Hawk1981
VIP Member
- Apr 1, 2020
- 209
- 270
- 73
President Nixon's trip to China in 1972 was so unlikely and dramatic that the expression "Nixon Goes to China" has become a political metaphor. Nixon was arguably the only United States politician at the time who had the 'Cold Warrior', right-wing, advocate of Taiwan, and anti-communist credentials who could get away with such a bold move.
Early in his administration, Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, had discussed pursuing the idea of rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since the 1940s the United States had only recognized the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan as being the legitimate Chinese government. The PRC and the United States had fought during the Korean conflict and the US policy was to contain the mainland Chinese and curtail their influence.
In 1971, United States foreign relations was in a rut. The mainland Chinese were isolated and hostile, the Russians were rebuffing overtures to meet and the war in Vietnam was stalemated, with the North Vietnamese unwilling to change their negotiating stance and the American people turning against supporting the conflict. Meeting with the PRC offered a number of tantalizing possibilities.
A thaw in relations with mainland China could provide flexibility on the world scene and add leverage in the relationship with the Soviet Union. If the relationships with the PRC and the Soviets were handled tactfully and care was taken not to turn Russia into a more bitter enemy, the meeting with the Chinese could stir up enough Russian paranoia that was already on edge from recent border conflicts with the Chinese, that could lead to better relations with the Soviet Union. Most importantly, better relations with the People's Republic and the Soviet Union could convince them that their interests were more in common with the US and leverage would be brought on North Vietnam to conclude a settlement that would allow the US to extricate itself from the conflict.
There were risks for the US and for the PRC. Taiwan and their "China Lobby" friends in the US would never be happy with an agreement with the PRC and the likelihood of eventual recognition over the claims of Taiwan. Negotiations without consulting the Japanese was not viewed favorably in Tokyo. The PRC needed to mollify both the North Vietnamese who felt betrayed, and the concerns of the North Koreans who would begin their slide into deeper isolation.
Early in his administration, Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, had discussed pursuing the idea of rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since the 1940s the United States had only recognized the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan as being the legitimate Chinese government. The PRC and the United States had fought during the Korean conflict and the US policy was to contain the mainland Chinese and curtail their influence.
In 1971, United States foreign relations was in a rut. The mainland Chinese were isolated and hostile, the Russians were rebuffing overtures to meet and the war in Vietnam was stalemated, with the North Vietnamese unwilling to change their negotiating stance and the American people turning against supporting the conflict. Meeting with the PRC offered a number of tantalizing possibilities.
A thaw in relations with mainland China could provide flexibility on the world scene and add leverage in the relationship with the Soviet Union. If the relationships with the PRC and the Soviets were handled tactfully and care was taken not to turn Russia into a more bitter enemy, the meeting with the Chinese could stir up enough Russian paranoia that was already on edge from recent border conflicts with the Chinese, that could lead to better relations with the Soviet Union. Most importantly, better relations with the People's Republic and the Soviet Union could convince them that their interests were more in common with the US and leverage would be brought on North Vietnam to conclude a settlement that would allow the US to extricate itself from the conflict.
There were risks for the US and for the PRC. Taiwan and their "China Lobby" friends in the US would never be happy with an agreement with the PRC and the likelihood of eventual recognition over the claims of Taiwan. Negotiations without consulting the Japanese was not viewed favorably in Tokyo. The PRC needed to mollify both the North Vietnamese who felt betrayed, and the concerns of the North Koreans who would begin their slide into deeper isolation.