P F Tinmore, et al,
That is a matter of interpretation. You do not have a "valid position." There cannot be an opposition to something that doesn't exist.
OK but, The Treaty of Lausanne, the LoN Covenant, and mandate documents place the inhabitants in primary concern. The rights of inhabitants have been reiterated in subsequent UN resolutions.
I think you are grasping at straws. I don't see a valid opposition to my position.
(COMMENT)
Nowhere does it say that the "inhabitants are a
primary concern." The establishment of the Jewish National Home had equal weight to the limited civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine of the first decade to the 20th Century. Nowhere does it say that primary goal was to grant the Arab inhabitants of Palestine independence. Over three-quarters of the original territory designated as territory to which the Mandate would apply went to the establishment of Arab autonomy and then independence.
It should be noted that while the establishment of the "Jewish National Home," and "self-governing institution are mentioned specifically, only the undefined notion of civil and religious rights are mentioned concerning the inhabitants. The question is: what were the defined civil and religious rights of the day?
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United Nations: Political History of Palestine under British Administration
3. The principal obligations of the mandatory Power are defined in Article 2 of the Mandate, which reads as follows:
"The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion."
This Article appears to give equal weight to three obligations: (i) the creation of conditions which would secure the establishment of the Jewish national home; (ii) the creation of conditions which would secure the development of self-governing institutions; and (iii) the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants.
The principle difference rested in the fact that the Arab Palestinians refused to cooperation at all with the Mandate Government from the beginning to the end. And, the Arab Palestinian refused to participate. Thus any "imbalance" was in part a responsibility of the Arab Palestinian who resisted and rejected the notion of participating in the general administration of the territory.
22. Later in l923, a third attempt was made to establish an institution through which the Arab population of Palestine could be brought into cooperation with the government. The mandatory Power now proposed "the establishment of an Arab Agency in Palestine which will occupy a position exactly analogous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency". The Arab Agency would have the right to be consulted on all matters relating to immigration, on which it was recognised that "the views of the Arab community were entitled to special consideration". The Arab leaders declined that this offer on the ground that it would not satisfy the aspirations of the Arab people. They added that, never having recognised the status of the Jewish Agency, they had no desire for the establishment of an Arab Agency on the same basis.
"The British Government desired to establish a self-government in Palestine, but to proceed in this direction by stages؟. It had been announced that the nominated Advisory Council was to be the first stage. The second stage would have been a Legislative Council without an Arab majority. If this worked satisfactorily, the third stage, after a lapse of perhaps same years, would have been a constitution on more democratic lines."
In practice it proved impossible even to initiate this policy of gradual constitutional development. From 1922 until the present day, the High Commissioner has governed Palestine with the aid of Councils consisting exclusively of British officials.
The Palestinians wanted ALL of the remainder of the Territory under Mandate west of the Jordan River.
88. In these circumstances the maintenance of the Mandate would mean the indefinite continuance of unrest and disturbance. The Commission therefore recommended that His Majesty's Government should take steps to terminate the Mandate and to partition the country in such a way as to create an independent Jewish State in the north and west, and to incorporate most of the remaining territory in Trans-Jordan.
"Manifestly", the Commission wrote, "the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want. The answer to the question 'which of them in the end will govern Palestine?' must surely be 'Neither.' We do not think that any fair-minded statesman would suppose, now that the hope of harmony between the races has proved untenable, that Britain ought either to hand over to Arab rule 400,000 Jews, whose entry into Palestine has been for the most part facilitated by the British Government and approved by the League of Nations; or that, if the Jews should become a majority, a million or so of Arabs should be handed over to their rule. But, while neither race can justly rule all Palestine, we see no reason why, if it were practicable, each race should not rule part of it."
That really only left one solution that looked viable at the time; the "two-state solution" by partition.
The First Monthly Progress Report of the UN-appointed Palestine Commission, charged with helping put Resolution 181 into effect was submitted to the Security Council (A/AC.21/7). Implementation of Resolution 181 hinged not only on the five member states appointed to represent the UN (Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, Philippines) and Great Britain, but first and foremost on the participation of the
two sides who were invited to appoint representatives. The Commission then reported:
“The invitation extended by the [181] resolution was promptly accepted by the Government of the United Kingdom and by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, both of which designated representatives to assist the commission. … As regards the Arab Higher Committee, the following telegraphic response was received by the Secretary-General on 19 January:
ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE IS DETERMINED PRESIST [PERSIST] IN REJECTION PARTITION AND IN REFUSAL RECOGNIZE UN[O] RESOLUTION THIS RESPECT AND ANYTHING DERIVING THEREFROM [THERE FROM]. FOR THESE REASONS IT IS UNABLE [TO] ACCEPT [THE] INVITATION."
The UN Palestine Commission’s February 16, 1948 report (A/AC.21/9) to the Security Council noted that Arab-led hostilities were an effort
“To prevent the implementation of the [General] Assembly’s plan of partition, and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including armed incursions into Palestinian territory.”
On May 17, 1948 – after the invasion began, the Palestine Commission designed to implement 181 adjourned
sine die [Latin: without determining a date] after the General Assembly appointed a United Nations Mediator in Palestine, which relieves the United Nations Palestine Commission from the further exercise of its responsibilities.
I am not at all grasping at straws. I am certainly not without history demonstrating the "intent" to create a Jewish National Home by the fact that it did happen, it was admitted to the UN and still exists today ad a stand alone, self-governing, nation that has successfully defended it independence several times. The Hostile Arab Palestinians that took the solemn oath to pursue the armed struggle and reject peace, cannot say the same even though they had the near exact same opportunities.
Most Respectfully,
R