would make them more comfortable lending (the "wealth effect"), but recognized, again, that even a truly massive program would have only weak effects. And true to form, it did. Bank lending is better predicted by a whole host of factors other than QE.
So no effect - except, perhaps, for some unintended ones which Bernanke either didn't think about or figured were acceptable risks.
We have had an amazing recovery in capital and financial markets, but that has zip to do with the creation of reserves by QE. It MAY partially have been caused by a shortage of Treasuries and rMBS created by QE. Shortages drive up prices, and one expects arbitrage effects. Or, maybe the asset boom just reflects a continuing lack of opportunities in real markets. Hard to say.
And finally, QE may have been counterproductive in two ways. First, the shortage of Treasuries created demand for other sorts of substitute securities, and we should have learned from 2008 that those sorts of substitutes can be, well, systemically risky. And we HAVE seen a ballooning of those sorts of products, and it may trace back to QE. It's even possible, though I'm not going to bet on it, that the uptick we've seen in forward fails after QE may have been a result of a shortage of short-term funding tools, which may have been created or exacerbated by QE.
Second, the loss of all of those Treasuries from private markets removed all of that interest income from the private sector as well. Removing income from the private sector is essentially the same as raising taxes - probably not what we needed to be doing.