In her book Unprotected Palestinians in Egypt Since 1948(2009), Dr. Oroub el-Abed highlights Egyptās dual view of the Palestinians:
Starting from the signing of the armistice agreement in February 1949, Egypt had two ādistinctā Palestinian populations under its control: the small population that had managed to remain in Egypt proper, and the population of the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, massively expanded by an influx of more than 200,000 refugees from elsewhere in Palestine. The premise of separateness was to have considerable influence on Egyptian policy toward both communities.
Hinting at Egyptās reluctance to embrace the refugees in the Gaza Strip, El-Abed notes:
There had been no question of granting Egyptian citizenship to Palestinians, so there was never any question of Egyptās annexing the Gaza Strip, as Jordan had done with the West Bank.
The Gaza Initiative was discussed in an academic article by Jacob Tovy (2003) and later by Shlomo Nakdimon in Haaretz(July 2014), but the topic has never drawn much attention in Israel, in the Arab world, or among the Palestinians.
The most comprehensive survey of the initiative was done by Neil Caplan in his series of books, Futile Diplomacy (1997). Caplan considered the plan from the American, Israeli, and Egyptian perspectives. He had access to scores of official protocols and diplomatic cables and his approach was objective and balanced.
The key player behind the Gaza Initiative was Mark Erthridge, the US representative on the PCC (the Palestine Conciliation Commission), who provided the international umbrella at the Lausanne talks. The official Israeli position was that āshould the annexation to the state of the Gaza Strip with all its inhabitants be proposed, our answer will be positive.ā Israel made a concrete proposal to the PCC on May 20, 1949 that focused on taking over the Gaza Strip, thereby making a ānotable contribution towards [a] solution [of the] refugee problem.ā
On June 4, the State Department informed the US delegation at Lausanne that the American government would approve the incorporation of Gaza into Israel as part of a final territorial settlement with Egypt, provided this could be achieved by negotiation with and the full consent of the Egyptian government and provided territorial compensation was made to Egypt according to the Presidentās formula (the āJessup principleā) if Egypt desired it.
(full article online)
Lessons from the Failed āGaza Initiativeā of 1949