You realize you just destroyed your argument that 95% is good enough, right?
From the same report:
To ensure that a new system will achieve or surpass its safety requirement, it should be designed and tested to do so with a statistical confidence level of 95%.
Why ED, you snivelling little bastard, you cherry pick your sources just like old fraud. Here is the WHOLE reference you twit. I highlighted the part you chose not to include to illustrate your pisstardedness. You will notice fellow readers that edthecynic, lying POS,
deleted the section that says
"at least as high as the Space ShuttleÂ’s, yielding a predicted probability of 0.999 or better for crew survival during ascent"
That my dear edthecynic lying pisstard is a 99%CL.
The Columbia accident, the selection of a booster for the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), and NASAÂ’s recently renewed interest in exploring beyond low Earth orbit have led the Astronaut Office to reexamine its views on launch system safety. Although flying in space will always involve some measure of risk, it is our consensus that an order-of-magnitude reduction in the risk of loss of human life during ascent, compared to the Space Shuttle, is both achievable with current technology and consistent with NASAÂ’s focus on steadily improving rocket reliability, and should therefore represent a minimum safety benchmark
for future systems. To reach that target, the Astronaut Office offers the following recommendations.
The Astronaut Office recommends that
the next human-rated launch system add abort or escape systems to a booster with
ascent reliability at least as high as
the Space ShuttleÂ’s, yielding a predicted probability of 0.999 or better
for crew survival during ascent.
The system should be designed to achieve or exceed its reliability requirement with 95% confidence.
The Astronaut Office recommends that
new human-rated launch vehicle programs follow guidelines, such as those given in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report and NASAÂ’s Human Rating Requirements (NPG 8705), for safety-conscious management, requirements definition, concept development, and design selection.
The Astronaut Office recommends that NASA specify and maintain a set of formal, standardized, complete methods and processes to be used in predicting the reliability of human-rated spacecraft, and identify or create an independent body to verify those analyses.
The Astronaut Office recommends that the test program
for the next human-rated launch system demonstrate its reliability through vigorous ground and flight testing of components and systems. The value of each test should be leveraged by proving a safe envelope larger than that expected during operations and by using flight data to validate system reliability models. After completion of the formal test program, the vigilance applied during testing to data gathering, analysis, and flight constraints should continue to be applied during operations. Reliability should be continuously reassessed.
The Astronaut Office believes that the next human-rated spacecraft must include a robust full-envelope abort or escape system. The safety of the overall system depends on the reliability of both the booster and the abort or escape system. As with the rocket itself, the abort or escape system reliability must be proven through flight testing.